Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs S. Surya Prakash Reddy And Ors. on 5 June, 2006
Equivalent citations: I(2007)ACC361, 2006ACJ2287, 2006(4)ALD530, AIR 2006 ANDHRA PRADESH 1424, 2006 (5) AIR KANT HCR 316, 2006 A I H C 3212, (2006) 4 ANDH LT 448, (2007) 1 TAC 120, (2007) 1 ACC 361, (2006) 4 RECCIVR 6, (2007) 1 ICC 436, (2006) 4 ACJ 2287, (2006) 2 LACC 307, (2006) 4 CTC 97 (AP), 2006 AIHC 3212
Author: G.S. Singhvi
Bench: G.S. Singhvi, Bilal Nazki, L. Narasimha Reddy, K.C. Bhanu
JUDGMENT G.S. Singhvi, C.J.
1. In furtherance of order dated 20-8-2004 passed by the Full Bench, LPA (SR) No. 87377 of 2003 has been placed before the Larger Bench for determination of the following question of law:
Whether, after insertion of amended Section 100-A in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short 'the Code') by Act No. 22 of 2002, Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against the judgment rendered by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a special enactment ?
2. The background in which the aforementioned question has been referred to the Larger Bench deserves to be noticed first.
3. By an award dated 1-10-1996, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-IV Additional District Judge, Tirupathi directed M/s. United India Insurance Company Limited to pay compensation of Rs. 90,000/-with interest @ 12% per annum to Sri 5. Surya Prakash Reddy in lieu of the death of his wife Rukmini caused in an accident which took place on 31-5-1991 on Tirupathi - Chandragiri Road. The appeal preferred by M/s. United India Insurance Company under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, vide his judgment dated 24-7-2003. Feeling dissatisfied, M/s. United India Insurance Company filed appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. At the time of scrutiny, an objection was taken by the Registry of the Court to the very maintainability of the appeal. This appears to have been done in view of the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Gandla Pannala Bhulaxmi v. Managing Director, APSRTC . Learned Counsel for the appellant resisted the office objection by stating that the Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against the judgment passed by a learned Single Judge in appeal filed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which was a special enactment. The matter was then placed before the Division Bench comprising one of us - Bilal Nazki, J and Tamada Gopalukrishna, J. The Division Bench felt that the judgment of the Full Bench in Gandla Pannala Bhulaxmi v. Managing Director, APSRTC (supra), needs reconsideration in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Subal Paul v. Malina Paul 2003 AIR SCW 1412. Therefore, while framing the question noted above, the Division Bench referred the matter to the Full Bench. On 20-8-2004, the Full Bench comprising of Devinder Gupta, CJ, A. Gopal Reddy, J., and C.V. Ramulu, J., observed that the question posed by the Division Bench deserves to be heard and decided by a Larger Bench. This is how the matter has been placed before the Bench of five Judges.
4. Brother Justice L. Narasimha Reddy has circulated draft judgment in which he has expressed the opinion that Section 100-A of the Code, as amended by Act No. 22 of 2002, does not have the effect of excluding Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment rendered by a Single Judge of the High Court in a matter arising out of an enactment other than the Code of Civil Procedure.
5. We have carefully gone through the judgment prepared by Brother Justice L. Narasimha Reddy, but have not felt persuaded to agree with him.
6. Since the arguments of the learned Counsel for the parties have been culled out in the judgment prepared by Brother Justice L. Narasimha Reddy, I do not propose to repeat the same. Suffice it to say that while Sarvasri J. Prabhakar, A. Ramalingeswara Rao, R.S. Murthy, and Mrs. A. Anasuya, learned Counsel for the appellants argued that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and other similar statutes are special enactments, which contain special procedure for adjudication of claims and disputes and, therefore, notwithstanding the insertion of amended Section 100-A in the Code with effect from 1-7-2002, an appeal is maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment rendered by the Single Bench in matters arising out of these special statutes, more so because the Legislature has not amended these enactments to exclude an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, learned Counsel for the respondents and Sri C. Sitaramaiah, Senior Advocate, who appeared as amicus curiae, maintained that after insertion of the amended Section 100-A, an appeal is not maintainable against the judgment rendered by the Single Bench even in matters arising out of special enactments like Motor Vehicles Act, Workmen's Compensation Act etc., and full effect should be given to the non-obstante clause contained in Section 100-A of the Code, which bars further appeal against the judgment rendered by a Single Bench from an original or appellate decree.
7. The First Letters Patent or Charter establishing High Courts was accompanied by a dispatch sent by the Secretary of the State on 14-5-1862. The same remained in force till it was revoked by another Letters Patent sent on 28-12-1865. By Clause 37 of the First Letters Patent, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859 enacted by the Legislature of India was made applicable to the High Courts not established by Royal Charter. Clause 37 of the Letters Patent, 1865, empowered the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal to make rules and orders for the purpose of regulating all proceedings in civil cases brought before the said High Court. Simultaneously, it was provided that, in making such rules and orders, the High Court shall, as far as possible, be guided by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859. Similar provisions were made in the Letters Patents of the High Courts of Bombay and Madras. Clauses 15 and 44 of the Letters Patent vide which Madras High Court was established and which are applicable to this Court read as under:
75. Appeal from the Courts of original jurisdiction to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction:
And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of judicature of Madras from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act made (on or after the 1st day of February, 1929) in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our Heirs or Successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided.
44. Powers of the Indian Legislature preserved :-And we do further ordain and declare that all the provisions of these Our Letters Patent are subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General in Legislative Council, and also of the Governor-General in Council under Section 71 of the Government of India Act, 1915; and also of the Governor-General, in cases of emergency under Section 72 of the Act, and may be in all respects amended and altered thereby.
8. The Code of Civil Procedure was for the first time enacted in 1859. The same was replaced by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877, which received the assent of the Governor-General on 30-3-1877 and was brought into force with effect from 1-10-1877. Part IX of the 1877 Code contained special rules relating to the Chartered High Courts. Chapter XLVIII of that Code applied only to the Chartered High Courts. The Legislature recognized the special role assigned to the Chartered High Courts and exempted them from the application of several provisions of the Code in the exercise of their ordinary or extraordinary civil jurisdiction for the simple reason that those jurisdictions were governed by the procedure prescribed by the rules made in exercise of the powers of the Chartered High Courts under Clause 37 of the Letters Patent. The 1877 Code was followed by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. That Code also contained Part IX dealing with special rules relating to the Chartered High Courts. Section 638 of this Code exempted the Chartered High Courts in the exercise of their ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction from the application of the Code. Section 652 invested the High Courts with power to make rules "consistent with this Code to regulate any matter connected with its own procedure or the procedure of the Courts of civil judicature subject to its superintendence."
9. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1882 was replaced by the Code of 1908. Sections 4 and 104 of the 1908 Code, which have bearing on the question of law refereed to the Larger Bench, read as under:
4. Savings-(1) In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the proposition contained in Sub-section (1), nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any remedy which a landholder or landlord may have under any law for the time being in force for the recovery of rent of agricultural land from the produce of such land.
104. Orders from which appeal lies :- (1)An appeal shall lie from the following orders, and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders:
[ x x x] [(ff) an order under Section 35-A;]
[(ffa) and order under Section 91 or Section 92 refusing leave to institute a suit of the nature referred to in Section 91 or Section 92, as the case may be;]
(g) an order under Section 95;
(h) an order under any of the provisions of this Code imposing a fine or directing the arrest or detention in the civil prison of any person except where such arrest or detention is in execution of a decree;
(i) any order made under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by rules:
[Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order specified in Clause (ff) save on the ground that no order, or an order for the payment of a less amount, ought to have been made.] (2) No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section.
10. Section 100-A was, for the first time, inserted in the Code by Amendment Act No. 104 of 1976. The same was as under:
Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, no further appeal (Letters Patent Appeal) will lie against the decision of a Single Judge in a second appeal.
11. By an amendment made in 1999 (Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999), Section 100-A was substituted by the following:
100-A. Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force-
(a) where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided
(b) where any writ direction or order is issued or made on an application under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment, decision or order of such Single Judge.
12. Though the Amendment Act, 1999 received the assent of the President on December 30, 1999, the same was not enforced apparently because of the stiff opposition by the members of the legal fraternity who were primarily agitated against the abolition of the intra Court appeal against the orders passed by the Single Judges in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. After three years, Section 100-A, in its present form, was inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002. The last amended Section 100-A reads as under:
100-A. No further appeal in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such Single Judge.
13. Having noticed the relevant statutory provision, I may now refer to some judicial precedents which have bearing on the question of maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment rendered by the Single Bench in an appeal filed under the Code and other legislations.
14. Section 588 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877, which is somewhat similar to Section 104(2) of the present Code, came up for consideration before the Privy Council in Hurrish Chunder Chowdry v. Kali Sundari Debia (1882-83) 10 IA 4 : ILR (1882) 9 Cal. 482 (PC). The Privy Council held that Section 588, which has the effect of restricting certain appeals, does not apply to a case where the appeal is from one of the Judges of the Court to the Full Court.
15. The abovementioned observations of the Privy Council were interpreted by the Bombay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts and it was held that Section 588 did not take away the right of appeal given under the Letters Patent. The Allahabad High Court took a contrary view and held that Letters Patent Appeal was barred by virtue of Section 588. In order to resolve this conflict, the Legislature stepped in and introduced Sections 4 and 104 in the Code. These were noticed by Allahabad High Court in L. Ram Swarup v. Kaniz Ummehani AIR 1937 All. 165, and it was held that in view of the newly inserted sections, an appeal would lie under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order by a Single Judge passed in an appeal. Though this judgment was overruled by the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania , the view expressed by the High Court on the maintainability of the Letters Patent was specifically approved.
16. In Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. , a Four Judges Bench of the Supreme Court considered the question whether an appeal is maintainable against the judgment rendered by a Single Bench in an appeal filed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. The Supreme Court referred to Clauses 10 and 37 of the Letters Patent of Punjab High Court and held that the Letters Patent are subject to the legislative power of the Governor-General-in-Council, which in the present day context means "subject to the legislative power of the appropriate Legislature". The Four Judges Bench further held that in view of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, only one appeal is maintainable and the right to further appeal is taken away. Some of the observations made in Paragraph 5 of that judgment, which are relevant to the question being considered by us, read as under:
By this clause, a right to appeal except in the cases specified, from one Judge of the High Court to a Division Bench is expressly granted. But the Letters Patent are declared by Clause 37 subject to the legislative power of the Governor-General in Council and also of the Governor-in-Council under the Government of India Act, 1915, and may in all respects be amended or altered in exercise of legislative authority.Under Section 39(1), an appeal lies from the orders specified in that sub-section and from no others. The Legislature has plainly expressed itself that the right of appeal against orders passed under the Arbitration Act may be exercised only in respect of certain orders. The right to appeal against other orders is expressly taken away. If by the express provision contained in Section 39(1), a right to appeal from a judgment which may otherwise be available under the Letters Patent is restricted, there is no ground for holding that Clause (2) does not similarly restrict the exercise of appellate power granted by the Letters Patent. If for reasons aforementioned the expression "second appeal" includes an appeal under the Letters Patent, it would be impossible to hold that notwithstanding the express prohibition, an appeal under the Letters Patent from an order passed in appeal under Sub-section (1) is competent.
(emphasis supplied)
17. In Gulab Bai v. Puniya , the Supreme Court considered the question whether an appeal under Clause 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance was maintainable against the judgment of a Single Judge passed on an appeal filed in a matter arising out of Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act. The Constitution Bench first considered Section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act, which permitted an appeal to the High Court, and Section 48, which gave finality to the judgment rendered in such appeal, and then proceeded to examine whether an appeal permitted under the Letters Patent of a High Court can be taken away by implication. Their Lordships referred to the judgment of the Privy Council in Hurrish Chunder Chowdry's case (supra) and observed:
The question as to whether an appeal permitted by the relevant clause of the Letters Patent of a High Court can be taken away by implication, had been considered in relation to the provisions of Section 588 of the Codes of Civil Procedure of 1877 and 1882. The first part of the said section had provided for an appeal from the orders specified by Clauses (1) to (29) thereof, and the latter part of the said section had laid down that the orders passed in appeals under this section shall be final. Before the enactment of the present Code, High Courts in India had occasion to consider whether the provision as to the finality of the appellate orders prescribed by Section 588 precluded an appeal under the relevant clauses of the Letters Patent of different High Courts. There was a conflict of decisions on this point. When the matter was raised before the Privy Council in Hurrish Chunder Chowdry v. Kali Sundari Debia (1882-83) 10 IA 4 : ILR (1882) 9 Cal. 482 (PC) (1A at p. 17) the Privy Council thus tersely expressed its conclusion:
It only remains to observe that Their Lordships do not think that Section 588 of Act 10 of 1877, which has the effect of restricting certain appeals, applies to such a case as this, where the appeal is from one of the Judges of the Court to the Full Court.
Basing themselves on these observations, the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay had held that Section 588 did not take away the right of appeal given by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, vide Toolsee Money Dassee v. Sudevi Dassee ILR (1899) 26 Cal. 361 : 3 CWN 347, Sabhapathi Chetti v. Narayanasami Chetti ILR (1902) 25 Mad. 555 : 11 MLJ 346 and Secy. of State for India in Council v. Jehangir Maneckji Cursetji (1902) 4 Bom LR 342, respectively. On the other hand, the Allahabad High Court took a different view, vide Banno Bibi v. Mehdi Hussain ILR (1889) 11 All. 375 : (1889) 9 AWN 70 and Mohd. Naim-Ul-Lah Khan v. Ihsan-W-Lah Khan ILR (1892) 14 All 226 : (1892) 12 AWN 14 (FB). Ultimately, when the present Code was enacted, Section 104 took the place of Section 588 of the earlier Code. Section 104(1) provides that an appeal shall lie from the following orders, and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders. It will be noticed that the saving clause which refers to the provisions of the Code, or to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, gives effect to the view taken by the Calcutta, Madras and Bombay High Courts. In fact, later, the Allahabad High Court itself has accepted the same view in L. Ram Sarup v. Kant Ummehani AIR 1937 All 165 : ILR 1937 All. 386.
We have referred to these decisions to emphasise the fact that even where the relevant provision of Section 588 of the earlier Code made certain appellate orders final, the consensus of judicial opinion was that the said provision did not preclude an appeal being filed under the relevant clause of the Letters Patent of the High Court.
18. In South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup Singh , the Supreme Court considered the question whether an appeal was competent under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Lahore against the judgment of a Single Judge in a second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Their Lordships held that unless the right of appeal was taken away by the appropriate Legislature either expressly or by necessary implication, an appeal was competent under Clause 10 against the judgment of the Single Judge. However, on an interpretation of Section 43 of the Act, it was held that finality conferred on the judgment of the Single Bench operate as a bar against further appeal.
19. In Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania (supra), the Supreme Court considered the question whether an order passed by a Single Judge on the original side of the High Court, which, if amounted to a judgment, was appealable under Clause 15. The Supreme Court considered the interplay of Section 104 on the Letters Patent and observed:
21. ...A bare perusal of this section would clearly reveal that excepting Revenue Courts all other Civil Courts would normally be governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of procedure. Section 4(1) of the Code of 1908 which is a saving provision clearly provides that in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary the provisions of the Code do not limit or affect any special or local law. Thus, the test contained in Section 4 is not applicable in the instant case because even if the Letters Patent of the High Court be deemed to be a special law as contemplated by Section 4, the provisions of Section 104 do not seek to limit or affect the provisions of the Letters Patent.
20. The proposition laid down in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania (supra) was followed and reiterated in various judgments rendered till 1996 and it was the unanimous view of all the Courts that Section 104(1) of the Code specifically saves Letters Patent Appeal and the bar contained in Section 104(2) is not applicable to such appeals and, further that the Letters Patent Appeal cannot be ousted by implication, though right of an appeal under the Letters Patent can be taken away by an express provision in an appropriate legislation.
21. For the first time, a contrary view was expressed by a two Judges Bench in Resham Singh Pyara Singh v. Abdul Sattar . The question which arose in that case was:
Whether Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in an appeal arising out of an order of interim injunction passed by City Civil Court?
22. The two Judges Bench distinguished the ratio of Shah Babulal Khimji (supra), by recording the following observations:
6. It would, therefore, be clear that when an appeal was filed against the order of the City Civil Court, Bombay to the learned Single Judge under Order 43 Rule l(r) as provided in Sub-section (1) of Section 104 by operation of Sub-section (2) of Section 104, no further appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section. In Khimji, case Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania , the suit was filed on the original side of the High Court and the learned Single Judge on the original side passed an interlocutory order. Against the orders of the learned Single Judge, though it was an interlocutory order, since the appeal would lie to the Division Bench under the Letters Patent, this Court held that against the interlocutory orders passed by the Single Judge, Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable. That ratio, therefore, is clearly inapplicable to the facts in this case.
23. The aforementioned view was reiterated in New Kennilworth Hotel (P) Ltd. v. Orissa State Finance Corporation .
24. In Vinetha M. Khanolkar v. Pragna M. Pai , the Supreme Court considered whether the bar contained in Section 6(3) of the Specific Relief Act is applicable to Letters Patent Appeal. While answering the question in negative, the Supreme Court observed:
3. Now it is well settled that any statutory provision barring an appeal or revision cannot cut across the constitutional power of a High Court. Even the power flowing from the paramount charter under which the High Court functions would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned expressly excludes appeals under Letters Patent. No such bar is discernible from Section 6(3) of the Act. It could not be seriously contended by learned Counsel for the respondents that if Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is invoked then the order would not be appealable. Consequently, in our view, on the clear language of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent which is applicable to Bombay High Court, the said appeal was maintainable as the order under appeal was passed by learned Single Judge of the High Court exercising original jurisdiction of the Court. Only on that short ground the appeal is required to be allowed.
25. Similarly, in Chandra Kanta Sinha v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. , it was held that a Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable against judgment/order of a Single Judge passed in a first appeal under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
26. In Sharada Devi v. State of Bihar , a Three Judges Bench considered the issue of maintainability of appeal against the judgment rendered by a Single Bench under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Bench held that a Letters Patent was a Charter under which the High Courts were established and, therefore, the right to entertain an appeal under the Letters Patent does not get excluded unless statutory enactment excludes such an appeal. It was further held that Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act does not bar a Letters Patent Appeal and, therefore, such an appeal is maintainable.
27. The question which fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Subal Paul v. Malina Paul (supra), was whether Letters Patent Appeal would lie against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court in an appeal filed under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. A Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court considered the provisions of Section 104 of the Code, Clause 15 of the Letters Patent (Calcutta) and Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act, and held as under:
By reason of Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure the bar of appeal under a special statute is saved. A plain reading of Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure would show that an appeal shall lie from an appelable order and no other order save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being in force. Section 104 of the Code merely recognizes appeals provided under special statute. It does not create a right of appeal as such. It does not, therefore, bar any further appeal also, if the same is provided for under any other Act, for the time being in force. Whenever the statute provides such a bar, it is so expressly stated, as would appear from Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure.
28. In none of the aforementioned judgments, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the ambit and scope of Section 100-A of the Code, as it stands today, and its effect on the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal, though in Subal Paul v. Malina Paul's case (supra), the Three Judges Bench did observe that this section creates an express bar to the maintainability of further appeal.
29. In S. Siva Raja Reddy and Ors. v. S. Raghu Raj Reddy , a Division Bench of this Court considered the question whether Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure is retrospective and no Letters Patent Appeal will lie against a judgment of a Single Judge passed in an appeal from an original decree or order and whether all such or those Letters Patent Appeals filed prior to 1-7-2002 alone are saved. After noticing the relevant statutory provisions, the Division Bench held that Section 100-A of the Code is not retrospective and will not affect the pending appeal. The Division Bench further held that in view of the non-obstante clause contained in Section 100-A, no further appeal shall lie against the judgment passed by the Single Judge in an appeal from the original decree or order.
30. In Gandla Pannala Bhulaxmi v. Managing Director, APSRTC (supra), the Full Bench considered the same question and held that the bar contained in Section 100-A of the Code is applicable to the appeals filed under special enactments. Paragraphs 6, 8 and 9 of the judgment of the Full Bench read as under:
(6) A plain reading of the said provision makes it abundantly clear that no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force. There is a complete prohibition of filing of further appeal against the judgment and decree of a learned Single Judge. It is a legislative declaration. The said legislative declaration prohibits preferring of a further appeal against the judgment and decree of a learned Single Judge even if an appeal is provided in any other law for the time being in force. The expression 'in any instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force' takes into its ambit of the legislations including the special enactments where a right of appeal may have been provided against the judgment and decree of a learned Single Judge to a Division Bench. What is prohibited is preferring of a further appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment and decree of a Single Judge not only under the Letters Patent for any High Court, but also under any special enactments even if an appeal is provided in such special enactments.
(8) It is true that no amendments as such are made to the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent remains intact. But what is prohibited is further appeal notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any instrument having the force of law.
(9) In our considered opinion, the provisions contained in Section 100-A of the Code are equally applicable to the proceedings arising under the special enactments also since Section 100-A of the Code specifically prohibits further appeal against the judgment and decree or order made by a learned Single Judge of a High Court. The language employed in Section 100-A of the Code is simple, clear and free from any vagueness.
31. The Full Bench then considered the judgments of the Supreme Court in Vinita M. Khanolkar v. Pragna M. Pai (supra), and distinguished the same by making the following observations:
Evidently, no provision similar to Section 100-A of the Code, which prohibits filing of further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a learned Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in Letters Patent, had fallen for consideration in that case. On the other hand, it is implicit in the said judgment that the statutory enactment concerned can always exclude and affect the power flowing from the paramount charter under which an appeal may have been provided against the decree and judgment or order of a learned Single Judge.
32. The Full Bench also noticed the judgment of Sharada Devi's(supra), case and observed:
(12) In Sharada Devi v. State of Bihar, the question as to whether Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable before the Letters Patent Bench against the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge of the High Court passed in an appeal preferred under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had arisen for consideration. The Supreme Court held that "by virtue of the Letters Patent "an appeal" against the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court would lie to a Division Bench. Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act does not exclude an appeal under the Letters Patent, The word "only" occurring immediately after the non-obstanteclause in Section 54 refers to the forum of appeal. In other words, it provides that the appeal will be to the High Court and not to any other Court e.g., the District Court. The term "an appeal" does not restrict it to only one appeal in the High Court. The term "an appeal" would take within its sweep even a Letters Patent Appeal."
(13) The Supreme Court having held that Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in no manner affects or restricts the right of an aggrieved individual to file a Letters Patent Appeal observed that "a Letters Patent is the charter under which the High Court is established. The powers given to a High Court under the Letters Patent are akin to the constitutional powers of a High Court. Thus, when a Letters Patent grants to the High Court a power of appeal, against a judgment of a Single Judge, the right to entertain the appeal would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned excludes an appeal under the Letters Patent.
(Emphasis is of ours).
(14) We have already noticed that the newly incorporated Section 100-A of the Code in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a learned Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law - be it against an original or appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge.
33. In P.S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd. , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was called upon to decide apparently conflicting views expressed in Gulab Bai v. Puniya (supra) on the one hand and New Kenilworth Hotel (P) Ltd. v. Orissa State Finance Corpn. (supra) on the other hand. The majority of the Constitution Bench examined the scheme of Section 104 of the Code in the light of the other provisions, including Section 4, and held that Section 104(1) specifically saves Letters Patent Appeals and the bar contained in Section 104(2) does not apply to such appeals. The conclusion of the majority is recorded in Paragraph 30 of the judgment, the relevant portion of which is extracted below:
As such if an appeal is expressly saved by Section 104(1), Sub-section (2) cannot apply to such an appeal. Section 104 has to be read as a whole. Merely reading Sub-section (2) by ignoring the saving clause in Sub-section (1) would lead to a conflict between the two sub-sections. Read as a whole and on well-established principles of interpretation it is clear that Sub-section (2) can only apply to appeals not saved by Sub-section (1) of Section 104. The finality provided by Sub-section (2) only attaches to orders passed in appeal under Section 104 i.e., those orders against which an appeal under "any other law for the time being in force" is not permitted. Section 104(2) would not thus bar a Letters Patent Appeal. Effect must also be given to legislative intent of introducing Section 4 CPC and the words "by any law for the time being in force" in Section 104(1). This was done to give effect to the Calcutta, Madras and Bombay views that Section 104 did not bar Letters Patent. As appeals under "any other law for the time being in force" undeniably include a Letters Patent Appeal, such appeals are now specifically saved. Section 104 must be read as a whole and harmoniously. If the intention was to exclude what is specifically saved in Sub-section (1), then there had to be a specific exclusion. A general exclusion of this nature would not be sufficient. We are not saying that a general exclusion would never oust a Letters Patent Appeal. However, when Section 104(1) specifically saves a letters patent appeal then the only way such an appeal could be excluded is by express mention in Section 104(2) that a Letters Patent Appeal is also prohibited.
34. In order to emphasize that the Legislature can exclude the Letters Patent Appeal, the majority of the Constitution Bench referred to Section 100-A of the Code, as amended in 2002, and observed:
As stated hereinabove, a specific exclusion may be clear from the words of a statute even though no specific reference is made to Letters Patent. But where there is an express saving in the statute/section itself, then general words to the effect that "an appeal would not lie" or "order will be final" are not sufficient. In such cases i.e., where there is an express saving, there must be an express exclusion. Sub-section (2) of Section 104 does not provide for any express exclusion. In this context reference may be made to Section 100-A. The present Section 100-A was amended in 2002. The earlier Section 100-A, introduced in 1976, reads as follows:
100-A. No further appeal in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment, decision or order of such Single Judge in such appeal or from any decree passed in such appeal.
It is thus to be seen that when the Legislature wanted to exclude a Letters Patent Appeal it specifically did so. The words used in Section 100-A are not by way of abundant caution. By the Amendment Acts of 1976 and 2002 a specific exclusion is provided as the Legislature knew that in the absence of such words a Letters Patent Appeal would not be barred. The Legislature was aware that it had incorporated the saving clause in Section 104(1) and incorporated Section 4 CPC. Thus now a specific exclusion was provided. After 2002, Section 100-A reads as follows:
100-A. No further appeal in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such Single Judge.
To be noted that here again the Legislature has provided for a specific exclusion. It must be stated that now by virtue of Section 100-A no Letter Patent Appeal would be maintainable.However, it is an admitted position that the law which would prevail would be the law at the relevant time. At the relevant time neither Section 100-A nor Section 104(2) barred a Letters Patent Appeal.
(Emphasis added)
35. The majority judgment also took cognizance of Clause 44 of the Letters Patent and observed that Letters Patent is a special law vis-a-vis the Code and, in case of conflict, the former would prevail, except when there is an express exclusion of the special law like the one made by Section 100-A. Paragraph 32 of the judgment which contains discussion on this aspect read as under:
It was next submitted that Clause 44 of the Letters Patent showed that Letters Patent were subject to amendment and alteration. It was submitted that this showed that a Letters Patent was a subordinate or subservient piece of law. Undoubtedly, Clause 44 permits amendment or alteration of Letters Patent, but then which legislation is not subject to amendment or alteration ? CPC is also subject to amendments and alterations. In fact it has been amended on a number of occasions. The only unalterable provisions are the basic structure of our Constitution. Merely because there is a provision for amendment does not mean that, in the absence of an amendment or a contrary provision, the Letters Patent is to be ignored. To submit that a Letters Patent is a subordinate piece of legislation is to not understand the true nature of Letters Patent. As has been held in Vinita Khanolkar case (supra), and Sharada Devi case (supra), a Letters Patent is the charter of the High Court. As held in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D, Kania (supra), a Letters Patent is the specific law under which a High Court derives its powers. It is not any subordinate piece of legislation. As set out in the aforementioned two cases a Letters Patent cannot be excluded by implication. Further it is settled law that between a special law and a general law the special law will always prevail. A Letters Patent is a special law for the High Court concerned. The Civil Procedure Code is a general law applicable to all Courts. It is well-settled law, that in the event of a conflict between a special law and a general law, the special law must always prevail. We see no conflict between the Letters Patent and Section 104 but if there was any conflict between a Letters Patent and the Civil Procedure Code then the provisions of the Letters Patent would always prevail unless there was a specific exclusion. This is also clear from Section 4 of the Civil Procedure Code which provides that nothing in the Code shall limit or affect any special law. As set out in Section 4 CPC, only a specific provision to the contrary can exclude the special law. The specific provision would be a provision like Section 100-A.
36. In the course of judgment, the majority of the Constitution Bench referred to Sharada Devi's case (supra), which contained an observation suggesting that in the Supreme Court's view, the Letters Patent was akin to the Constitutional powers of the High Court, and observed:
...At this stage it must be clarified that during arguments, relying on the sentence "the powers given to a High Court under the Letters Patent are akin to the constitutional powers of a High Court" in Para 9 of this judgment it had been suggested that a Letters Patent had the same status as the Constitution. In our view, these observations merely lay down that the powers given to a High Court are the powers with which that High Court is constituted. These observations do not put Letters Patent on a par with the Constitution.
37. A careful reading of the majority judgment in P.S. Sathappan's case (supra), makes it clear that the opinion expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in S. Shiva Raja Reddy and Ors. v. S. Raghu Raj Reddy (supra), and the Full Bench in Gandla Pannala Bhulaxmi v. Managing Director, APSRTC (supra), on the interpretation of Section 100-A of the Code and maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment rendered by a Single Bench in an appeal arising out of the special enactment is in consonance with the views expressed by the Supreme Court. The observations contained in the last two lines of Para 20 of the judgment of Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Subal Paul v. Malina Paul (supra), also supports the view taken by the Division Bench and Full Bench of this Court in the two cases referred to above.
38. The issue deserves to be considered from another angle. Clause 44 of the Letters Patent makes all the provisions of the Letters Patent subject to the legislative power of the Governor-General-in-Council and of the Governor-in-Council under Section 71 of the Government of India Act, 1915 and also of the Governor-General in cases of emergency under Section 72 of the Act and can be amended in all respects. In the post-Constitution era, the legislative power of the Governor-General or Governor-in-Council has to be construed as power of the appropriate Legislature. This aspect was specifically noticed in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. (supra), and it was held that the Letters Patent can be amended by the appropriate Legislature.
39. The right of the Legislature to abolish Letters Patent was considered by the Constitution Bench in Hasinuddin Khan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation . After making reference to the earlier judgments in State of Bombay v. Narrottamdas Jethabai , Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. (supra) and Ram Adhar Singh v. Ramroop Singh , the Supreme Court held that U.P. High Court (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1962 and U.P. High Court (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) (Amendment) Act 33 of 1972 were constitutional.
40. The ratio of these decisions is that the competent Legislature can amend and even abolish the Letters Patent. Undisputedly, Section 100-A of the Code is a piece of legislation enacted by the competent Legislature i.e., the Parliament, The non-obstante clause contained in Section 100-A of the Code, as amended by 2002 Act, has the effect of taking away the right of appeal which may earlier be available either under the Letters Patent or any provision of law, including the Code. The use of the expression "in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force" in Section 100-A is clearly indicative of the Legislature's intention to bar Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment rendered by a Single Bench in an appeal arising from an original or appellate decree or order. The language of Section 100-A does not suggest that the exclusion of the right of appeal available under the Letters Patent is confined only to the matters arising under the Code and not other enactments. Therefore, full effect deserves to be given to the legislative intendment enshrined in the non-obstante clause contained in Section 100-A and it must be held that an appellate judgment rendered by the Single Bench in matters arising out of the Code, as also other enactments, is expressly barred with effect from 1-7-2002.
41. Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for an appeal against an award made by the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1973. Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides for an appeal against the award of the Reference Court. Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 provides for an appeal against an order made by the Commissioner. Similar provisions are available in other enactments for an appeal against an award or order passed by the competent authority or Court. As per the High Court Rules, all such appeals are heard by Single Bench. There is no provision in these enactments under which an appeal can be preferred against the judgment rendered by the Single Bench in a matter arising out of an award or order made by the competent authority or Court. Such appeal could be filed only under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. However, by virtue of the non-obstante clause contained in Section 100-A, with reference to Letters Patent and all other statutory enactments, no appeal can now be maintained under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment rendered by a Single Bench in an appeal arising out of these enactments.
42. In view of the above discussion, the question referred to the Larger Bench is answered in the following terms:
After insertion of amended Section 100-A in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by Act No. 22 of 2002, Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable against the judgment rendered by a Single Bench in an appeal arising out of a special enactment.
L. Narasimha Reddy, J.
1. The question as to whether a Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against the judgment rendered by a Single Judge of the High Court in an appeal filed under Section 96 C.P.C., is no longer res integra. Not only Section 100-A C.P.C., as it stands now, is clear about it, but judicial pronouncements were also made, by Benches of varying strength, reiterating the same. Doubt, however, persisted, as to the applicability of Section 100-A, in respect of matters, which arose out of Motor Vehicles Act (for short 'the M.V. Act') and other special enactments. A Full Bench of this Court in G. Pannala Bhulaxmi v. Managing Director, A.P.S.R.T.C. 2003 (4) ALD 216 (FB), held that Letters Patent Appeal is no longer available against the judgment rendered by Single Judge, in an appeal, arising out of the provisions of the M.V. Act. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court has undertaken extensive discussion, on the purport of Section 100-A of the C.P.C., and various Clauses of Letters Patent, in Subal Paul v. Melina Paul 2003 AIR SCW 1412. The appellants, preferred this batch of appeals against the judgments rendered by Single Judges of this Court, in the matters arising out of M.V. Act, or the Workmen's Compensation Act (for short 'the W.C. Act'), as the case may be. The Registry raised an objection, as to the maintainability, and posted the appeals before a Division Bench, for orders. The Division Bench took the view that in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in Subal Paul's case (supra), the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in G. Pannala Bhulaxmi v. Managing Director, A.P.S.R.T.C. (supra), deserves to be reconsidered. That is how, the Larger Bench came to be constituted.
2. On behalf of the appellants Sri J. Prabhakar, Sri A. Ramalingeswara Rao, Mrs. A. Anasuya and Sri R.S, Murthy, addressed the arguments. The other Counsel adopted their arguments.
3. The purport of the submissions made on behalf of the appellants is that the M.V. Act and particularly Chapter XII thereof, is a self-contained Code, providing for adjudication of the claims arising out of the accidents, involving motor vehicles. They contend that a special and different procedure is prescribed, for adjudication of such disputes and the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is totally taken away, in respect of such matters. They submit that any provisions in the C.P.C., and for that matter, Section 100-A, can regulate only those proceedings, to which the provisions of C.P.C. apply, and not others, which are consciously kept outside the purview of C.P.C. It is urged that Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is an independent source of appeal for the matters, arising under different enactments, including C.P.C, and an amendment in C.P.C. cannot regulate the applicability of Clause 15, to the matters arising out of other enactments. It is also their case that as long as Clause 15 remains in the present form, a non-substante clause contained in Section 100-A of C.P.C., cannot prohibit an appeal, against the judgment rendered by a Single Judge, in a matter arising under the M.V. Act.
4. The respondents comprise of individuals as well as institutions. Sri Kota Subba Rao, and few Advocates oppose the claim of the appellants. According to them, it is permissible for the Parliament, to amend Letters Patent, as is evident from Clause 44 thereof, and Section 100-A of C.P.C. can certainly be treated as, such an amendment. They plead that with the introduction of Section 100-A, the whole ambit of Clause 15 of Letters Patent gets restricted, and except where the adjudication by the Single Judge is on original side, Letters Patent is prohibited in all other categories.
5. The Counsel appearing on behalf of both the parties have cited decisions in support of their respective contentions.
6. Sri Challa Seetharamayya, learned Senior Counsel extended valuable assistance to the Court, on being requested to act as an amicus curiae. He has taken the trouble of compiling useful material and making it available to the Court.
7. For the most part of it, provision of hierarchy of appeals is a matter of procedure. However, more often that not, the remedy of appeal assumes the character of a substantive right by itself. There hardly exists any doubt, that an appeal is always a creation of a statute. It cannot exist independently, unless provided for, under the relevant law. Generally, the circumstances under which, an appeal would lie and the forum to which it can be maintained, are provided for under the general enactments, such as C.P.C, or the special enactments, such as the Arbitration Act, M.V. Act Specific Relief Act and the Land Acquisition Act, etc. In our legal system, in many cases, the mechanism of appeals is dealt with by other enactments also, over and above, the one under which, the original proceedings, arise. For instance, the Central Excise Act and the Arbitration Act, 1940 prescribe the procedure governing the original proceedings, the manner in which it can be taken to High Court and the circumstances under which an appeal can be preferred to the Supreme Court. On the other hand, the Acts, such as, the Land Acquisition Act, M.V. Act, deal with the procedure, upto the stage, the matter lands in the High Court. If the appeals arising out of such enactments are heard by Single Judges, the procedure relating to internal appeals, within the High Court, is governed by Letters Patent, and the appeal to the Supreme Court is dealt with by Article 133 or 136, as the case may be, of the Constitution of India.
8. It needs no emphasis that C.P.C, is not the sole repository of the procedure, for adjudication of all civil matters. Section 4 thereof makes it amply clear. It reads as under:
Section 4. Savings.-{1) In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the proposition contained in Sub-section (1), nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any remedy which a landholder or landlord may have under any law for the time being in force for the recovery of rent of agricultural land from the produce of such land.
9. As and when the concerned Legislature felt that disputes of a particular category need to be dealt with, in a manner, different from the one, prescribed under C.P.C.; enactments were made, incorporating the provisions, ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and directing that the matters covered by such enactments be adjudicated in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein. It is in this context, that certain provisions of the M.V. Act become relevant.
10. Chapter XII contains procedural as well as substantive provisions, for settlement of the disputes arising out of accidents, involving motor vehicles. Claims Tribunals are constituted under Section 155, for this purpose. The legislative intent of having an altogether a different procedure for adjudication of such disputes is evident from the provisions, such as Sections 169, 173, 174 and 175. They read as under:
Section 169. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals.-(1) In holding any inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules, that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit.
(2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
(3) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the Claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of any matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry.
Section 173. Appeals.-(1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:
Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court, unless he has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court;
Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in tune.
(2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees.
Section 174. Recovery of money from insurer as arrear of land revenue.-Where any amount is due from any person under an award, the Claims Tribunal may, on an application made to it by the person entitled to the amount, issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.
Section 175. Bar on jurisdiction of Civil Courts.-Where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the Claims Tribunal in respect of the claim for compensation shall be granted by the Civil Court.
11. The procedure to be adopted by the Tribunals is by and large, summary in nature. Jurisdiction of civil Courts is totally ousted. The manner in which interest can be awarded is different from the one stipulated under Section 34 C.P.C. The procedure under Order 21 C.P.C, is for all practical purposes, done away with, by providing for recovery of the amount covered by the award, as arrears of land revenue. The award passed by the Tribunal does not answer the description of the judgment or decree. Irrespective of the value of a claim, it is to be adjudicated by the same Tribunal and the appeal is invariably to the High Court, subject, of course, to Sub-section (2) of Section 173.
12. Similarly, the W.C. Act prescribes the procedure for adjudication and settlement of claims made by workman against the employers. The initial adjudication is to be made by Commissioners by way of a reference under Section 19 of the Act. Section 23 is comparable to Section 169 of the M.V. Act. The Commissioner is conferred with the power to make a reference, directly to the High Court under Section 27, if he entertains any doubt as to question of law. Section 30 of the W.C. Act provides an appeal to the High Court, from the orders of Commissioner, and it reads as under:
Section 30. Appeals.(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely:
(a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum;
[(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under Section 4-A;]
(b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment;
(c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased workman, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant;
(d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 12; or
(e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions:
Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal, and in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in Clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees:
Provided further that no appeal shall lie in any case in which the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner, or in which the order of the Commissioner gives effect to an agreement come to by the parties:
[Provided further that no appeal by an employer under Clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against.] (2) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days.
(3) The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall be applicable to appeals under this section.
13. The procedure for recovery of the amount awarded by Commissioner is prescribed under Section 31, which reads as under:
Section 31. Recovery.-The Commissioner may recover as an arrear of land revenue any amount payable by any person under this Act, whether under an agreement for the payment of compensation or otherwise, and the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a public officer within the meaning of Section 5 of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890 (1 of 1890).
14. One can discern traces of civil adjudication, in respect of proceedings under the M.V. Act, having regard to the officer, who decides it, and the place where the matter is adjudicated. An order passed by the Commissioner does not have any such traces.
15. From this, it is clear that the C.P.C., or the procedure prescribed thereunder, is inapplicable, in respect of the proceedings arising under the M.V. Act, or W.C. Act, till they land in the High Court, in the form of an appeal under Section 173 or Section 30, respectively, of the said enactments. A fortiori, it does not apply thereafter. Letters Patent Appeals were entertained till recently, against the judgments rendered by Single Judges, arising out of appeals under Section 173 of M.V. Act. Such a remedy is sought to be scuttled on the basis of Section 100-A C.P.C.
16. The procedure that governs the appeals from a judgment of a Single Judge, to a Division Bench in the High Courts, has been the subject-matter of interpretation by many Courts, for the past several decades. Such appeals are provided for, under the Letters Patent. It is the form of a Charter, issued by the British Government, constituting the three High Courts, at Madras, Bombay and Calcutta (known at one point of time as the Chartered High Courts), under the High Courts' Act, 1861. The same provisions came to be extended to few other High Courts, which are mostly, the off shoots of the said three High Courts. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent reads as under:
Clause 15 : Appeals from the Courts of original jurisdiction to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction : And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at (Madras) (Bombay), Fort William in Bengal from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of a revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, (on or after the first day of February 1929) in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our heirs or Successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided.
Similar clauses were contained in the Charters, under which certain other High Courts were constituted.
17. A perusal of the same discloses that an appeal is provided, from the judgment rendered by a Single Judge of a High Court, to a Division Bench, subject to three exceptions. The first is where the judgment rendered by a Single Judge, is in a case, arising out of an appeal, disposed of, by a Subordinate Court. The second is where the order by the Single Judge is in exercise of revisional Jurisdiction. The third is where the order is passed in exercise of power of superintendence under Section 107 of the Government of India Act (now, Article 227 of the Constitution of India). Out of the three categories referred to above, an appeal was maintainable against the first category of cases, if the Single Judge, who rendered the judgment, declares, that it is a fit case for appeal. It is trite that Clause 15 covers wide range of matters, such as, those, arising out of the decrees and orders, as defined under C.P.C., judgments rendered in exercise of its original jurisdiction, and matters arising out of special enactments, such as, Arbitration Act, 1940, M.V. Act.
18. As is well-known, C.P.C., is a general enactment, providing for the manner in which, the civil cases must be adjudicated by the Courts, conferred with civil jurisdiction. It is not necessary to deal with the scope and ambit of the C.P.C., in detail. For the purpose of this case, it would be sufficient, to take note of Section 4 C.P.C., which makes it clear that, nothing in that Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law, in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force. In the ordinary course of the things, the adjudication in the original suit or original petition, presented to a civil Court, comes to an end with the delivery of judgment, and passing of a 'decree', as defined under Section 2(2). Circumstances do exist, wherein the Courts are required to determine the rights of the parties, though, not finally, even while the suit or petition is pending. This results in passing of 'orders', as defined under Section 2(14). Against a decree, appeal is provided for, under Section 96, read with Order XVI, and appeals arising out of orders, are governed by Section 104, read with Order XVIII, C.P.C.
19. If the suit, as well as the appeal arising out of decree in the suit are dealt with by Subordinate Courts, at different levels, second appeal is provided for to the High Court, under Section 100 C.P.C. By the time, the second appeal comes to be disposed of, the parties would be facing three stages of adjudication. It was permissible under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, for there being a further appeal in the High Court itself, against a judgment rendered in a second appeal by a Single Judge of a High Court, if it was certified to be a fit case. Before the dispute was to have its way to the Supreme Court, a fourth stage of litigation was also possible. With a view to curb this, Parliament amended C.P.C, by incorporating Section 100-A, in 1976. It read as under:
Section 100A. No further appeal in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Singe Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such Single Judge.
20. The prohibition contained in Section 100-A, introduced in 1976, was to the effect that, notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent, a further appeal does not lie to the High Court against the judgment rendered by a Single Judge, in an appeal, which in turn, arose, out of an appeal decided by a Subordinate Court.
21. Depending on the valuation of a suit, an appeal under Section 96 of C.P.C, is provided to the High Court itself. Against the judgment and decree in such an appeal, rendered by a Single Judge, an appeal to Division Bench, under Clause 15 of Letters Patent was maintainable. Section 100-A, as it stood before 2002, did not prohibit such appeals, because the decree and judgment was rendered in an appeal, which arose out of an original decree, in contradistinction to an appellate decree. Parliament did not want an internal appeal within the High Court, even as regards such matters. Therefore, it amended Section 100-A, through C.P.C. Amendment Act of 2002 (Act 22 of 2002), in such a manner, that no Letters Patent Appeal shall lie from a judgment and decree rendered by a Single Judge, whether such judgment was in respect of an original or appellate decree or order, passed by a Subordinate Court. To this extent, there does not exist any doubt. The controversy is as to whether the amendment to Section 100-A C.P.C. would bar appeals arising out of other enactments.
22. In this regard, it needs to be observed that Letters Patent is comparable to a legislation, but it is a class, by itself. It was not enacted by the Parliament and is in the form of a Charter, in exercise of powers under the High Courts Act 1861. Even after independence and the country became a Republic, Letters Patent did not undergo any qualitative change, unlike many of the Imperial Legislations, which were treated as Acts of Parliament, through the process of adaptation (under Article 372 of the Constitution of India). Judicial opinion differed as to the amenability of the Letters Patent for amendment. Clause 44 of the Letters Patent makes it clear that the Charter is subject to legislative powers of the then Governor-General in Legislative Council, whose successor, in a way, can be said to be the Parliament.
23. The predominant judicial opinion is to the effect that the clauses indicated in various legislations, dealing with the corresponding matters can certainly have their impact on the Letters Patent. It was for this reason, that a Letters Patent Appeal which was permissible against the judgment rendered in a Second Appeal, under Section 100 C.P.C, by a Single Judge, with necessary certification, could be prohibited, in view of Section 100-A, introduced through Act 104 of 1976 in the C.P.C. Section 116-A of Representation of Peoples' Act (for short 'the R.P. Act') had impliedly barred Letters Patent in respect of an order passed under Sections 98 and 99 under the Representation of Peoples' Act, by a Single Judge. Consequently, the efficacy of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent stands reduced insofar as it relates to the judgments passed by Single Judges in respect of matters arising out of Representation of Peoples' Act. In the same way, Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act 1940 prohibited a Second Appeal from an order passed in appeal under that section, but kept the right to appeal to the Supreme Court in tact. The provisions read as under:
Section 39(1) : Appealable orders.-An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act (and from no others) to the Court authorized by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order:
An Order-
(i) superseding an arbitration;
(ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case;
(iii) modifying or correcting an award;
(iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement;
(v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement;
(vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award;
Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court.
Section 39(2) : No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.
24. Under the Arbitration Act 1940, the matter can land in the High Court only by way of an appeal. The prohibition of second appeal under Section 39(2) is referable to the one under Clause 15 of Letters Patent. This aspect of the matter was examined by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. , and it was observed, "Under Section 39(1), an appeal lies from the orders specified in that sub-section and from no others. The Legislature has plainly expressed itself that the right of appeal against orders passed under the Arbitration Act may be exercised only in respect of certain orders. The right to appeal against other orders is expressly taken away. If by the express provision contained in Section 39(1), a right to appeal from a judgment which may otherwise be available under the Letters Patent is restricted, there is no ground for holding that Clause (2) does not similarly restrict the exercise of appellate power granted by the Letters Patent. If for reasons aforementioned the expression "second appeal" includes an appeal under the Letters Patent, it would be impossible to hold that notwithstanding the express prohibition, an appeal under the Letters Patent from an order passed in appeal under Sub-section (1) is competent."
25. While the application of Clause 15 of Letters Patent is barred, by incorporating a non-obstante clause, under Section 100-A C.P.C. the prohibition of Letters Patent Appeal against the orders passed under Section 98 or 99 of the R.P. Act or those under the Arbitration Act, 1940, is by implication.
26. From this, it is evident that wherever the Letters Patent Appeal was available against a set of proceedings arising of an enactment, the only way, that was adopted to curb it, was, to make necessary provision in that enactment itself. This is obviously for the reason, there does not exist a facility to reframe the Letters Patent to prohibit, restrict, or expand its scope. By way of illustration it can be stated that Clause 15 of Letters Patent is a source of power for an internal appeal in the High Court, and access to it, in respect of different categories of matters is through different entrances or counters. If the Legislature is of the view that the matters of a particular category must be denied access to the Letters Patent, it can shut the entrance or counter by incorporating necessary provisions in the corresponding enactments. However, it is impermissible to close the access for matters arising out of one enactment by making provisions in another enactment.
27. The importance of the right, which accrues to a citizen under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, was emphasized by the Supreme Court in several cases. It was treated as a right, de hors, the provisions of the Act under which, the subject-matter arises. As is well-known, Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act prohibits an appeal, from any order or decree passed thereunder, viz., in a suit, filed for recovery of immovable property, of which the plaintiff was dispossessed, shortly before the suit was filed. In Vinita M. Khanolkar v. Pragna M. Pai, the Supreme Court examined the question as to whether a Letters Patent Appeal can still be maintained, in the teeth of such prohibition. The law, in this regard, was succinctly stated by Justice Majmudar, in the following passage:
Para-3: Now it is well settled that any statutory provision barring an appeal or revision cannot cut across the constitutional power of a High Court. Even the power flowing from the paramount Charter under which the High Court functions would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned expressly excludes appeals under Letters Patent. No such bar is discernible from Section 6(3) of the Act. It could not be seriously contended by learned Counsel for the respondents that if Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is invoked then the order would be appealable. Consequently, in our view, on the clear language of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent which is applicable to Bombay High Court, the said appeal was maintainable as the order under appeal was passed by learned Single Judge of the High Court exercising original jurisdiction of the Court.;
(emphasis supplied)
28. In Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar, the controversy related to the availability of Letters Patent Appeal against a judgment rendered in an appeal, filed under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. Here again, the Supreme Court emphasized that, the only way through which, a Letters Patent can be excluded, is by suitably amending the "enactment Concerned", under which, the subject-matter arises. After referring to its own judgment in Basant Kumar v. Union of India , and certain other judgments, the. Supreme Court observed as under:
Para 9: A Letters Patent is the Charter under which the High Court is established. The powers given to a High Court under the- Letters Patent are akin to the constitutional powers of a High Court. Thus when a Letters Patent grants to the High Court a power of appeal, against a judgment of a Single Judge, the right to entertain the appeal would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned excludes an appeal under the Letters Patent.
(emphasis supplied).
29. The underlined portions in the two paragraphs extracted above, clearly indicate that, in relation to the matters arising under special enactments, the appeal under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, can be excluded only by causing necessary amendments in the relevant provisions of the concerned enactments, and not through any other means. This aspect of the matter was further emphasized and clarified in Subal Paul's case (supra), wherein the Supreme Court held:
Para-21 : If a right of appeal is provided for under the Act, the limitation thereof must also be provided therein. A right of appeal which is provided under the Letters Patent cannot be said to be restricted. Limitation of a right of appeal in absence of any provision in a statute cannot be readily inferred. It is now well-settled that the appellate jurisdiction of a superior Court is not taken as excluded simply because Subordinate Court exercises its special jurisdiction.
The judgment in Sharda Devi's case (supra), was cited with approval. The Full Bench of this Court in G. Bhulaxmi's case (supra), examined the impact of amendment of Section 100-A, on the availability of Letters Patent Appeal, against a judgment rendered by a Single Judge, in a matter arising out of the M.V. Act. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Sharda Devi's case (supra), was cited before it, and discussion was undertaken thereon. Paragraph 13, which was extracted above, was quoted in that judgment also. However, Section 100-A of C.P.C. was treated as a statutory exclusion under the "enactment concerned". It has already been pointed out that the proceedings, under the M.V. Act and W.C. Act, are governed by the respective legislations and the C.P.C, has no application for them, from the stages of initiation of proceedings, to the stage of execution. Therefore, C.P.C. cannot be said to be the "statutory enactment concerned", in relation to proceedings under those two enactments. This aspect of the matter does not appear to have been argued or pressed before the Full Bench.
30. After the present reference came to be made to the Larger Bench, the Supreme Court rendered a judgment in P.S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd. JT 2004 (8) SC 464. This judgment was rendered by a Bench, comprising of Five-Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and the subject-matter was, interpretation of Sections 100-A and 104 of C.P.C It, however, needs to be noted that the subject-matter of that judgment was, the one, arising under C.P.C. itself. It was a claim petition, filed in execution proceedings. Another important fact is that Section 104-A, as amended in 2002, did not apply to that case. The entire case-law, touching on the interpretation of Letters Patent, and the provisions contained in various enactments, having a bearing on the scope of the appellate power under Letters Patent; was extensively discussed. In the minority judgment, it was held that the Letters Patent is only a supporting legislation. This was observed in the context of observations made in earlier pronouncements in Vinita's case (supra) and Sharda Devi's case (supra), to the effect that the powers conferred on High Court under Letters Patent, are constitutional in nature. The majority judgment, however affirmed the view expressed by the Supreme Court earlier, and held as under:
To submit that a Letters Patent is a subordinate piece of legislation is to not understand the true nature of a Letters Patent. As has been held in Vinita Khanolkar's case and Sharda Devi's case (supra) a Letters Patent is the Charter of the High Court. As held in Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra) a Letters Patent is the specific law under which a High Court derives its powers. It is not any subordinate piece of legislation.
So far as the question whether a Letters Patent can be excluded, either by implication or by causing an amendment, in a general law, as distinguished from specific law; the Supreme Court held:
As set out in aforementioned two cases a Letters Patent cannot be excluded by implication. Further it is settled law that between a special law and a general law the special law will always prevail. A Letters Patent is a special law for the concerned High Court. Civil Procedure Code is a general law applicable to all Courts. It is well settled law, that in the event of a conflict between a special law and a general law, the special law must always prevail.
31. No conflict as such was discerned in that case, since the proceedings arose under C.P.C, and the relevant provisions, which sought to restrict the scope of Letters Patent, were of the C.P.C. itself. After making reference to Section 4 of C.P.C, it was held that the application of a special law can be excluded by making a specific provision in such law, and not otherwise. Section 100-A of C.P.C, which, in fact, did not apply to the facts of that case; was treated as a specific provision, excluding the appeal under Letters Patent Appeal, obviously, in relation to proceedings arising under C.P.C. Ultimately, the view taken by the Madras High Court, that Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable, against an order passed by a Single Judge of that Court, in an appeal, filed against the dismissal of a claim petition; was held to be incorrect.
32. It was urged on behalf of the respondents that the ratio of the judgment in P.S. Sathappan's case (supra), is to the effect that, Section 100-A C.P.C, as it stands now, would exclude Letters Patent Appeals, arising out of the provisions of M.V. Act and W.C. Act. However, on a careful analysis of the matter, it becomes evident that, apart from not supporting the contentions of the respondents, the various observations made by the Supreme Court, some of which have already been extracted, indicate that, unless the exclusion is specific, by causing amendments to the concerned statutes, the appellate power, under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, in relation to such proceedings; does not get effected.
33. The legislative steps taken by the Parliament in enacting Section 100-A of C.P.C. in 1976 and thereafter in 2002, Section 116-A of Representation of Peoples' Act in 1967, and Sub-section (2) of Section 39 in 1950, are suggestive and indicative of the fact that the scope of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent can be restricted or regulated in relation to particular categories of matters by incorporating provisions in the corresponding enactments. Conversely, restriction placed in one enactment on the applicability of the Letters Patent cannot be applied to those under the other enactments. If that were to have been so, the earliest of the amendments, in an enactment, which prohibited, expressly, or by necessary implication, the Letters Patent Appeal, in relation to the matters arising out of that enactment would have barred such appeals, arising out of matters, under all other enactments. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the contention that Section 100-A of C.P.C, as amended in the year 2002, would prohibit Letters Patent Appeals, in respect of matters arising out of other enactments also.
34. This aspect of the matter can be buttressed by making a reference to an important development, which took place in the recent past. The provisions of the C.P.C. are made inapplicable to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Section 141 C.P.C. was suitably amended in this regard in the year 1976. It reads as under:
Section 141. Miscellaneous proceedings,- The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suit shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction.
Explanation.-In this section, the expression "proceedings" includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Despite the same, the Parliament amended Section 100-A C.P.C, through Act 46/99, in such a way, as to prohibit Letters Patent Appeals against the orders passed by the Single Judges in writ petitions, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Section 100-A, as amended through Act 46/99, reads as under:
100A. No further appeal in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force,-
(a) where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided,
(b) where any writ, direction or order is issued or made on an application under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, by a Single Judge of High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment, decision or order of such Single Judge.
35. Widespread protest was made by the Advocates' community against various amendments carried through Act 46 of 1999. The matter has also reached the Supreme Court. Ultimately, the amendments carried through in 1999 were revised and replaced by Act 22 of 2002. The revised form of Section 100-A, which holds the field, now, reads as under:
Section 100A : No further appeal in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such Single Judge.
Except that it adds the words "original or" before the words "appellate decree", it is the same as the one introduced in the year 1976.
36. Omission of clause, dealing with the appeals arising out of writs, directions or orders, passed under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, from Section 100-A, is not an insignificant development. The Parliament as well as the other concerned, did realize the fact that once explanation to Section 141, kept the C.P.C. away from the proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, it was impermissible for the C.P.C. to regulate or control the said proceedings vis-a-vis the Letters Patent. The same reason applies as regards the operation of Section 100-A of C.P.C, in relation to the proceedings to the other enactments, particularly those, which, barred suits and prescribed a procedure, different from the one, stipulated under C.P.C, as regard the adjudication of matters thereunder.
37. An attempt is made to suggest that the M.V. Act does not provide for a further appeal from the judgment of a Single Judge and as such one does not have to depend on, any amendment to the M.V. Act for restricting the same. In fact, the same can be said about the matters, arising out of original and appellate decrees under C.P.C. The further appeals were under Letters Patent. In fact, a categorical answer to this question, is found in the judgment of the Privy Council in Adaikappa Chettiar v. R. Chandrasekhara Thevar 1948 PC 12, wherein it was held:
Where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies if authorized by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not, in terms confer a right of appeal.
38. Learned Counsel for the respondents laid much emphasis upon the non-obstante clause contained in Section 100-A C.P.C. It was urged that, this section with a sweeping non-obstante clause, read with Section 44 of Letters Patent, would cover all the matters, and can be treated, almost as a general amendment to Clause 15 of Letters Patent, itself.
39. It is somewhat difficult, to accept such a sweeping and too general, a proposition. Recourse is had to, inclusion of non-obstante clauses, in the provisions of an enactment, basically for two purposes : The first is to accord primacy to the provision, in which, such a clause is used, over another provision, contained in the same, or other enactment. The second is to galvanize the situation, contemplated or dealt with, by a provision in which, the non-obstante clause is contained, from the operation, or impact of, an otherwise powerful and pervasive provision, in the same or other enactment.
40. Whatever may be the object, with which such a clause is used in a particular enactment, it does have any impact vis-avis the enforceability of provisions of another enactment, except for the situations, covered by the former. By no stretch of imagination, such a clause can control the operation of a provision of another enactment, vis-a-vis the subject-matter, covered by the latter, in other aspects. Such a situation, if permitted to emerge, would amount to an indirect amendment, and in extreme cases, repeal, of, other enactments, through the sole mechanism of incorporating a non-obstante clause, in other enactments; and this was never recognized as a valid legislative process.
41. It stands to reason, logic and common sense that the C.P.C. which is totally kept aside for the adjudication of matters arising under the M.V. Act, can by no stretch of imagination, govern them, at the stage of Letters Patent Appeal. Such a suggestion would ignore the fact that the Parliament deliberately kept the proceedings governed by the C.P.C. on the one hand, and those under the M.V. Act on the other hand, in two separate streams and there did not arise any occasion, for these distinct sets of proceedings, to coalesce.
42. At any rate, had the Parliament wanted to deny the remedy of further appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, against an order passed by learned Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 173 of the M.V. Act, or Section 30 of the W.C. Act, the easiest thing for it, would have been to suitably amend the said provisions. Since such a step was not taken, the valuable remedy available to a citizen cannot be taken away, by making a reference to the provisions of a Code, which is expressly made inapplicable, in relation to such matters.
43. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Section 104-A C.P.C, as amended to Act 22 of 2002, does not have the effect of excluding the Letters Patent Appeals against a judgment rendered by a Single Judge of a High Court, in a matter arising out of an enactment, other than C.P.C.