Allahabad High Court
The Indian Section The Theosophical ... vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others on 3 September, 2019
Bench: Shashi Kant Gupta, Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD A.F.R. Reserved on - 7.8.2019 Delivered on - 3.9.2019 Case :- WRIT - C No. - 17658 of 2019 Petitioner :- The Indian Section The Theosophical Society Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Ishir Sripat,Rahul Sripat Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. Hon'ble Shashi Kant Gupta,J.
Hon'ble Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J.
{Delivered by : Hon'ble Saurabh Shyam Shamshery, J.}
1. The writ petition has been filed seeking following reliefs :-
"(i) a writ of certiorari to send for the records of the case and to quash the orders dated 23.01.2019 passed by the respondent no.2 and the order dated 30.01.2019 passed by the respondent no.3 (Annexure No.13 and 14 respectively to the writ petition).
(ii) a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus to grant free hold rights to the petitioner on his application dated 31.07.2009.
(iii) a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus to restore the possession of Nazul Plot in Arazi Chavani, Tappa and Pargana Haveli, Tehsil Sadar, Gorakhpur area 1.35 acres as contained in the leased deed which has been filed as annexure 1 with the writ petition."
2. Brief facts giving rise to this writ petition are that :-
The petitioner - society is a registered society under the Indian Societies Registration Act, 1860 which is renewed up to 10.10.2020 as per the certificate dated 11.3.2016, issued by the Registrar of Societies Registration, U.P.
3. The petitioner - society was granted a lease of nazul plot in Arazi Chavni, Tappa and Pargana Haveli, Tehsil Sadar, Gorakhpur, area 1.35 acres with boundaries described in the lease agreement dated 31.12.1943 under the Government Grants Act, 1895. The term of said lease was for thirty years on the payment of the certain yearly rent with the condition of renewal by every 30 years with the restriction of the term not exceeding the aggregate for the period of 90 years.
4. As per the case of the petitioner, society applied for the renewal firstly in the year 1973 i.e. after expiry of 30 years and secondly in the year 2003 i.e. after expiry of further 30 years. However, no decision was taken and both the application for renewal were kept pending.
5. In the year 2003, the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur issued a notice dated 14.1.2003 to the Secretary of the petitioner - society mentioning therein that as per the policy of the Government, the petitioner - society could apply for freehold. In pursuance of the said notice, petitioner - society deposited the requisite amount of Rs.40,00,000/- in two installments dated 31.8.2009 and dated 23.1.2010 and also submitted an application in the prescribed proforma in the year 2010. Meanwhile, a report was sought by the Collector, Gorakhpur regarding the status of the lease area. Accordingly, the Tehsildar after inspection submit a report dated 23.1.2008 wherein violation of certain conditions of lease agreement were found.
6. The Collector, Gorakhpur communicated the same to the State under letter dated 26.2.2008 wherein violations of certain conditions of lease were communicated. For ready reference, said letter is reproduced hereinafter :-
" isz"kd] ftykf/kdkjh] xksj[kiqjA lsok esa] Jh fo".kq izrki flag] la;qDr lfpo] m0iz0 'kklu] vkokl ,oa 'kgjh fu;kstu vuqHkkx&4] y[kuÅA la[;k& 77@,y0ch0lh0&08] fnukad& 26 Qjojh] 2008 fo"k;%& fFk;kslkfQdy lkslkbVh ds iV~Vs ds uohuhdj.k ds laca/k esaA egksn;] d`i;k mi;qDr fo"k;d 'kkllukns'k la[;k&1688@vkB&4&05&288 ,u]@2005 fnukad 02-3-2006 dk lanHkZ xzg.k djus dk d"V djsa] ftlds }kjk 5 foUnqvksa ij lwpuk@vk[;k 'kklu dks miyC/k djkus dk funsZ'k fn;k x;k bl laca/k esa okafNr lwpuk@vk[;k fuEuor~ gS& 1- iV~Vs dh Nk;k izfr layXu gSA 2- ftyk 'kkldh; vf/koDrk nhokuh dh jk; fnukad 01-12-04 dh Nk;k izfr layXu gSA 3- 'kklukns'k la[;k&6422¼6½@9&utwy&485,u@83 fnukad 16-10-86 esa dqN 'krksZ ij vfrpkjh ds yht dks fofufeRrhdj.k djus dk izkfo/kku fd;k x;k gS ftlds izLrj&3 esa ;g Hkh izkfo/kku gS fd iV~Vs ds mya?ku ds ekeys esa mDr dk;Zokgh dh tk ldrh gSA fFk;kslkfQdy lkslkbVh ds dFkukuqlkj ;g laLFkk fo'o Lrjh; psjhVscqy laLFkk gS rFkk fo'o cU/kqRo] lkEiznkf;d ln~Hkkouk] ekuo ds lokZxh.k fodkl rFkk i'kqvksa ds lkFk gks jgh dwjrk dks lekIr djus dh fn'kk esa fujarj iz;kljr gS rFkk laLFkk ds fdz;k dykiksa dks ns[krs gq, mDr laLFkk ds iV~Vs dk uchuhdj.k fd;s tkus dk iw.kZ vkSfpR; gSA 4- iz'uxr Hkw[k.M ds laca/k esa rglhynkj ls tkap djkbZ x;h tkap fjiksVZ fnukad 23-1-08 ftlds lkFk iz'uxr Hkw[k.M dk utjh uD'kk rS;kj fd;k x;k gS layXu gS ls Li"V gS fd fFk;kslkfQdy lkslkbVh }kjk iV~Vs ds 'krksZ ds foijhr fo|ky; dk lapkyu ,oa nqdkuksa dk fuekZ.k fd;k x;k gSA 5- lkslk;Vh xfrfof/k;ka@fdz;k dyki lfdz; gS cl LVS.M dh rjQ dh Hkwfe ges'kk mi;ksx esa yk;h tk jgh gSA vr% 'kklu ls vuqjks/k gS 'kklukns'k 1686 ds vuqlkj n.Muh; nj ij utjkuk o fdjk;k ysdj fofu;feRrhdj.k djrs gq, uohuh dj.k fd;s tkus dh vuqefr iznku dh tk;A Hkonh;] g0 viBhr ¼j.kthr flag iadt½ ftykf/kdkjh] xksj[kiqjA la[;k & @,y0ch0lh0&08] rn~fnukafdrA izfrfyfi% vk;qDr] xksj[kiqj e.My] xksj[kiqj dks lwpukFkZ izsf"krA g0 viBhr ftykf/kdkjh xksj[kiqjA"
7. The matter for renewal of lease as well as converting it to freehold was kept pending. In the year 2018, the petitioner - society, by letter dated 19.8.2018, sought status of their application for freehold from the office of the District Collector, Gorakhpur. In pursuance of the said letter, the Additional District Collector, Gorakhpur sought certain information from the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Gorakhpur, vide letter dated 25.10.2018. Later on, a reminder was also sent on 7.12.2018.
8. In pursuance of the above-mentioned communications, the Lekhpal and other revenue officers sent an inquiry report dated 9.1.2019 to the office of the S.D.M., Gorakhpur. S.D.M. (Sadar) Gorakhpur communicated the same to the A.D.M. Gorakhpur, vide letter dated 16.1.2019. The said communication recorded informations regarding the misuse of the land as well as other violation of conditions of the lease agreement. The report was prepared after inspection of the lease area. For ready reference, said letter is quoted hereinafter :-
dk;kZy; mi ftykf/kdkjh (lnj) xksj[kiqjA la0 499 @ vk'kqfy&lnj fnukad% tuojh 16 2019 fo"k;% bafM;u lsD'ku fFk;kslksfQdy lkslkbZVh }kjk eq0vkjkth Nkouh 'kgj xksj[kiqj esa fLFkr utwy "w[k.M la[;k 118 fe0] 119 fe0 jdck 1-35 ,dM "wfe dks iV~Vkxr "wfe crkrs gq, Qzh&gksYM fd, tkus ds laaca/k esaA vij ftykf/kdkjh (fo@jk) xksj[kiqjA egksn;] mijksDr fo"k;d vius i= la[;k 1077@utwy fyfid&19 fnukad 25-10-2018 dk lanHkZ xzg.k djus dh d`ik djsa ftlds ek/;e ls fn, x;s funsZ'k ds vuqikyu esa izdj.k ds laca/k esa rglhynkj] lnj dh vk[;k izkIr dh x;hA rglhynkj] lnj }kjk tkapksijkar fcUnqokj viuh tkap vk[;k fnukad 9-1-2019 ¼ewy :i esa layXu½ fuEukuqlkj izLrqr dh x;h gS%& ¼1½ iV~Vk /kkjd }kjk utwy Hkw[k.M ls lacaf/kr js.V ds Hkqxrku laca/kh dksbZ Hkh lk{; izLrqr ugha fd;k x;k gSA ¼2½ iV~Vsnkj }kjk mDr Hkwfe ij fu/kkZfjr njksa] djksa] 'kqYdksa ds Hkqxrku laca/kh dksbZ izi= izLrqr ugha fd;k x;k gSA ¼3½ iz'uxr Hkwfe ds iV~Vs dk uohuhdj.k dc rd djk;k x;k gS] bl laca/k esa iV~Vsnkj }kjk dksbZ vfHkys[k izLrqr ugha fd;k x;kA ¼4½ mDr Hkw[k.M ds iwohZ fgLls esa 'kadj xqIrk ,oa mfeZyk xqIrk vkokl cukdj jgrs gSA ¼5½ mDr Hkw[k.M esa ewy ¼6½ iz'uxr Hkw[k.M ij fLFkr ewy Hkou dh fLFkfr larks"ktud gSA ¼7½ mijksDr iV~Vk'kqnk Hkw[k.M esa ewy iV~Vsnkj ds vfrfjDr 'kadj xqIrk] lqHkk"k pUn] Jherh mfeZyk xqIrk] mn;Hkku flag o iq:"kksRre flag LVS.M@nqdku cukdj dkfct gSA ¼8½ iz'uxr Hkwfe ds Hkou ij iV~Vsnkj laLFkk dk dCtk gSA ¼9½ iz'uxr Hkwfe ds iwohZ fgLls esa dkfct yksxksa }kjk crk;k x;k fd os yksx laLFkk dh lgefr ls dkfct gSA iwNrkN ls irk pyk fd ogka ij dkfct nqdku ekfyd laLFkk dks nku Lo:i fdjk;k nsrs gSA ¼10½ iz'uxr Hkw[k.M ds iwohZ fgLls dk O;olkf;d mi;ksx fd;k tk jgk gSA Hkw[k.M ds iwohZ fgLls esa dks;ys dh nqdku] vU; nqdkusa] Vªsoy ,tsalh o eksVj lkbfdy LVS.M voS/k :i ls py jgk gSA Hkw[k.M ds if'peh fgLls esa Hkh voS/k LVS.M dh rjg bLrseky gks jgk gSA lk{; Lo:i ekSds dk gLrfp= layXu gSA ¼11½ iz'uxr Hkw[k.M dk O;olkf;d mi;ksx fd;k tk jgk gSA voS/k rjhds ls eksVj lkbfdy ikfdZx ,oa nqdkusa cuh gqbZ gS ftudk Nk;kfp= lkFk esa layXu gSA ¼12½ Hkwfe ds laca/k esa dksbZ fookn laKku esa ugha vk;kA ¼13½ i= esa of.kZr vkjkth la[;k 139 vfHkys[k esa lMd iks[rk uke ls ntZ gS rFkk ekSds ij iDdh lMd Hkh py jgh gSA vk0ua0 139 jdck 4-808 esa bafM;u fFk;kslksfQdy lkslkbVh dk dCtk ugha gSA ,d vU; fopkj.kh; fcUnq ;g Hkh gS fd pwafd mDr Hkw[k.M 'kgj ds eq[; LFky ij vofLFkr gS rFkk fofHkUu ljdkjh iz;kstuksa ds fy, Hkwfe dh fLFkfr cgqr mfpr izrhr gksrh gSA vr% vk[;k e; layXuksa lfgr lknj voyksdukFkZ ,oa vko';d dk;Zokgh gsrq iszf"kr gSA layXud% ;FkksifjA TokbaV eftLVsªsV@ mi ftykf/kdkjh ¼lnj½ xksj[kiqj"
9. The Collector, Gorakhpur, vide impugned order dated 23.1.2019 after considering the inspection report communicated by the A.D.M., Gorakhpur came to the conclusion that petitioner - society has violated many conditions mentioned in lease agreement, therefore, the Collector, Gorakhpur not only rejected the application for freehold but also cancelled the lease and directed to remove the illegal occupants and to take over the possession of the lease land. In pursuance of the said order, possession of the lease land was taken over by the State after making inventory of the material lying on the lease land and presently, the possession of the land is with the State Government.
10. The lease land is now being allocated for the purpose of constructing the building for District Court as well as Collectorate, Gorakhpur.
11. The petitioner - society has now challenged the order dated 23.1.2019 passed by the Collector whereby the lease was cancelled as well as the order dated 30.1.2019 passed by the City Magistrate, Gorakhpur for taking possession of the lease land.
12. Shri Sripat, learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the entire exercise of cancellation of lease as well as taking possession of the lease land is without any authority as well as without granting any opportunity to the petitioner - society and the impugned orders are passed in violation of principles of natural justice. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the impugned order is illegal, unjust and arbitrary and has been passed in colorable exercise of powers. The order of cancellation of lease while rejecting the application of freehold is patently illegal as order of cancellation of lease ought have to be passed in separate proceedings. The order of cancellation of lease could not be passed without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner - society to rebut the allegation of alleged violation of conditions of lease agreement. Learned Senior Counsel has also denied the alleged violations of the conditions of the lease.
13. Learned Senior Counsel has relied upon a judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of U.P. and others vs. Lalji Tandon through LRs. reported at (2004) 1 SCC 1 in order to suggest that renewal of lease cannot be stalled on the account of alleged breach of conditions and for cancelling the lease, separate inquiry has to be conducted.
14. Learned Senior Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the matter of P.D. Dinakaran (1) vs. Judges Inquiry Committee reported at (2011) 8 SCC 380 to impress upon the court that principles of natural justice has to be adhered to secure justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice. The relevant part of the said judgment is reproduced hereinafter :-
"31. In R v. Gough (1993) AC 646, the House of Lords applied the `real likelihood' test by using the expression `real danger'. Two portions of the leading speech given by Lord Goff are extracted below:
"In my opinion, if the circumstances of the case (as ascertained by the court), it appears that there was a real likelihood, in the sense of a real possibility, of bias on the part of a justice or other member of an inferior tribunal, justice requires that the decision should not be allowed to stand. I am by no means persuaded that, in its original form, the real likelihood test required that any more rigorous criterion should be applied. Furthermore the test as so stated gives sufficient effect, in cases of apparent bias, to the principle that justice must manifestly be seen to be done, and it is unnecessary, in my opinion, to have recourse to a test based on mere suspicion, or even reasonable suspicion, for that purpose"
"In conclusion, I wish to express my understanding of the law as follows. I think it possible, and desirable, that the same test should be applicable in all cases of apparent bias, whether concerned with justices or members of other inferior tribunals, or with jurors, or with arbitrators. Likewise I consider that, in cases concerned with jurors, the same test should be applied by a judge to whose attention the possibility of bias on the part of a juror has been drawn in the course of a trial, and by the Court of Appeal when it considers such a question on appeal. Furthermore, I think it unnecessary, in formulating the appropriate test, to require that the court should look at the matter through the eyes of a reasonable man, because the court in cases such as these personifies the reasonable man; and in any event the court has first to ascertain the relevant circumstances from the available evidence, knowledge of which would not necessarily be available to an observer in court at the relevant time. Finally, for the avoidance of doubt, I prefer to state the test in terms of real danger rather than real likelihood, to ensure that the court is thinking in terms of possibility rather than probability of bias. Accordingly, having ascertained the relevant circumstances, the court should ask itself whether, having regard to those circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the part of the relevant member of the tribunal in question, in the sense that he might unfairly regard (or have unfairly regarded) with favour, or disfavour, the case of a party to the issue under consideration by him...."
(emphasis supplied)."
15. Per contra, Mrs. Kritika Singh, learned Standing Counsel has vehemently opposed the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner and submitted that admittedly the lease has not been renewed after the expiry of 30 years from the first allotment i.e. from the year 1973 and since the lease has not been renewed, the status of occupant petitioner - society is an encroacher. Learned counsel further points out from the inquiry report that several conditions of the lease agreement have been violated. The petitioner - society not only used the land for a residential purpose but also altered the construction without prior permission of the Collector. She further points out that even the unauthorized/illegal constructions on the lease land were used for the commercial purpose and the persons residing in the unauthorized constructions were paying rent to the society. Learned counsel further submitted that there is no material on record to contradict the specific allegations mentioned in the inquiry report as well as in the impugned order. Possession of the lease area was taken over by the State in pursuance of impugned order.
16. Learned Standing Counsel further relied upon Section 20(6) (C) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 in order to show that once the petitioner - society has been declared as encroacher, there is no need to even issue notice for eviction proceedings. Learned counsel has relied upon paragraph 32 of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the matter of Delhi Development Authority vs. Anant Raj Agencies Pvt. Ltd. reported in 2016 (11) SCC 406 wherein, inter alia, it has been held as follows :-
"32. In the absence of renewal of lease after 10.8.1968, the pleadings of the original lessee that the DDA is estopped from taking the plea that there is no renewal of lease after having accepted the rent after 10.8.1968, in respect of property in question and after accepting certain sums in respect of the same, subsequently, for change of the property in question from leasehold to freehold are all irrelevant aspects for the reason that the same are contrary to the aforesaid provisions of the DD Act, the Nazul Land Rules applicable to the fact situation and the terms and conditions of the lease deed. Further, it is clear from the contents of the termination notice dated 01.09.1972 served upon the original lessee by the DDA that it has not only refused to renew the lease of the property but also asked the original lessee to hand over the possession of the property in question within 30 days, which is absolutely in consonance with Section 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971."
17. Heard Shri Rahul Sirpat, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Ishir Sripat, learned counsel for the petitioner, Ms. Kritika Singh, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the writ petition as well as the original records submitted by learned counsel for the respondent - State. With the consent of counsels appearing for the parties we are finally deciding the present petition.
18. In the present matter, by way of impugned order, lease allotted to the petitioner - society has been cancelled while considering the application of the petitioner for freehold the lease land. The said order was passed on the basis of an inquiry wherein it was found that there were violation of certain conditions of the lease agreement. From the perusal of the records, it is evident that the petitioner was not granted any opportunity to rebut the allegation of violation of conditions as mentioned in the inquiry report as well as in the impugned order. No notice was issued to the petitioner to participate either in the inquiry or in the proceedings which resulted into the impugned order. The entire exercise was completed at the back of the petitioner, and as such, the proceedings are offending the principles of natural justice. It is trite law that any administration action which is likely to have adverse affect should be based in the conformity with the principles of natural justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. vs. Deputy Commission of Cental Excise, Gauhati and others reported at 2015 (8) SCC 519 while dealing with the requirement of observance of principles of natural justice, has held as under :-
"25. This aspect of procedural fairness, namely, right to a fair hearing, would mandate what is literally known as 'hearing the other side'. Prof. D.J. Galligan[5] attempts to provide what he calls 'a general theory of fair treatment' by exploring what it is that legal rules requiring procedural fairness might seek to achieve. He underlines the importance of arriving at correct decisions, which is not possible without adopting the aforesaid procedural fairness, by emphasizing that taking of correct decisions would demonstrate that the system is working well. On the other hand, if mistakes are committed leading to incorrect decisions, it would mean that the system is not working well and the social good is to that extent diminished. The rule of procedure is to see that the law is applied accurately and, as a consequence, that the social good is realised. For taking this view, Galligan took support from Bentham[6], who wrote at length about the need to follow such principles of natural justice in civil and criminal trials and insisted that the said theory developed by Bentham can be transposed to other forms of decision making as well. This jurisprudence of advancing social good by adhering to the principles of natural justice and arriving at correct decisions is explained by Galligan in the following words:
"On this approach, the value of legal procedures is judged according to their contribution to general social goals. The object is to advance certain social goals, whether through administrative processes, or through the civil or criminal trial. The law and its processes are simply instruments for achieving some social good as determined from time to time by the law makers of the society. Each case is an instance in achieving the general goal, and a mistaken decision, whether to the benefit or the detriment of a particular person, is simply a failure to achieve the general good in that case. At this level of understanding, judgments of fairness have no place, for all that matters is whether the social good, as expressed through laws, is effectively achieved." Galligan also takes the idea of fair treatment to a second level of understanding, namely, pursuit of common good involves the distribution of benefits and burdens, advantages and disadvantages to individuals (or groups). According to him, principles of justice are the subject matter of fair treatment. However, that aspect need not be dilated.
26. Allan, on the other hand, justifies the procedural fairness by following the aforesaid principles of natural justice as rooted in rule of law leading to good governance. He supports Galligan in this respect and goes to the extent by saying that it is same as ensuring dignity of individuals, in respect of whom or against whom the decision is taken, in the following words:
"The instrumental value of procedures should not be underestimated; the accurate application of authoritative standards is, as Galligan clearly explains, an important aspect of treating someone with respect. But procedures also have intrinsic value in acknowledging a person's right to understand his treatment, and thereby to determine his response as a conscientious citizen, willing to make reasonable sacrifices for the public good. If obedience to law ideally entails a recognition of its morally obligatory character, there must be suitable opportunities to test its moral credentials. Procedures may also be though to have intrinsic value in so far as they constitute a fair balance between the demands of accuracy and other social needs: where the moral harm entailed by erroneous decisions is reasonably assessed and fairly distributed, procedures express society's commitment to equal concern and respect for all."
27. It, thus, cannot be denied that principles of natural justice are grounded in procedural fairness which ensures taking of correct decision and procedural fairness is fundamentally an instrumental good, in the sense that procedure should be designed to ensure accurate or appropriate outcomes. In fact, procedural fairness is valuable in both instrumental and non-instrumental terms.
28. It is on the aforesaid jurisprudential premise that the fundamental principles of natural justice, including audi alteram partem, have developed. It is for this reason that the courts have consistently insisted that such procedural fairness has to be adhered to before a decision is made and infraction thereof has led to the quashing of decisions taken. In many statutes, provisions are made ensuring that a notice is given to a person against whom an order is likely to be passed before a decision is made, but there may be instances where though an authority is vested with the powers to pass such orders, which affect the liberty or property of an individual but the statute may not contain a provision for prior hearing. But what is important to be noted is that the applicability of principles of natural jsutice is not dependent upon any statutory provision. The principle has to be mandatorily applied irrespective of the fact as to whether there is any such statutory provision or not.
29. De Smith captures the essence thus - "Where a statute authorises interference with properties or other rights and is silent on the question of hearing, the courts would apply rule of universal application and founded on plainest principles of natural justice".
30. X X X X X X X X
31. X X X X X X X X
32. X X X X X X X X
33. X X X X X X X X
34. X X X X X X X X
35. From the aforesaid discussion, it becomes clear that the opportunity to provide hearing before making any decision was considered to be a basic requirement in the Court proceeding. Later on, this principle was applied to other quasi-judicial authorities and other tribunals and ultimately it is now clearly laid down that even in the administrative actions, where the decision of the authority may result in civil consequences, a hearing before taking a decision is necessary. It was, thus, observed in A.K. Kraipak's case (supra) that if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see how these rules should not be made available to administrative inquiries. In the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr. also the application of principle of natural justice was extended to the administrative action of the State and its authorities. It is, thus, clear that before taking an action, service of notice and giving of hearing to the noticee is required. In Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Suvarna Board Mills & Anr., this aspect was explained in the following manner:
"3. It has been contended before us by the learned counsel for the appellant that principles of natural justice were satisfied before taking action under Section 29, assuming that it was necessary to do so. Let it be seen whether it was so. It is well settled that natural justice cannot be placed in a straight-jacket; its rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one fact-situation to another. All that has to be seen is that no adverse civil consequences are allowed to ensue before one is put on notice that the consequence would follow if he would not take care of the lapse, because of which the action as made known is contemplated. No particular form of notice is the demand of law: All will depend on facts and circumstances of the case."
19. We find substance in the submissions of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner - society that in the present case, there is violation of principles of natural justice. Accordingly, we allow the present writ petition to the extent that the impugned order dated 23.1.2019 shall be kept in abeyance for a period of four months from today. Meanwhile, the respondents will take a fresh decision regarding the cancellation of lease after issuing notice to the petitioner and after granting an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner - society within the stipulated period mentioned hereinabove.
20. It is made clear that we have not scrutinized the matter on the merits, therefore, the Collector, Gorakhpur shall decide the matter on its own merit.
21. Accordingly, the present writ petition stands disposed of.
22. The original record be returned back to learned counsel for the State.
Order Date :- 3.9.2019
Rishabh
(Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J.) (Shashi Kant Gupta, J.)