Gujarat High Court
Vanitaben D-O Natvarbhai Gordhan Patel vs Kamlaben Sukhabhai Mali on 13 August, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 2086 of 2013
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2013
In R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 2086 of 2013
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10729 of 2013
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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VANITABEN D-O NATVARBHAI GORDHAN PATEL
Versus
KAMLABEN SUKHABHAI MALI & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR P P MAJMUDAR(5284) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR SHITAL R PATEL(2166) for the Defendant(s) No. 4,5,6,7
RULE NOT RECD BACK for the Defendant(s) No. 10,8,9
RULE SERVED for the Defendant(s) No. 1,2,3
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
Date : 13/08/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
ORDER IN FIRST APPEAL NO.2086 OF 2013
1. The present First Appeal has been filed under Section 96 read with Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the CPC"). The appeal is filed at the instance of the original plaintiff of Special Civil Suit No. 244/2012, challenging the judgement and decree dated 30.04.2013 passed by the 12th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara, below Exhs. 17 Page 1 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined and 19, whereby the suit came to be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11(a), (c), and (d) of the CPC.
2. As far as possible, the parties to the appeal will be referred to as per their original position in the suit
3. Short Facts of the case appears to be reads as under:-
3.1. The Appellant herein is original plaintiff, whereas Respondents herein are original Defendants of Regular Civil Suit No.244/2012. The Defendant Nos.8 to 10 happen to be siblings (sisters) of plaintiff.
3.2. Whereas, plaint disclosed the facts that the Will executed in favour of father of plaintiff in relation to suit property, so plaintiff filed the suit considering herself having right and ownership over the suit property by way of the aforesaid Will. The registered sale deed dated 17/04/2009 executed by Defendants Nos. 1 to 3 in favour of Defendants No. 4 to 7 is null and void and illegal, and as such, the plaintiff is in legal use and possession of the suit property.
3.3. Defendants No. 4 to 7 and Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 have filed impugned applications vide Ex Nos. 17 and 19 respectively, praying that the suit filed with a deficit court fee, is barred by law, and that there is no cause of action for filing this suit and as such barred by law. The defendants further state that looking to the prayer of the Page 2 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined plaintiff, there was a deficit court fee and, looking to the market value of the suit property and the various prayers of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is liable to pay a deficit court fee of Rs. 1,50,000/- in all, and considering the deficit court fee, this suit is also required to be dismissed 3.4. While Defendants No. 1 to 3 have filed this application vide Ex. 19 under Order 7, Rule 11(a) and (d) of the C.P.C. to reject the plaint. In the said application, it is stated that the plaintiff has filed this suit for declaration and permanent injunction on the ground of a "Will" as described for the suit land situated at Tandalja, bearing R.S. No. 2. It is stated that the plaintiff has no cause of action to file this suit, as well as the plaintiff having no litigant interest in the suit. The 'banakhat' of the suit land was executed between the father of plaintiff and the defendant No.1 to 3's father and under such pretext, Will dated 27.12.1990 was executed in favour of father of plaintiff. But later on, such Will was cancelled by defendant No. 1to 3's father having executed Will dated 20.10.1995. So, an earlier Will was rejected as it was made by cheating by the father of the plaintiff, and as per the last Will, it was decided to give the suit land to the heirs as per the Will. And in that Will, the names of the defendants No. 1to 3 were mentioned as nominees.
3.5. It is further stated in the application that the plaintiff has Page 3 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined filed this suit without getting Probate of the said Will to get relief in respect of ownership, right, and possession of the waste land. That the suit is barred by Section 213 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 9 of the CPC. That this Court has no jurisdiction to decide this suit because the testimony of the Will is to be decided or heard only by the designated Probate Court, and even as proposed per Section 213 of the Indian Succession Act, whether this Will is last and final is decided only by the designated Court. Hence, as per Section 213 of the Indian Succession Act, whether this Will is last or not? Even right or wrong? The said question is to be decided by the Probate Court, and therefore, this suit cannot proceed as it is barred by law and is required to be rejected.
3.6. It is further contended that suit property was new tenure land which was restricted tenure and as per provisions of Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the "Tenancy Act, 1948") especially Section 43 of Tenancy Act, 1948, even through Will as well, such land could not have bequeathed in favour of father of plaintiff in turn by way of Will in favour of plaintiffs. There is a clear bar under law thus, neither cause of action to file suit nor could have been decided on its merit being barred by law.
3.7. The plaintiff has opposed both these applications filed below Exhs. 17 and 19, thereby contending that the suit requires to Page 4 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined be decided on its merits by giving her an opportunity to lead evidence to prove her case.
3.8. After hearing the parties, the trial Court has found that there is no cause of action arising in the matter and as such, no relief can be granted in favour of the plaintiff as it is barred under Section 43 of Tenancy Act, 1948. It was also observed by the trial Court that the plaintiff has not even paid the requisite court fee to maintain the suit when seeking the declaratory relief prayed for in the suit.
3.9. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, the trial Court, vide the impugned order dated 30.04.2013, rejected the suit. Hence, the present appeal has been filed.
4. SUBMISSION OF APPELLANT - PLAINTIFF:-
4.1. Learned Counsel Mr. Shegun Chokshi for learned Advocate Mr. P.P. Majmudar submits that the impugned order passed by the trial Court is without jurisdiction inasmuch as it has traveled beyond the ambit and scope of Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC.
4.2. Learned Counsel Mr. Chokshi would further submit that the trial Court could not have relied upon the documents which were submitted by the defendants along with their written statement, while adjudicating the impugned application filed below Page 5 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined Exhs. 17/19 under Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC.
4.3. It is submitted that whether the original owner of the suit land had the right to bequeath the suit land in favour of the father of the plaintiff by way of a will would be a matter of trial and could not have been examined in an application filed under Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC.
4.4. Learned Counsel Mr. Chokshi would further submit that the judgment which was cited and relied upon by the defendants would not be applicable to the case on hand, inasmuch as the execution of the will in favour of the father of the original plaintiff was on 27.12.1990 and, as such, the owner of the suit land, namely Sukharam, died on 05.09.1997. At that point in time, there was no such decision of this Court which prohibited the transfer of suit land by virtue of a will.
4.5. It was submitted that when the original owner of the suit land died in the year 1997, on the strength of his registered will dated 27.12.1990 in favour of the father of the plaintiff, he became the owner of the suit land. When the father of the plaintiff died on 07.02.2000, the plaintiff became a co-owner of the suit land along with Defendants Nos. 7 to 9.
4.6. Learned Counsel Mr. Chokshi further submitted that there are disputed questions of fact in the matter; thereby, the trial Court could not have rejected the plaint at the threshold. It is respectfully Page 6 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined submitted that as per the settled position of law, whenever there is a disputed fact in question, the suit cannot be rejected without allowing the parties to lead evidence.
4.7. Learned Counsel Mr. Chokshi would further submit that, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, none of the provisions of the Tenancy Act, 1948, would be applicable. It is respectfully submitted that neither Section 43 nor Section 63 of the Tenancy Act, 1948, would apply to the facts of the present case and, as such, there was no bar under the law for the execution of a will, in relation to the suit land. And as such, the trial Court has committed a serious error of law while rejecting the suit.
4.8. Making the above submissions, I would request this Court to allow the present appeal.
5. POINT FOR DETERMINATION:-
i) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the trial Court has committed any error of law while rejecting the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11(a), (c), and (d) of the CPC or not?
6. ANALYSIS:-
7. The facts which are observed herein above are not in dispute.
The plaintiff, claiming to be one of the legal heirs of one Late Natvarbhai Gordhanbhai Patel, who was allegedly holding a registered Will dated 27.12.1990 of one Late Mr. Sukhabhai Page 7 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined Shamalbhai Mali (erstwhile owner of suit land) whereby, Late Mr. Sukhabhai bequeathed the suit land in favour of said late Mr. Natvarbhai.
8. The averments made in the plaint would indicate that Late Mr. Sukhabhai was tilling the suit land and by virtue of a Gujarat Government circular dated 30.06.1962 and an order passed thereon dated 19.09.1962, Mr. Sukhabhai and Mr. Chhotabhai Mansukhbhai received the land. As Late Mr. Sukhabhai deposited some amount as per a circular dated 25.01.1963, the suit land was occupied and owned by him as a new tenure land.
9. The revenue records were also submitted by the plaintiff herself along with the plaint. The bare reading of such averments made in the plaint, coupled with the documents/evidence produced on record by the plaintiff herself, it would appear that the suit land was a new tenure land. Further, it appears that such land was made available to Late Mr. Sukhabhai as he was tilling the land.
This fact remains undisputed, as stated by the plaintiff herself in the plaint, which can surely be looked into by the trial Court while adjudicating the impugned application filed below Exhs. 17/19 by the original Defendants Nos. 1 to 7 under Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC.
9.1. The trial Court has considered such averments made in the plaint and so also referred revenue records made available by Page 8 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined plaintiff on record along with his suit and so also referred a decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajenbhai Baldevbhai Shah Vs. Baljiben Kabhaibhai Patanwadia And Others, reported in 2009 (2) GLR 1784 whereby, rejected the suit.
9.2. The issue germane in the present appeal is, as such, squarely covered by decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajenbhai (supra) which was confirmed by Full Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of Rajenbhai Baldevbhai Shah Vs. Laxmanbhai Fakirbhai And Others reported in 2020 18 SCC 144.
10. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajenbhai Shah (supra) held thus:-
"1. Leave granted. These appeals arise out of the common judgment and order dated 17-3-2009 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No. 25058 of 2006 and all other connected matters while answering the questions referred to it by a Single Judge of the High Court. The questions that arose for consideration and the circumstances in which the matters were referred to it were set out by the Division Bench as under : (SCC OnLine Guj) "We are called upon to decide as to whether Section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (for short "the Bombay Tenancy Act") debars an agriculturist from parting with his agricultural land to a non-agriculturist through a "will" so also, whether Section 43(1) of the Tenancy Act restricts transfer of any land or interest purchased by the tenant under Sections 17-B, 32, 32-F, 32-I, 32-O, 32-U, 33(1) or 88-E or sold to any person under Section 32-P or 64 of the Tenancy Act through the execution of a will or by way of testamentary disposition. Learned Single Judges of this Court have taken a consistent view that such transfer of property through testamentary disposition would not violate Page 9 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined Section 43 or 63 of the Tenancy Act. J.B. Mehta, J. in Manharlal Ratanlal v. Taiyabali Jaji Mohamed [Manharlal Ratanlal v. Taiyabali Jaji Mohamed, (1967-68) 5 Guj LT 199] while interpreting Section 43(1) of the Tenancy Act took the view that the expression "transfer" which is used in Section 43(1) of the Tenancy Act must be interpreted in the light of the Transfer of Property Act viz. the transfer by way of act of parties. Learned Judge took the view that, if the legislature wanted to include a transfer by operation of law as to include succession, insolvency, inheritance, etc. or sales by public auction, specific provision would have been made to that effect. Learned Judge held that all the specific categories which are mentioned are all of transfers by act of parties, bequest by will cannot be included in the scope of the term "gift" or "assignment". Rajesh Balia, J. in Ghanshyambhai Nabheram v. State of Gujarat [Ghanshyambhai Nabheram v. State of Gujarat, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 266 : (1999) 40 (2) GLR 1061] while interpreting Section 63 of the Tenancy Act took a view that just like, a non-agriculturist be not deprived Leave granted. These appeals arise out of the common judgment and order dated 17-3-2009 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No. 25058 of 2006 and all other connected matters while answering the questions referred to it by a Single Judge of the High Court. The questions that arose for consideration and the circumstances in which the matters were referred to it were set out by the Division Bench as under : (SCC OnLine Guj) "We are called upon to decide as to whether Section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (for short "the Bombay Tenancy Act") debars an agriculturist from parting with his agricultural land to a non- agriculturist through a "will" so also, whether Section 43(1) of the Tenancy Act restricts transfer of any land or interest purchased by the tenant under Sections 17-B, 32, 32-F, 32-I, 32-O, 32-U, 33(1) or 88-E or sold to any person under Section 32-P or 64 of the Tenancy Act through the execution of a will or by way of testamentary disposition.
Learned Single Judges of this Court have taken a consistent view that such transfer of property through testamentary disposition would not violate Section 43 or 63 of the Tenancy Act. J.B. Mehta, J. in Manharlal Ratanlal v. Taiyabali Jaji Mohamed [Manharlal Ratanlal v. Taiyabali Jaji Mohamed, (1967-68) 5 Guj LT 199] while interpreting Section 43(1) of the Tenancy Act took the view that the expression "transfer" which is used in Section 43(1) of the Tenancy Act must be interpreted in the light of the Transfer of Property Act viz. the transfer by way of act of parties. Learned Judge took the view that, if the legislature wanted to include a transfer by operation of law as to include Page 10 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined succession, insolvency, inheritance, etc. or sales by public auction, specific provision would have been made to that effect. Learned Judge held that all the specific categories which are mentioned are all of transfers by act of parties, bequest by will cannot be included in the scope of the term "gift" or "assignment". Rajesh Balia, J. in Ghanshyambhai Nabheram v. State of Gujarat [Ghanshyambhai Nabheram v. State of Gujarat, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 266 : (1999) 40 (2) GLR 1061] while interpreting Section 63 of the Tenancy Act took a view that just like, a non-agriculturist be not deprived of his inheritance, a legatee under a will, can also be a non-agriculturist, hence, there is no bar in succeeding the property through testamentary disposition. Learned Judge held that Revenue laws dealing with agricultural lands have not made the land uninheritable and they also do not disqualify a non- agriculturist from inheritance nor a number of persons are disentitled from succeeding to estate of an agriculturist as body of successors, which may result in well-defined share of the estate of deceased vesting in them individually. Rajesh Balia, J. again in Pravinbhai Bhilalbhai Gor v. Rajivkumar Gupta [Pravinbhai Bhilalbhai Gor v. Rajivkumar Gupta, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 260 : (1999) 40 (1) GLR 440] while interpreting Sections 43 and 63 of the Tenancy Act took the view that both provisions clearly go to show that they refer only to transaction or transfer or agreement to transfer of land or any interest therein which are inter vivos and not to vesting of such rights in anyone as a result of transmission or as a result of succession on death of holder and the provisions do not affect the operation of law of inheritance. Appeal filed against the above judgment was, however, dismissed in State of Gujarat v. Pravinbhai Bhailalbhai Gor [State of Gujarat v. Pravinbhai Bhailalbhai Gor, 1999 SCC OnLine Guj 476 : (2000) 41 (3) GLR 2168] . K.A. Puj, J. also took identical view in Gasfulbhai Mohmadbhai Bilakhia v. State of Gujarat [Gasfulbhai Mohmadbhai Bilakhia v. State of Gujarat, 2004 SCC OnLine Guj 242 : (2005) 46 (1) GLR 575] and Gopiram Dedraj Agrawal v. State of Gujarat [Gopiram Dedraj Agrawal v. State of Gujarat, 2003 SCC OnLine Guj 405 : (2004) 45 (1) GLR 237] . Learned Judge also made reference to the Circular dated 13-2-1989 issued by the State Government and took a view that that Section 43 as well as Section 63 of the Tenancy Act would not debar transfer of property by testamentary disposition. R.K. Abichandani, J. also took the same view in Babubhai Mervanbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat [Babubhai Mervanbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2004 SCC OnLine Guj 623 : (2005) 1 GLH (UJ) 3] . Learned Single Judge Jayant Patel expressed some doubts about the views expressed in the abovereferred judgments and felt that the matter requires reconsideration in the light of the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in Sangappa Kalyanappa Bangi v. Land Tribunal, Jamkhandi [Sangappa Kalyanappa Bangi v. Land Tribunal, Page 11 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined Jamkhandi, (1998) 7 SCC 294] (Rajendra Babu, J.) and Jayamma v. Maria Bai [Jayamma v. Maria Bai, (2004) 7 SCC 459] (Sinha, J.) and hence these matters have been placed before us."of his inheritance, a legatee under a will, can also be a non-agriculturist, hence, there is no bar in succeeding the property through testamentary disposition. Learned Judge held that Revenue laws dealing with agricultural lands have not made the land uninheritable and they also do not disqualify a non-agriculturist from inheritance nor a number of persons are disentitled from succeeding to estate of an agriculturist as body of successors, which may result in well-defined share of the estate of deceased vesting in them individually. Rajesh Balia, J. again in Pravinbhai Bhilalbhai Gor v. Rajivkumar Gupta [Pravinbhai Bhilalbhai Gor v. Rajivkumar Gupta, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 260 : (1999) 40 (1) GLR 440] while interpreting Sections 43 and 63 of the Tenancy Act took the view that both provisions clearly go to show that they refer only to transaction or transfer or agreement to transfer of land or any interest therein which are inter vivos and not to vesting of such rights in anyone as a result of transmission or as a result of succession on death of holder and the provisions do not affect the operation of law of inheritance. Appeal filed against the above judgment was, however, dismissed in State of Gujarat v. Pravinbhai Bhailalbhai Gor [State of Gujarat v. Pravinbhai Bhailalbhai Gor, 1999 SCC OnLine Guj 476 : (2000) 41 (3) GLR 2168] . K.A. Puj, J. also took identical view in Gasfulbhai Mohmadbhai Bilakhia v. State of Gujarat [Gasfulbhai Mohmadbhai Bilakhia v. State of Gujarat, 2004 SCC OnLine Guj 242 : (2005) 46 (1) GLR 575] and Gopiram Dedraj Agrawal v. State of Gujarat [Gopiram Dedraj Agrawal v. State of Gujarat, 2003 SCC OnLine Guj 405 : (2004) 45 (1) GLR 237] . Learned Judge also made reference to the Circular dated 13-2-1989 issued by the State Government and took a view that that Section 43 as well as Section 63 of the Tenancy Act would not debar transfer of property by testamentary disposition. R.K. Abichandani, J. also took the same view in Babubhai Mervanbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat [Babubhai Mervanbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2004 SCC OnLine Guj 623 : (2005) 1 GLH (UJ) 3] . Learned Single Judge Jayant Patel expressed some doubts about the views expressed in the abovereferred judgments and felt that the matter requires reconsideration in the light of the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in Sangappa Kalyanappa Bangi v. Land Tribunal, Jamkhandi [Sangappa Kalyanappa Bangi v. Land Tribunal, Jamkhandi, (1998) 7 SCC 294] (Rajendra Babu, J.) and Jayamma v. Maria Bai [Jayamma v. Maria Bai, (2004) 7 SCC 459] (Sinha, J.) and hence these matters have been placed before us."
7. The Division Bench considered the scope and ambit of Sections 43 and 63 of the Act as under : (Rajenbhai Baldevbhai Shah case [Rajenbhai Page 12 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined Baldevbhai Shah v. Baijiben Kabhaibhai Patanvadia, 2009 SCC OnLine Guj 1804 : (2009) 50 (2) GLR 1784] , SCC OnLine Guj) "We may, before examining the scope and ambit of Sections 43 and 63 of the Tenancy Act, examine the object and purpose of the Tenancy Act. The Bombay Tenancy Act was enacted with an avowed object of safeguarding interest of the tenants who held the land for over a number of years, on principle that the land tilled belongs to the tillers of the soil and also to preserve agricultural lands to safeguard interest of the agriculturists. Object is also to improve the economic and social conditions of peasants ensuring the full and efficient use of land for agriculture, and to assume management of estates held by landholders and to regulate and impose restrictions on the transfer of agricultural lands, dwelling houses, sites and lands appurtenant thereto belonging to or occupied by agriculturists, agricultural labourers and artisans. Chapters II and III of the Act deal with tenancies in general and "protected tenants" and their special rights, and privileges, in particular. Legislature also thought it necessary to confer on "protected tenants" the right to purchase their holdings from their landlords, to prevent uneconomic cultivation and to create and encourage peasant proprietorship in respect of holdings of suitable sizes. The Act is covered by Schedule VII List II Entry 18 to the Constitution of India and was enacted for the protection of tenants and to organise agriculture by maintaining agricultural lands so as to be in tune with the directive principles of the State Policy. Article 48 of the Constitution of India state that the State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines, and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter of cows, calves and other milch and drought cattle. The necessity of meeting agricultural production and to preserve agricultural land is clearly discernible in the above constitutional provisions. Further, by enacting clause
(g) in Article 51-A, Parliament has given the status of fundamental duties to Article 48 and honoured the spirit and message of Article 48 as a fundamental duty of the citizens. The Bombay Tenancy Act not only takes a positive step towards achieving the goal of transferring the land tilled to the tillers, but also wanted to preserve and protect agricultural lands and for improving the economic and social conditions of persons and to ensure the full and efficient use of land for agriculture. Section 43, which appears in Chapter III of the Tenancy Act, deals with special rights and privileges of tenants and provisions for distribution of land for personal cultivation. Section 63 appears in Chapter V of the Tenancy Act deals with restrictions on transfers of agricultural lands, management of uncultivated lands and acquisition of estates and lands."
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8. In these appeals challenging the correctness of the decision [Rajenbhai Baldevbhai Shah v. Baijiben Kabhaibhai Patanvadia, 2009 SCC OnLine Guj 1804 : (2009) 50 (2) GLR 1784] of the Division Bench of the High Court, we have heard Mr Sanjay Parikh, learned Senior Advocate and Mr Raghavendra S. Srivatsa, learned advocate for the appellants and Mr Aniruddha P. Mayee, learned advocate for the State.
9. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that what is prohibited under Sections 43 and 63 of the Act is transfer inter vivos, and not any "testamentary disposition" by the holder of the land. In their submission, the expressions used in Sections 43 and 63 like "sale", "gift", "exchange", and "mortgage" are suggestive of transfers by a living person and the expression "assignment" in Section 43(1) of the Act must be read ejusdem generis with the preceding expressions appearing in that section and that the expression "assignment" does not even appear in Section 63. It is, therefore, submitted that both these provisions do not deal with any "testamentary disposition".
10. It is also submitted by Mr Srivatsa that the concept of succession, whether testamentary or intestate, being part of Schedule VII List III Entry 5 to the Constitution and a concurrent subject, the Central legislation, namely, the Succession Act, 1925 must hold the field and any prohibition in the State enactment inconsistent with the general principles of the Central legislation, in the absence of any assent of the President, would be void. It is further submitted that the State Legislature must be taken to be fully aware of this legal position and, therefore, while construing the term "assignment" due regard to this aspect must also be given. As an extension of this submission, it is contended that the decisions of this Court in relation to the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 in Sangappa [Sangappa Kalyanappa Bangi v. Land Tribunal, Jamkhandi, (1998) 7 SCC 294] and Jayamma [Jayamma v. Maria Bai, (2004) 7 SCC 459] are distinguishable as the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 had received Presidential assent, whereas, the provisions of the Act have not received any such assent. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of this Court in Mahadeo v. Shakuntalabai [Mahadeo v. Shakuntalabai, (2017) 13 SCC 756 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 749] in which similar provisions from the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1958 (as applicable to Vidarbha Region of the State of Maharashtra) came up for consideration before this Court.
12. We may now consider the decisions of this Court which have dealt with issues concerning testamentary disposition of agricultural holdings--
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12.1. In Sangappa [Sangappa Kalyanappa Bangi v. Land Tribunal, Jamkhandi, (1998) 7 SCC 294] , the facts were noted as under : (SCC p. 296, para 2) "2. The facts leading to this appeal are as follows:
Sangappa Bangi made an application under Section 45 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") in Form 7 claiming occupancy rights in respect of the land in question. During the pendency of the proceedings, he made a will on 8-4-1975 bequeathing his tenancy rights in respect of the land in favour of one Ameerjan who claims to be the legal representative of the appellant Sangappa who died during the pendency of proceedings before the Tribunal. She in turn executed another will under which Husensab is making a claim to the land through the said Sangappa. Respondent 2 is the wife of the said Sangappa while Respondents 3 to 5 are the children of Sangappa. The Land Tribunal as well as the Appellate Authority examined the question whether right to tenancy could have been the subject-matter of a bequest under a will. In answering that question, the Appellate Authority referred to a decision of the High Court of Karnataka in Shivanna v. Rachiah [Shivanna v. Rachiah, (1977) 1 Kant LJ (SN 160) 146] wherein it was stated that there was no prohibition against a tenant disposing of his interest by testamentary disposition. However it was stated that such testamentary disposition must be confined to the heirs of the deceased or an interpretation of the provision of Sections 21 and 24 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act that the tenancy rights are inherited only by legal representatives and not by anybody else; that tenancy could be deemed to have been continued in favour of the heirs of the tenant. It is also made clear that transfer of tenancy rights made in violation of the provisions of Section 21 would be void. The High Court did not give any detailed reasons, but taking the view that the Appellate Authority and the Land Tribunal having concurrently held that Respondents 2 to 5 are entitled to grant of occupancy rights, found no reasons to interfere with the order made by them." 12.2. The question that arose for consideration was dealt with by this Court as under : (SCC pp. 298-99, paras 5-6) "5. This case gives rise to a difficult and doubtful question, whether a devise under a will would amount to an assignment of interest in the lands and, therefore, would be invalid under the provisions of Section 21 of the Land Reforms Act. What is prohibited under Section 21 of the Act is that there cannot be any sub-division or sub-letting of the land held by a tenant or assignment of any interest thereunder. Exceptions thereto are when the tenant dies, the surviving members of the joint family and if he is not a member of the joint family, his heirs shall be entitled to partition and sub-divide the land Page 15 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined leased subject to certain conditions. Section 24 of the Act declares that when a tenant dies, the landlord is deemed to continue the tenancy to the heirs of such tenant on the same terms and conditions on which the tenant was holding at the time of his death. We have to read Section 21 with Section 24 to understand the full purport of the provisions. Section 24 is enacted only for the purpose of making it clear that the tenancy continues notwithstanding the death of the tenant and such tenancy is held by the heirs of such tenant on the same terms and conditions on which he had held prior to his death. The heirs who can take the property are those who are referable to in Section 21. If he is a member of the joint family, then the surviving members of the joint family and if he is not such a member of a joint family, his heirs would be entitled to partition. Again, as to who his heirs are will have to be determined not with reference to the Act, but with reference to the personal law on the matter. The assignment of any interest in the tenanted land will not be valid. A devise or a bequest under a will cannot be stated to fall outside the scope of the said provisions inasmuch as such assignment disposes of or deals with the lease.
When there is a disposition of rights under a will, though it operates posthumously is nevertheless a recognition of the right of the legatee thereunder as to his rights of the tenanted land. In that event, there is an assignment of the tenanted land, but that right will come into effect after the death of the testator. Therefore, though it can be said in general terms that the devise simpliciter will not amount to an assignment, in a special case of this nature, interpretation will have to be otherwise.
6. If we bear in mind the purpose behind Section 21, it becomes clear that the object of the law is not to allow strangers to the family of the tenant to come upon the land. The tenanted land is not allowed to be sub-let i.e. to pass to the hands of a stranger nor any kind of assignment taking place in respect of the lease held. If the tenant could assign his interest, strangers can come upon the land, and therefore, the expression "assignment" will have to be given such meaning as to promote the object of the enactment. Therefore, the deceased tenant can assign his rights only to the heirs noticed in the provision and such heirs could only be the spouse or any descendants or one who is related to the deceased tenant by legitimate kinship. We must take into consideration that when it is possible for the tenant to pass the property to those who may not necessarily be the heirs under the ordinary law and who become heirs only by reason of a bequest under a will in which event, he would be a stranger to the family and imported on the land thus to the detriment of the landlord. In that event, it must be taken that a devise under a will will also amount to an assignment and, therefore, be not valid for the purpose of Section 21 of the Act. If Section 24 is read along with Section 21, it would only mean that the land can pass by succession to the heirs of a deceased tenant, but subject to Page 16 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined the conditions prescribed in Section 21 of the Act. Therefore, we are of the view that the broad statement made by the High Court in the two decisions in Shivanna [Shivanna v. Rachiah, (1977) 1 Kant LJ (SN 160) 146] and Dhareppa v. State of Karnataka [Dhareppa v. State of Karnataka, 1978 SCC OnLine Kar 308 : (1979) 1 Kant LJ 18] would not promote the object and purpose of the law. Therefore, the better view appears to us is as stated by the High Court in Timmakka Kom Venkanna Naik v. Land Tribunal [Timmakka Kom Venkanna Naik v. Land Tribunal, 1987 SCC OnLine Kar 172 : (1987) 2 Kant LJ 337] ."
12.3. Similar issues regarding disposition by will were dealt with by this Court in Jayamma [Jayamma v. Maria Bai, (2004) 7 SCC 459] , as follows : (SCC pp. 464-65, paras 16 & 18-22) "16. We would discuss the construction of the provision of Section 61 of the said Act, a little later, but we have no hesitation in holding that in the event if it be held that the testator could not have executed the will in favour of a person who could not be declared to be a tenant having occupancy right, such a will would be void ab initio and, therefore, non est in the eye of the law. The court in such an event would not be determining a disputed question of title but would be considering the effect of the statute vis-à-vis the will in question.
***
18. As we have noticed hereinbefore, that the statutory embargo on transfer of land is stricter in a case where the tenant has become occupant than a land held by a tenant simpliciter. We have also noticed that the embargo on transfer is not only by way of sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease but also by assignment. What is permitted under the law is partition of the land amongst the members of the family. Section 61 of the Act is to be read in its entirety.
19. Sub-section (3) of Section 61 lays down that any transfer of land in contravention of sub-section (1) shall be invalid whereupon the same shall vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The legislative intent that the land should not be allowed to go into the hands of a stranger to the family is, therefore, manifest. Whereas in terms of Section 21, strangers to the family of the tenant to come upon the land is not allowed, the tenor of Section 61 is that except partition amongst the co-sharers, no transfer of the property, in any manner, is permissible.
20. When an assignment or transfer is made in contravention of statutory provisions, the consequence whereof would be that the same is invalid, and thus, being opposed to public policy the same shall attract the provisions of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.
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21. It is not disputed that in view of the purport and object the legislature sought to achieve by enacting the said provision the expression "assignment" would include a will.
22. In this case, there is also no dispute that grant of agricultural land with occupancy right in terms of the provisions of the said Act was made on 14-10- 1981. The will in question having been executed on 20-2-1984; the transfer has been made within a period of fifteen years from the date of grant which is prohibited in law."
12.4. Both these decisions were in the context of prohibition against transfer or assignment under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. In Mahadeo [Mahadeo v. Shakuntalabai, (2017) 13 SCC 756 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 749] , this Court dealt with Section 57 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1958 as applicable to Vidarbha Region of the State Maharashtra, and observed : (SCC pp. 757-58, paras 4-6) "4. The High Court took the view [Mahadeo v. Shakuntalabai, 2003 SCC OnLine Bom 453 : (2004) 2 Bom CR 456] that the provisions of Section 57 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1958 pertaining to Vidarbha Region do not permit the transfer of land by way of a will. Section 57 of the Act which is relevant reads as follows:
'57. Restriction on transfers of land purchased or sold under this Act.--(1) No land purchased by a tenant under Section 41 or 46 or 49-A or 57-D or 130 or sold to any person under Section 91 or 122 shall be transferred by sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or assignment without the previous sanction of the Collector. Such sanction shall be given by the Collector in such circumstances and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by the State Government.
(2) Any transfer of land in contravention of sub-section (1) shall be invalid:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to the lands purchased by an occupancy tenant.'
5. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that transfer without the previous sanction of the Collector is impermissible by way of sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or assignment. There is no prohibition insofar as the transfer of land by way of a will is concerned. In fact, in view of the decision of this Court in State of W.B. v. Kailash Chandra Kapur [State of W.B. v. Kailash Chandra Kapur, (1997) 2 SCC 387] , devolution of property by way of a will does not amount to a transfer of the property. This is clear from para 12 of the aforesaid decision wherein it has been observed that transfer connotes, normally, between two living persons during life. However, Page 18 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined a will takes effect after demise of the testator and transfer in that perspective becomes incongruous.
6. That the beneficiary of a will receives the property by way of devolution and not by way of transfer is also made clear by the decision of this Court in S. Rathinam v. L.S. Mariappan [S. Rathinam v. L.S. Mariappan, (2007) 6 SCC 724] wherein this Court has held in para 21 that : (SCC p. 732) '21. A testator by his will, may make any disposition of his property subject to the condition that the same should not be inconsistent with the laws or contrary to the policy of the State. A will of a man is the aggregate of his testamentary intentions so far as they are manifested in writing. It is not a transfer but a mode of devolution.' In coming to this conclusion, this Court referred to Beru Ram v. Shankar Dass [Beru Ram v. Shankar Dass, 1998 SCC OnLine J&K 19 : AIR 1999 J&K 55] ."
12.5. It must be stated here that the decisions in Sangappa [Sangappa Kalyanappa Bangi v. Land Tribunal, Jamkhandi, (1998) 7 SCC 294] and Jayamma [Jayamma v. Maria Bai, (2004) 7 SCC 459] were rendered by Benches of two Judges and so was the decision in Mahadeo [Mahadeo v.
Shakuntalabai, (2017) 13 SCC 756 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 749] . However, the decision in Mahadeo [Mahadeo v. Shakuntalabai, (2017) 13 SCC 756 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 749] does not show that the attention of the Bench was invited to the earlier decisions in Sangappa [Sangappa Kalyanappa Bangi v. Land Tribunal, Jamkhandi, (1998) 7 SCC 294] and Jayamma [Jayamma v. Maria Bai, (2004) 7 SCC 459] .
12.6. The decision of this Court in Sangappa [Sangappa Kalyanappa Bangi v. Land Tribunal, Jamkhandi, (1998) 7 SCC 294] had approved the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka in Timmakka [Timmakka Kom Venkanna Naik v. Land Tribunal, 1987 SCC OnLine Kar 172 : (1987) 2 Kant LJ 337] , wherein the following observations were made by the Division Bench : (SCC OnLine Kar paras 13-15) "13. Two decisions of the Supreme Court were also referred, in support of his contention by the learned counsel. In Jaspal Singh v. Addl. District Judge, Bulandshahr [Jaspal Singh v. Addl. District Judge, Bulandshahr, (1984) 4 SCC 434] , a question arose under U.P. Act 13 of 1972. There was a bar against transfer of the tenant's interest during his lifetime. Similarly, if a tenant sub-leases the premises, he was liable to be ejected. Therefore, is was held that the scheme of the Act did not warrant the transfer of the tenancy right, to be effective after the lifetime of the tenant. Thus the claim of the nephew of the tenant who claimed the right under a will executed by the Page 19 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined deceased tenant was rejected.
14. In Bhavarlal Labhchand Shah v. Kanaiyalal Nathalal Intawala [Bhavarlal Labhchand Shah v. Kanaiyalal Nathalal Intawala, (1986) 1 SCC 571] the question was whether the tenant of a non-residential premises continuing in occupation after the period of contract is over, can bequeath his right of occupation by will. The Supreme Court negatived such a contention. The Supreme Court approved the observations of the Bombay High Court in Anant T. Sabnis v. Vasant Pratap Pandit [Anant T. Sabnis v. Vasant Pratap Pandit, 1979 SCC OnLine Bom 90 : AIR 1980 Bom 69] which were extracted....
15. Having regard to the above decisions, we are of the opinion that the deceased Hammi could not have bequeathed the tenancy right in favour of Respondents 2 and 3 or to any one of them. If so, any possession and cultivation by Respondents 2 and 3, after the death of the original tenant Hammi, cannot be termed as lawful and they cannot be termed as tenants. It has also come on record that throughout there was protest by the appellant against registering the names of Respondents 2 and 3 or any one of them as a tenant in the record-of-rights. Therefore, as on 1-3-1974 neither Respondent 2 nor Respondent 3 was cultivating the lands in question as a tenant and hence Sections 44, 45 or 48-A of the Act cannot govern their claim. The Land Tribunal erred in granting occupancy right in favour of Respondents 2 and 3 on the basis of the alleged will and hence the same is liable to be set aside. In this view of the matter, the learned Single Judge should have reversed the order of the Land Tribunal. Therefore, the order of the learned Single Judge also cannot be sustained."
12.7. On the other hand, the decision in Mahadeo [Mahadeo v. Shakuntalabai, (2017) 13 SCC 756 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 749] had placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in State of W.B. v. Kailash Chandra Kapur [State of W.B. v. Kailash Chandra Kapur, (1997) 2 SCC 387] and in S. Rathinam [S. Rathinam v. L.S. Mariappan, (2007) 6 SCC 724] . In neither of these cases any statutory prohibition or restriction on transfer or assignment was involved.
(emphasis supplied)
10. As referred to hereinabove, the aforesaid judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court was carried to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which has confirmed the aforesaid judgment in a Page 20 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined case of Laxmanbhai Fakirbhai And Others (supra) held thus:-
"35. If the provisions referred to in Section 43 of the Act and allied provisions are considered in light of the settled principles extracted earlier, it emerges that the primary concern of those provisions is to see that the legislative scheme of granting protection to persons from disadvantaged categories and conferring the right of purchase upon them, and thereby ensure direct relationship of a tiller with the land. The provisions, though lay down a norm which may not be fully consistent with the principles of the Succession Act, are principally designed to attain and subserve the purpose of protecting the holdings in the hands of disadvantaged categories. The prohibition against transfers of holding without the previous sanction of the authorities concerned, is to be seen in that light as furthering the cause of legislation. Even if by the process of construction, the expression "assignment" is construed to include testamentary disposition, in keeping with the settled principles, the incidental encroachment cannot render the said provisions invalid. In pith and substance, the legislation and the provisions concerned are completely within the competence of the State Legislature and by placing the construction upon the expression "assignment" to include testamentary disposition, no transgression will ensue.
37. In the premises, we accept the construction put by the Division Bench on the provisions that fell for consideration. The challenge to the view [Rajenbhai Baldevbhai Shah v. Baijiben Kabhaibhai Patanvadia, 2009 SCC OnLine Guj 1804 : (2009) 50 (2) GLR 1784] taken by the Division Bench must therefore be rejected. We must also observe that the decision of this Court in Mahadeo [Mahadeo v. Shakuntalabai, (2017) 13 SCC 756 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 749] which had failed to notice the earlier decisions in Sangappa [Sangappa Kalyanappa Bangi v. Land Tribunal, Jamkhandi, (1998) 7 SCC 294] and Jayamma [Jayamma v. Maria Bai, (2004) 7 SCC 459] and which is inconsistent with the decisions referred to hereinabove and what we have concluded, must be held to be incorrectly decided."
(emphesis supplied)
11. Thus, in view of the above-stated legal position of law, it is now a well-settled legal position of law that the land which is restricted tenure land/new tenure land as per the provisions of the Tenancy Act, 1948, such land cannot be bequeathed by way of Page 21 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined execution of Will. If it done so, no right would accrue in favour of the beneficiary of the Will. Once such is the position of law, the execution of any alleged Will by Late Mr. Sukhabhai in favour of the father of the plaintiff, in relation to the suit land concerned, the father of the plaintiff could not have derived any benefit out of such Will, as the land is undisputedly a new tenure - restricted nature of land given by the Government to Late Mr. Sukhabhai, who was tilling it when it was offered.
12. When no right accrued in favour of the father of the plaintiff in relation to the suit land is concerned, the question of any transfer of such alleged non-exist right would not be passed on to the plaintiff and/or her siblings. So, there would not be any cause of action accrued for filing the aforesaid suit seeking any declaration as prayed for in the suit. Likewise, the execution of a Will could not be considered as a transfer in favour of the father of the plaintiff, having a bar under Section 43 read with Section 63 of the Tenancy Act, 1948. In light of aforesaid provisions of law, the suit itself would not be maintainable whereby the plaintiff is questioning the sale deed executed by the legal heirs of Late Mr. Sukhabhai, i.e., Defendants Nos. 1 to 3 in favour of Defendants Nos. 4 to 7 on 17.04.2012.
13. Further, observation as regards deficient court fees is concern, considering nature of dispute and declaration sought for Page 22 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined by plaintiff, she required to pay court fee as per valuation of suit property as plaintiff is seeking declaration qua suit property apart from seeking declaration that sale deed in question is null and void not binding to plaintiff. So, on all counts, suit deserves to be rejected.
14. Thus, in view of aforesaid, none of the arguments canvassed by learned Advocate Mr. Chokshi impressed me to take a different view than that taken by the trial Court. As such, I do not find any error committed by the trial Court while rejecting the suit as, according to my view also, the suit would not be maintainable as stated aforesaid.
15. In view of the aforesaid observations, discussions, and reasons, there is no merit in the appeal, which requires to be dismissed, which is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. The Record and Proceedings if any received by this Court shall be returned to the trial Court forthwith. The Civil Application is also disposed of accordingly.
ORDER IN SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10729 of 2013:-
1. The present writ application is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the original plaintiff of Regular Civil Suit No. 244 of 2012, thereby challenging the impugned order dated Page 23 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/2086/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 13/08/2025 undefined 13.04.2013 passed by the 12th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara, below Exh. 17 in the aforesaid suit.
2. As such, in view of the order, judgment, and decree dated 13.08.2025 passed by this Court while dismissing First Appeal No. 2086 of 2013 as aforesaid, the present writ application is not required to be further adjudicated upon.
3. Accordingly, the present writ application is also rejected.
Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. Interim relief stands vacated forthwith (MAULIK J.SHELAT,J) KKN Page 24 of 24 Uploaded by MS.KAJAL KISHORBHAI NAVLAKHA (HCD0076) on Tue Aug 26 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Aug 29 23:00:11 IST 2025