Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
M/S Almomin College Of Education, vs The Registrar, on 18 June, 2021
Author: M. Satyanarayana Murthy
Bench: M. Satyanarayana Murthy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH: AMARAVATI
WRIT PETITION No.18703 of 2020;
W.P.Nos.1438, 2104, 2716, 2734, 2756, 2772, 2788, 2800, 2845, 3848,
3851, 4875, 5147, 5148, 5149, 5391, 5486, 41968, 42252, 43589, 43885,
44474, 45113, 45342, 46368, 46973, 43900, 43921, 44053, 44125,
44523, 44646, 44659, 45097, 45099, 45133, 45284, 45338, 45615,
46329, 46375, 46524, 46863, of 2018;
W.P.Nos.1565, 2587 of 2019;
W.P.No.8023 of 2021;
W.P. No.21502 of 2011;
W.P.Nos. 26708, 26815, 36495 of 2014;
W.P.No.16159 of 2015;
W.P.Nos.29596, 29602, 33225, 34720, 37635, 37645, 37665, 37909,
38071,42955, 43001 of 2017;
W.P.No.29783 of 2018;
W.P.Nos. 8506, 13948, 17028, 20077 of 2019;
W.P.No.5600 of 2020;
W.P.No.5338, 7479, 9299 of 2021;
% Dated 18.06.2021
#W.P.No.18703 OF 2020 & 71 other writ petitions
M/s. Al-Momin College of Education
Kandukur Revenue Division
East Palem Road, Podili
Prakasam District ..... Petitioners
Vs.
$
The Registrar,
Acharya Nagarjuna University
Guntur, Andhra Pradesh ..Respondents
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 18.06.2021
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY
Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
Whether the copies of judgment may be marked to Law
Reporters/Journals
Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish to see the fair
copy of the Judgment?
MSM,J
2
W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY
+ WRIT PETITION No.18703 of 2020;
W.P.Nos.1438, 2104, 2716, 2734, 2756, 2772, 2788, 2800, 2845, 3848,
3851, 4875, 5147, 5148, 5149, 5391, 5486, 41968, 42252, 43589, 43885,
44474, 45113, 45342, 46368, 46973, 43900, 43921, 44053, 44125,
44523, 44646, 44659, 45097, 45099, 45133, 45284, 45338, 45615,
46329, 46375, 46524, 46863, of 2018;
W.P.Nos.1565, 2587 of 2019;
W.P.No.8023 of 2021;
W.P. No.21502 of 2011;
W.P.Nos. 26708, 26815, 36495 of 2014;
W.P.No.16159 of 2015;
W.P.Nos.29596, 29602, 33225, 34720, 37635, 37645, 37665, 37909,
38071,42955, 43001 of 2017;
W.P.No.29783 of 2018;
W.P.Nos. 8506, 13948, 17028, 20077 of 2019;
W.P.No.5600 of 2020;
W.P.No.5338, 7479, 9299 of 2021;
% Dated 18.06.2021
#W.P.No.18703 OF 2020 & 71 other writ petitions
M/s. Al-Momin College of Education
Kandukur Revenue Division
East Palem Road, Podili
Prakasam District ..... Petitioners
Vs.
$
The Registrar,
Acharya Nagarjuna University
Guntur, Andhra Pradesh ..Respondents
! Counsel for the petitioner :
1. Sri P. Pandu Ranga Reddy
2. Sri B. Chandrasen Reddy
3. Sri D. Kasim Saheb
4. Smt. Y. Anupama Devi
5. Sri Y. Nagi Reddy
6. Sri K. Gani Reddy
^ Counsel for the respondent :
1. Learned Government Pleader for School Education
2. Learned Standing Counsel for Acharya Nagarjuna University
3. Learned Standing Counsel for Yogi Vemana University
4. Learned Standing Counsel for Krishna University
<GIST:
MSM,J
3
W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1. AIR 1985 SC 218
2. (2003) 6 SCC 697
3. (2016) 6 ALT 477 (DB)
4. AIR 1956 SC 60
5. (1977) 2 SCC 148
6. AIR 1933 SC 1082
7. 1991 SCR (3) 102
8. AIR 1993 SC 892
9. 1986 (4) SCC 632
10. 1995 ALL.L.J. 534
11. (1996) 9 SCC 309
12. (2004) 2 SCC 150
13. (2008) 2 SCC 280
14. 2017 (9) ADJ 251
15. AIR 1952 SC 12
16. AIR 1951 SC 41
17. AIR 1977 SC 276
18. (2002) 1 SCC 33
19. (1981) 1 SCC 568
20. (2005) 5 SCC 181
21. (1992) 2 SCC 343
22. (2002) 2 SCC 333
23. (2019) 7 SCC 172
24. (2010) 3 ALD 113
25. (2012) 6 ALD 495
26. WP Nos.7873 of 2015 & batch dated 03.07.2015
27. (2016) 6 ALT 477 (DB)
28. 16 CAL. 2D 516
29. AIR 1963 SC 786
30. (2016) 2 SCC 779
31. 1996 (1) MLJ 32
32. 1985 (1) SCR 216
33. 2004 (1) LLJ 1061 SC
MSM,J
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W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY
WRIT PETITION No.18703 of 2020;
W.P.Nos.1438, 2104, 2716, 2734, 2756, 2772, 2788, 2800, 2845, 3848,
3851, 4875, 5147, 5148, 5149, 5391, 5486, 41968, 42252, 43589, 43885,
44474, 45113, 45342, 46368, 46973, 43900, 43921, 44053, 44125,
44523, 44646, 44659, 45097, 45099, 45133, 45284, 45338, 45615,
46329, 46375, 46524, 46863, of 2018;
W.P.Nos.1565, 2587 of 2019;
W.P.No.8023 of 2021;
W.P. No.21502 of 2011;
W.P.Nos. 26708, 26815, 36495 of 2014;
W.P.No.16159 of 2015;
W.P.Nos.29596, 29602, 33225, 34720, 37635, 37645, 37665, 37909,
38071,42955, 43001 of 2017;
W.P.No.29783 of 2018;
W.P.Nos. 8506, 13948, 17028, 20077 of 2019;
W.P.No.5600 of 2020;
W.P.No.5338, 7479, 9299 of 2021;
COMMON ORDER:
All these writ petitions are filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by various Higher Educational Institutions; either aided or unaided, questioning the action of the respondents/universities viz., Acharya Nagarjuna University, Yogi Vemana University and Krishna University in demanding the petitioners/institutions for payment of university service fee in addition to the fee fixed by erstwhile Andhra Pradesh Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee (AFRC), now, Andhra Pradesh Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee Andhra Pradesh Higher Education Regulatory and Monitoring Commission (henceforth 'AP-HERMC) by the universities concerned, as illegal, arbitrary and violative of provisions of Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admissions and Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1983 (for short 'Capitation Fee Act, 1983') and consequently direct the respondents not to insist for payment of any service fee or any other fee;
MSM,J 5 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch without there being any approval and orders from HERMC and without following due process of law.
Various petitioners/Higher Educational Institutions/Colleges, are running different courses for different academic years and the additional fee collected by the respondents/Universities is shown in Column No.4, in addition to the fee fixed by HERMC under different proceedings with different dates, is shown in the table below.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Writ Petition Courses Academic Proceedings questioned
University
year
1. 18703/2020 B.Ed 2019-20 Oral demand made by university for
collection of Rs.970/- and Rs.2,500/-
ANU
NO AFRC per student, in addition to the fee
fixed by AFRC.
2. 1438/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Oral demand of the University Service
Fee of Rs.990/- per student, in
NO AFRC addition to fee fixed by the committee ANU
for fixation for fee structure in private
unaided professional colleges
3. 2104/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Proceedings
No.ANU/F&A/FEE/CHARGES/
NO AFRC M.Ed 137/2017 dated 16.08.2017
Demand made by university for
collection of Rs.625/- per student for
B.Ed course and Rs.1,690/- per
ANU
student for M.Ed course, in addition
to the fee fixed by the committee
established and constituted by the
Government for regulating and
admissions fixing the fee to be
charged from the candidates
4. 2716/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Oral demand to pay an amount of
Rs.925/- per student towards
ANU
NO AFRC University Service Fee, in addition to
the fee fixed by AFRC
5. 2734/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Oral demand to pay an amount of
Rs.925/- per student towards
ANU
NO AFRC University Service Fee, in addition to
the fee fixed by AFRC
6. 2756/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Oral demand to pay an amount of
Rs.925/- per student towards
ANU
NO AFRC University Service Fee, in addition to
the fee fixed by AFRC
7. 2772/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Oral demand to pay an amount of
Rs.925/- per student towards
ANU
NO AFRC University Service Fee, in addition to
the fee fixed by AFRC
8. 2788/2018 BED 2017-18 Oral demand to pay an amount of
Rs.925/- towards University Service
ANU
NO AFRC Fee, in addition to the fee fixed by
AFRC
9. 2800/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Oral demand to pay an amount of
Rs.925/- per student towards
ANU
NO AFRC University Service Fee, in addition to
the fee fixed by AFRC
MSM,J
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W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch
10. 2845/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017
& demanding to pay Registration/ ANU
NO AFRC B.P.Ed recognition/university services fee
11. 3848/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Oral demand to pay an amount of
Rs.990/- per student towards
NO AFRC University Service Fee, in addition to
ANU
the fee fixed by the committee for
fixation for fee structure in private
unaided professional colleges
12. 3851/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Oral demand to pay an amount of
Rs.990/- per student towards
NO AFRC University Service Fee, in addition to
ANU
the fee fixed by the committee for
fixation for fee structure in private
unaided professional colleges
13. 4875/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Oral demand to pay an amount of
Rs.990/- per student towards
NO AFRC University Service Fee, in addition to
ANU
the fee fixed by the committee for
fixation for fee structure in private
unaided professional colleges
14. 5147/2018 B.Ed 2016- Proceedings dated 16.08.2017
M.Ed 2017 demanding to pay Registration/
NO AFRC B.P.Ed recognition/university services fee of
ANU
D.P.Ed 2017- Rs.925/- per student studying
2018 B.Ed & D.P.Ed and Rs.1690/- for
student studying B.P.Ed, M.Ed
15. 5148/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017
M.Ed demanding to pay Registration/
NO AFRC recognition/university services fee of
ANU
Rs.925/- per student studying
B.Ed and Rs.1690/- for student
studying M.Ed
16. 5149/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017
M.Ed demanding to pay Registration/
NO AFRC recognition/university services fee of
Rs.925/- per student studying
B.Ed and Rs.7610/- towards
Research journal fee in addition to ANU
the fee prescribed under Andhra
Pradesh private aided/unaided
college of education regulation of
admission
17. 5391/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017
M.Ed demanding to pay Registration/
NO AFRC B.P.Ed recognition/university services fee of
Rs.925/- per student studying
ANU
B.Ed & B.P.Ed; Rs.1690/- for student
studying M.Ed and Rs.7610/- for
Research Journal Fee, in addition to
the fee fixed by the Committee
18. 5486/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017
M.Ed demanding to pay Registration/
NO AFRC B.P.Ed recognition/university services fee of
Rs.925/- per student studying
ANU
B.Ed & B.P.Ed; Rs.1690/- for student
studying M.Ed and Rs.7610/- for
Research Journal Fee, in addition to
the fee fixed by the Committee
19. 41968/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017
demanding to pay Registration/ ANU
NO AFRC recognition/university services fee
20. 42252/2018 B.Ed, 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017
M.Ed demanding to pay Registration/
ANU
NO AFRC U.G.D.P.E recognition/university services fee
d, B.P.Ed
MSM,J
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W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch
& M.P.Ed
21. 43589/2018 B.Ed, 2018-19 Proceedings 27.10.2018 demanding
M.Ed to pay Registration/
NO AFRC U.G.D.P.E recognition/university services fee ANU
d, B.P.Ed
& M.P.Ed
22. 43885/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017
demanding to pay Registration/
ANU
NO AFRC recognition/university services fee of
Rs.925/- per student
23. 44474/2018 B.Ed, 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017 &
M.Ed 27.10.2018, insisting the petitioners
NO AFRC U.G.D.P.E 2018-19 to pay registration/recognition and ANU
d, B.P.Ed university services fee
& M.P.Ed
24. 45113/2018 B.Ed, 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017 &
M.Ed 27.10.2018, insisting the petitioners
NO AFRC U.G.D.P.E 2018-19 to pay registration/recognition and
ANU
d, B.P.Ed university services fee
D.P.Ed
& M.P.Ed
25. 45342/2018 B.Ed, 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017 &
U.G.D.P.E 27.10.2018, insisting the petitioners
ANU
NO AFRC d, B.P.Ed 2018-19 to pay registration/recognition and
& M.P.Ed university services fee
26. 46368/2018 B.Ed, 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017 &
M.Ed, 27.10.2018, insisting the petitioners
NO AFRC U.G.D.P.E 2018-19 to pay registration/recognition and ANU
d, B.P.Ed university services fee
& D.P.Ed
27. 46973/2018 B.Ed, 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017 &
U.G.D.P.E 27.10.2018, insisting the petitioners
ANU
NO AFRC d, B.P.Ed 2018-19 to pay registration/recognition and
& M.P.Ed university services fee
28. 43900/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017,
insisting the petitioners to pay
ANU
NO AFRC registration/recognition and
university services fee
29. 43921/2018 B.Ed 2018-19 Proceedings dated 27.10.2018
insisting the petitioners to pay
ANU
NO AFRC registration/recognition and
university services fee
30. 44053/2018 B.Ed 2018-19 Proceedings dated 27.10.2018
insisting the petitioners to pay
ANU
NO AFRC registration/recognition and
university services fee
31. 44125/2018 B.Ed, 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017 &
M.Ed 27.10.2018, insisting the petitioners
NO AFRC U.G.D.P.E 2018-19 to pay registration/recognition and ANU
d, B.P.Ed university services fee
& M.P.Ed
32. 44523/2018 B.Ed 2018-19 Oral demand of the University Service
Fee of Rs.990/- per student, in ANU
NO AFRC addition to fee fixed by AFRC
33. 44646/2018 B.Ed, 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017,
M.Ed insisting the petitioners to pay
NO AFRC U.G.D.P.E registration/recognition and ANU
d, B.P.Ed university services fee
& D.P.Ed
34. 44659/2018 B.Ed, 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017 &
M.Ed 27.10.2018, insisting the petitioners
NO AFRC U.G.D.P.E 2018-19 to pay registration/recognition and
ANU
d, B.P.Ed university services fee
& M.P.Ed
35. 45097/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Oral demand of the University Service
ANU
Fee of Rs.990/- per student, in
MSM,J
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W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch
NO AFRC addition to fee fixed by AFRC
36. 45099/2018 B.Ed 2018-19 Oral demand of the University Service
Fee of Rs.990/- per student, in ANU
NO AFRC addition to fee fixed by AFRC
37. 45133/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017
B.P.Ed demanding to pay Registration/
NO AFRC M.Ed recognition/university services fee of
ANU
Rs.925/- per student studying
B.Ed & B.P.Ed and Rs.1690/- for
student studying M.Ed
38. 45284/2018 B.Ed 2018-19 Oral demand of the University Service
Fee of Rs.990/- per student, in ANU
NO AFRC addition to fee fixed by AFRC
39. 45338/2018 B.Ed, 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017 &
M.Ed 27.10.2018, insisting the petitioners
NO AFRC U.G.D.P.E 2018-19 to pay registration/recognition and ANU
d, B.P.Ed university services fee
& M.P.Ed
40. 45615/2018 B.Ed, 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017 &
M.Ed 27.10.2018, insisting the petitioners
NO AFRC U.G.D.P.E 2018-19 to pay registration/recognition and ANU
d, B.P.Ed university services fee
& M.P.Ed
41. 46329/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Oral demand of the University Service
Fee of Rs.2,100/- per student, in
NO AFRC 2018-19 addition to fee fixed by the committee ANU
for fixation for fee structure in private
unaided professional colleges
42. 46375/2018 B.Ed, 2017-18 Proceedings dated 27.10.2018,
M.Ed insisting the petitioners to pay
NO AFRC U.G.D.P.E registration/recognition and
ANU
d, university services fee
B.P.Ed &
D.P.Ed
43. 46524/2018 B.Ed 2017-18 Oral demand of the University Service
Fee of Rs.990/- per student, in
NO AFRC 2018-19 addition to fee fixed by the committee ANU
for fixation for fee structure in private
unaided professional colleges
44. 46863/2018 B.Ed, 2017-18 Proceedings dated 16.08.2017 &
U.G.D.P.E 27.10.2018, insisting the petitioners
ANU
NO AFRC d, B.P.Ed 2018-19 to pay registration/recognition and
& D.P.Ed university services fee
45. 1565/2019 B.Ed, 2016-17 Proceedings 16.07.2016, insisting the
M.Ed petitioners to pay
NO AFRC U.G.D.P.E registration/recognition and ANU
d, B.P.Ed university services fee
& M.P.Ed
46. 2587/2019 B.Pharma 2011-12 Proceedings No.148/ANU/F&A/FEE/
cy CHARGES/2010-2011 dated ANU
NO AFRC 28.04.2011
47. 8023/2021 M.B.A 2020-21 Proceedings dated 14.12.2020,
insisting the petitioners to pay
KU
NO AFRC registration/recognition and
university services fee
48. 21502/2011 B.Ed 2010-11 Proceedings dated 24.09.2010
demanding the petitioners to pay
ANU
NO AFRC admission fee of Rs.2,000/- per
student
49. 26708/2014 L.L.B 2013-14 Lr.No.YUV/CDC/MAT.AFFIN/2014
dated 04.07.2014 demanding to pay
YVU
NO AFRC University Development Fee of
Rs.3,00,000/- for L.L.B
50. 26815/2014 B.Ed 2013-14 Lr.No.YUV/CDC/AFFIN
04.07.2014 demanding to pay
YVU
NO AFRC university development fee of
Rs.750/- per student for B.Ed for the
MSM,J
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W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch
college
51. 36495/2014 Degree 2014-15 Lr. No. YUV/ADMIN dated
courses 20.02.2014 demanding the
NO AFRC petitioners to collect university
YVU
development fee of Rs.480/- per
student and inter university
tournament fee of Rs.120/-
52. 16159/2015 Degree 2014-15 Lr. No. YUV/ADMIN dated
courses 20.02.2014 demanding the
NO AFRC petitioners to collect university
YVU
development fee of Rs.480/- per
student and inter university
tournament fee of Rs.120/-
53. 29596/2017 Degree 2014-15 Lr. No. YUV/ADMIN dated
courses 20.02.2014 demanding Rs.480/- YVU
NO AFRC towards university development fee
54. 29602/2017 Degree 2014-15 Lr. No. YUV/ADMIN dated
courses 20.02.2014 demanding the
NO AFRC petitioners to collect university
YVU
development fee of Rs.480/- per
student
55. 33225/2017 Degree 2014-15 Lr. No. YUV/ADMIN dated
courses 20.02.2014 demanding the
petitioners to collect university YVU
development fee of Rs.480/- per
student
56. 34720/2017 Degree 2014-15 Lr. No. YUV/ADMIN dated
courses 20.02.2014 demanding the
petitioners to collect university YVU
development fee of Rs.480/- per
student
57. 37635/2017 Degree 2017-18 Proceedings of the 2nd respondent
courses dated 15.06.2017 demanding the
YVU
NO AFRC petitioner to pay University Services
Fee @ Rs.600/- per student
58. 37645/2017 Degree 2017-18 Proceedings of the 2nd respondent
courses dated 15.06.2017 demanding the
YVU
NO AFRC petitioner to pay University Services
Fee @ Rs.600/- per student
59. 37665/2017 Degree 2017-18 Proceedings of the 2nd respondent
courses dated 15.06.2017 demanding the
YVU
NO AFRC petitioner to pay University Services
Fee @ Rs.600/- per student
60. 37909/2017 B.Sc 2017-18 Proceedings Dated 12.09.2017
B.A To pay registration
NO AFRC B.Com fee/affiliation/matriculation/
recognition/late fee/university service fee/inter university tournament YVU fee/inter university cultural festival fee/NSS service fee/ inter college tournament fee/CDC processing fee in total of Rs.2500/-
61. 38071/2017 B.Sc 2017-18 Proceedings Dated 12.09.2017 B.Com To pay registration NO AFRC fee/affiliation/matriculation/ recognition/late fee/university service fee/inter university tournament YVU fee/inter university cultural festival fee/NSS service fee/ inter college tournament fee/CDC processing fee in total of Rs.2500/-
62. 42955/2017 Degree 2017-18 Proceedings of the 2nd respondent Courses dated 15.06.2017 demanding NO AFRC payment of service fee of Rs.600/- per YVU student MSM,J 10 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch
63. 43001/2017 Degree 2017-18 Proceedings of the 2nd respondent Courses dated 15.06.2017 demanding YVU NO AFRC payment of service fee of Rs.600/- per student
64. 29783/2018 Degree 2018-19 Proceedings dated 31.07.2018 Courses To pay registration fee/recognition YVU NO AFRC and university services fee
65. 8506/2019 B.Ed 2015-16 Proceedings Dated 18.02.2019 demanding to pay university services NO AFRC fee of Rs.805/- per student, in addition to fee fixed by the committee ANU for fixation for fee structure in private unaided professional colleges
66. 13948/2019 Degree 2019-20 Proceedings Dated 19.08.2019 Courses demanding to pay registration YVU NO AFRC fee/recognition fee and university services fee
67. 17028/2019 B.Ed 2017-18 Oral demand of the University service NO AFRC fee of Rs.820/- per student, in YVU addition to fee fixed by AFRC
68. 20077/2019 Degree 2019-20 Proceedings dated 05.10.2019, NO AFRC Courses demanding payment of development YVU fee, inter university tournament fee in addition to the fee fixed by AFRC
69. 5600/2020 B.Pharmac 2018-19 Questioning the proceedings of the y respondent in not issuing order in NO AFRC affiliating petitioner institution for the M.Pharmac ANU academic 2018-19, while orally y demanding to pay university service fee from the students
70. 5338/2021 B.Ed 2016-17 Proceedings dated 14.12.2020 To demanding registration/recognition/ KU NO AFRC 2019-20 university services fee
71. 7479/2021 B.Ed 2019-20 Proceedings dated 04.05.2019 NO AFRC insisting the petitioners for payment KU of registration/recognition/ university service fee
72. 9299/2021 B.A 2020-21 Proceedings Dated 07.04.2021 B.Com To pay registration NO AFRC B.Sc fee/affiliation/matriculation/ recognition/late fee/university service fee/inter university tournament YV fee/inter university cultural festival fee/NSS service fee/ inter college tournament fee/CDC processing fee in total of Rs.2500/-
Note: ANU - Acharya Nagarjuna University YVU - Yogi Vemana University KU - Krishna University All educational institutions/petitioners herein are conducting courses viz., B.Ed, M.Ed, M.Ped, L.L.B, B. Pharmacy, M.Pharmacy, etc., as shown in Column No.3 of table, for the last many years. The institutions have been granted all recognitions, permissions and affiliations to conduct the above courses after meeting all requirements MSM,J 11 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch and following the procedure laid down as per NCTE norms and after paying prescribed fee for admission for different academic year. The respondents/Universities are bound to follow the fee structure fixed by HERMC for the colleges and cannot demand anything above and beyond the prescribed fee either from the students or the college management. The respondents/Universities have no role to play in the matter of fixation of fee payable by the students admitted under Management Seats or Convener Seats to the Courses in Higher Educational Institutions. The students who are prosecuting studies in different courses in the petitioner/institutions have paid fee fixed by HERMC for different academic years, but the University is claiming additional amount, for different academic years, for different courses in addition to the fee fixed by HERMC and that the respondents are adopting arm- twisting tactic to pressurize the colleges to collect fee from the students. It is pertinent to state that, if, any such additional amount is collected, such an action amounts to collection of capitation fee within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Capitation Fee Act, 1983, which is not permitted as per law. Making such demands from the students at any point of time is not only contrary to the provisions of law and without any authority, illegal and unethical. Hence, the petitioners sought the relief as stated above.
The respondent/Acharya Nagarjuna University filed detailed counter affidavit in W.P.No.3848 of 2018, raising several contentions with reference to law, while denying material allegations made in the affidavit filed along with the writ petition. The other respondent/ Universities viz., Yogi Vemana University, Krishna University adopted the counter affidavit filed in W.P.No.3848 of 2018.
MSM,J 12 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch The first and foremost contention raised by the respondents/ Universities is that, the writ petitions are not maintainable, as the State is not impleaded as party to the proceedings. It is contended that Section 5(20) of the A.P. Universities Act, 1991 (for short 'Act, 1991) conferred power on the University to fix the fee and other charges as may be prescribed. Section 19(37) of Act, 1991 conferred power on the Executive Council (the Board of Management) to prescribe the fee to be charged for the affiliation and recognition of the Colleges. At the same time, Section 19(12) of Act, 1991, conferred power on the Executive Council (the Board of Management) to prescribe the fee to be charged for admission to the examinations, degrees, diplomas and oriental titles of the University. Section 53 of Act, 1991, permitted the Executive Council to make Ordinances subject to the provisions of the Act and Statutes and such Ordinances may provide for (a) the levy of fee in the University and the Constituent Colleges; (b) the fee to be charged for admission to the examinations, degrees and diplomas of the University. As per Section 54 of Act, 1991, the Executive Council (Board of Management) shall make Ordinances. By exercising power under Clause (a) of Section 53 of Act, 1991, the Executive Council made Ordinance 9 in respect of levy of fee for various courses of study in the University. As per Section 2 of Ordinance 9 of the University, the Executive Council shall have power to modify the rates of fee as and when found necessary and/or in pursuance of relevant orders of the Government of Andhra Pradesh. This Ordinance was approved by the Executive Council vide Resolution No.1.16 in the meeting held on15.05.2018 and it is effective from 27.10.2018. The Executive Council of the University at its meeting held on 17.09.2010 under Item No.5.02 considered the Letter dated 13.09.2010 from Sri B. Suryanarayana, President, Acharya Nagarjuna MSM,J 13 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch University Private Colleges Management Association, Vijayawada, requesting for reduction in certain rates of revised fee payable by affiliated colleges implemented w.e.f. 01.04.2010 as per circular No.ANU/Affil. Payment of fee/2010-2011 dated 25.06.2010 and also the concrete proposals for reduction submitted by him. The Executive Council has resolved that the revised rates of affiliation fee and other categories of fee payable by affiliated colleges implemented from 01.04.2010 be further revised for certain categories of fee as per the details shown in the resolution. Accordingly, admission registration/recognition/university service fee is revised and fixed as Rs.100/- per year per student from 2010-2011 batch. Further, the Executive Council has resolved to enhance the fee applicable to affiliated colleges by 10% every year rounding to the nearest ten rupees. As per Resolution 4.07 passed by the Executive Council in meeting held on 30.11.2010, the Executive Council has ratified the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor regarding enhancement of affiliation and other related fee by 10% every year approved by the Executive Council on 17.09.2010. Accordingly, the University every year enhances the affiliation fee by 10 per cent by following the Resolution 4.07 of the Executive Council meeting held on 30-11-2010 and Resolution 5.02 of the Executive Council of the University at its meeting held on 17.9.2010.
The 1st respondent after having considered the minutes of the meeting of the Andhra Pradesh Regulatory and Monitoring Commission (previously AP Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee (HERMC) has issued G.O.Ms. No. 59, School Education (Training) Department dated 25-07-2017, fixing fee structure for UG D.P.Ed., courses, G.O.Ms.No. 57, School Education (Training) Department dated 25-07-2017 fixing fee structure for B.P.Ed., G.O.Ms.No. 58, School Education (Training) MSM,J 14 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch Department dated 25-07-2017 fixing fee structure for M.P.Ed., courses and similarly G.O.Ms.No.110, School Education (training) Department, dated 01-10-2016 fixing fee structure for B.Ed., and G.O.Ms.No. 66, School Education (Training) Department dated 30-09-2019 fixing fee structure for M.Ed., and some other GOs issued for Pharmacy courses also. The Petitioner/Colleges have accepted the above fee structure and has not made any representation with the Andhra Pradesh Higher Education Regulatory & Monitoring Commission. The Petitioner College didn't approach the Hon'ble High Court against the above fee structure. As such, there is no grievance to the Petitioners/colleges against the above fee structure. The Govt. of AP, School Education department has issued G.Os fixing the fee on the recommendations of the erstwhile A.P. Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee (now, A.P. Higher Education Regulatory & Monitoring Commission) for the block period from 2016-17 to 2018-19. The fee for the Petitioner College is also fixed in the said G.O. The Petitioners/Colleges, after having accepted the fee structure as specified in the above said G.O.Ms.No. 66 and 110, the Petitioner College has approached the High Court with a request to interfere in the matter without paying the fee without making the A.P. Higher Education Regulatory & Monitoring Commission as one of the party respondent to these petitions and thereby, the petitions are not maintainable.
The University is informing to pay the fee as accepted by the Petitioner College at the Andhra Pradesh Higher Education Regulatory & Monitoring Commission, i.e., the fee towards services rendered by the University, since the Petitioners/Colleges have neither represented any grievance against the fixation of University Services Fee, etc., in the fee structure at Andhra Pradesh Higher Education Regulatory & Monitoring MSM,J 15 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch Commission nor approached the High Court as was done by other similarly situated Colleges.
The University is not fixing the amount of fee towards services rendered by the University rather it was as fixed by the Government on the recommendations of the erstwhile Admission and Fee Regulatory Commission (HERMC) and now, Andhra Pradesh Higher Education Regulatory & Monitoring Commission. The fee has to be collected from each student and be remitted to the University but not from the College funds. Further, once collected the fee towards common services from the students, for remitting the same to the University, it is not open to the colleges to retain the same. The students have paid it for the University, and, none of the students has raised any grievance in respect of this fee. No student approached the High Court challenging the collection of amount. Strangely, the institutions filed the present Writ Petitions challenging the action of the University in insisting payment of University service fee. The petitioners are not aggrieved parties because when they collected fee from the students, they are supposed to remit to the University as per the proceedings of the University. Even some of the Colleges are making false statements that they are not collecting the service fee from the students although it was clearly stated in the University proceedings to collect the service fee from the students and to remit the same to the University. Thus, the petitioners/colleges/ educational institutions have no locus standi to maintain the writ petitions questioning the action of the respondents, since the petitioners are not the persons aggrieved. On this ground also, requested to dismiss writ petitions.
MSM,J 16 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch It is further contended that, similar issue came up for consideration before High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in W.P.No.7873 of 2015 against Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Hyderabad, questioning the collection of common services fee from them in relation to the students pursuing Undergraduate and Postgraduate Engineering Courses in Private Unaided Institutions in the State of Telangana for the block period 2013-14 to 2015-16. They also challenged the action of the State in not excluding the Private Autonomous Colleges from payment of common services fee to the University as fixed under various Government Orders. The appellants further prayed for a consequential direction to the University not to collect fee towards common services. Common order passed in Writ Petition Nos.7873, 9799, 13427, 16267, 16343 and 16576 of 2015 ordered that "If the concerned institutions have not collected the said amount, the reasons under which they have not collected have to be informed to the University and it is for the University to take necessary action in pursuance thereof". When the matter was carried to the Division Bench, the Division Bench upheld the Judgment passed by the Single Judge in W.A No.268 of 2016 on 28th July 2016.
It is contended in the counter affidavit that, it is not in dispute that whole year, the Universities are supposed to have such department/wing not only for conducting convocation functions but to maintain the entire record and to see that every student gets degree certificate irrespective of the fact whether he attends graduation function. The Original Degree fee collected from each student is for actual issue of original certificate and may be to cover the expenditure for conducting convocation function. It may be true that autonomous-colleges conduct examination and may be rendering some other examination related services but that by itself is MSM,J 17 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch not sufficient to hold that the University has no role to play or does not render any examination related services to the autonomous colleges. Even the other services, the University continues to render to the autonomous colleges in some or the other form, directly or indirectly, such as imparting training to teachers, holding meetings, access to publications, maintaining website etc. Once having collected the fee towards common services from the students, for remitting the same to the University, it is not open to the colleges to retain the same. The students have paid it for the University, and, none of the students has made any grievance in respect of this fee. That apart, the College, cannot, under any circumstances, decide whether the University renders any services and that they are entitled to retain the said amount collected towards common services to be rendered by the University.
In Amar Nath Om Parkash and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors1, the Supreme Court, after considering somewhat similar situation, in paragraph-7 observed thus:
7. It is thus well settled by numerous recent decisions of this Court that the traditional concept in a fee of quid pro quo is undergoing a transformation and that though the fee must have relation to the services rendered, or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough. It is not necessary to establish that those who pay the fee must receive direct benefit of the services rendered for which the fee is being paid. If one who is liable to pay receives general benefit from the authority levying the fee the element of service required for collecting fee is satisfied. It is not necessary that the person liable to pay must receive some special benefit or advantage for payment of the fee.
Finally, it is contended in the counter affidavit that, even if it is assumed that some of the services, which University was rendering before the colleges acquired autonomous status, which now they need 1 A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 218 MSM,J 18 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch not render that by itself is not justifiable for the colleges to retain common services fee. In any case, it cannot be stated that the University does not render any service to the colleges including autonomous colleges. Whether there is broad and general co-relationship between the totality of the fee on the one hand, and the totality of the expenses of the services on the other hand will have to be seen and there need not be an exact or mathematical correlation between the amount realized as a fee and the value of the services rendered.
In Islamic Academy of Education and Another vs State of Karnataka and Others2 the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that, that while fixing the fee structure it should be taken into consideration, inter alia, the salary or remuneration paid to the members of the faculty, other staff, investments made by the University, infrastructure provided and plan for future development of the University as also its expansion. Future planning or improvement of facilities, the Supreme Court stated, may be provided for. These factors undoubtedly are required to be taken care of by the University while fixing and demanding fee from the students through their colleges or the examination authority. It is true that the University cannot charge anything unreasonable under the guise of surplus, indirectly or systematically and then claim that they are established for educational purpose and not for the purposes of profits. From the facts of the present case, the amount to be remitted to the University towards common services, by no stretch of imagination, could be termed as unreasonable and even if it is assumed that the entire amount of Rs.990/- cannot be accounted by University that by itself would not amount to unreasonable enrichment.
2 (2003) 6 SCC 697 MSM,J 19 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch The Division Bench of High Court of Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and State of Andhra Pradesh in CMR College of Engineering Technology Kandlakoya v. The Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University3 observed that, "As it is settled by the Supreme Court, it is not necessary to establish that those who pay the fee must receive direct benefit of the services rendered for which the fee is being paid. It is not necessary that the person liable to pay must receive some special benefit or advantage for payment of the fee. The students in all colleges including affiliated to the University, receive several direct or indirect benefits of the services rendered by the University". It is now well-settled and accepted proposition of law that the University is entitled to generate reasonable surplus for development of education and its expansion. From the facts of the present case, the amount to be remitted to the University towards common services, by no stretch of imagination, could be termed as unreasonable and even if it is assumed that the entire amount of Rs.990/- cannot be accounted by University that by itself would not amount to unreasonable enrichment.
Finally, it is contended that, the provisions of the A.P. Universities Act, 1991 and the Ordinance Rules made thereunder and finality of the determination and consequential proceedings of the Vice-Chancellor prescribing the service fee, it is binding on all colleges including autonomous colleges even after acquiring autonomous status to remit common services fee collected by them. Therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to claim writ of mandamus, as the petitioners are not vested with any legal right or they failed to plead and prove vesting of any legal right and its infringement or invasion, thereby, none of the petitioners are 3 (2016) 6 ALT 477 (DB) MSM,J 20 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch entitled to claim writ of mandamus and requested to dismiss the writ petitions.
Considering rival contentions, perusing the material available on record, the points that need to be answered by this Court in these writ petitions are as follows:
(1) Whether the petitioners have locus standi to question the action of the respondents/Universities in collection of service fee, etc., in addition to the fee fixed by the HERMC?
(2) Whether the petitioners pleaded and proved that the institutions are vested with any legal right, its infringement or invasion or threatened infringement or invasion?
(3) Whether collection of service fee by way of recognition/revaluation by the university is justified, as recommended by HERMC to the government and notified by the government in various government orders. If not, whether the action of the respondent No.1 be declared as illegal and arbitrary?
(4) Whether the writ petitions are maintainable without impleading the State HERMC and the State which passed government orders based on the recommendations of HERMC, without claming any relief to declare various government orders?POINT Nos.1 & 2
Since the respondents questioned the locus standi of the petitioners/colleges/educational institutions, so also, infringement or invasion of legal rights of these petitioners, it is appropriate to decide both the points by common discussion. Hence, both the points are taken up by common discussion to record findings thereon.
The petitioners are colleges/educational institutions and they are collecting fee as claimed by the University and recommended by AP- HERMC and notified by the Government for some years and some years without any recommendation or notification. The subject matter of MSM,J 21 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch dispute from the years 2017 onwards and most of the students have completed their studies in higher education. But the petitioners collected fee as contended by the Universities from the students and retained the same with them. In case, the University is not competent to collect the fee, the students are the persons aggrieved, but not the higher educational institutions or colleges. The petitioners are neither aggrieved persons nor the persons affected on account of the demand made by the University. The petitioners are only third parties i.e collecting agents for the Universities from the students, but not the affected or the persons aggrieved, at best, the petitioners may file appropriate application invoking jurisdiction of the High Court under public interest litigation, but not by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in their individual capacity. More particularly, questioning the act of the respondents/Universities which affects the alleged rights of third parties i.e. students who are prosecuting studies in the institutions. Here, the demand was made by the Universities for collection of additional fee from the students and at best, the students are the aggrieved persons, but not the petitioners. Even assuming for a moment without conceding that these petitioners are rendering services for collection of fee claimed by the students, but still, not competent to question the action of the respondents/Universities as any of the petitioners are aggrieved persons having no litigational competency to move the Court .
Litigational competency is to be decided by the Court on the basis of nature of issues, matters of concern raised, nature of the right or interest violated, on account of such demand made by the Universities for collection of additional fee in different kinds referred in the table, the MSM,J 22 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch rights of these petitioners are not infringed. But, at best, the students are the persons aggrieved and their competency can be decided based on
(i) existence of an actual issue, contest or controversy;
(ii) provisions of the Constitution or any law shown to be, or intended to be in protection of any right or interest,
(iii) the infringement of or an adverse impact on such right, or interests owning to the action or conduct under challenge, and
(iv) the scope of redressability for remedial measures that can be granted by courts.
A person will have a standing if he or she is harmed by a legal wrong caused by administrative or State action or is adversely affected or aggrieved by such actions within the meaning of the relevant statute. (vide Director of Endowments, Hyderabad v. Akram Ali4 and D. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka5). Locus standi in the context of statutory remedy is not to be determined by analogy of locus standi to file petitions under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India. But, when a dispute or a controversy, productive of an injury in fact or that the party has been wronged or adversely affected by the action which impaired that concern and the said right or interest is arguably within "the zone of interest" protected by a statute or other instruments of law, can also give standing to the person. There is fine distinction between litigational competency in ordinary litigation i.e. adversarial and public interest litigation as non- adversarial, which varies from one to the other. If, the Act of the State or administrative authority of the State causes public injury or affects the right of public at large, such act need not be 4 AIR 1956 SC 60 5 (1977) 2 SCC 148 MSM,J 23 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch questioned by a person having locus standi or litigational competency and such act can be questioned by invoking pro bono publico.
The tests that may be applied for determining standing in private or individual interest pursuits may not be strictly applied in all cases of litigation in public interest. However, the commonality of some factors for determination of standing in both cases may be restated. Thus, a real grievance or injury must exist; the impact of State action must be demonstrated, access to justice in substantive or procedural terms must be shown to be involved, the demand to do justice and the failure to rectify the wrong is a relevant factor, the inappropriateness, futility, inadequacy, onerous or burdensome nature of alternative administrative processes, may have to be established to redress a claim by an individual by filing an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But the action of the State infringes either fundamental right or statutory right of general public and apprehending injury to the public at large, to any person having no interest in the said matter may question or challenge the State act.
Litigational competency is not waived in private litigation. But in public interest litigation only the litigational competency is waived to some extent but not absolutely. Therefore, one must have locus to get redressal of the claim approaching the Court in a private litigation and they must have a right or interest in the property and infringement of it or invasion or infringement of such is sine qua non to obtain any relief from the competent court.
MSM,J 24 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch In Union of India v. W.N. Chadha6, the Apex Court held as follows:
"179. In Union Carbide Corporation, it has been said that any member of the society must have locus to initiate a prosecution as well as to resist withdrawal of such prosecution if initiated.
180. That proposition is also, in our opinion, cannot be availed of as the prosecution was initiated by the appellants herein and they are persecuting and pursing the matter upto this Court, The proposition that any one can initiate a criminal proceeding is not in dispute.
181. We have already considered the locus standi of a third party in a criminal case and rendered a considered finding in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdary [AIR 1993 SC 892] when this matter came before us in the first round of its litigation. Reference also may be made to Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India and Anr
182. Before the Supreme Court of United States, a similar question arose in Whitmore v. Arkansas ([1990] 495 US 149), , whether a next friend can invoke the jurisdiction of the Court when a real party was not able to litigate his or her own cause. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari for want of jurisdiction on the ground that Whitmore, an independent person lacked standing to proceed in the case. In said case of Whitmore, reliance has been placed on a decision, namely, Gusman v. Marrero 180 US 81, 87, 45 L. Ed. 436, 21, S.Ct. 293 (1901), in which it has been held thus:
However friendly he may be to the doomed man and sympathetic for his situation; however concerned he may be lest unconstitutional laws be enforced, and however laudable such sentiments are, the grievance they suffer and feel is not special enough to furnish a cause of action in a case like this.
183. In fact when this case on hand came up before this Court arising out of the public interest litigation of Shri H.S. Chowdhary, some other political parties approached this Court as public interest litigants to challenge the impugned judgment in that case, but this Court rejected all those appeals on the ground of locus standi."
Similarly, in Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa And others7, the Apex Court discussed the scope of litigational competence i.e. locus standi and its relaxation in public interest litigation based on Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdary8. The law declared by the Apex Court in the above judgments is that, only in public interest litigation the litigational competence is waived though not absolutely, but in private litigation, such litigational competence cannot be waived. 6 AIR 1993 SC 1082 7 1991 SCR (3) 102 8 AIR 1993 SC 892 MSM,J 25 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch The petitioners are claiming that they are the persons aggrieved, as they are collecting fee from the students on behalf of the Universities. But, they are not the persons aggrieved in fact, since no legal right of these petitioners was infringed on account of demand and collection of fee by the Universities from the students, but not from the colleges. On the other hand, the petitioners have collected fee from the students as claimed by the Universities and retained the same without crediting the same to the Universities. It appears that the petitioners approached this Court to avoid remittance of the amount collected from the students to the Universities on the lame excuse that the Universities are not competent to collect such fee. Therefore, it is clear from the material on record that these petitioners/colleges/educational institutions are not the aggrieved persons, as their right is not infringed or invaded on account of the demand made by the Universities.
At the same time, Writ of Mandamus is discretionary in nature and such power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be exercised only in certain circumstances. At best, this Court cannot decide the legality of the order. Yet issuance of Writ of Mandamus is purely discretionary and the same cannot be issued as a matter of course.
In "State of Kerala v. A.Lakshmi Kutty9", the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a Writ of Mandamus is not a writ of course or a writ of right but is, as a rule, discretionary. There must be a judicially enforceable right for the enforcement of which a mandamus will lie. The legal right to enforce the performance of a duty must be in the applicant himself. In general, therefore, the Court will only enforce the performance 9 1986 (4) SCC 632 MSM,J 26 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch of statutory duties by public bodies on application of a person who can show that he has himself a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of a right is the foundation of the jurisdiction of a Court to issue a writ of Mandamus.
In "Raisa Begum v. State of U.P.10", the Allahabad High Court has held that certain conditions have to be satisfied before a writ of mandamus is issued. The petitioner for a writ of mandamus must show that he has a legal right to compel the respondent to do or abstain from doing something. There must be in the petitioner a right to compel the performance of some duty cast on the respondents. The duty sought to be enforced must have three qualities. It must be a duty of public nature created by the provisions of the Constitution or of a statute or some rule of common law.
Writ of mandamus cannot be issued merely because, a person is praying for. One must establish the right first and then he must seek for the prayer to enforce the said right. If there is failure of duty by the authorities or inaction, one can approach the Court for a mandamus. The said position is well settled in a series of decisions.
In "State of U.P. and Ors. v. Harish Chandra and Ors.11" the Supreme Court held as follows:
"10. ...Under the Constitution, a mandamus can be issued by the court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to the performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and the said right was subsisting on the date of the petition."
(Emphasis supplied) 10 1995 All.L.J. 534 11 (1996) 9 SCC 309 MSM,J 27 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch In "Union of India v. S.B. Vohra12" the Supreme Court considered the similar issue and held that 'for issuing a writ of mandamus in favour of a person, the person claiming, must establish his legal right in himself. Then only a writ of mandamus could be issued against a person, who has a legal duty to perform, but has failed and/or neglected to do so.
In "Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Sunder Lal Jain13" the Supreme Court emphasized the necessity to establish existence of legal right and its infringement for grant of writ of mandamus referred the principles stated in the Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies by F.G. Ferris and F.G. Ferris, Jr.:
"Note 187.-Mandamus, at common law, is a highly prerogative writ, usually issuing out of the highest court of general jurisdiction, in the name of the sovereignty, directed to any natural person, corporation or inferior court within the jurisdiction, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, and which appertains to their office or duty. Generally speaking, it may be said that mandamus is a summary writ, issuing from the proper court, commanding the official or board to which it is addressed to perform some specific legal duty to which the party applying for the writ is entitled of legal right to have performed.
Note 192.-Mandamus is, subject to the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, the appropriate remedy to enforce a plain, positive, specific and ministerial duty presently existing and imposed by law upon officers and others who refuse or neglect to perform such duty, when there is no other adequate and specific legal remedy and without which there would be a failure of justice. The chief function of the writ is to compel the performance of public duties prescribed by statute, and to keep subordinate and inferior bodies and tribunals exercising public functions within their jurisdictions. It is not necessary, however, that the duty be imposed by statute; mandamus lies as well for the enforcement of a common law duty.
Note 196.-Mandamus is not a writ of right. Its issuance unquestionably lies in the sound judicial discretion of the court, subject always to the well settled principles which have been established by the courts. An action in mandamus is not governed by the principles of ordinary litigation where the matters alleged on one side and not denied on the other are taken as true, and judgment pronounced thereon as of course. While mandamus is classed as a legal remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles. Before granting the writ the court may, and should, look to the larger public interest which 12 (2004) 2 SCC 150 13 (2008) 2 SCC 280 MSM,J 28 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch may be concerned-an interest which private litigants are apt to overlook when striving for private ends. The court should act in view of all the existing facts, and with due regard to the consequences which will result. It is in every case a discretion dependent upon all the surrounding facts and circumstances."
(Emphasis supplied) Similarly, in Corpus Juris Secundum, summarized the pre-requisites for grant of writ of mandamus and the same is extracted hereunder:
"Mandamus may issue to compel the person or official in whom a discretionary duty is lodged to proceed to exercise such discretion, but unless there is peremptory statutory direction that the duty shall be performed mandamus will not lie to control or review the exercise of the discretion of any board, tribunal or officer, when the act complained of is either judicial or quasi-judicial unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of discretion on the part of such Court, board, tribunal or officer, and in accordance with this rule mandamus may not be invoked to compel the matter of discretion to be exercised in any particular way. This principle applies with full force and effect, however, clearly it may be made to appear what the decision ought to be, or even though its conclusion be disputable or, however, erroneous the conclusion reached may be, and although there may be no other method of review or correction provided by law. The discretion must be exercised according to the established rule where the action complained has been arbitrary or capricious, or based on personal, selfish or fraudulent motives, or on false information, or on total lack of authority to act, or where it amounts to an evasion of positive duty, or there has been a refusal to consider pertinent evidence, hear the parties where so required, or to entertain any proper question concerning the exercise of the discretion, or where the exercise of the discretion is in a manner entirely futile and known by the officer to be so and there are other methods which it adopted, would be effective."
(emphasis supplied) The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Ajit Singh v. Union of India14 while dealing with locus standi of a person who filed petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, referred the judgments of the Supreme Court to hold that existence of legal right and its infraction must necessarily be pleaded and proved to issue Writ of Mandamus.
14 2017 (9) ADJ 251 MSM,J 29 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch In State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal15 Hon'ble Apex Court has ruled that the existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Charanjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India16, it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that the legal right that can be enforced under Article 32 must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief. The Court did not find any reason why a different principle should apply in the case of a petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution. The right that can be enforced under Article 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule may have to be relaxed or modified. Thus, Article 226 confers very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. It is, therefore, clear that persons other than those claiming fundamental rights can also approach the Court seeking a relief thereunder. The Article in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder; but it is implicit in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right.
Similarly, in Mani Subrat Jain v. State of Haryana17, while considering Article 226 of the Constitution, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 9, observed thus:
"...It is elementary though it is to be restated that no one can ask for a mandamus without a legal right There must be a judicially enforceable right as well as a legally 15 AIR 1952 SC 12 16 AIR 1951 SC 41 17 AIR 1977 SC 276 MSM,J 30 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch protected right before one suffering a legal grievance can ask for a mandamus. A person can be said to be aggrieved only when a person is denied a legal right by someone who has a legal duty to do something or to abstain from doing something. (See Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Ed. Vol I, paragraph 122); State of Haryana v. Subash Chander, (1974) 1 SCR 165 : (AIR 1973 SC 2216); Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed, (1976) 3 SCR 58 : (AIR 1976 SC 578) and Ferris Extraordinary Legal Remedies paragraph 198."
(emphasis supplied) It is well-settled that existence of a legal right of a petitioner which is alleged to have been violated is the foundation for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. While reiterating this legal proposition, the Supreme Court in paragraph 38 of its judgment in Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal18, held thus:
"38. There is no dispute regarding the legal proposition that the rights under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be enforced only by an aggrieved person except in the case where the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus or quo warranto. Another exception in the general rule is the filing of a writ petition in public interest. The existence of the legal right of the petitioner which is alleged to have been violated is the foundation for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under the aforesaid Article. The orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi of a person to reach the Court has undergone a sea change with the development of constitutional law in our country and the constitutional Courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with the cases or dislodging the claim of a litigant merely on hypertechnical grounds. If a person approaching the Court can satisfy that the impugned action is likely to adversely affect his right which is shown to be having source in some statutory provisions the petition filed by such a person cannot be rejected on the ground of Ms having not the locus standi. In other words, if the person is found to be not merely a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, he cannot be non-suited on the ground of his not having the locus standi."
(emphasis supplied) In view of catena of perspective pronouncements, the petitioner must plead and prove that legal right existed either statutory or constitutional right of this petitioner is infringed or invaded or threatened to infringe or invade by the act of the first respondent. But, the bald 18 (2002) 1 SCC 33 MSM,J 31 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch allegations made in the affidavit without demonstrating the existence of any right and it's infringement or it's invasion or threatened infringement or invasion by the first respondent. In the absence of establishing the existence of right, it's infringement or invasion or threatened infringement or invasion, the petitioners are not entitled to claim writ of mandamus. In view of the law declared by the Supreme Court and reiterated by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the judgment referred supra, the petitioner must plead and prove that a legal right possessed by him is violated or infringed or threatened to be infringed to obtain a relief of writ of mandamus.
In the present writ petitions, except alleging that, service fee is charged without any authority by the University, no other allegation is made about infringement or violation of the petitioners legal right, either statutory or constitutional. These pleadings are insufficient to prove that there existed a legal right in the petitioners, enforceable in a Court of law, either statutory or constitutional and it's infringement or invasion or threatened to infringe or invade by the act of the first respondent. In the absence of pleadings, it is difficult for this Court to hold that the petitioners legal right, either statutory or constitutional is infringed or invaded by the act of the first respondent in charging service fee. Hence, I find that the petitioners failed to establish existence of any legally enforceable right, its infringement or invasion by University, thereby the petitioners have no locus to claim relief of writ of mandamus against the respondents/Universities. Accordingly, Point Nos. 1 and 2 are held in favour of the respondents/Universities and against the petitioners/colleges.
MSM,J 32 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch POINT NO.3 Before deciding the authority of the respondents/Universities to collect fee in the name of university service fee, it is appropriate to examine the scope and jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with the administrative actions, more particularly, when it relates to economic matters pertaining to colleges based on policy decisions.
The scope and jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with such quasi-judicial actions of respondent No.2, which were accepted by respondent No.1 is limited and this Court can interfere with such decisions only when the recommendations were made in utter deviation of procedure prescribed under the Rules or such recommendations made by respondent No.2 and notified by respondent No.1 in violation of principles of natural justice. Thus, the jurisdiction of this Court is limited and interference with such orders as a matter of routine is impermissible.
Judicial review, as is well known, lies against the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. If the decision-making process is flawed inter alia by violation of the basic principles of natural justice, is ultra-vires the powers of the decision maker, takes into consideration irrelevant materials or excludes relevant materials, admits materials behind the back of the person to be affected or is such that no reasonable person would have taken such a decision in the circumstances, the court may step in to correct the error by setting aside such decision and requiring the decision maker to take a fresh decision in accordance with the law. The court, in the garb of judicial review, cannot usurp the jurisdiction of the decision maker and make the decision itself.
MSM,J 33 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch In "Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.), Sindri v. Union of India19", the Apex Court observed as follows:
"We certainly agree that judicial interference with the administration cannot be meticulous in our Montesquieu system of separation of powers. The court cannot usurp or abdicate, and the parameters of judicial review must be clearly defined and never exceeded. If the directorate of a government company has acted fairly, even if it has faltered in its wisdom, the court cannot, as a super auditor, take the Board of Directors to task. This function is limited to testing whether the administrative action has been fair and free from the taint of unreasonableness and has substantially complied with the norms of procedure set for it by Rules of public administration."
(Emphasis supplied) Judicial restraint in exercise of judicial review was considered in "the State of (NCT) of Delhi v. Sanjeev20" as follows:
"One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is "illegality", the second "irrationality", and the third "procedural impropriety". These principles were highlighted by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (commonly known as CCSU case). If the power has been exercised on a non-consideration or non- application of mind to relevant factors, the exercise of power will be regarded as manifestly erroneous. If a power (whether legislative or administrative) is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated."
(Emphasis supplied) It needs no emphasis that complex executive decisions in economic matters are necessarily empiric and based on experimentation. Its validity cannot be tested on any rigid principles or the application of any straitjacket formula. The Court while adjudging the validity of an executive decision in economic matters must grant certain measure of freedom or play in the joints to the executive. Not mere errors, but only palpably arbitrary decisions alone can be interfered with in judicial 19 (1981) 1 SCC 568 20 (2005) 5 SCC 181 MSM,J 34 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch review. The recommendation made by a statutory body consisting of domain experts not being to the satisfaction of the State Government or to the higher educational institutions is an entirely different matter with which I am not concerned in the present discussion. The Court should therefore be loath to interfere with such recommendation of an expert body, and accepted by the government, unless it suffers from the vice of arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity or violates any provisions of the law under which it is constituted. The Court cannot sit as an appellate authority, entering the arena of disputed facts and figures to opine with regard to manner in which respondent No.2 ought to have proceeded without any finding of any violation of Rules or procedure. If a statutory body has not exercised jurisdiction properly the only option is to remand the matter for fresh consideration and not to usurp the powers of the authority.
In "Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India21", it was observed as follows:
"The function of the court is to see that lawful authority is not abused but not to appropriate to itself the task entrusted to that authority. It is well settled that a public body invested with statutory powers must take care not to exceed or abuse its power. It must keep within the limits of the authority committed to it. It must act in good faith and it must act reasonably. Courts are not to interfere with economic policy which is the function of experts. It is not the function of the courts to sit in judgment over matters of economic policy and it must necessarily be left to the expert bodies. In such matters even experts can seriously and doubtlessly differ. Courts cannot be expected to decide them without even the aid of experts."
(Emphasis supplied) In the context of Indian jurisprudence, the Constitution is the supreme law. All executive or legislative actions have to be tested on the anvil of the same. Such actions will have to draw their sustenance as 21 (1992) 2 SCC 343 MSM,J 35 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch also their boundaries under the same. Any action falling foul of the constitutional guarantees will call for corrective action in judicial review to ensure adherence to the constitutional ethos. But so long as the fabric of the constitutional ethos is not set as under, the Court will have to exercise restraint, more particularly in matters concerning domain experts, else the risk of justice being based on individual perceptions which may render myths as realities inconsistent with the constitutional ethos. Courts often adjudicate disputes that raise the question of how strictly should they scrutinise executive or legislative action. Therefore, courts have identified certain questions as being inappropriate for judicial resolution or have refused on competency grounds to substitute their judgment for that of another person on a particular matter.
The need for judicial restraint with regard to recommendations of expert committees, more particularly in matters relating to finance and economics, was considered by the Apex Court in "BALCO Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India22" and held:
"Nevertheless, contention is sought to be raised that the method of valuation was faulty, some assets were not taken into consideration and that Rs. 551.5 crores offered by M/s. Sterlite did not represent the correct value of 51% shares of the Company along with its controlling interest. It is not for this Court to consider whether the price which was fixed by the Evaluation Committee at Rs. 551.5 crores was correct or not. What has to be seen in exercise of judicial review of administrative action is to examine whether proper procedure has been followed and whether the reserve price which was fixed is arbitrarily low and on the face of it, unacceptable."
(Emphasis supplied) In the case of a policy decision on economic matters, the Courts should be very circumspect in conducting any enquiry or investigation and must be most reluctant to impugn the judgment of the experts who 22 (2002) 2 SCC 333 MSM,J 36 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch may have arrived at a conclusion unless the Court is satisfied that there is illegality in the decision itself.
Noting the above principles, the Apex Court in "Vasavi Engineering College Parents Association v. State of Telangana23"
categorically held that the Court has to maintain judicial restraint while dealing with the economic policy decision of the State. The Courts cannot interfere with those decisions unless those decisions are taken in violation of principles of natural justice or in violation of any rule authorizing such authorities to take such decision. Therefore, the jurisdiction of this Court is limited and this Court has to examine, keeping in view the principles laid down in the above judgments, whether there is any procedural violation or violation of principles of natural justice as contended by the petitioners herein.
Keeping in view the law declared by the Apex Court in various judgments referred above, I would like to examine the authority of the University(s) to collect service fee.
Fixation of fee is governed by the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admissions and Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1983 and Andhra Pradesh Higher Education Regulatory and Monitoring Commission Rules, 2019.
Section 2(b) of the Capitation Fee Act, 1983 defined 'Capitation fee' as any amount collected in excess of the fee prescribed under Section 7.
Section 7 is an enabling provision to regulate the fee. According to Section 7, it shall be competent for the Government by notification, to regulate the tuition fee or any other fee that may be levied and collected 23 (2019) 7 SCC 172 MSM,J 37 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch by any educational institution in respect of each class of students; no educational institution shall collect any fee in excess of the fee notified under sub-section (1) and every educational institution shall issue an official receipt for the fee collected by it.
Section 9 of the Capitation Fee Act, 1983 deals with 'Penalties' in case of violation of Sections 5 & 6 of the Act. Therefore, it is evident from the provisions of the Capitation Fee Act, 1983 that the educational institutions cannot collect any fee in excess of the fee notified under Sub- section (1) of Section 7 of the Capitation Fee Act, 1983. But, who will fix the fee is again another question?.
Regulation 8 permits the Commission to fix the fee of both aided and unaided educational institutions, taking into consideration various aspects referred therein. Therefore, the fee shall be fixed by HERMC and the educational institutions are not entitled to collect any amount other than the fee fixed under Section 7 of the Capitation Fee Act, 1983.
The main contention of the petitioners is that, in view of the bar under Section 7 of the Capitation Fee Act, 1983, demand or collection of fee in addition to the fee fixed by HERMC is illegal and arbitrary, the university is not entitled to collect such fee in excess of the fee fixed under Section 7 of the Capitation Fee Act, 1983. Whereas, learned Standing Counsels for the respondents/Universities in all these writ petitions would contend that the University is competent to collect fee and on the demand made by the University, HERMC issued the following Government Orders, fixing fee payable to the University towards service fee on the recommendation made by HERMC, Government Orders were issued by the State Government.
MSM,J 38 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch 1 G.O.Ms.No.40 Higher Education (E.C.) Department 24.06.2016 2 G.O.Ms.No.43 Higher Education (E.C.) Department 25.06.2016 3 G.O.Ms.No.110 School Education (Training) Department 01.10.2016 4 G.O.Ms.No.58 School Education (Training) Department 25.07.2017 5 G.O.Ms.No.59 School Education (Training) Department 25.07.2017 6 G.O.Ms.No.41 Higher Education (U.C.) Department 19.08.2019 7 G.O.Ms.No.47 Higher Education (U.C.) Department 19.09.2019 8 G.O.Ms.No.48 Higher Education (U.C.) Department 20.09.2019 9 G.O.Ms.No.66 School Education (Training) Department 30.09.2019 10 G.O.Ms.No.49 Higher Education (U.C.) Department 11.10.2019 11 G.O.Ms.No.15 Higher Education (E.C.) Department 24.03.2020 12 G.O.Ms.No.2 Higher Education (E.C.) Department 18.01.2021 13 G.O.Ms.No.9 Higher Education (E.C.) Department 20.02.2021 14 G.O.Ms.No.19 Higher Education (E.C.) Department 16.04.2021 Most peculiarly, the petitioners in all these writ petitions did not challenge any of the Government Orders, but the authority of the University is questioned. However, in this regard, learned Standing Counsel referred to Sections 53 & 54 of the A.P. Universities Act, 1991. Chapter IX of the A.P. Universities Act, 1991, consists from Sections 51 to 55 dealing with Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations. Section 53 is the provision for deciding the real controversy in the present batch of writ petitions.
Section 53 deals with 'Ordinances'. According to it, the Executive Council shall have power to make Ordinances subject to the provisions of this Act and the Statutes and such Ordinances may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:-
(a) the levy of fee in the University and the constituent colleges;
(b) the fee to be charged for admission to the examinations, degrees and diplomas of the University;
(c) the conditions of residence of students to the University and the levy of fee for residence in hostels maintained by the University,
(d) the conditions of recognition of hostels not maintained by the University;
(e) the number, qualifications and emoluments of teachers of the University;
(f) the fee to be charged for courses of study given by the teachers of the University for lectures, for tutorial and supplementary instruction provided by the University, and for services rendered by the University Officers;
(g) the mode of appointment and duties of examiners;
MSM,J 39 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch
(h) the conduct of examinations;
(i) the constitution and determination of the functions of the Boards of Studies;
(j) the discipline, health and welfare of students of the University;
(k) the constitution, powers and duties of University Extension Boards; and
(l) all matters which by this Act or by the Statutes may be provided for by the Ordinances.
Section 54 deals with as to how 'Ordinances are made' and Section 55 deals with 'Regulations'. Based on Sections 53 and 54 of the A.P. Universities Act, learned Standing Counsel for Universities would contend that the Universities can pass Ordinances for collection of fee and placed on record a copy of book of Ordinances approved at the Executive Council Meeting held on 15.05.2018 and Academic Senate Meeting held on 27.10.2018, with effect from 27.10.2018. Based on Ordinances passed by exercising power under Sections 53 & 54 of the A.P. Universities Act, 1991, different fee is levied and ordered to be collected by the educational institutions/colleges and the petitioners/colleges are liable to pay the fee fixed by HERMC and notified by the Government. In view of these provisions, it is necessary to advert to various Government Orders issued by the Government from 2016 onwards.
S.No. G.O. Fixation of fee structure for various courses
Ms.No. and
date
1 G.O.Ms.No.40 Fixation of fee structure for Post Graduate M.E./M.Tech.
Higher courses in Private Un-Aided Professional Institutions in the
Education State of Andhra Pradesh, for the block period 2016-17 to 2018-
(E.C.) 19
Department
The Private Un-Aided Engineering Colleges are permitted to Dated collect:-
24.06.2016
a) An amount of Rs. 2,000/- as onetime payment per student at the time of admission towards Admission/Registration/Recognition fee and out of the said amount of Rs. 2,000/-, Rs. 500/- shall be remitted by the institution to the concerned University and the remaining amount of Rs. 1,500/- shall be retained by the institution.
b) An amount of Rs. 1,850/- per annum per student (towards MSM,J 40 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch examination related, academic audit, curriculum revision & content, development, staff training, coordination meeting and university publications website maintenance) during the course towards common services rendered by the University to the college as mentioned below and such amount collected by the College shall be remitted to the concerned University.
c) An amount of Rs. 500/- towards library deposit and an amount of Rs. 500/- towards laboratory deposit (totaling into Rs. 1000/-) by way of refundable caution deposits at the time of admission only as onetime payment.
2. G.O.Ms.No.43 Fixation of fee structure for B.Pharmacy, Pharma-D, Pharma(PB) Higher and M.Pharmacy Courses in Private Un-Aided Professional Education Institutions in the State of Andhra Pradesh for the block period (E.C.) 2016-17 to 2018-19 Department
ii) The fee structure under NRI Quota in respect of those Dated institutions who desire to admit the students for the courses of 25.06.2016 B. Pharmacy, Pharma-D, B.E. / B.Tech. & B.Arch., M.E. / M.Tech. & M.Arch., Pharma(PB) and M.Parmacy is as follows:-
a) $ 5000 (US Dollars) per student per annum for B.Pharmacy and Pharma-D Courses each;
b) $ 5000 (US Dollars) per student per annum for B.E./B.Tech & B. Architecture Courses each;
c) $ 6000 (US Dollars) per student per annum for M.E./M.Tech. & M.Arch Courses each;
d) $ 7000 (US Dollars) per student per annum for M. Pharmacy;
e) $ 6000 (US Dollars) per student per annum for Pharma(PB) Course.
iii) The Private Un-Aided B. Pharmacy, Pharma-D, Pharma (PB) and M. Pharmacy Colleges are permitted to collect:
a) An amount of Rs. 2,000/- as onetime payment per student at the time of admission towards Admission/Registration/Recognition fee and out of the said amount of Rs. 2,000/-, Rs. 500/- shall be remitted by the institution to the concerned University and the remaining amount of Rs. 1,500/- shall be retained by the institution.
b) An amount of Rs. 1,850/- per annum per student during the course towards common services rendered by the University to the college as mentioned below and such amount collected by the College shall be remitted to the concerned University.
c) An amount of Rs. 1,850/- per annum per student (towards examination related, academic audit, curriculum revision & content, development, staff training, coordination meeting and university publications website maintenance) during the course towards common services rendered by the University to the college as mentioned below and such amount collected by the College shall be remitted to the concerned University.
d) An amount of Rs. 500/- towards library deposit and an amount of Rs. 500/- towards laboratory deposit (totaling into Rs. 1000/-) by way of refundable caution deposits at the time of admission only as onetime payment.
MSM,J 41 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch 3 G.O.Ms.No.110 Fixation of Fee structure and special fee for B.Ed. course in School Private Un-aided Minority/Non Minority colleges in the State of Education Andhra Pradesh for the block period 2016 - 17 to 2018 - 19 (Training) Department (i) The Tuition Fee is fixed per annum per each student are shown against the college name for 220 B.Ed colleges listed. Dated 01.10.2016 (ii) Special fee is of Rs.3000/- (Three thousand Rupees only) per annum for each student as specified below for all the Private unaided (Minority and Non-Minority) B.Ed Colleges in the State for the years 2016 - 17 to 2018 - 19.
4 G.O.Ms.No.58 Fixation of Fee structure and special fee for M.P.Ed course in
School the State of Andhra Pradesh for the block period 2017 - 18 to
Education 2019 - 20
(Training)
Department (i) The Tuition Fee is fixed per annum per each student are
shown against the college name for 04 M.P.Ed colleges listed in Dated Annexure.
25.07.2017
(ii) Special fee is of Rs.4000/- (Four thousand Rupees only) per annum for each student as specified below for all the 04 Private Un Aided M.P.Ed Colleges in the State for the years 2017 - 18 to 2019 - 20.
5 G.O.Ms.No.59 Fixation of Fee structure and special fee for UG D.P.Ed course in
School the State of Andhra Pradesh for the block period 2017-18 to
Education 2019 -20
(Training)
Department (i) The Tuition Fee is fixed per annum per each student are
shown against the college name for 09 UG D.P.Ed colleges Dated 25.07.2017 (ii) Special fee is of Rs.3500/- (Three thousand five hundred Rupees only) per annum for each student as specified below for all the 09 Private Un Aided UG D.P.Ed Colleges in the State for the years 2017-18 to 2019 -20.
As the State Government issued G.O.Ms.No.40 and other government orders enabling the colleges/institutions to collect different fee as shown in the table mentioned above, the petitioners/colleges are bound to collect the same and remit as directed in the said G.O., since it is a part of the fee levied, exercising power by HERMC and the petitioners/colleges are bound to collect the fee in terms of Section 7 of the Capitation Fee Act, 1983.
Before, 27.10.2018, no Ordinances were passed, but, in the present batch of writ petitions, the petitioners claimed that the University is collecting the fee in excess of the fee fixed by HERMC as illegal and sought declaration.
MSM,J 42 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch As seen from the Government Orders from 25.06.2016 to 27.10.2018, HERMC itself recommended for collection of different fee in excess of the fee fixed under Section 7 of the Capitation Fee Act, 1983. Therefore, when the HERMC fixed fee separately payable to the University, that cannot be treated as Capitation Fee, as defined under Section 2(b) of the Capitation Fee Act, 1983, since the fee was fixed by HERMC exercising power under the Regulations. Therefore, collection of fee by the University under different heads, as recommended by HERMC and notified by the Government cannot be termed as Capitation Fee, as it is not collection of fee in addition of fee notified by the Government under Section 7 of the Capitation Fee Act, 1983. Hence, the fee whatever is fixed under various Government Orders referred above for various courses is only by HERMC on the request of Universities and notified by the Government, such collection of fee under different heads cannot be said to be in violation of Section 7 of the Capitation Fee Act, 1983.
Learned counsel for the petitioners mainly relied on two judgments of the learned single Judge of High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Adarsha College of Education, Giddalur, Prakasam District v. Acharya Nagarjuna University, Guntur District24 while dealing with similar situation referred to Section 2(14) and Section 5(20) of the A.P. Universities Act, 1991; it was observed that; The word 'prescribed' is defined under Section 2(14) of the Act, as "prescribed by Statutes, Ordinances or Regulations". A combined reading of sections 5(20) and 2(14) makes it clear that a University can fix and demand fee, only when it is prescribed under the statutes, ordinances or regulations. Under Chapter IX of the Act, the power to make statutes is conferred upon the Executive Council. Sections 51 and 53 stipulate the subjects on 24 (2010) 3 ALD 113 MSM,J 43 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch which the statutes and ordinances, respectively, can be made. The Executive Council of the University is conferred with the power to make these subordinate legislations, though the procedure stipulated therefor is slightly different. The Regulations, on the other hand, are made by the Academic Senate, as provided for under Section 55 of the Act. The learned single Judge specifically held that, the University would have been justified in demanding the infrastructure/development fee, if there existed any statute, ordinance or regulation, providing for it.
But, in the facts of the judgment, no regulation or ordinance was passed by the University under Section 53 or Section 54 of the Universities Act, thereby the learned single Judge allowed the writ petitions, holding that the demand issued by the University is illegal, as the demand is not based on any statute or regulation.
Similarly, in Islamia Education Society v. Government of Andhra Pradesh25, the learned Single Judge also expressed an identical view and declared that the demand made by the University is illegal and arbitrary, as it is not based on any ordinance or regulation, passed in exercise of power under Sections 53 & 54 of Chapter IX of A.P. Universities Act, 1991.
Adverting to the present facts of the case, a bare look at the Ordinances passed by Acharya Nagarjuna University for the academic year 2016-2017, the Executive Council reserved right to modify the rights of fee for various courses which is inclusive of tuition fee, special fee and additional fee (medical fund) and the Ordinances were approved at the Executive Council Meeting on 15.05.2018 and it came into effect from 27.10.2018.
25 (2012) 6 ALD 495 MSM,J 44 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch Relevant ordinances are extracted as under:
Ordinance No.9 - Levy of Fee for various courses of study in the University was approved by the Executive Council vide Resolution Number 1.16 in the meeting held on 15.05.2018 and is effective from 27.10.2018. Following are the rate of fee per annum for various courses of study in the University for the academic year 2016-2017. The revised rates of fee is shown in the table below:
MSM,J 45 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch Ordinance No.9 states that the Executive Council shall have power to modify the rates of fee as and when found necessary and/or in pursuance of relevant orders of the Government of A.P. Thus, it is evident from Ordinance No.9 that an Additional Fee i.e. Medical Fund of Rs.240/- was collected for the year 2016-2017.
Ordinance No.11 - Fee Particulars for admission to various Examinations, Degrees and Diplomas of the University was approved by the Executive Council vide Resolution Number 1.16 in the meeting held on 15.05.2018 and is effective from 27.10.2018. Following are the rate of fee for admission to various examinations, degrees and diplomas of the University for the academic year 2016-2017.
MSM,J 46 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch MSM,J 47 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch MSM,J 48 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch MSM,J 49 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch MSM,J 50 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch In view of the Ordinance Nos.9 & 11 passed by the University for Collection of fee under different heads mentioned in the Ordinances, the collection of fee by the University is not illegal. However, the University demanded fee other than the fee covered by Ordinance Nos. 9 & 11. But, the State HERMC recommended fee payable to the University and notified by the Government. Therefore, such demand or collection of different fee is against the principles laid down by the learned Single Judge in Adarsha College of Education case (referred supra) and Islamia Education Society case (referred supra).
A similar question came up for consideration in CMR College of Engineering Technology Kandlakoya v. The Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University26, wherein the learned Single Judge upheld the contention of the Universities while holding that the petitioners have no locus standi and when once they collected fee from the students, they are bound to remit the same to the University concerned. The order passed in the batch of writ petitions was challenged in appeal before the Division Bench of High Court of Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and State of Andhra Pradesh in CMR College of Engineering Technology Kandlakoya v. The Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University27, wherein the Division Bench held as follows:
"In our opinion, once having collected the fee towards common services from the students, for remitting the same to the University, it is not open to the colleges to retain the same. The students have paid it for the University, and, as rightly observed by learned single Judge in the impugned order, none of the students has made any grievance in respect of this fee. That apart, the College, cannot, under any circumstances, decide whether the University renders any services and that they are entitled to retain the said amount collected towards common services to be rendered 26 WP Nos.7873 of 2015 & batch dated 03.07.2015 27 (2016) 6 ALT 477 (DB) MSM,J 51 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch by the University. As rightly observed by the learned single Judge, it was open to the Colleges to seek revision of the fee structure contemplated by the Rules and as observed by the Supreme Court in Islamic Academy of Education."
The order of the learned Single Judge was upheld and affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad. In view of the judgment of the Division Bench, the judgments of the learned Single Judge in Adarsha College of Education case (referred supra) and Islamia Education Society case (referred supra) are not binding on this Court and therefore, by applying the law declared by the Division Bench in CMR College of Engineering Technology Kandlakoya (referred supra), collection of fee even in the absence of any Ordinance is legal and the same cannot be set-aside, when once it was recommended by HERMC and notified by the Government which falls within Section 7 of the Capitation Fee Act, 1983.
Assuming for a moment that the demand made by the University is without any authority of law, as no Regulation or Ordinance was passed for collection of the fee under various heads, as mentioned in the table referred supra. The petitioners are not the aggrieved persons due to the act of the University, demanding to collect different kind of fee and at best, the student who seeks admission or who was already admitted in the educational institutions/colleges were the persons aggrieved. But, they did not challenge the demand made by the University for collection of different kinds of fee shown in table referred supra. As I already held in Point Nos. 1 & 2, that the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the demand made by the Universities, as the petitioners/educational institutions are only intermediaries who are collecting fee from the students who is under obligation to remit the same to the concerned Universities and the question of infringement or invasion of right of the MSM,J 52 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch petitioners either under constitution or under any statute does not arise, thereby, the petitioners are disentitled to claim writ of mandamus, as claimed in these writ petitions. Accordingly, I hold that these petitioners are not entitled to claim writ of mandamus, as they have no locus standi. Hence, the point is held in favour of the respondents/Universities and against the petitioners/colleges.
P O I N T NO.4 One of the contentions raised before this Court is that, HERMC recommended fee under different heads, including service fee for different courses and notified the same by Principal Secretary to the Government and Special Chief Secretary to the Government. But, HERMC and the Government are not made parties to the writ petitions, except impleading the Universities in most of the writ petitions. When once an attempt was made by the Universities for collection of service fee and recommendation was made by HERMC, which is an instrumentality of the State. Therefore, they are proper and necessary parties to the writ petitions, in whose absence, the real controversy between the parties cannot be decided.
Undoubtedly, when necessary parties are not impleaded to the writ petition, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limini. But, who is necessary and proper party is a question of fact depending upon the facts of each case. Proper party is a party, in whose absence effective adjudication cannot be made. Necessary party is a party, in whose absence the dispute cannot be decided. Similar issue was decided in MSM,J 53 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch "Bank of California v. Superior Court28" California Court held as follows:
"First, then, what parties are indispensable? There may be some persons whose interests, rights, or duties will inevitably be affected by any decree which can be rendered in the action. Typical are the situations where a number of persons have undetermined interests in the same property, or in a particular trust fund, and one of them seeks, in an action, to recover the whole, to fix his share, or to recover a portion claimed by him. The other persons with similar interests are indispensable parties. The reason is that a judgment in favor of one claimant for part of the property or fund would necessarily determine the amount or extent which remains available to the others. Hence, any judgment in the action would inevitably affect their rights. Thus, in an action by one creditor against assignees for the benefit of creditors, seeking an accounting and payment of his share of the assets, the other creditors were held indispensable (McPherson v. Parker, 30 Cal. 455 [89 Am. Dec. 129]); and in an action [16 Cal.2d 522] by plaintiff to enforce a trust, where he claimed the property in his own right, to the exclusion of another actual beneficiary, failure to join the latter was held fatal to the judgment. (O'Connor v. Irvine, 74 Cal. 435 [16 P. 236].) Where, also, the plaintiff seeks some other type of affirmative relief which, if granted, would injure or affect the interests of a third person not joined, that third person is an indispensable party. Thus, in an action by a lessor against a sublessee to forfeit a parent lease because of acts of the sublessee, the sublessors (original lessees) were indispensable parties, since a decree of forfeiture would deprive them of their lease. (Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal.2d 232, 262 [73 PaCal.2d 1163].) And in a suit to cancel illegal registration of voters, all voters whose registration was challenged were indispensable parties. (Ash v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App. 800 [166 P. 841].) Many other cases, illustrating the reasons for compulsory joinder, may be found. (See, e. g., Mitau v. Roddan, supra; Crowell v. Cape Cod Ship Canal Co., 164 Mass. 235 [41 N.E. 290]; Lawrence v. Smith, 201 Mass. 214 [87 N.E. 623]; Florida Land Rock Phosphate Co. v. Anderson, 50 Fla. 501 [39 So. 392, 396]; Hartley v. Langkamp, 243 Pa. 550 [90 Atl. 402]; Fineman v. Cutler, 273 Pa. 189 [116 Atl. 819]; Matagorda Canal Co. v. Markham Irr. Co., [Tex. Civ. App.] 154 S.W. 1176; Franz v. Buder, supra; Weeden v. Gher, 316 Ill. 534 [147 N.E. 388]; Hauser v. Power, 351 Ill. 36 [183 N.E. 580]; notes, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 995; 23 Cal. L. Rev. 320, 340.) All of these persons are, of course, "necessary" parties, but the decisions show that they come within a special classification of necessary parties, to which the term "indispensable" seems appropriate. An attempt to adjudicate their rights without joinder is futile. Many cases go so far as to say that the court would have no jurisdiction to proceed without them, and that its purported judgment would be void and subject to collateral attack. [5] The objection being so fundamental, it need not be raised by the parties themselves; the court may, of its own motion, dismiss the proceedings, or refuse to proceed, until these indispensable parties are brought in. (Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., supra; Solomon v. Redona, 52 Cal.App. 300 [198 P. 643]; Hutchins v. Security Trust etc. Bank, 208 Cal. 463, 467 [281 P. 1026, 65 A.L.R. 1059]; Florida Land Rock Phosphate [16 Cal.2d 523] Co. v. Anderson; supra; Hartley v. Langkamp, supra; Krueding v. Chicago Dock & Canal Co., 285 Ill. 79 [120 N.E. 478]; Hauser v. Power, supra; Fineman v. Cutler, supra.) [6] It follows that if the court does attempt to proceed, it is acting beyond its jurisdiction and may be restrained by prohibition.
This analysis finds complete support in the well-considered case of Rundell v. McDonald, supra, where all of the heirs of the intestate were named as defendants, but the action was dismissed as to some of them. The court said (p. 728): "If, on the other hand, as appellant contends, an action such as this can be maintained only against the heirs, appellant nevertheless is in no 28 16 Cal.2d 516 MSM,J 54 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch position to complain of any defect of parties defendant, since the decree cannot injudiciously affect the other heirs. Though the heirs succeeded to the legal title as tenants in common, they held their respective undivided moieties by several and distinct titles ... The theory on which the courts proceed, therefore, is to fasten a trust on the property in favor of the promisee, and to enforce such trust against the heirs of the deceased. Under this theory each heir holds the title to which he has succeeded in trust for the promisee. In the instant case the effect of the judgment against appellant as the surviving husband was to fasten a trust on the title to which he succeeded and to compel a conveyance of that title to respondent. If, as appellant contends, an action such as this lies only against the heirs of the deceased promisor and not against his estate or personal representative, then the judgment cannot be pleaded against any of the heirs as to whom the action was dismissed. It follows, therefore, that the decree in nowise affects the rights of appellant's coheirs, and that they were not indispensable parties to the action." (See, also, to the same effect, Oles v. Wilson, 57 Colo. 246 [141 P. 489, 498].) If, in this kind of action, the court has jurisdiction to try the case, and may render a valid judgment where the plaintiff sues or maintains the suit against less than all of the distributees, it must be clear that they are not indispensable [16 Cal.2d 526] parties. So, in the present case, the absent defendants are not indispensable parties, and the court has jurisdiction to proceed without them, to determine the rights of the parties actually before it."
A Four-judge Bench Apex Court in "Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar29" has observed thus:
"The question is whether in a writ in the nature of certiorari filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution the party or parties in whose favour a tribunal or authority had made an order, which is sought to be quashed, is or are necessary party or parties. While learned Additional Solicitor General contends that in such a writ the said tribunal or authority is the only necessary party and the parties in whose favour the said tribunal or authority made an order or created rights are not necessary parties but may at best be only proper parties and that it is open to this Court, even at this very late stage, to direct the impleading of the said parties for a final adjudication of the controversy, learned counsel for the respondents contends that whether or not the authority concerned is necessary party, the said parties would certainly be necessary parties, for otherwise the High Court would be deciding a case behind the back of the parties that would be affected by its decision.
Lord Justice Slesser in The King v. London County Council [1931] 2 K.B. 215, dissected the concept of judicial act laid down by Atkin, L J., into the following heads in his judgment : "wherever any body of persons (1) having legal authority (2) to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and (3) having the duty to act judicially (4) act in excess of their legal authority - a writ of certiorari may issue". It will be seen from the ingredients of judicial act that there must be a duty to act judicially. A tribunal, therefore, exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial act cannot decide against the rights of a party without giving him a hearing or an opportunity to represent his case in the manner known to law. If the provisions of a particular statute or rules made thereunder do not provide for it, principles of natural justice demand it. Any such order made without hearing the affected parties would be void. As a writ of certiorari will be granted to remove the record of proceedings of an inferior tribunal or authority exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial acts, ex hypothesi it follows that the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction shall also act judicially in disposing of the proceedings before it. It is implicit in such a proceeding that a tribunal or authority which is directed to transmit the records must be a party in the writ proceedings, for without giving notice to it, the record of proceedings cannot be brought to the High Court. It is said that in an appeal against the decree of a subordinate court, the court that 29 AIR 1963 SC 786 MSM,J 55 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch passed the decree need not be made a party and on the same parity of reasoning it is contended that a tribunal need not also be made a party in a writ proceeding. But there is an essential distinction between an appeal against a decree of a subordinate court and a writ of certiorari to quash the order of a tribunal or authority : in the former, the proceedings are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure and the court making the order is directly subordinate to the appellate court and ordinarily acts within its bounds, though sometimes wrongly or even illegally, but in the case of the latter, a writ of certiorari is issued to quash the order of a tribunal which is ordinarily outside the appellate or revisional jurisdiction of the court and the order is set aside on the ground that the tribunal or authority acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. If such a tribunal or authority is not made party to the writ, it can easily ignore the order of the High Court quashing its order, for, not being a party, it will not be liable to contempt. In these circumstances whoever else is a necessary party or not the authority or tribunal is certainly a necessary party to such a proceeding. In this case, the Board of Revenue and the Commissioner of Excise were rightly made parties in the writ petition.
The next question is whether the parties whose rights are directly affected are the necessary parties to a writ petition to quash the order of a tribunal. As we have seen, a tribunal or authority performs a judicial or quasi-judicial act after hearing parties. Its order affects the right or rights of one or the other of the parties before it. In a writ of certiorari the defeated party seeks for the quashing of the order issued by the tribunal in favour of the successful party. How can the High Court vacate the said order without the successful party being before it ? Without the presence of the successful party the High Court cannot issue a substantial order affecting his right. Any order that may be issued behind the back of such a party can be ignored by the said party, with the result that the tribunal's order would be quashed but the right vested in that party by the wrong order of the tribunal would continue to be effective. Such a party, therefore, is a necessary party and a petition filed for the issue of a writ of certiorari without making him a party or without impleading him subsequently, if allowed by the court, would certainly be incompetent. A party whose interests are directly affected is, therefore, a necessary party.
In addition, there may be parties who may be described as proper parties, that is parties whose presence is not necessary for making an effective order but whose presence may facilitate the settling of all the questions that may be involved in the controversy. The question of making such a person as a party to a writ proceeding depends upon the judicial discretion of the High Court in the circumstances of each case. Either one of the parties to the proceeding may apply for the impleading of such a party or such a party may suo motu approach the court for being impleaded therein."
The same principle was reiterated by the Apex Court in "Poonam v. State of U.P.30", held as follows:
"We may add that the law is now well settled that a necessary party is one without whom, no order can be made effectively and a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision of the question involved in the proceeding."
In Baskaran v. The Commissioner of College Education and Ors31, a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court following the judgment of 30 (2016) 2 SCC 779 MSM,J 56 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch Prabodh Verma v. State of Uttar Pradesh32, held that the remedy under Article 226 of Constitution of India is equitable and discretionary and the persons who would be vitally affected by the decision are necessary parties. The Court should dismiss the writ petition, if necessary parties are not impleaded in the writ petition.
In yet another decision in Ramarao and Ors. v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Association and Ors33, the Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated the legal position and held that ".... An order against the person without impleading him as a party and without giving an opportunity of hearing must be held to be bad in law. The appellants herein, keeping in view of the fact that by reason of the impugned direction, the orders of promotion effected in their favour had been directed to be withdrawn, indisputably, were necessary parties. In their absence, therefore, the writ petition could not have been effectively adjudicated upon. In the absence of the 'promotees' as parties, therefore, it was not permissible for the High Court to issue the directions by reason of the impugned judgment."
In the present facts of the case, recommendation was made by HERMC for fixation of additional fee payable at the request of the University itself. The Government issued notification accepting the notification, permitting the Universities to collect additional fee. Therefore, the State Government has notified the fee recommended by the authority and the authority who made recommendation at the request of the universities, are proper and necessary properties, since the issue of any direction as sought by these petitioners would annul the 31 1996 (I) MLJ 32 32 1985(1) SCR 216 33 2004 (I) LLJ 1061 SC MSM,J 57 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch Government Orders issued by the Government and recommendations made by the authority indirectly. In their absence, passing any order annulling the recommendation and notifications issued by the Government without impleading them as parties to the writ petitions is impermissible under law. By applying the principles laid down in the above judgments, the presence of HERMC and State is indispensable in view of the consequences that ensue from issue of such direction, as sought by these petitioners. Hence, they are proper and necessary parties to the writ petitions whose presence cannot dispensed with and consequently on this ground also, writ petitions are liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of proper and necessary parties.
In the present batch of writ petitions, University is only claiming payment of fee collected by the colleges/educational institutions in terms of the recommendation made by HERMC and notified by the State Government. When the petitioners are questioning the authority of the University to collect such fee, the authority who made recommendation and notified the fee are proper and necessary parties to the writ petitions, in whose absence, the lis before this Court cannot be adjudicated effectively and completely and their presence cannot be dispensed with. Hence, I hold that, HERMC and the State Government are proper and necessary parties to the following writ petitions and they are liable to be dismissed, for non-joinder of proper and necessary parties to the writ petitions.
Writ Petition 1. 18703/2020 41 46329/2018 2. 1438/2018 42 46375/2018 3. 2104/2018 43 46524/2018 4. 2716/2018 44 46863/2018 5. 2734/2018 45 1565/2019 6. 2756/2018 46 2587/2019 7. 2772/2018 47 8023/2021 8. 2788/2018 48 21502/2011 9. 2800/2018 49 26708/2014 MSM,J 58 W.P.No.18703 of 2020 & batch 10. 2845/2018 50 26815/2014 11. 3848/2018 51 36495/2014 12. 3851/2018 52 16159/2015 13. 4875/2018 53 29596/2017 14. 5147/2018 54 29602/2017 15. 5148/2018 55 37635/2017 16. 5149/2018 56 37645/2017 17. 5391/2018 57 37665/2017 18. 5486/2018 58 37909/2017 19. 41968/2018 59 38071/2017 20. 42252/2018 60 42955/2017 21. 43589/2018 61 43001/2017 22. 43885/2018 62 29783/2018 23. 44474/2018 63 8506/2019 24. 45113/2018 64 13948/2019 25. 45342/2018 65 17028/2019 26. 46368/2018 66 20077/2019 27. 46973/2018 67 5600/2020 28. 43900/2018 68 5338/2021 29. 43921/2018 69 7479/2021 30. 44053/2018 70 9299/2021 31. 44125/2018 32. 44523/2018 33. 44646/2018 34. 44659/2018 35. 45097/2018 36. 45099/2018 37. 45133/2018 38. 45284/2018 39. 45338/2018 40. 45615/2018 Accordingly, Point No.4 is held in favour of the respondents and against the petitioners.
In view of my finding on Point Nos. 1 to 4, writ petitions are liable to be dismissed, as they are meritless.
In the result, writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending if any shall stand closed. No costs.
_________________________________________ JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY Date:18.06.2021 Note: LR copy to be marked b/o SP