Bombay High Court
The State Of Maharashtra (Through The ... vs Smt. Kamali Keshav Mhatre And Ors. on 31 March, 2004
Author: F.I. Rebello
Bench: F.I. Rebello, S.R. Sathe
JUDGMENT F.I. Rebello, J.
1. First Appeal 757 of 2003 is preferred by the State against the Judgment and order dated 12.1.2000 passed by Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Panvel, Raigad. Civil Application 514 of 2003 is for stay. First Appeal No. 1782 of 2002 is preferred by the Claimants before the Land Acquisition Officer. The Claimants have also taken out Civil Application No. 1078 of 2004 for leading additional evidence. These are basically to bring on record certain judgments which have been passed after the award has been passed and arising out of the same notification and for the very same public purpose.
2. In this appeal we propose to discuss and dispose of the major issues. The discussion herein is to be adopted in respect of the batch of other Appeals which are on board and which arise out of the same notification and in respect of lands which are located in Panvel, within Panvel Municipal Council. A few facts may be noted. The notification under Section 4 on Land Acquisition Act was published in all these cases on 3.2.1970. The public purpose as set out was acquisition of land for CIDCO for residential, commercial and industrial purpose. Awards came to be passed in all these cases. No application for enhancement in respect of amount awards was made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.
On 29.4.1995, the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Alibag, passed the judgment and award in LAR 71 of 1982 and awarded compensation at a higher rate. On account of that various claimants applied under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act for enhancement of market value. That was rejected. Claimant applied under Section 28A(3) of the Land Acquisition Act pursuant to which reference was made. The State resisted the said applications for enhancement of the market value. On behalf of the Appellants they examined Shri Ambaji Gopal Mali, Power of Attorney holder, as also Shri M.G. Vaidya, Architect and Government Approved Valuer. On behalf of the State they examined Shri Shankar Prabhakar.
The learned Civil Judge after considering the material on record awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 5/- per sq.mt alongwith statutory payments. The learned Judge divided the land into four categories which are as under:
Group-I: The land below 100 meter and abutting to Bombay Pune Highway the Court held will fetch more value and fixed market value at the rate of Rs. 25/- per sq. mt.
Group-II: The lands which are abutting to the Bombay Poona Highway within 300 meters, the market value of the land was fixed at Rs. 22/- per sq. mt.
Group-III: The lands which are at a distance of more than 300 meters from Bombay Poona Highway and to the extent of 1000 meters the market value was fixed at the rate of Rs. 18/- per sq. mt.
Group-IV: All the lands those at a distance of beyond 1000 meters from Bombay Poona Highway, the market value was fixed at the rate of Rs. 15/- per sq. mt.
The learned Reference Court apart from increasing the market value also awarded the other statutory benefits including additional amount of 12% under Section 23(1A) of the Act.
3. In the appeal preferred by the State basically three contentions have been urged which are as under:
a) In respect of those lands where proceedings were not pending before the Collector on the day the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984 came into force, the statutory benefit under Section 23(1A) would not be applicable.
b) On reading of Section 25 which also came to be amended by the Act of 1984, if the party had not made a claim for compensation pursuant to notice under Section 9 or made claim restricting the market value to a particular amount, then the Reference Court could have no jurisdiction either to award amount higher than that awarded by the SLAO or beyond what was claimed by the claimants, in the reply to the notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act.
c) Considering the fact and circumstances, and the amount awarded, the market value fixed is on the higher side and ought to be reduced.
On behalf of the Appellants/Claimants in their appeal the principle contention is that considering the potentiality of the land and the land being close to Mumbai and situated within the area of Municipal Council had huge potentiality for non agricultural purpose. The land was acquired for residential, commercial and industrial purposes. Considering the material on record and the evidence adduced, the Appellants are entitled for fixation of higher market value then what was fixed by the SLAO and consequently the market value ought to be enhanced.
In so far as the Civil Application is concerned, it is pointed out that it is only to bring on record certain orders and judgments passed by the Reference Court or by this Court and this being vital material and or evidence the application should be allowed and the Court should remand the matter back to the Reference Court for reconsideration based on the judgments subsequently passed.
4. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. It is first proposed to dispose of the objections based on interpretation of Section 23(1A) and Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984 which came into effect from 24.9.1984.
Let us first, deal with the contentions under Section 23(1A) of the Act. If is pointed out that from the 43 First Appeals filed by the Government and which are pending, the award under Section 11 of the Act is passed prior to the cut off date i.e. 30.4.1982 in 17 matters and in the remaining 26 matters the award under Section 11 of the Act was passed after cut off date i.e. 30.4.1982. It is contended by the learned Counsel on behalf of the State Government that the right of the claimant/appellants to make an application under Section 28(A) of the Land Acquisition Act arose when the said bill was introduced on 30.4.1982 though it came into force on 24.9.1984. The right of claimants to make an application at a highest arose on 27.4.1995 when the Civil Judge, Senior Division, in another LAR 71 of 1982 awarded compensation at higher rate than the rate awarded to the appellants and in respect of the adjoining lands which were acquired at the same in the same village. The provisions of Section 28(A) of the Land Acquisition Act having come into force on 30.4.1982, it is only in those cases where the proceedings were pending before the Collector considering the language of the section itself that the claimants would be entitled to compensation under Section 23(1-A). In those cases where the proceedings were not pending before the SLAO (Collector) the claimants would not be entitled to apply under Section 23(1-A).
On the other hand, on behalf of the claimants their Learned Counsel points out that though the Act came into force on 24.9.1984 the date on which the section became applicable is 30.4.1982. If the matter was pending in the Court they are entitled to compensation under Section 23(1-A). At any rate Section 28(A) provides a right to the claimant to apply for higher compensation, if any, in respect of the lands from the same notification higher compensation is awarded. All persons, who apply under Section 28(A) if the market value is fixed after 30.4.1982 would be entitled to apply and claim compensation under Section 23(1-A), even if the award under Section 11 was made prior to 30.4.1982.
Section 28A reads as under:
"28A. Redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court. -(1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court.
Provided that in compution the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under Sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interest and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants.
(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under Sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Section 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18."
Section 23(1-A) reads as under:
23. Matters to be considered in determining compensation - (1) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the Court shall take into consideration -
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(1A) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.
Section 23(1A) came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of the Goa Agricultural Produce Market Committee & etc. v. Government of Goa and Ors., . Dealing with the issue of applicability of Section 23(1A) the learned Division Bench observed as:
"The learned counsel for the Goa Agricultural Produce Market Committee rightly submitted that the benefit of Section 23(1A) of the land Acquisition Act, 1894 could not be made available to Shri Sonu Babu Kudnekar in the proceedings under Section 28A of the Act as the original Award was made by the Collector on 26th March, 1979. Section 23(1A) of the Act as authoritatively interpreted by the larger Bench of the Supreme Court in its recent judgment in the case of K.S. Paripoonam v. State of Kerala . In this case no proceedings were pending before the Collector under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on or after 30th April, 1982. In this case the award was already made by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 26th March, 1979. For the proceedings under Section 28A of the Act the benefit of Section 23(1A) of the act could not be made available to the claimant if the same was not available at the time when the original award was made under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894."
The matter came up for consideration before Apex Court again in the Case of Kashiben Bhikabai and Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Anr. . The issue was whether the additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) was available to the claimant where the award was made by Collector prior to 30.4.1982. The Apex Court adverted to para 21 of its judgment in the case of Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama, 1991 Supreme Court Cases 277 and reproduced para 21 which reads as under:
"Entitlement of additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A) depends upon pendency of acquisition proceedings as on 30.4.1982 or commencement of acquisition proceedings after that date. Section 30 Sub-section (1)(a) provides that additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A) shall be applicable to acquisition proceedings pending before the Collector as on 30.4.1982 in which he has not made the award before that date. If the Collector has made the award before that date then, that additional amount cannot be awarded. Section 30 Sub-section (1)(b) provides that Section 23(1-A) shall be applicable to every acquisition proceedings commenced after 30.4.1984. The final point to note is that Section 30 Sub-section (1) does not refer to court award and the court award is used only in Section 30 Sub-section (2)."
After quoting the said paragraph from the judgment the Apex Court noted that no judgment taking a contrary view to the above referred case was cited before them and accordingly held that an additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) of the Act would not be available to the claimant, where the acquisition proceeding had commenced and the award was made by the Collector prior to 30.4.1982.
The argument sought to be advanced on behalf of the claimant is that, the ratio that would not apply to an application made under Section 28(A). At the highest it is contended that the ratio of those judgments can be extended to those proceedings which arose out of reference under Section 18 or Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. We are afraid we can not countenance such an argument. If it is not open to the Courts to award compensation under Section 23(1-A) where the award was made before 30.4.1982 or who had applied under Section 18 or where dispute was referred under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act to get the additional compensation, merely because an additional right has been conferred on the claimant to apply under Section 28(A), would not result in such claimant being entitled to benefits which otherwise were not available to claimants where awards were passed before 30.4.1982. The Section would have to be read to mean that under Section 28(A) also, only those claimants would be entitled to the benefit under Section 23(1A) which were available to the claimants in respect of whom proceedings were pending before the Collector on 30.4.1982. The contention therefore, advanced on behalf of the claimants/appellants will have to be rejected. The contention of the State will have to be upheld only in those appeals where proceedings were pending before the Collector on 30.4.1982 and award under Section 11 was not made would be entitled to compensation under Section 23(1-A). In other words proceedings must have been pending before the Collector on 30.4.1982 and no award had been made before the date. In all such cases the appeal to that extent will have to be allowed and the order of Reference Court awarding compensation under Section 23(1-A) will have to be set aside.
5. We then come to the next contention advanced on behalf of the State that considering Section 25 as it stood prior to its amendment, the claimants who had not replied pursuant to notice under Section 9, claiming market value for the acquired land which they were entitled to or had claimed at market value at a particular rate, would not be entitled to claim market value of the acquired land at a higher rate than that awarded by the SLAO or more than what they themselves had claimed in the reply to the notice under Section 9.
On behalf of the claimants their learned counsel contends that what is to be considered in Section 25 as it now stands and once that be the case and considering the language of Section 28(A), the Court before whom the application under Section 28(A-3) is pending would not be bound by the unamended provision of Section 25 and the Court would be entitled to fix market value at a higher rate considering the overall provisions.
The provisions of unamended Section 25 have been reproduced by the Apex Court in the case of Land Acquisition Officer-cum-DSWO, A.P. v. B.V. Reddy & Sons . Before the Apex Court also the very issue which was under consideration before us was also in issue. Answering the question Whether the amended provisions of Section 25 would be retrospective, the Apex Court has observed as under:
"The amended provision of Section 25 nowhere indicates that the same would have any retrospective effect. Consequently, therefore, it would apply to all acquisitions made subsequent to 24.9.1984, the date on which Act 68 of 1984 came into force."
Therefore, the provisions of Section 25 as amended would apply to those acquisitions which were made subsequent to 24.9.1984. On behalf of the State, our attention was also invited to the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran, (Ujjain Development Authority) v. Tarachand and Anr. . The Apex Court therein noted that under Section 25(2) of the Act prior to the Amendment, the Court was prohibited to enhance the compensation in excess of the amount claimed pursuant to the notices issued under Section 9 and 10 of the Act. Since Sub-section (2) of Section 25 was deleted by Amendment Act 68 of 1984, the limitation on the exercise of the power of the court was taken away. Nonetheless, it would always be open to a party to claim a particular amount and having claimed at the rate, the question arises whether the court could grant compensation higher than that claimed by the party? Answering the issue the court observed that it would be obvious that when a party claims compensation at a particular rate, he assesses the market value of the land at that particular rate and seeks compensation on that basis. Having assessed the compensation at that particular rate, the question emerges whether the court could grant higher compensation than was assessed by the party. The court held that in such situation the court could not grant compensation then what was sought for by the party.
It is therefore clear that it will not be open to the Court to consider the provisions of Section 25 as amended in those appeals where the awards were made before the amendment. The question then would be whether on this count the State appeal will have to be allowed and the market value as granted will have to be set aside.
We have earlier referred to provisions of Section 25. Section 25(4) and 25(5) before its amendment read as under :
"(4). When the applicant has refused to make such claim or has omitted without sufficient reason ( to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded by the Court shall in no case exceed the amount awarded by the Collector.
(5). When applicant has omitted for a sufficient reason ( to be allowed by the Judge ) to make such claim, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not be less than and may exceed the amount awarded by the Collector".
We have already reproduced the provisions of Section 28(A). A perusal of Sub-section (3) of Section 28(A), would show that any person who has not accepted the award under Sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by the Collector for determination of the Court and the provisions of Section 18 to 28 shall so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18. In other words the provisions of Section 18 to 28 are also made applicable while considering the reference under Section 28(A). What this would mean is that the provision of Section 25(4) and (5) as they stood before the amendment, would also be applicable in those cases where the amendment provisions of the act are not applicable. That would mean that under Section 25, the reference Court for sufficient reason can allow party to make a claim, even if the claim had not been made. It will also mean that it will be open to the party to make a higher claim, if the claim had been restricted and for the Reference Court to consider whether it should be allowed. It would not be possible to construe the power under Section 25 to only those cases where no claim had been made. To give effect to the provisions, it would cover both situations, where either claimant had not made a claim or had made a lesser claim. In such cases the reference Court for sufficient cause can allow the party to make the claim. It is, therefore, clear that there was discretion in the reference court even prior to the amendment to allow a party to make claim if not made in reply to a notice served under Section 9 or to permit a higher claim then that made in a reply to the notice under Section 9 of the Act.
Once that be the case, the question would be whether in the absence of any specific order permitting the claimant to claim higher market value can it be said that the discretion has been wrongly exercised. We find firstly that the learned Judge did consider the application for reference claiming higher compensation. The reference to the Court was made by the S.L.A.O. That was not opposed before the learned Judge on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to do so. The fact that the learned Judge permitted the claimants before it to claim higher compensation and awarded higher compensation would mean that the Court had exercised its discretion in favour of the claimants. The second aspect of the matter is that, in the appeals filed before the Court there no ground has been raised objecting to the exercise of discretion by the Reference Court. Once that be the case, it would not be possible to entertain the contention raised on behalf of the State that the Reference Court could not have awarded higher compensation. It is not a purely question of law. It pertains to exercise of discretion, based on the material available, in other words a mixed question of facts and law. Once the reference Court has exercised its discretion, we do not propose to interfere with the exercise of that discretion. We may also note here that the claimants are affected people who have lost their land on account of acquisition for CIDCO who have subsequently sold the land for very high prices. While discussing the issue of market value, we will also note the various judgments of this Court wherein the market value had been fixed in respect of lands from the very same notification. This aspect was also before the learned Reference Court. Considering all these factors we do not think that we should permit the State to raise such an objection at this stage. The language of Section 28(A) would also be defected it the claimants are not entitled to claim higher market value considering the record. At any rate, discretion having been exercised, we do not find that the reference Court had jurisdiction to exercise that discretion. It is no doubt true that the learned Counsel for the State points out that before the Court the State had raised an objection that some of the claimants had not claimed compensation in reply to the notice under Section 9. Inspite of that the Reference Court has exercised its discretion. In other words the plea of the State was rejected. There is no challenge in the appeal memo to the exercise of that discretion as noted earlier. The contention therefore advanced on behalf of the State on that count will have to be rejected.
6. We now come to the last issue in so far as the fixation of market value is concerned. As we have noted earlier, the Reference Court for the purpose of fixing market value, categorized the land into four groups and accordingly awarded compensation ranging between Rs. 15/- to Rs. 25/-. In respect of the very same notification various other awards were made by the Reference Court and in respect of which several appeals had come up before this court, being First appeal 754 of 1986 alongwith other appeals which came to be disposed of by a learned Division Bench of this Court ( S.W. Puranik & D.J. Moharir, JJ) on 25-26/2/1993. The lands involved there were situated within the Municipal limits of Panvel and Kamothi. After considering the material which had come on record including earlier awards made in the year 1966, the learned Division bench divided the land into Group 1, Group 2, Group 3, Group 4A and Group 4B. In respect of the first group it awarded Rs. 25/-, in the second group it awarded Rs. 23/-, in the third group it awarded Rs. 22/- and in the forth (A) and (B) group it awarded Rs. 20/- each. Against the judgment of the Division Bench SLP was preferred by the State Government, which was rejected.
Another group of appeals being Frist Appeal No. 382 of 1984 came up before another Division bench of the Court (Shah & Kotwal, JJ) which were disposed of by judgment pronounced between 3.3.1987 and 19.3.1987. The area included Panvel Village, Asudgaon Village, Khamote Village and Kalamboli Village. The Division bench noted that it is on record and not in dispute that Panvel is Located on the Bombay-Pune National Highway, where the lands have acquired non-agricultural potentialities. It had become a center for local trade and commerce. It is also a place of Taluka headquarter having a Municipality to a very long time. The lands under acquisition are in the extended Municipal area, which is quite adjacent and practically encircling Panvel Town which has commercial activities and educational facilities. The Bombay-Pune Road and Diva-Panvel railway pass through this area. At a short distance to the east of Bombay-Pune National Highway within the extended Municipal limits lies the Industrial Estate where 35 factories are located. There is also a Co-operative Housing Society called Cosmopolitan Copoperative Society which has purchased lands for construction of houses for its members. Abutting the National Highway at some distance to the north of the Industrial estate is the factory of Jenson & Nicholson in existence for over six years prior to the notification under Section 4. A few years prior to the present acquisition, lands had been acquired for the S.T. bus stand, chowkidars quarters and so on. To the South of the acquired area is the junction of the two National Highways viz. Bombay-Pune and Bombay-Konkan-Goa road, hardly at a distance of two kms., proceeding to the north there is the junction of two major highways viz. Bombay-Pune Highway and Sion-Pune Highway. Various other aspects were also noted. It was urged by Mr. Paranjpe, appearing for the claimants in that appeal that the distance of the National Highway should be the sole criteria for fixing the market value of each of the acquired lands. The learned Division bench noted that cannot be the only criteria for fixing the market value though there is no doubt that the proximity of land from the road would be a very relevant consideration alongwith other factors for determination of the market value. The Division bench noted that in their opinion several other factors such as the already existing non agricultural development or the trend or possibility of further development in a particular direction or locality has to be taken into account alongwith the advantage of nearness of the land to the highway, and based on this the learned Division bench fixed the compensation.
7. Another Division Bench of this Court in another group of appeals arising from the same notification in First Appeal No. 875 of 1985 decided on 16.3.2000 fixed the market value between Rs. 25/- and Rs. 20/- per sq. mt. It may only be pointed out that the lands involved in these appeals were from village Pendhar, Taloja, Panchand, Owe, Belpada and Kharghar in Panvel Taluka of Raigad District. None of these lands were situated within the Municipal area of Panvel Municipal Council like in the present case. From the map placed before us find that village Taloja far instance is situated at quite a far distance from Panvel city. The learned Division Bench proceeded solely on the basis of the distance from the National Highway should as the criteria for fixing the market value In the present case the land is situated within Panvel Municipal Council. This is an additional criteria and has to be taken into consideration. Within the township several industrial project had commenced and the land had potentialities for commercial and residential activities. The land also is situate also closer to Mumbai then the lands which were being considered by the Division Bench. The additional factors will have to be considered while fixing the market value. We have also noted that the State Government accepted the judgment of this Court of 16.3.2000 in F.A. No. 875 of 1985 and other appeals. The only additional factor that the Division Bench it has taken into consideration is 10% deduction which was not considered in the Judgment of Puranik, J. The judgment of Puranik, J, was maintained by the Apex Court as the SLP filed was dismissed though it is correct that judgment does not show that it took into consideration the aspect of deduction. The very fact that the SLP was rejected, it will presumed that the Apex Court did find that the market value fixed needs not to be interfered with. In our opinion, therefore, while maintaining the basic principle followed by the other Division Benches we do not want to depart from the market value, but considering that the lands are within the municipal limits and considering the national highway the lands can be grouped into three groups.
8. The first group will consist of the lands situated within 750 mts, of the National Highway where the market value is fixed Es.28/-. Considering 10% deduction and rounding the figure we fix the market value at Rs. 25/-. This will be market value for all such lands in the group of appeals.
The second group will consist of lands situated between 750 and 1500 sq. mts. In respect of these lands we fix the market value at Rs. 26/-. Considering 10% deduction and rounding up the figure we fix the market value at Rs. 23/- per sq. mt.
The third Category will include the lands beyond 1500 sq. mt. We fix the market value of these land at Rs. 23.50p and after deducting 10% and rounding the figure, fix the market value at Rs. 21/-.
9. In the light of the above, the following conclusions emerge:
(1) Additional compensation under Section 23(1A) is not allowable in those cases where the award under Section 11 was made before 30.4.1982. The awards in those cases accordingly will have to be modified to that extent.
(2) Considering the provisions of Section 25 as it stood before the amendment and as the Reference Court has exercised its discretion, we reject the contentions raised on behalf of the State.
(3) The market value of the acquired land is fixed in terms of paragraph 8 of this judgment.
10. On behalf of the Appellants/State, the learned Counsel points out that considering the finding by the Court that in some cases compensation under Section 23(1A) is not to be paid and if already paid and received by the Appellant, then the State should be entitled to refund of that amount or adjustment in the compensation as now enhanced, the claimants should be called upon to pay the interest on the said component for the first year at the rate of 9% and for the subsequent years at 15%. On the other hand on behalf of the claimants their learned Counsel contends that the Court had permitted withdrawal of the amount deposited in those cases where it was deposited to the extend of 50% of the amount deposited. In most cases the claimants have not withdrawn the amount. In those cases where the claimants have withdrawn the amount, the amount withdrawn should be treated as compensation other then under Section 23(1-A).
We find merit in the submission advanced on behalf of the Counsel for the claimants, as the amount awarded by the Reference Court was not paid but was deposited. If any amount has been withdrawn it is to be treated in the first instance towards market value and incidental benefits like Solatium, but not compensation under Section 23(1-A).
11. Considering the above, we now come to the merits of the present matter.
The present appeal arises from Land Acquisition Reference No. 9 of 1999. The notification under Section 4 was published on 3.2.1990. The award under Section 11 was made on 21.11.1980. The award under Section 28(A) was made on 31.3.1997. Possession of the land was taken on 7.3.1974. In respect of survey Nos. 514 and 574 the distance from Bombay-Pune Highway is 679 mt and 485 mt. The SLAD fixed market value at the rate of Rs. 9/- and Rs. 10/- per sq. mt. In respect of both the survey numbers the market value is enhanced to Rs. 25/- per sq. mt.
In respect of survey No. 555 it is situated at distance of 975 mt. The SLAD awarded Rs. 9/- per sq. mt. The market value is enhanced to Rs. 23/- per sq. mt.
On this enhanced compensation the claimants would be entitled to other statutory benefits except the compensation under Section 23(1A).
12. In view of the above, the following order:
First Appeal 757 of 2003 is partly allowed.
Civil Application 514/2003 stands disposed of.
First Appeal 1762 of 2003 is partly allowed.
The Civil Application stands disposed of.
There shall be no order as to costs.