Delhi High Court
Maharishi Dayanand Co-Operative Group ... vs Union Of India And Ors. on 27 August, 1993
Equivalent citations: 1993IIIAD(DELHI)788, 51(1993)DLT554, 1993(27)DRJ223, 1995 A I H C 44, (1993) 51 DLT 554, (1993) 27 DRJ 223, (1994) ILR 1 DEL 225
Author: D.P. Wadhwa
Bench: D.P. Wadhwa
JUDGMENT D.P. Wadhwa, J.
(1) This is a petition file under Article 226 of the Constitution. Petitioner is a society registered under the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act. There are seven respondents, these being (1) Union of India through the Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Urban Development, (2) Lt. Governor, Delhi, (3) Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi, (4) Delhi Administration through the Secretary, Land & Building Department, (5) Delhi Development Authority (for short 'DDA'), (6) Municipal Corporation of Delhi ('MCD' for short), and (7) Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Delhi. The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari quashing the notification dated 7 June 1990 issued under section 4 read with section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act') in respect of land bearing Khasra Nos. 415/1 (0-8), 421/1-2 (2-8),426(7-ll),431 (4-10), 603/526/2 (3-17),527/ 2(3-8) and 525/1(2/5) totalling 24 bighas 7 biswas situated in the revenue estate of village Kasoompur,Tehsil Mehrauli, New Delhi. The petitioner society claims to be the owner of this land. A writ of certiorari is also prayed for quashing the order of the Dda refusing to grant sanction to the petitioner for erection of buildings/execution work of its group housing scheme and communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 2 July 1990 of the D.D.A. This letter is addressed to the Hony. Secretary of the petitioner society and is as "Sir, With reference to your application dt. 1.6.90 for the grant of sanction for the erection of buildings/execution work of the group housing scheme for Maharishi Dayanand Cghs Ltd. situated at village Kusumpur, Tehsil Mehrauli, I am to inform you that the sanction has been refused on 20.6.90 on the ground that the land for which the group housing scheme has been submitted does not form part of the approved layout plan of DDA. Yours faithfully, sd/- ( A.K. Gupta ) Jt. Director (Bldg.) "
(2) The petitioner then also seeks a mandamus directing respondents not to interfere with peaceful enjoyment and possession of its land and further seeks a direction to the Dda to approve and sanction the layout plans and building plans of the petitioner for construction of group housing residential flats for its 181 members as per plans submitted to the DDA. Declaration is also being sought that impugned notification and the letter of rejection of the Dda as aforesaid are arbitrary, malafide, and in abuse and excess of authority and power conferred upon the authorities. These are the main reliefs which the petitioner claims. Other reliefs are all supplementary or incidental to these.
(3) On 28 September 1986 the petitioner entered into an agreement to purchase the land in question with the original owners. On 30 January 1987 possession of the land was delivered by the land owners to the petitioner after receiving full and final consideration. On 11 July 1988 the land owners executed assignment deeds assigning all their rights, title and interests in the land and these were registered in the office of the Sub Registrar, Delhi.
(4) At this stage it may be appropriate to give background of the earlier writ petition filed by the land owners respecting the land in question. The predecessors of the petitioner had earlier filed a writ petition (Writ Petition No. 1283/83) on 13 June 1983 in this Court. The petitioners therein had challenged an earlier notification under section 4 and declaration under section 6 of the Act as well as notices under section 9 and 10 of the Act in respect of the land in question which, as noted above, is the same as in the present petition before us. They also challenged the award No. 2181-C dated 12 September 1980 whereby the Land Acquisition Collector in respect of the subject land had stated that since notices under section 55 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957(for short 'the D.D.Act')had been received, award for this land would be prepared after clarification from the department by means of a supplementary award. Supplementary award was, however, made on 19 September 1986 during the pendency of the writ petition. The principal grievance in that petition was that in respect of notice under section 55(2) of the D.D. Act the Central Government failed to acquire the land within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the notice and the land was, therefore, could not be subject to compulsory acquisition. The notification under section 4 in that petition was dated 23 January 1965 under which various chunks of land totalling over 1300 bighas of the village Kasumpur were sought to be acquired for a public purpose, namely, for the planned development of Delhi. This notification included the subject land as well. Declaration under section 6 of the Act was issued on 6 September 1966. Notices under sections 9 and 10 were issued on21 May 1983. The petitioners therein alleged that for almost 18 years there was complete inaction in acquiring the land from the date of notice under section 4 and declaration under section 6 and the notices under sections 9 and 10 of the Act. The petitioners therein, therefore, served a notice under section 55(2) of the D.D. Act on Central Government with copies to the Lt. Governor and the Vice Chairman, D.D.A., etc. This notice is dated 28 September 1976. The petitioners said that since there was no response or action taken by the Central Government or any of the other authorities after the receipt of notice under section 55(2) of the Act, the land in question stood free from compulsory acquisition. Nevertheless, the Land Acquisition Collector gave his award on 12 September 1980. That writ petition was allowed by judgment of a Single Judge of this Court on 9 March 1989. He declared that the lands of the petitioners stood released from compulsory acquisition by virtue of section 55(2) of the Delhi Development Act and all subsequent land acquisition proceedings were invalid and were set aside. In pronouncing this judgment the learned Single Judge relied on a decision of this Court in C.W.P. 721/74 in the case of Scindia Potteries Pvt. Ltd.v. Union of india, decided on 5 December 1977,also by a learned Single Judge of this Court. The court therein had observed that private interest and public interest were tried to be reconciled by the provisions of section 55 of the D.D. Act and the provision was if at the expiry of 10 years from the date of the operation of the master plan or where such land was required or designated for compulsory acquisition and not being so acquired shall be deemed to have been released from compulsory acquisition six months after the notice to that effect was served on the Central Government. That being so, the learned Single Judge in C.W.P. 1283/83 held that after the notice under section 55 of the Act was served on the Central Government on 28 September 1976, six months thereafter the land in question automatically stood released from compulsory acquisition and that the petitioner was entitled to such a declaration. He held, therefore, that subsequent proceedings in regard to award dated 12 September 1980 and supplementary award dated 19 September 1986 were illegal and incompetent in law.
(5) After the judgment in Writ Petition 1283/83 the land owners being the predecessors in-interest of the petitioner applied for, issue of no objection certification for transfer of land by means of sale deeds in favor of the petitioner. This requirement was under the provisions of the Delhi Lands (Restrictions of Transfer) Act, 1972.The Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) granted the requisite no objection certificate. Then by means of eight sale deeds, all executed on 16 March 1990, the original land owners transferred the land to the petitioner, these sale deeds were registered with the Sub Registrar, Delhi, on 20 March 1990. The land being agricultural land mutation was effected by the Tehsildar, Mehrauli,on 7 May 1990. Thereafter, the petitioner society got prepared layout plans and building plans for construction of group housing residential flats for its members and submitted the same to D.D.A. for necessary approval. This was on 1 June 1990. Then came the impugned notification of 7 June 1990 and the petitioner was also informed of the refusal of the Dda to sanction the building plans, etc., by impugned letter dated 2 July 1990. Since there was imminent threat of dispossession the petitioner filed this petition and by means of an ad interim order it was directed that the petitioner shall not be dispossessed from the land inquestion. This interim order is continuing. Petitioner also stated that no construction had been made at the land in question. Three principal contentions have been raised by the petitioner: (l)in view of the section 55 of the D.D.Act the land could not have been acquired as it stood released from compulsory acquisition as per decision in C.W.P. No. 1283/83; (2) notification under section 4/17 of the Act was bad as there was no urgency and the petitioner has been deprived of its right to file objections to the acquisition under section 5-A of the Act; and (3) permission for development of land was wrongly refused by the D.D.A. in contravention of section 13 of the D.D. Act.
(6) D.D.A. is a body corporate constituted under the D.D. Act. That Act provided for development of Delhi according to plan and for matters ancillary thereto. Section 6 gives objects of the D.D.A. which in brief are to promote and secure development of Delhi according to plan and for that purpose D.D.A. shall have the power to acquire, hold, manage and suppose of land and other property, to carry out building operation, etc. Section 55 of the D.D.Act specifies the circumstances in which plans could stand modified. This section is as under:-
"55.Plans to stand modified in certain cases.-(1) Where any land situated in any area in Delhi is required by the master plan or a zonal development plan to be kept as an open space or unbuilt upon or is designated in any such plan as subject to compulsory acquisition, then, if at the expiration often years from the date of operation of the plan under Section 11 or where such land has been so required or designated by any amendment or such plan, from the date of operation of such amendment, the land is not compulsorily acquired the owner of the land may serve on the Central Government a notice requiring his interest in the land to be so acquired.
(2)If the Central Government fails to acquire the land within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the notice, the master plan or, as the case may be, the zonal development plan shall have effect, after the expiration of the said six months as if the land were not required to be kept as an open space or unbuilt upon or were not designated as subject to compulsory acquisition."
(7) The impugned notification dated 7 June 1990 barring the area specified sought to be acquired is as under:- "NO.F.9/56/75-Lab/14286. - Whereas it appears to the Lt. Governor, Delhi that land is likely to be required to be taken by the Government at public expenses for a public purpose, namely for Planned Development of Delhi's viz. Vasant Kunj Residential Scheme, it is hereby notified that the land in the locality described below is likely to be acquired for the above purpose. This notification is made under the provision of section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to all whom it may concern. In exercise so the powers conferred by the aforesaid section the Lt. Governor is pleased to authorise the officers for the time-being engaged in the undertaking with their servants and workmen to enter upon and survey any land in the locality and do all other acts required or permitted by that section. The Lt. Governor, Delhi, being of the opinion that the provisions of subsection(l) of section 17 of the said Act applicable to this land, is further pleased under sub-section 4 of the said section to direct that the provisions of section 5-A shall not apply."
(8) Registrar of Cooperative Societies submitted that earlier the petitioner had on its list 101 members which was approved. Subsequently, another list of 80members was also sent by the petitioner and approved by the Registrar on the condition that the petitioner society would not ask for land from the D.D.A. On this an argument of 'legitimate expectation', as we shall presently see, was raised by the petitioner during the course of arguments though there was no such plea in the petition originally presented. Registrar also stated that he had been advised that the land in question has again since been acquired under the Act, and, therefore, petitioner was not entitled to get the plans sanctioned from the D.D.A. Of course, this part of the submission coming from the Registrar has no meaning.
(9) In the counter-affidavit filed by respondents I to 4 it is stated that in the impunged notification it was not necessary to mention the word "urgency" and that omission of this word would not make the notification invalid. Reliance has been placed on a Bench decision of this Court in Shakuntala B. Moda v. Union of India and others. Civil Writ No. 342/90, decided on 28 May 1991 [(1993) 3 Delhi Lawyer 301 ]. These respondents say that though the land was earlier released from acquisition but the same was not exempted in future for all times to come, and that releasing of land at one time did not put a bar for future acquisition for all times to come. It was also stated that it was not necessary to give the details of reasons in the notification under sections 4 and 17 of the Act and that it was on the basis of satisfaction of the Lt. Governor on the facts of each case, and after satisfying himself the Lt. Governor forms opinion. It is stated that in the present case the necessary opinion was formed by the. Lt. Governor and thereafter the notification issued as per provisions of law. Reference was drawn to a decision of the Supreme Court where the court held that opinion as to the existence of the p73urgencyjustifying taking possession of the land has to be formed by the appropriate Government and that formation of such an opinion is subjective and thus had to be left entirely to the discretion and decision of the appropriate Government. These respondents say that the land was acquired for public purpose, i.e., planned development of Delhi, viz., Vasant Kunj Residential Scheme.
(10) In its counter-affidavit Dda asserted that the acquisition of the land in question was for public purpose and it was the sovereign function of the State and did not give rise to cause of action to the petitioner. Again the ground of urgency mentioned is requirement for Vasant Kunj Residential Scheme. It is stated that the acquisition of the land is in public interest and is urgently required for planned development of Delhi which development comprises within its compass the implementation of the Vasant Kunj Residential Scheme, and that the user for which the land was sought to be acquired on an urgent basis was in accordance with the provisions of the Master Plan for Delhi- Perspective 2001 which has since been approved and notified in the Gazette of India on I August 1990. It is stated that the Vasant Kunj Residential Scheme could not be completed in the absence of the land in question being made available to Dda and it was on that account that the notification under section 4 read with section 17 of the Act was issued. Any abuse of exercise of power in acquiring the land is denied. Lastly, it is submitted that the building plans of the petitioner could not be sanctioned since subject land is under acquisition. It is denied that any right of the petitioner has been infringed.
(11) Respondent Mcd did not put in any appearance in spite of service and remained unrepresented.
(12) In the earlier writ petition (CWP1283/83)the stand taken by Dda, raising the preliminary objections, was, as under:-
I.That under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, a declaration that the land is required for public purpose and planned development of Delhi, is conclusive evidence that the land is needed for public purpose, the subjective satisfaction of the appropriate Government being the only pre-condition.
II.That the land covered under the Writ Petition measuring 24 Bighas 7 Biswas, village Kasum Pur, is required for the construction of flats under the Self-Financing Housing Scheme known as Vasant Kunj Residential Scheme. All the adjacent land has already been acquired and physical possession taken over. The Scheme is under various stages of development. Due to the non-availability of the land covered by the present Writ Petition the Scheme in the area is held up.
(13) During the pendency of the writ petition No. 1283/83 the petitioners therein entered into an agreement to sell their land to the present petitioner, now before us, who then filed an application for being imp leaded in writ petition No. 1283/83. This application was allowed and it was observed that being successors-in-interest present petitioner was entitled to continue those proceedings. Present petitioner was, therfore, substituted in place of original petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1283/83.
(14) Before the amendment of the Act in 1923 (Act 38 of 1923) a notice could be published under section 4 of the Act if it appeared to the Government that land in any locality was likely to be needed for any public purpose. After the amendment notification under section 4 of the Act could be issued whenever it appeared to the Government that "land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose." Thus, there are two different expressions: (1) where land is needed, or (2) where it is likely to be needed, for any public purpose. Section 5A was also introduced by the Amending Act of 1923 under which any person interested in any land which had been notified under section 4 as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose would file objections to the acquisition of the land. The Collector under sub-section (2) of section 5A is to consider the objections and to submit his report to the Government whose decision on the objections shall be final. Declaration under section 6 is issued when any particular land is needed for a public purpose. Sub-section (4) of section 17 is as under :- "(4)In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section5-A shall not apply,and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section ( 1)."
(15) This sub-section was also inserted by Act 38 of 1923. Sub-section (2) is not applicable in .the present case and sub-section ( I ) of section 17 is as under:- "17.4Special powers in cases of urgency. - (1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1), take possession of any land needed for public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. "
(16) This sub-section (1) does not use the expression "likely to be needed" as appearing in sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Act. This sub-section (1) of section 17, as reproduced above, is after its amendment in 1984, but as to how this sub-section existed earlier to its amendment in 1984 is not quite relevant for our purpose.
(17) In Patel Shankerbhai Mahijibhai and etc. v. State of Gujarat and others, , the court said that the expression "is needed" in section 4 has reference to the existing need, and that the expression "is likely to be needed" has reference to the future need. A future need had reference to a foreseeable future.
(18) In Dora Phalauli v. State of Punjab and others, , the question which the court considered was as to whether even on the face of the notification issued under section 4 of the Act an order under section 17(4) dispensing with the compliance with the provisions of section 5-A was validly made. The relevant paragraph of the notification which incorporated the order exercising the power under sub-section (4) of section 17 readasunder:- "FURTHER in exercise of the powers under the said Act, the Governor of Punjab is pleased to direct that action under section 17 shall be taken in this case on the grounds of urgency and provisions of section 5-A will not apply in regard to this acquisition."
(19) On this the court had to say as under :- "In the portion of the Notification which we have extracted above, it is neither mentioned that the land is waste or arable nor has it been stated that in the opinion of the Government, there was any urgency to take recourse to the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. A direction to the Collector has been given to take action under Section 17 on the ground or urgency but this is not a legal and complete fulfillment of the requirement of the law. It is to be remembered that the right of a person having any interest in the property to file an objection under Section 5-A of the Act should not be interfered with in such a casual or cavalier manner as has been done in this case."
(20) We may note that before the amendment of sub-section (1) of section 17 in 1984 the land had to be waste or arable.
(21) Basing on this judgment a Division Bench of this Court in Dhani Ram & ors v. Union of India and ors, 39 (1989) Delhi Law Times 208, quashed the notification issued under section 4 of the Act relevant portion of which read as under:- "THELt. Governor being of the opinion, that provisions of Sub-Section (1) of Section 17 of the said Act are applicable to this land, is further pleased under Sub-Section (4) of the said Section to direct that the provisions of Section 5 shall not apply."
(22) The Court said that the notification did not give any reason invoking the provisions of section 17 and that it had been held in Dora Phalauli case by the Supreme Court that the notification must mention that there was urgency and only then the provisions could be invoked.
(23) A learned Single Judge of this Court in Mahant Ram Nath Chela of Mahant Prithvi Nath v. Union of India and others, 40(1990)Delhi Law Times 298,following Dora Phalauli case observed that although section 17 had been invoked no urgency was explicitly stated in the said notification. He said power under section 17 is a drastic power to be invoked in a real case of emergency where the delay in the procedure for acquisition prescribed in the Act might defeat the purpose of the acquisition. When section 17 is invoked the valuable right of the person interested under section 5-A is taken away and that is the reason why the courts had been interpreting the power under section 17 strictly.
(24) In Ghaziabad Sheromani Sahknri Avas Samiti Ltd. and another v. State of U .P. and others, , there was challenge to the notification under section 4(1) of the Act. The challenge was by some co-operative societies with membership of Government servants mostly of the lower strata. The petitioners contended that their members consisted of the low-paid Government servants having acquired the land in dispute for the purpose of providing residential accommodations to them and that the land sought to be acquired by the Ghaziabad Development Authority was for the same purpose and the authorities should not have, therefore, been permitted to acquire that land to the prejudice of the petitioners. This argument did not prevail before the Allahabad High Court where writ petitions were filed. However, on appeal to the Supreme Court the court observed that the grievance advanced by the members through their cooperative societies were genuine and they should not be denied residential accommodation for which they had taken effective steps before the acquisition for the Ghaziabad Development Authority was notified. The court, therefore, deleted from the notification and released the land required by the societies. It would appear that in this case the court assumed the role of a developer, it identified the members, fixed the area of the plots, laid requirements of construction of double storey on the plots, fixed the price of the plots and even identified the land to be released to the petitioner cooperative societies. We find that no law has been propounded in this judgment and we have no evidence on the basis of which we can grant relief to the petitioners. In the High Court two principal contentions had been raised:, (1) purpose of acquisition of land for the Ghaziabad Development Authority was the same for which the cooperative societies had acquired the land, and (2) there was no justification for depriving the petitioners of their right to representation under section 5-A of the Act in the facts and circumstances of the case. On the second point there is no discussion in the judgment. The court also fixed Rs.100.00 per square yard as development charges to be paid to the Ghaziabad Development Authority towards sewerage, electricity, road construction and the like, and the internal development was left to be done by the societies itself. Certain other guidelines were also laid and the area of the land to be allotted to each member was 80 sq. yards.
(25) In Mansoor Khan and others v. State of U.P. and others, , one of the contentions raised was that there was no urgency for applying section 17(1) of the Act even before the representation under section 49 of the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965, had been considered. The court observed as under:- "THE provisions of section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, leaves it absolutely to the discretion of the appropriate Government in cases of urgency to direct the Collector to take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purposes even though no award has . been made. There is no dispute that these lands are arable lands. So, the question whether there is urgency or not is left to the discretion and decision of the appropriate Government. Under sub-section (4) of that section in the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply. One of the modifications to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, made by section 55 of the U.P. Act I of 1966 is that the provisions of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, shall be inapplicable in relation to any land proposed to be acquired under any housing or improvement scheme notified in the Official Gazette under section 28 or under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 31. It is, therefore, obvious that the Legislature has specifically applied its mind to the question whether an inquiry under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act was necessary and dispensed with it in the case of schemes undertaken under the provisions of that Act. We do not see what relevance the power of the State Government under Section 49 of the Act to call for and examine the records of the Board relating to any housing or improvement scheme and modify, annul or remitting for re-consideration has to the power to take possession of the land under provisions of Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. 1894. Furthermore, this scheme being sanctioned by the Government itself there is no room for exercise of the powers under section 49."
(26) In Jage Ram and others v. The State of Haryana and others, , the court said that conclusion of the Government in a given case that there was urgency was entitled to great weight if not conclusive.
(27) In UdayKaushik v. The Land Acquisition Collector and others, Air 1988 Delhi 101 (DB), the court said that though it was not open to the court to consider the adequacy or otherwise of the material on the basis of which Lt. Governor reached his satisfaction, it was open to the court to examine whether there was material at all before the Lt. Governor to reach such satisfaction, whether the Lt. Governor applied his mind to a considerable material and whether the conclusion or satisfaction was based on relevant considerations. In this case there was a challenge to notification issued under sub-section (4) of section 17 of the Act.
(28) In Stale of U.P. v. Smt. Pista Devi and others, ,the High Court had set aside the impugned notification and the declaration on the ground that the case of urgency put forward by the State Government for dispensing with the compliance with the provisions of section 5-A of the Act had been belied by the delay of nearly one year that had ensued between the date of the notification under section 4 and the date of declaration made under section 6 of the Act. The court observed that the question for consideration was whether in the circumstances of the case it could be said that on account of mere delay of nearly one year in the publication of the declaration it could be said that the order made by the State Government dispensing with the compliance with section 5-A of the Act at the time of the publication of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act would stand vitiated in the absence of any other material. The court held that in this case there was no allegation of any kind of mala fides on the part of either the Government or any of the officers, nor did the respondents contend that there was no urgent necessity for providing housing accommodation to a large number of people of Meerut city during the relevant time. The court found that the relevant record clearly demonstrated that at the time when notification under section 4(1) of the Act was issued there was a great urgency felt by the officers regarding the provision of housing accommodation at Meerut, and that the State Government acted upon those reports and it, therefore, could not be said that the State Government in resorting to section 17(1) of the Act acted in an unwarranted fashion. The court said that "the provision for housing accommodation in these days has become a matter of national urgency. We may take judicial notice of this fact. Now it is difficult to hold that in the case of proceedings relating to acquisition of land for providing house sites it is unnecessary to invoke S. 17(1) of the Act and to dispense with the compliance with S. 5-A of the Act."
(29) Mr. Lekhi referred to another decision of the Supreme Court in Narayan Govind Gavate etc.v. State of Maharashtra and others, . A notification was issued under section 4 of the Act and the public purpose recited in the notification was "development and utilisation of said land as a residential and industrial area", and thereafter the notification read as under :- "ANDWHEREAS the Commissioner, Bombay Division, is of the opinion that the said lands were waste or arable lands and their acquisition is urgently necessary, he is further pleased to direct under section (4) of section 17 of the said Act, that the provisions of Section 5-A of the said Act shall not apply in respect of the said lands."
(30) The court said that section 17(4) could not be read in isolation from section 4(1) and section 5-A of the Act, and that the mind of the officer or authority concerned had to be applied to the question whether there was an urgency of such a nature that even summary proceedings under section 5-A of the Act should be eliminated. The court said it was not just the existence of an urgency but the need to dispense with an inquiry under section 5- A which had to be considered. Then the court observed as under in the case before us, the public purpose indicated is the development of an area for industrial and residential purposes. This, in itself,on the face of it, does not call for any such action, barring exceptional circumstances, as to make immediate possession, without holding even a summary enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, imperative. On the other hand, such schemes generally take sufficient period of time to enable at least summary inquiries under Section 5a of the Act to be completed without any impediment whatsoever to the execution of the scheme. Therefore, the very statement of the public purpose for which the land was to be acquired indicated the absence of such urgency, on the apparent facts of the case, as to require the elimination of an enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. Again, the uniform and set recital of a formula, like a ritual or mantra, apparently applied mechanically to every case, itself indicated that the mind of the Commissioner concerned was only applied to the question whether the land was waste or arable and whether its acquisition is urgently needed. Nothing beyond that seems to have been considered. The recital itself shows that the mind of the Commissioner was not applied at all to the question whether the urgency is of such a nature as to require elimination of the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. If it was, at least the notifications gave no inkling of it at all. On the other hand, its literal meaning was that nothing beyond matters stated there were considered. All schemes, relating to development of industrial and residential areas must be urgent in the context of the country's need for increased production and more residential accommodation. Yet, the very nature of such schemes of development does not appear to demand such emergent action as to eliminate summary enquiries under section 5A of the Act. There is no indication whatsoever in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State that the mind of the Commissioner was applied at all to the question whether it was a case necessitating the elimination of the enquiry under section 5a of the Act. The recitals in the notifications, on the other hand,indicate that elimination of the enquiry under section 5A of the Act was treated as an automatic consequence of the opinion formed on other matters. The recital does not say at all that any opinion was formed on the need to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. It is certainly a case in which the recital was at least defective. The burden, therefore, rested upon the State to remove the defect, if possible, by evidence to show that some exceptional circumstances which necessitated the elimination of an enquiry under section 5A of the Act and that the mind of the Commissioner was applied to this essential question. It seems to us that the High Court correctly applied the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act to place the burden upon the State to prove those special circumstances although it also appears to us that the High Court was not quite correct in staling its view in such a manner as to make it appear that some part of the initial burden of the petitioners under Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act had been displaced by the failure of the State to discharge its duty under Section 106 of the Act. The correct way of putting it would have been to say that the failure of the State to produce the evidence of facts especially within the knowledge of its officials, which rested upon it under section 106 of the Evidence Act, taken together with the attendant facts and circumstances, including the contents of recitals, had enabled' the petitioners to discharge their burdens under Secs. 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act. "
(31) This judgment of Supreme Court in Narayan Govind Gavate case was referred to by a subsequent Bench of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Smt. Pista Devi and others where the court observed as under :- "PERHAPS,at the time to which the decision in Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharasthra, related the situation might have been that the schemes relating to development of residential areas in the urban centres were not so urgent and it was not necessary to eliminate the inquiry under S. 5A of the Act. The acquisition proceedings which had been challenged in that case related to the year 1963. During this period of nearly 23 years since then the population of India has gone up by hundreds of millions and it is no longer possible for the Court to take the view that the schemes of development of residential areas do not 'appear to demand such emergent action as to eliminate summary inquiries under S. 5-A of the Act."
(32) In Shakuntala B.Modav V. Union of India and others, (1993) 3Delhi Lawyer 301 (DB), where also there was no mention of the word "urgency" in the impugned notification the court said that a notification could not be declared as bad simply on that score and that a mere omission to mention the word "urgency" would not ipso facto would render a particular notification illegal or invalid if the urgency could be shown otherwise by the words used in the impugned notification. While examining the notification the court held that the lands mentioned in the impugned notification were being acquired for a public purpose which was of an emergent nature, i.e.,forrehabilitation of the persons displaced or affected due to expansion/development of the Palam Airport. The court said that the need or urgency to rehabilitate the persons displaced or affected owing to expansion or development of a particular project could hardly be over emphasised. There could be nothing more sacrosanct than this purpose.
(33) We have seen the relevant files of the Delhi Administration for the purpose of examining as to the circumstances under which notification under section 4 of the Act was issued on 7 June 1990 wherein it was also mentioned that the Lt. Governor, Delhi, was of The opinion that provisions of sub-section ( I ) of section 17 of the Act were applicable to the land and had ordered by virtue of powers under sub-section (4) of section 17 that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply. Subsequent to this and, as noted above, declaration under section 6 of the Act was issued on 22 October 1990. In the notification under section 4 of the Act it was mentioned that the land was likely to be required to be taken by the Government at public expense for a public purpose, namely, for planned development of Delhi, viz., Basant Kunj Residential Scheme. The process for issuance of impugned notifications starts in the Land and Building Department of the Delhi Administration on receipt of a letter dated I January 1990 of the Director (Land Management) of the D.D.A. to the Joint Secretary, Land and Building Department, Delhi Administration. This letter points out that the subject land stood released from compulsory acquisition by virtue of section 55(2) of the D.D. Act in view of the judgment of the High Court dated 9 March 1989 in C.W.P. 1283/83. It was mentioned that this land was urgently required by the D.D.A. for planned development of Delhi. It was, therefore, requested that acquisition proceedings under sections 4,6and 17(1) of the Act may kindly be initiated urgently. No other details are given in this letter as to for what particular purpose the land was urgently required. The Land and Building Department responded by letter dated 9 January 1990 asking certain details before any action could be taken. This was replied to by the Deputy Director (New Leases), D.D.A. It was stated that the land was required for Basant Kunj Residential Scheme as per master plan/zonal plan. It will be noted that the Land & Building Department asked for full justification for invoking the provisions of section 17(1) of the Act and the justification given was that the land in question stood "released from the compulsory acquisition by virtue of section 55(2) of the D.D. Act vide High Court order dated 9 March 1989 and the said land is urgently required for Vasant Kunj Residential Scheme." Draft notifications under section 4 read with section 17(1) as well as for declaration under section 6 of the Act were prepared by the office of the Deputy Commissioner (Land Acquisition Branch) and sent to the Building Department for its pursuance. This was on 8 February 1990. A letter dated 12 February 1990 is again addressed by Land and Building Department to the Deputy Commissioner's office asking for certain clarifications. Meanwhile, it appears, a notice was served upon Delhi Administration by the petitioners in earlier writ petition No. 1283/83 that since the land in question was free from compulsory acquisition, no objection certificate applied for was being withheld illegally and for malafide reasons, and that the officers were guilty of contempt of court. On 7 February 1990 the Deputy Commissioner ote to the Secretary (Land and Building) that the judgment in the Writ Petition 1283/83 appeared to be bad in law and that his office had suggested that a Letters Patent Appeal be filed, but from the records it was confirmed that L.P.A. had not been filed. The Deputy Commissioner advised that a draft notification under section 4 and 17 of the Act was being prepared and would be sent to the Land and Building Department in a day or two. He wrote that "in case the notification is issued promptly we can possibly defend the contempt proceedings in the court of law by saying that land was required for a scheme of D.D.A. and notification is being issued or has been issued." On 14 February 1990 the Additional District Magistrate wrote to the Land and Building Department complaining about delay in issuing the notifications and pointing out that senior officers of the administration had received notices of contempt. The Additional District Magistrate said that back references should be avoided on flimsy grounds and that notifications should not be delayed. It was also written in this letter that action' for issuance of notice be taken as early as possible "otherwise I cannot withhold the request for Noc for long." A note is prepared in the office of the Land and Building Department, but this note does not talk of the threat of contempt proceedings as mentioned in the letters, and the justification for invoking the urgency provision of sub-section ( I ) of section 17 of the Act is that "in view of the Hon'ble High Court order dated 9 March 1989 the land stands released from the compulsory acquisition, and the land is urgently required for the Vasant Kunj Residential Scheme." This justification, as we have seen above, is communicated by the D.D.A. and we find there is no application of independent mind in the office of the Land and Building Department. On this very basis the file is sent to the Lt. Governor, Delhi, who records the following note on 14 May 1990 :- "Discussed with Secy.(L&B). I have gone through the records and requirements of the Delhi Development Authority, as also the draft notifications. I am fully satisfied that the land in question is urgently required for a valid public purpose namely, 'Planned Development of Delhi' (viz. Vasant Kunj Residential Scheme). I order that in view of the urgency of the scheme, notification under sections 4, 6 & 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 be issued immediately. sd/- (Arjan Singh ) Lt. Governor, Delhi. 14.5.90"
(34) And the impugned notification is issued. During the course of hearing our attention was drawn to two letters issued from the office of the Registrar Cooperative Societies, Delhi, one dated 30 September 1988 and the other dated 28 December 1988. In the first letter it has been mentioned that it had come to the notice of the department that the society had purchased agricultural land from private parties for construction of flats. The society was directed to submit a complete report indicating the mode of purchase and clearance from the Deputy Commissioner, Delhi's office of the registration of the land and also to get a certificate to the effect that this land was for "housing purpose". In the second letter the society has been asked to give clarifications or to submit documents regarding ( I ) confirmation that the society will construct houses for all the enrolled members on the land already purchased by the society and will not demand/claim or press for land from D.D.A., and (2) exact measurement of the land and proof that it was free from all encroachments and in the legal possession of the society. The society was also asked to give information as to how many total members will be enrolled by the society in proportion of the land available to it and the likely share of each member in the land (in square metres). We have examined the relevant file of the Registrar of Societies as well to find out under what circumstances these two letters were issued. It may be useful to refer to the note of the date 28 December 1988 itself of the Registrar of Societies who in turn agreed to the note of the Deputy Registrar dated 27 December 1988. In his note the Deputy Registrar has given a brief background of the case. He has noted that the society was initially registered with 64 promoter members and thereafter the strength increased to 101 and intimated to the department on 29 April 1984. This list was approved. Subsequently the society enrolled 50 members after 31 July 1985 and sought approval of the department for their enrolment. This was not agreed to as a directive had been issued wherein the societies were prevented to make fresh enrolment after 31 July 1985 which was a freeze date. The note proceeds to record that the society continuously pleaded for approval of these 50 new members and was also pressing hard to enrol more members on the pretext that the society had already purchased land at its own level from private sources and was not a claimant for land from Dda, and there should be no objection by the department to approve the enrolment of 50 members and also to allow the society to make further enrolment of members in the circumstances particularly when the land was already available with the society for construction of dwelling units. An opinion was expressed in the note that there was no reason why the society be not allowed to increase the membership to the extent the land was available with it and if the society ask for land from the D.D.A. certainly the directive issued freezing the list as on 31 July 1985 would apply. Then the note further records that when the society has already made provision for construction of flats there might not be any objection by the department for the enrolment of the members already made after the freeze date and further enrolment of members in proportion of the availability of the land with the society. The note then records that the society should fulfill two requirements before any permission regarding enrolment of new members was accorded, and these two conditions were: (1) that the society will furnish an affidavit confirming that it would construct houses for all the enrolled members on the land already purchased by it and it will not demand/claim or press for land from D.D.A.,and(2)the society would indicate the measurement of land available with it and would also confirm that it was free from all kinds of encroachments and was in its legal possession. The society was also to intimate as to how many total members would be enrolled by it in proportion of the land available with it and likely share of land of each member would also be intimated to the department. On this the Registrar of Societies records on 28 December 1988 as under :- "I agree. The legal possession of land and the related issues should be ensured. "
(35) On the same day the letter of 28 December 1988 is issued which we have referred to above. On the basis of this letter and the counter-affidavit of Registrar of Societies an argument has been raised of legitimate expectation that the petitioner could not have been deprived of its land meant for housing of its members. Of course, this argument is further being fortified on two more circumstances, namely, the no objection certificate granted under the provisions of the Delhi Lands (Restrictions of Transfer) Act, 1972, and the mutation of the land ultimately infavor of the petitioner society.
(36) Though the impugned notification does not mention the grounds of urgency or the urgency, rather it says that "land is likely to be required". After examining the relevant record and the law on the subject it does appear to us that there was no urgency in the matter for directing the Lt. Governor to say that provisions of section 5-A of the Act shall not apply. The impugned notification was rushed through for purpose unconnected with urgency to acquire the land. If opportunity under section 5-A of the Act had been given to. the petitioner, it would have endeavored to satisfy the authorities that the land which it had acquired was meant for residential accommodation of its members and, perhaps, on that ground the notification under section 4 could have rescinded. As noted above, there is a difference in the wordings "likely to be needed" and "is needed". The notification is, therefore, bad in law. We, however, do not find any substance in the argument of the petitioner that the land could not have been acquired for residential scheme to be developed by the D.D.A. when the petitioner society itself had a scheme for that very purpose. The development by a private society and the development by an authority constituted under a statute for the purpose of planned development having distinct objects are two separate matters. Then we find notification is also bad in view of the earlier notification acquiring this very land for the same very purpose which had been set aside in the writ petition filed by the earlier land owners by a learned Single Judge of this Court. We have noted above that in that writ petition this petitioner society had been added a petitioner as well. That notification under section 4 of the Act had said "that the land is likely to be required to be taken by Government at the public expense for a public purpose, namely, for the planned development of Delhi." In the return filed in that petition it had been specifically averred that the land was required for construction of flats under the Self Financing Housing Scheme known as Vasant Kunj Residential Scheme. This very purpose has now been men-p73tioned in the impugned notification dated 7 June 1990. We, however, agree with Mr. Sethi, learned counsel for the D.D.A., that the learned Single Judge in the earlier writ petition (CW 1283/83) did not examine if provisions of section 55 of the D.D.Act were at all applicable and that he was merely guided by the fact that the Central Government failed to acquire the land in question within a period of six months from the date of receipt of notice. For section 55 to become applicable three conditions are to be satisfied before the owner of the land could serve a notice on Central Government under sub-section (1) and these are : the land is required by the master plan or a zonal development plan to be kept as (i) an open space, or (ii) unbuilt open, or (iii) is designated in any such plan as subject to compulsory acquisition. Nothing has been said if the land in question falls in any of these three categories. Nevertheless, in the earlier writ petition filed by the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner where the petitioner was also a party the notification had been quashed on the ground that the Central Government failed to acquire the land within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the notice. The argument raised was that that being so the master plan or, as the case may be. zonal development plan shall have effect after the expiration of the said six months as if the land were not required to be kept us an open space or unbuilt upon or was not designated as subject to compulsory acquisition. In view of the decision of the earlier writ petition we will not go into the question if circumstances existed for a valid notice under sub-section (1) of section 55 of the D.D. Act. But the release of land cannot bar any subsequent notification for acquisition of the land under any provision of law and for any other purpose than specified in section 55 of the D.D. Act. It is, however, admitted case that the land is earmarked for residential purposes and it is, therefore, unnecessary to go into the question as to the effect of the failure of the Central Government to acquire the land within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the notice, and its effect on the master plan or the zonal development plan. Since the purpose for acquisition of the land is same as in the earlier notification which had been set aside, the second notification which is impugned one could not have been issued for that very purpose. Mr. Sethi said there were two options with the respondents: (1) tog 'in appeal against the judgment in the earlier writ petition, and (2) to go for a fresh notification under section 4 of the Act. Since the judgment was accepted and it was decided not to file an appeal, recourse was had to the second option. But if the purpose is same the second notification could not have been issued. The plea that section 55 of the D.D.Act was inapplicable in the first writ petition is certainly barred now and barred even by principle analogous to res judicata. The respondents cannot go on issuing' successive notifications for the same very purpose when earlier notification had been set aside.
(37) 'DEVELOPMENT' under clause (d)ofsection 2 of the D.D. Act with its grammatical variations means the carrying out of building,engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under land or the making of any material change in any building or land and includes redevelopment; and under clause (e) 'development area" means any area declared to be a development area under sub-section (1) of section 12. Section 12 of the D.D. Act relates to the declaration of development areas and development of land in those and other areas. The Central Government by notification in official gazette may declare \ .any area in Delhi to be a development area for the purposes of this Act. The D.D.A. shall * not undertake or carry out any development of land in any area which is not a development area. Then, no development of land shall be undertaken or carried out in any area by any person or body unless, where that area is a development area, permission for such development has been obtained in writing from the D.D.A. in accordance with the provisions of this Act. There is nothing on the record to show that the land in question falls in any area in Delhi which is a development area as notified by the Central Government. The D.D.A., therefore, could not entertain any plans for carrying out development of the land in question, and plans, etc. submitted by the petitioner were rightly rejected by the D.D.A. (38) The area was not a development area at the time when plans, etc., were submitted to the D.D.A. It is stated that notification was issued only on 19 March 1993 declaring the area to be development area. In this view of the matter it was submitted that the competent authority to sanction the layout plans, etc. was the M.C.D. (39) The petitioner has also raised the plea of discrimination. It was stated that in Cwp 2903/82 [Hamdard Dawakahan (Wakf) v. Union of India and others] where there was challenge to the acquisition of certain land of the petitioner in village Tughlakabad the D.D.A. settled the matter with the petitioner. Under this settlement the petitioner was to surrender a big chunk of land so acquired without any monetary consideration and the D.D.A. agreed to allow the petitioner to utilise the remaining land, which was about 1/4 of the land acquired, for construction of a group housing (institutional) project on freehold basis for residential purposes as per regulations. This case is of no help to the petitioner. The facts are entirely different.
(40) The other case on which reliance has been placed by the petitioner is that of Krishan Mohan Bijli v. Union of India and others (C.W.P. No. 1902/81 ). In this case the petitioner had challenged notification under section 4 of the Act as well as declaration under section 6 thereof and had sought quashing of the entire acquisition proceedings. The petitioner also sought restraining the D.D.A. from forcibly demolishing the houses and structures standing on the land. Various other reliefs were also sought. However, a statement was made by the D.D.A. in court that since in pursuance to notification under section 4 an award in respect of the land in dispute could not be made within time, the acquisition proceedings, therefore, lapsed under section 11-A of the Act. On the basis of this statement a learned Single Judge of this Court observed that there was no opposition to the grant of reliefs made in the writ petition and he allowed the same. He specifically ordered that "petitioners shall be entitled to all the reliefs claimed therein." Again we do not think this order of the learned Singly Judge is of any help to the petitioner. Rather we are of the view there was no occasion for the learned Single Judge to observe that petitioner would be entitled to all the reliefs claimed in the petition when the statement made by the D.D.A. only pertain to the acquisition proceedings.
(41) An argument was based on the doctrine of legitimate expectation. This has been explained in Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 1(1) 151 (para 81) as under:- "81.4Legitimate expectations. A person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. The existence of a legitimate expectation may have a number of different consequences; it may give locus standi to seek leave to apply for judicial review; it may mean that the authority ought not to act so as to defeat the expectation without some overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing so; or it may mean that, if the authority proposes to defeat a person's legitimate expectation, it must afford him an opportunity to make representations on the matter. The courts also distinguish, for example in licensing cases, between original applications, applications to renew and revocations; a party who has been granted a license may have a legitimate expectation that it will be renewed unless there is some good reason not to do so, and may therefore be entitled to greater procedural protection than a mere applicant for a grant. "
(42) This doctrine has been referred to and explained to in considerable detail by the Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. Hindustan Development Corporation and others, , where the court observed as under:- "ON examination of some of these important decisions it is generally agreed that legitimate expectation gives the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation is to be confined mostly to right of affair hearing before a decision which results in negativing a promise or withdrawing an undertaking is taken. The doctrine does not give scope to claim relief straightaway from the administrative authorities as no crystalised right as such is involved. The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfillment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. "
(43) In Council of Civil Service Unions and others v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 All E.R. 935 (HL), where it was stated that the expression legitimate expectation' was used for the first time in the speech of Lord Diplock. In this case staff of a certain department (DCHQ) of the British Government had a long standing right to belong to national trade unions and most of them were in fact members of such trade unions. The unions represented at this department were all members of a association of civil service unions and there was an established practice at the department of consultation between the manangement and the unions about important alterations in the terms and conditions of employment of the staff. On certain occasions industrial disputes had arisen causing disruption in the working of the department. The Minister concerned issued instructions to the effect that the terms and conditions of civil service at the department would have revised so as to exclude membership of any trade union other than a departmental staff association approved by the head of the department. Before issuing such an instruction no prior consultation with the staff of the department was held. The staff employed at the department applied for judicial review of the Minister's instructions seeking, inter alia, declaration that it was invalid because the Minister had acted unfairly in removing their fundamental right to belong to a trade union without consultation. The Minister defended his action on two grounds contending (i) that prerogative powers, and instructions given under a delegated power emanating from the prerogrative, were discretionary and not open to review by the courts, and (ii) that the requirements of national security overrode any duty which the minister otherwise had to consult the staff. The court held as under (relevant portions from the head notes):- "AN aggrieved person was entitled to invoke judicial review if he showed that a decision of a public authority affected him by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which in the past he had been permitted to enjoy and which he could legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to enjoy either until he was given reasons for its withdrawal and the opportunity to comment on those reasons or because he had received an assurance that it would not be withdrawn before he had been given the opportunity of making representations against the withdrawal. The appellants' legitimate expectation arising from the existence of a 241 regular practice of consultation which the appellants could reasonably expect to continue gave rise to an implied limitation on the minister's exercise of the power contained in art 4 of the 1982 order, namely an obligation to act fairly by consulting the Gchq staff before withdrawing the benefit of trade union membership. The minister's failure to consult prima facie entitled the appellants to judicial review of the minister's instruction. Although where the government sought to rely on reasons of national security to justify a decision or action the courts would not accept a mere assertion to that effect but would require evidence that the decision or action was taken for reasons of national security, the question whether the decision or action was in fact necessitated by the requirements of national security was non-justiciable since the executive was the sole judge of what national security required and alone had access to the information that enabled the judgment to be made as to what was required. Once the minister produced evidence that her decision not to consult the staff before withdrawing the right to trade union membership was taken for reasons of national security, that overrode any right to judicial review which the appellants had arising out of the denial of their legitimate expectation of consultation. "
(44) It would be, thus, seen that doctrine of legitimate expectation provides that hearing should be granted before there is a change in policy. It is more a rule of natural justice, a rule of procedural law rather than a rule of substantive law. In the Halsbury's Laws of England certain instances have been given where a plea of legitimate expectation may be raised, but that would only be so if the policy does not change, and circumstances and conditions of grant of license remain the same. The legitimate expectation must be raised by the actions of the authority competent in law and this right has to be inconsonance with law, i.e., the right should be available in law. In the Halsbury's Laws of England, we find, this principle of legitimate expectation is a part of administrative law and finds mentioned in the heading "Judicial Control" by the courts to review the exercise by public bodies or officers of statutory powers. impinging on legally recognised interests and in the sub-heading "Procedural requirements and a right to a fair hearing." In Council of Civil Service Unions case, (1984)3 ALLE.R. 935, the principle of legitimate expectation was applied to the grant of fair hearing.
(45) In the present case before us, no foundation has been laid for the petitioner to raise the plea of legitimate expectation. The permission under the Delhi Lands (Restorations of Transfer) Act, 1972, has been rushed through on the threat of contempt of court given by the petitioner which threat, we find, could not have been there. The record of the Registrar of Societies also does not support the case of the petitioner to raise such a plea and a stray sentence in the counter-affidavit of the Registrar-of Societies that addition of 80 more members of the petitioner society was approved on the condition that the petitioner would not ask for land from the D.D.A. does not advance the case of the petitioner. We, therefore, do not find any substance in the plea of legitimate expectation raised by the petitioner and reject the same.
(46) In view of our discussion, the only relief to which the petitioner is entitled is that the impugned notification dated 7 June 1990 under sections 4 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act is set aside. Since the notification has been set aside the petitioner would not be disturbed from the land covered under that notification and which has been mentioned in the earlier portion of the judgment. By letter dated 2 July 1990 the respondent D.D.A. refused sanction to the petitioner for erection of building/ execution of work of the group housing scheme of the petitioner on the ground that the land for which the group housing scheme had been submitted did not form part of the approved lay out plan of the D.D.A. As we have noticed in the judgment, the area where the land under the impugned notification is situate was declared as development area by a notification issued under section 12 of the Delhi Development Act only on 19 March 1993. Petitioner would be,thus,entitled to apply afresh to the D.D.A. for permission for development of the land in question and respondent- D.D.A. shall consider the application keeping in view the provisions of sections 12 and 13 of the Delhi Development Act. To the extent aforesaid the rule is made absolute. There will be, however, no order as to costs.