Karnataka High Court
Vijaya Bank Employees Housing ... vs Muneerappa on 15 November, 1990
Equivalent citations: ILR1990KAR4179, 1990(2)KARLJ513
Author: S. Mohan
Bench: S. Mohan
ORDER Mohan, C.J.
1. The lands forming the subject matter, spread over in Survey Nos. 115/7, 115/8, 115/9 and 115/10 as well as Survey Nos. 116/4, 116/5, 116/6 and 116/7 of Bilekahalli village, came to be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (Central Act No. 1 of 1894) by the State of Karnataka for a public purpose. The beneficiary is the complainant (Vijaya Bank Employees Housing Co-operative Society Ltd). These acquisition proceedings were challenged by Muneerappa, the respondent herein, before this Court by way of a Writ Petition in W.P.No. 14940 of 1985. That Writ Petition came to be dismissed along with other petitions which also questioned the validity of the acquisition proceedings on 30-6-1987. Against the said Judgment, W.A.No. 1411 of 1987 was filed. That was also dismissed by this Court on 30-5-1988. The matter was taken up to the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 2323 of 1988. The possession of the lands was handed over to the complainant-Society on 1-10-1988. A notification under Section 16(2) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was issued and published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 24-11-1988. This will clearly establish that the property had vested in the Society free from all encumbrances in terms of Section 16(2).
While the matter stood thus, the respondent-accused filed O.S.No. 5579 of 1988 on the file of the learned City Civil Judge, (CCH-17), Bangalore. The prayer in that suit was for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the schedule lands of the respondent--accused. An ex parte interim order was passed directing the parties to maintain the status-quo. Thereupon, the complainant before us who was a defendant in the suit filed an application for vacating that interim order. A written statement was also filed opposing the prayer for Injunction in the suit. The suit as well as the petition to vacate the stay were adjourned from time to time and the order of status-quo was extended repeatedly. This led the complainant to file M.F.A.No. 755 of 1989 before this Court. This Court by an order dated 28-7-1989 set aside the order passed by the trial Court and allowed the appeal.
Thereafter O.S.No. 1773 of 1990 was filed by the accused before the City Civil Judge (CCH-22), Bangalore, for injunction. Strangely, to that suit the complainant-Society was not made a party. However, the office bearers and the Contractors of the complainant-Society were made parties. Here again an ex parte order of injunction was passed. The defendants entered appearance and filed their counter and prayed for vacating the interim order. It is under these circumstances, the present complaint has been preferred for initiating action under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Article 215 of the Constitution of India.
2. A statement of objection has been preferred by the accused stating that there is no cause of action for filing this complaint. He is a poor agriculturist who had been deprived of his land and thereby he became destitute. He ekes out his livelihood solely by doing agricultural operations of these lands. He had been approaching judicial forum seeking justice which only shows the respect and faith he had in the Judiciary. The acquisition of lands by the Society has always been the matter of public concern and criticism. It is by virtue of the money power the Society has been successfully influencing the bureaucracy.
As far as the accused is concerned, he has been resisting the acquisition at every stage. Even today he is in possession of the lands. The actual possession was never handed over. May be some records might have been created to that effect.
3. Mr. P. Vishwanatha Shetty, learned Counsel for the complainant, relying on the decision in ADVOCATE-GENERAL, STATE OF BIHAR v. MADHYA PRADESH KHAIR INDUSTRIES 1980(3) SOC 311 would submit that where a party files suit after suit and application after application, to somehow thwart the benefits of the Judgment obtained by the Society, it is nothing more than abuse of process of Court. This is only to circumvent the orders of this Court and that of the Supreme Court. The object is to defeat the fruits of those orders and to render them nugatory. Therefore, action must be taken against the accused for Contempt of Court under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
4. Mr. A.K. Subbaiah, learned Counsel for the accused, would submit that here is no mala fide in a party even if he is misguided in trying to secure the justice at the hands of the Court. He further submitted that unless and until permission is obtained from the Advocate General under Section 15, no question of criminal contempt would arise. Lastly, it is submitted that it is not the case of the complainant that there is any disobedience of any order and therefore no question of contempt would arise.
5. In order to appreciate the respective contentions, we must find out whether there is an abuse of process of Court. Such an abuse undoubtedly would constitute contempt of Court as held by the Supreme Court in . While examining the scope of criminal contempt within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, their Lordships pointed out as follows:-
"Abuse of the process of the Court calculated to hamper the due courses of a judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justice is a Contempt of Court."
Their Lordships further pointed out as follows:
"In considering whether the action of the accused amounted to Contempt of Court, the Court must take into, account the whole course of the continuing contumacious conduct of the accused from the very beginning."
Their Lordships also pointed out:
"Application after application was thereafter filed before the same single Judge, everyone of them being designed to circumvent, defeat or nullify the effect of the orders of the Division Benches of that High Court as well as the High Court having the jurisdiction of the case. Every application was a daring 'raid' on the Court and each was an abuse of the process of the Court, calculated to obstruct the due course of a judicial proceedings and the administration of justice which amounted to criminal contempt of Court,"
6. It is in this background we propose to examine this complaint. It is not denied and in fact it is undeniable that the accused preferred a Writ Petition challenging the land acquisition proceedings. That ended against him. W.A.No. 1411 of 1987 was dismissed. The Supreme Court dismissed Civil Appeal No. 2323 of 1988 confirming the Judgment of this Court by an order dated 11-8-1988. Therefore, we take it the highest Court in the land had expressed its opinion that the land acquisition proceedings are valid. The matter did not stop there. The possession of the schedule lands was taken by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 29-9-1988 and the same was handed over on 1-10-1933. Evidencing this, a notification under Section 16(2) of the Act was published on 24-11-1988. That states:
That puts beyond doubt that the lands vested free from all encumbrances in the complainant-Society. If this be the true position, it is rather impossible to conceive that the accused could still contend that he is in possession of the properties. He filed O.S.No. 5579 of 1988 seeking for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession. How such a suit came to be filed is hard to guess. When the order of status-quo was passed, that was successfully questioned in M.F.A.No. 755 of 1989 by the complainant. After all this, another suit comes to be filed in O.S.No. 1773 of 1990. There again, the same prayer was made, but, strangely without impleading the Society as party-defendant. In that suit, only the office bearers and the contractors were made parties. This ingenuity is something very hard to appreciate. There again, an ex parte order was obtained. These attempts, in our view, namely filing suit after suit and application after application could not but be characterised as daring raid on the Court and an abuse of the process of the Court. To use the words of the ruling of the Supreme Court in , they are undoubtedly calculated to obstruct the due course of a judicial proceeding. The facts in the decision cited above are more or less the same. In the present case, it is worse. After the Supreme Court has rendered a decision, we do not know how the accused go to the Civil Court not only to circumvent the Judgment which is a Judgment of the highest Court and is binding on Civil Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. It even amounts to harass and oppress the other side. Therefore, we hold that there are no bona fides in the filing of the suit.
7. As regards the second submission of Mr. Subbaiah that the Advocate General's permission is required to initiate criminal contempt, we are not persuaded to accept the same because Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act enables this Court to take action on its own motion (suo motu).
8. The filing of the suit cannot be got away with on the ground that there is no disobedience of any order. It is not mere disobedience, but as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the above ruling, even abuse of process of the Court would amount to contempt of Court within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act. Therefore, where the action of the accused is calculated to obstruct the due courses of a judicial proceeding and the administration of justice, it would amount to criminal contempt of Court. We do not have even a formal apology of the accused in the statement of objections. Therefore, we hold that the accused is guilty of contempt of Court.
9. In the result, having regard to the old age of the accused, we sentence him to pay a fine of Rs, 1,000/-, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two weeks.
10. We hereby direct that O.S.Nos. 5579 of 1988 and 1773 of 1990 shall stand transferred to the 17th Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, who shall take up the matter at once and dispose them off on merits by 31st of December 1990. The interim applications in these suits shall be taken up and disposed of on or before 30th of November 1990.