Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P.Through Collector ... vs Kashi Krishna Verma on 11 November, 2019
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2019 ALL 1872, 2020 (2) ALJ 27 (2020) 1 ALL RENTCAS 69, (2020) 1 ALL RENTCAS 69
Author: Jaspreet Singh
Bench: Jaspreet Singh
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
RESERVED
Case :- CIVIL REVISION No. - 11 of 2010
Revisionist :- State Of U.P.Through Collector Faizabad And Ors.
Opposite Party :- Kashi Krishna Verma
Counsel for Revisionist :- C.S.C.
Counsel for Opposite Party :- S.K.Mehrotra,Aditya Tewari,Apoorva Tewari,I.D.Shukla,Ishwar Dutt Shukla
*****
Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh,J.
1. Heard learned standing counsel for the revisionist and Shri Apoorva Tewari, learned counsel for the opposite parties.
2. By means of the instant revision, the judgment passed by the Additional District Court, Court No.6, Faizabad acting as Judge Small Causes Court dated 07.12.2009 is under challenge passed in S.C.C. Suit No.1/2002 by which the suit of the landlord opposite parties has been decreed.
3. In order to appreciate the contention of the respective parties, certain brief facts giving rise to the above revision are being noted hereinafter.
4. That one Shri Kashi Krishna Sharma instituted a S.C.C. Suit No.1/2002 with the averments that the plaintiff is the owner-landlord of the building bearing No.1/13/34 and 1/13/35 situate at Mohalla Civil Lines, City, in District Faizabad. It was further pleaded that the Superintendent of Police, Department of Vigilance had its office in the aforesaid house which was allotted in favour of the Superintendent of Police, Department of Vigilance, Faizabad by means of the allotment order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 26.09.1975. Later, the rent was enhanced with the consent of the parties and a lease deed dated 22.06.1991 came to be executed and the rent of the premises was enhanced to Rs.1150/- per month. It was also specifically pleaded that the defendant-revisionist in furtherance of the said lease deed continued to pay the rent @ Rs.1150/- per month and it stood paid up to September, 2000. Significantly, the rent paid for the period upto September, 2009 was paid to the plaintiff-landlord in the month of January, 2001. Since, the lease was initially for a period of five years, which expired by efflux of time and apparently there was no renewal of the aforesaid lease. It is alleged that the plaintiff demanded rent from the defendant-revisionist which they failed to pay and even failed to vacate the premises. In the meantime, the Superintendent of Police, Department of Vigilance, made an application to the District Magistrate / Officer Incharge of the Nazool Department on 16.11.2000 seeking transfer of the land underneath the building apportioned thereof in favour of the State of U.P. It is the specific case of the plaintiff-landlord that the defendant-revisionist by making an application dated 16.11.2000 for getting the property transferred in the name of the State of U.P., was a clear act by which the title of the plaintiff was challenged.
5. In the aforesaid application, it is stated that the land in question belonged to Nazool and accordingly it was prayed that the same be transferred in the name of the Department. Thus, title of the plaintiff was sought to be challenged. It will be relevant to mention that the plaintiff being the landlord-owner had already applied before the District Authorities for getting the land in question converted into freehold vide letter dated 05.05.2001 and also the application of the revisionists was rejected. It is in this backdrop that the plaintiff issued a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 80 CPC dated 01.04.2001 claiming arrears of rent with effect from 01.10.2000 till the date of notice @ Rs.1,150/-. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff had not waived his right of entry nor condoned the conduct of the tenant. The aforesaid notice was received by the revisionists, who gave a reply to the notice on 01.05.2001. It has further been stated that in the meantime, the defendant with a malafide intent started depositing the rent under Section 30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. With the aforesaid submissions, the suit of arrears of rent and eviction came to be filed on 29.01.2002.
6. The suit was contested by the defendants-revisionists and primarily they raised two pronged defence (i) that the defendants had not denied the title of the plaintiff, to justify the same, it was pleaded that one Smt. Usha Verma had issued a notice dated 03.03.2000 claiming rent for the premises in question. It was stated that this had created a doubt in the mind of the defendants-revisionists regarding the true ownership of the premises in question and in the aforesaid circumstances, the defendants-revisionists started depositing the rent under Section 30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 in Misc. Case No.76/2001; (ii) it was also stated that the rent had been paid in the aforesaid case and, therefore, there is neither any default nor denial of title and as such the suit ought to have been dismissed.
7. The parties led their respective evidence both oral and documentary. The trial court upon the pleadings and in light of the controversy raised, framed as many as eight questions for determination. The trial court considering the issue No.1 relating to the relationship of landlord and tenant held that in light of the pleadings of the parties, there was no denial regarding the ownership and the landlordship between the parties. The trial court also considered the effect of the lease-deed executed in between the parties on 22.06.1991 and held that though the aforesaid lease was unregistered yet in light of the averments made and the pleadings as well as the evidence led by the parties, it was clear that the factum of execution of the lease-deed dated 26.02.1991 was not in dispute and the relationship of the landlord and the tenant continued. While dealing with the Issue No.3 relating to the fact whether the defendant denied the title of the plaintiff after considering the entire facts and evidence of the parties recorded a finding that the defendants-revisionists disputed the title of the plaintiff. Issue No.4 relating to the fact that the defendants-revisionists refused to pay rent to the plaintiff. This was also decided in favour of the landlord by holding that deposit of rent under Section 30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 was a clear indication that the defendants-revisionists refused to pay the rent especially when the due rent, upon demand, was not paid by the defendants-revisionists and as such it was not even entitled to deposit made under Section 30 of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972.
8. So far as the service of notice is concerned as well as the termination of the tenancy, the Court held that the tenancy was duly terminated by means of the notice dated 01.04.2001 which was duly served on the defendants-revisionists and they replied to the same by means of their reply dated 01.05.2001. On the question of the validity of deposit under Section 30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, the trial court recorded a finding upon the appraisal of the facts and evidence that the defendants-revisionists was not entitled to the benefit under Section 30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 and thereafter finding that the defendants-revisionists was in arrears of rent for a period of more than four months on the date of the issuance of notice dated 01.04.2001 and on the date of institution of the suit coupled with the fact that the defendants-revisionists denied the title of the plaintiff, accordingly, the suit was decreed both for the arrears of rent as well as ejectment by means of the judgment dated 07.12.2009.
9. It is this judgment which has been assailed in the instant revision by the defendants-revisionists. The learned standing counsel while assailing the impugned judgment has raised two fold submissions. It has been submitted that from the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be deciphered that the defendants-revisionists ever challenged the title of the plaintiff. The learned standing counsel has drawn attention of the Court to paragraphs 33 and 40 of the written statement to indicate that the defendants did not raise any title dispute nor challenge the status of the plaintiff as its landlords. It further elaborated that one Smt. Usha Verma, who is the sister-in-law (Bhabhi) of the plaintiff Kashi Krishna Verma had sent a notice to the defendants-revisionists on 03.03.2000 claiming rent and right in the property in question. It is on the basis of the aforesaid that the defendants haboured a belief that there was a dispute between the co-landlords and it is in this backdrop that the defendants started paying rent under Section 30(2) of the Rent Control Act No.13 of 1972 in Misc. Case No.76/2001 and it has been emphasized that the defendants have continued to pay rent under the aforesaid provisions in Misc. Case No.76/2001 and thus there is neither any default nor any challenge to the landlordship. Accordingly, the decree passed by the court below being illegal deserves to be set aside.
10. Learned standing counsel in support of his arguments has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kailash Chandra and another vs. Mukundi Lal and others, (2002) 2 SCC 678.
11. Per contra, Shri Apoorva Tewari has ably argued and has drawn attention of the Court to certain facts in chronology to indicate the conduct of the defendants-revisionists. It was pointed out that initially the premises in question was allotted in favour of the revisionist No.3 on 26.09.1975 and thereafter on 24.10.1978 it was informed that the rent for the premises in question be paid to one Raj Narayan Verma, who was the brother and caretaker of the landlord Kashi Krishna Verma. Later, since the rent was to be enhanced, accordingly, the parties entered into a lease on 22.06.1991 for a period of five years and by means of the aforesaid lease, the rent was enhanced to Rs.1,150/- per month. It has also been pointed out that the rent was being paid to Kashi Krishna Verma and this fact was specifically pleaded in the plaint and has not been denied by the defendants in their written statement.
12. It was also pointed out that though Smt. Usha Verma had issued a notice to the revisionists on 03.03.2000 alleging being a co-owner of the suit property and also demanded rent. However, significantly the revisionists did not pay any heed to the said notice nor paid any rent to her and rather they continued to pay the rent to the plaintiff-opposite party till the month of September, 2000 which was paid to the plaintiff only in the month of January, 2001. Thus, it has been emphasized that though the notice was received by the revisionists in the month of March, 2000 yet on their own action, they paid the rent to the plaintiff in the month of January 2001 almost after ten months of having received the notice from Smt. Usha Verma and this clearly indicates that insofar as the right of the plaintiff to receive the rent is concerned, there was no confusion in the mind of the defendants.
13. It has further been elaborated that only when the plaintiff did not receive the rent after January 2001, it sent a notice terminating the tenancy as well as claiming arrears of rent on 01.04.2001. It was clearly stated in the aforesaid notice that the defendants had not paid rent from October, 2000 and rent of more than six months was outstanding on the date of issuance of the notice coupled with the fact that the Superintendent of Police had made an application seeking transfer of the property belonging to the plaintiff in his name by moving an application before the District Magistrate which also indicate that the defendants was challenging the title of the plaintiff. Though the notice of the plaintiff was served on the defendants-revisionists, however, instead of replying to the same, it surreptitiously started depositing the rent in the proceedings under Section 30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 in Misc. Case No.76/2001 which was instituted on 18.04.2001 and thereafter on 01.05.2001 had sent a reply to the plaintiff indicating the aforesaid fact.
14. Thus, it has been submitted that two main issues relevant for the decree of the suit i.e. whether the notice of terminating the tenancy was duly served and the fact whether the defendants were in arrears of rent for more than four months and that whether the defendants had assailed the title of the plaintiff stood duly established and in light of the evidence which was led before the trial court, upon considering, the trial court has given the findings in favour of the plaintiff-landlord and these findings essentially being question of fact based on evidence requires no interference from this Court.
15. The Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record.
16. In the aforesaid backdrop, the Court has to satisfy itself whether the judgment passed by the court below is in accordance with law or not.
17. Before proceeding further, it will be apposite to notice the scope of Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act, the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Murti Devi Vs. Pushpa Devi and Others reported in 2017 (15) SCC 230 while considering the scope of revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts' Act has stated in following words which reads as under:-
"29. The High Court was hearing a revision under Section 25 of the 1887 Act. What is the scope of Section 25 of the 1887 Act came for consideration before this Court in Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury [Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698] , where this Court laid down the following in para 9: (Hari Shankar case [Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698] , AIR p. 701) "9. The section we are dealing with, is almost the same as Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. That section has been considered by the High Courts in numerous cases and diverse interpretations have been given. The powers that it is said to confer would make a broad spectrum commencing, at one end, with the view that only substantial errors of law can be corrected under it, and ending, at the other, with a power of interference a little better, than what an appeal gives. It is useless to discuss those cases in some of which the observations were probably made under compulsion of certain unusual facts. It is sufficient to say that we consider that the most accurate exposition of the meaning of such sections is that of Beaumont, C.J. (as he then was) in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj [Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, 1937 SCC OnLine Bom 99 : AIR 1938 Bom 223] where the learned Chief Justice, dealing with Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, observed: (SCC OnLine Bom paras 3-4) ''3. The object of Section 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law.
4. The section does not enumerate the cases in which the Court may interfere in revision, as does, Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference; but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction, or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere. But, in my opinion, the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at.' This observation has our full concurrence."
30. Further, in Mundri Lal v. Sushila Rani [Mundri Lal v. Sushila Rani, (2007) 8 SCC 609] which was a case arising from Act 13 of 1972 and a revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the 1887 Act, in paras 22 and 23, this Court held that the jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, is wider than Section 115 CPC. It is further held that pure finding of the fact based on appreciation of evidence although may not be interfered but there are several circumstances in which the Revisional Court can interfere with the finding of fact. In paras 22 and 23 following was stated: (SCC pp. 617-18) "22. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the fact that a revision is provided for by the statute, and not an appeal, itself is suggestive of the fact that ordinarily revisional jurisdiction can be exercised only when a question of law arises.
23. We, however, do not mean to say that under no circumstances finding of fact cannot be interfered therewith. A pure finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence although may not be interfered with but if such finding has been arrived at upon taking into consideration irrelevant factors or therefor relevant fact has been ignored, the Revisional Court will have the requisite jurisdiction to interfere with a finding of fact. Applicability of the provisions of Section 2(2) of the Act may in that sense involve determination of mixed question of law and fact."
18. Similarly in the case of Trilok Singh Chauhan Vs. Ram Lal, reported in 2018 (2) SCC 566, once again while considering the scope of Revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act the Apex Court has stated and the relevant portion reads as under:-
"14. The High Court was exercising the jurisdiction under Section 25 of the 1887 Act, which provision is as follows:
"25. Revision of decrees and orders of Courts of Small Causes.--The High Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was according to law, may call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit."
15. The scope of Section 25 of the 1887 Act, came for consideration before this Court on several occasions. In Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury [Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698] , in paras 9 and 10, this Court laid down the following: (AIR p. 701) "9. The section we are dealing with, is almost the same as Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. That section has been considered by the High Courts in numerous cases and diverse interpretations have been given. The powers that it is said to confer would make a broad spectrum commencing, at one end, with the view that only substantial errors of law can be corrected under it, and ending, at the other, with a power of interference a little better than what an appeal gives. It is useless to discuss those cases in some of which the observations were probably made under compulsion of certain unusual facts. It is sufficient to say that we consider that the most accurate exposition of the meaning of such sections is that of Beaumont, C.J. (as he then was) in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj [Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, 1937 SCC OnLine Bom 99 : (1938) 40 Bom LR 125 : AIR 1938 Bom 223] , where the learned Chief Justice, dealing with Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, observed: (SCC OnLine Bom paras 3-4).
''3. ... The object of Section 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law.
4. The section does not enumerate the cases in which the Court may interfere in revision, as does, Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference; but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction, or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the Court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere. But, in my opinion, the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at.' This observation has our full concurrence.
10. What the learned Chief Justice has said applies to Section 35 of the Act, with which we are concerned. Judged from this point of view, the learned Single Judge was not justified in interfering with a plain finding of fact and more so, because he himself proceeded on a wrong assumption."
16. Another judgment which needs to be noted is judgment of this Court in Mundri Lal v. Sushila Rani [Mundri Lal v. Sushila Rani, (2007) 8 SCC 609] . This Court held that jurisdiction under Section 25 of the 1887 Act, is wider than the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. But pure finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence may not be interfered with, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25 of the 1887 Act. The Court also explained the circumstances under which, findings can be interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25. There are very limited grounds on which there can be interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25; they are, when (i) findings are perverse or (ii) based on no material or (iii) findings have been arrived at upon taking into consideration the inadmissible evidence or (iv) findings have been arrived at without consideration of relevant evidence."
19. In light of the principles as extracted above, the judgment rendered by the trial court is to be assessed. So far as the fact stated by both the sides are concerned, there is not much dispute and, therefore, this Court is not repeating the same for the sake of brevity. However, the only issue which requires examination as to whether there has been any denial of title and the fact whether the defendants-revisionists has committed default and arrive to a conclusion it is also to be seen whether the benefit of deposit under Section 30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 can be granted to the tenant-revisionists.
20. On perusal of the record and reading of the impugned judgment, it would indicate that it is not in dispute that the last paid rent by the defendants-revisionists was in the month of January, 2001 for the period of September, 2000. Thus, on the date of issuance of a notice dated 01.04.2001 when the plaintiff demanded the rent from the defendants, rent for the period of October, 2000 till March, 2001 i.e. more than four months was outstanding.
21. Learned standing counsel could not dispute the fact that in furtherance of the notice of the demand sent by the landlord dated 01.04.2001, it did not tender the rent to the plaintiff. Learned standing counsel could not indicate nor point out why the rent was not tendered to the landlord. He could not establish how the rent was sent and when it was refused nor any documents/money order to the above effect was filed and further when the rent was not refused then what prompted the defendants to deposit the rent under Section 30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. Learned standing counsel also could not explain as to the fact that when allegedly it had received the notice from the Smt. Usha Verma in the month of March, 2001, despite the said notice being in the knowledge of the defendants yet it paid the rent up to the month of September, 2000 to the landlord in the month of January, 2001 nor could he explain why after receiving of the notice from the landlord on 01.04.2001, it did not tender the rent to the landlord and rather it deposited the amount under Section 30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 only on 18.04.2001 i.e. within 18 days of the receiving the notice and thereafter on the first May, 2001, it sent a reply to the landlord informing him that the rent was deposited and that too not under Section 30(1) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 but under Section 30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972.
22. Considering the decision of Kailash Chandra (supra), it would be noticed that the Hon'ble Apex Court by mean of the aforesaid judgment has only upheld the preposition that if the deposit is made either under Section 30(1) and 30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, the same should be taken into consideration while considering whether the deposit has been validly made under Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972.
23. This case is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as it does not come to the rescue of the defendants for the reason that in the present case, the defendants has not made any compliance of Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. Moreover, as already discussed above in order to treat the deposit under Section 30(2) as a valid deposit under Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. It was incumbent upon the tenant to indicate that the rent was offered by the tenant and refused by the landlord and thereafter it deposited the rent under Section 30 of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972.
24. As discussed above, this aspect of the matter could not be explained by the learned standing counsel inasmuch as the landlord had already sent a notice on 01.04.2001 and the defendants had failed to indicate how after the demand was made it ever tendered rent to the landlord and how and when it was refused.
25. In absence of this refusal of rent by the landlord any deposit made by the tenant either under Section 30(1) or 30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 becomes invalid and the same cannot be considered as a valid deposit. Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kailash Chandra (supra) does not help the defendants-revisionists.
26. In the entire petition it is stated that the landlord had refused to accept the rent but it could not explain nor establish how the rent was tendered and how it was refused. That being the undisputed situation, it is clear that in absence of the refusal of the landlord to accept the rent, the tenant was not justified in depositing the same under Section 30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. In support of this view, the court is fortified by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kameshwar Singh Srivastava vs. IV Additional District Judge, Lucknow & Ors., (1986) 4 SCC 661. wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:-
"... Primarily a tenant is under a legal obligation to pay rent to the landlord as and when due and if he fails to pay the same on demand from the landlord and if he is in arrears for a period of more than four months he would be liable to ejectment. Where there is a bona fide dispute regarding the landlord's right to receive rent on account of there being several claimants or if the landlord refuses to accept the rent without there being any justification for the same, the tenant would be entitled to take proceedings under Section 30 of the Act and deposit the rent in court thereupon he would be deemed to have paid the rent to the landlord, consequently he would be relieved of his liability of eviction. It does not however follow that the tenant is entitled to disregard the landlord or ignore his demand for payment of rent to him. The provisions of the Act safeguard tenant's interest but it must be kept in mind that the landlord's right to receive rent and in the event of the tenant's being in arrears of rent for a period of more than four months, his right to evict the tenant is preserved. If the tenant makes the deposit in court without there being any justification for the same or if he refuses to pay the rent even on the service of notice of demand by the landlord, he would be liable to eviction."
27. Accordingly, the trial court has rightly concluded that the defendants-revisionists were in arrears of rent of more than four months and also that the defendants could not be granted the benefit of the deposit made by it under Section 30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972.
28. Another significant feature is that despite the commencement of the proceedings of eviction i.e. filing of the S.C.C. Suit, the defendants did not bother to deposit the rent in S.C.C. Suit rather it continued to deposit the rent under Section 30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, therefore, this action of the defendants-revisionists is also self-contradictory wherein in the S.C.C. Suit while filing its written statement, it admits the plaintiff Kashi Krishna Verma to be the owner-landlord and then instead of depositing the rent in the S.C.C. Suit and making the compliance of Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 to save itself from eviction, it rather continued to deposit the rent under Section 30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 with the averment that the defendants is not aware that who is the landlord. This act of the defendants is clearly malafide and the findings recorded by the trial court on the question of default as well as whether the benefit of Section 30 of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 can be granted is absolutely in consonance with the settled legal principles and cannot be faulted, accordingly, the same is upheld.
29. The other issue whether the defendants challenged the title of the plaintiff is concerned, the same is also borne out from the record inasmuch as without any basis the defendants wrote a letter to the District Magistrate seeking the transfer of the property in its name whereas the plaintiff was already in the process to get the property transferred and converted into freehold in its name. The freehold deed was also executed in favour of the plaintiff on 13.03.2003 whereas the letter dated 16.11.2000 which was written by the defendants seeking conversion of the property into freehold and without any charge in favour of the defendants-revisionists clearly amounts to a contradiction in the status of the defendants as a tenant coupled with the plea raised by the defendants that it was habouring a doubt regarding who is the landlord and started depositing rent under Section 30 of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. The trial court has considered this aspect of the matter after assessing the evidence as well as the pleadings of the parties and has recorded a finding which is in consonance with the settled legal principles.
30. In light of the discussions made hereinabove, this Court finds that the reasons and the conclusions drawn by the trial court is based on the pleadings and evidence, which cannot be treated to be perverse or suffering from any legal infirmity.
31. In view of the above, the judgment passed by the Judge, Small Cause Court / Additional District Judge, Court No.6, Faizabad in S.C.C. Suit No.9/2002 dated 07.12.2009 is confirmed. The revision being devoid of merits is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
32. The registry is directed to remit the record of lower court to the court concerned expeditiously say within a period of two weeks.
Order Date :- 11.11.2019 Rakesh/-