Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Molabanti Jayalakshmi vs Sri Lakshmi Rama Cooperative Building ... on 9 May, 2025
APHC010649842023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3311]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
Friday, the ninth day of May,
May two thousand and twenty five
Present
The Honourable Ms. Justice B. S. Bhanumathi
Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.74 of 2024
Between:
Molabanti Jayalakshmi and others ...Appellants
Appellants
and
Sri Lakshmi Rama Cooperative Building Society ...Respondents
Respondents
Limited and others
Counsel for the appellant
ppellants:
1. Sodum Anvesha
Counsel for the respondent
espondents:
1. T. V. P. Sai Vihari
The Court made the following:
2
BSB, J
C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 &
C.M.A.No.300 of 202
2023
APHC010337312023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3311]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
Friday, the ninth day of May,
May two thousand and twenty
wenty five
Present
The Honourable Ms. Justice B. S. Bhanumathi
Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.
No.300 of 2023
Between:
Kaja Vidya Sagar and others
thers
...Appellants
and
Si Lakshmi Rama Cooperative Building Society Limited ...Respondents
Respondents
and others
Counsel for the appellant
ppellants:
1. Sodum Anvesha
Counsel for the respondent
espondents:
1. T. V. P. Sai Vihari
The Court made the following:
3
BSB, J
C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 &
C.M.A.No.300 of 2023
COMMON JUDGMENT:
These two appeals by the unsuccessful defendants / judgment debtors are filed challenging the order, dated 11.05.2023, allowing E.P.No.78 of 2013 in O.S.No.66 of 1984 on the file of the Court of II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada, filed under Order XXI, Rule 34(5) CPC.
2. C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 is filed by the judgment debtor No.7 and the legal representative of judgment debtor No.11; whereas, C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 is filed by judgment debtor No.3 and the other judgment debtors.
3. The facts necessary for disposal of these appeals, briefly stated, are as follows:
a. The decree holder / plaintiff, by name, Sri Lakshmi Rama Cooperative Building Society Limited, represented by its President, filed a suit in O.S.No.66 of 1984. The said suit was decreed on 19.08.1995 as follows:
"i) That the defendants be and are hereby directed to execute a regular sale deed in pursuance of the agreement of sale, dated 19.03.1981 in respect of suit schedule property, subject to obtaining exemption from the competent authority and the government;
ii) The plaintiff be and hereby is directed to deposit the balance of sale consideration amount along with interest @ 18% per annum from 01.07.1981 to 01.09.1981 within ten days from today.4
BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023
iii) On such deposit of the amount by the plaintiffs, the defendant be and hereby is directed to apply for exemption to the concerned authority and the Government within one month and failure to do so, the plaintiff is at liberty to get appointed receiver for the said purpose and the execution of sale deed is subject to the exemption from the concerned authority and the Government."
b. The defendants filed appeal against the judgment and decree, dated 19.08.1995 before this Court in A.S.No.478 of 1996. The appeal was dismissed by this Court on 03.06.2013 by confirming the decree passed in O.S.No.66 of 1984. Since the judgment debtor failed to execute the registered sale deed as per the decree in O.S.No.66 of 1984, the decree holder (DHr) filed E.P.No.78 of 2013 against the judgment debtor No.2 (JDr No.1 since died). In the execution petition, the DHr filed draft sale deed in support of the plaint schedule property and requested to direct the JDr to register the sale deed or on their failure, the Court to execute and register the sale deed and put the DHr in possession of the property.
c. The JDr No.2 filed counter denying the material averments of the affidavit of the DHr and submitted that two reliefs under two different heads, viz., registration of the sale deed and delivery of the property, are not maintainable in a single application and on that ground alone, the execution petition is liable to be dismissed. Even though the decree was passed in the name of the building society, the DHr did not file any document to show that the society was in existence by the date of the petition and that the signatory of the petition was authorized to sign as per the by-laws of the society. The draft sale deed was silent with 5 BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 regard to the status of Section 8(4) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and did not mention anything about granting exemption by the Urban Land Ceiling Authority. The appointment of the President of the society is not in accordance with the rules laid down under the Societies Act and the president is not entitled to sign on the execution petition in the absence of the resolution. Since there is change in the schedule, the decree cannot be executed through execution proceedings, except seeking refund of the advance amount. The petition is not maintainable without cancellation of the documents executed by the JDr. The contents of the draft sale deed with regard to delivery of the property is impossible and such a clause cannot be incorporated. In view of the difficulty in implementing the decree, the DHr restricted for refund of the advance amount instead of specific performance under Rule 34 of Order XXI CPC. Therefore, the execution petition is liable to be dismissed.
d. During the pendency of the execution petition, the JDr No.2 had sold away the E.P. schedule property in parts under different sale transactions and the transferees were brought on record as JDrs 3 to
29. e. The JDr Nos.10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 20, 22, 24 & 25 filed counter with the following averments:
i) The 1st respondent sold an extent of 180 square yards in R.S.No.8/4, Plot No.9 situated in Vidyadharapuram, Vijayawada to V.Nagamma for a valid consideration through registered sale deed, dated 26.04.2001, vide document No.2228 of 2001 who in turn sold the same to K. Krishna Reddy through registered sale deed, dated 23.02.2008, vide document No.1076 of 2008, who in turn sold the same to P. Siva Sankara Reddy through registered sale deed, dated 6 BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 15.05.2011 vide document No.2638 of 2011. He, in turn, sold the same to Sure Kiran Chand through registered sale deed, dated 10.01.2014, in favour of 10th respondent vide document No.1158 of 2014. The respondent No.10 has been in possession and enjoyment of the said property as an absolute owner.
ii) The 1st respondent sold various extents of land in R.S.No.8/4 for a valid consideration and executed sale deeds in favour of respondents No.10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 20, 22, 24 and 25 after obtaining the necessary permissions from the Urban Land Ceiling Authority.
iii) The petitioner did not take steps to protect the property by obtaining lawful orders from the respective Courts. The respondents came to know that the petitioner and the 1st respondent colluded with each other. The 1st respondent is, in fact, hand in glove with the petitioner. The society is not in existence. The so-called President had no right to represent the society. The respondents being bona fide purchasers of the property, their rights over the property cannot be questioned. The alienations in favour of these respondents and their predecessors-in-title are bona fide and Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable to the sale transactions. The right, title and interest of these respondents over the respective properties in R.S.No.8/4 is perfected by adverse possession.
iv) The land in R.S.No.8/4 was divided into house plots long ago by forming roads. The roads in R.S.No.8/4 were in existence even prior to purchase of plots by the respondents. The Vijayawada Municipal Corporation is maintaining the roads, the plots were assessed to vacant land tax and some plots wherein houses were constructed, the Corporation is collecting house tax. The electricity department laid 7 BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 electrical poles, service connections were given to some of the plots and street lighting was also provided. The property as described in the E.P. schedule is not in existence. The petitioner / DHr suppressed all facts and filed the execution petition. The DHr is not entitled to implead these respondents in execution proceedings, as they are not parties to the suit proceedings. The decree sought to be executed is ineffective and unenforceable. All the transactions in favour of the respondents and their purchasers in title are bona fide sale transactions. Without challenging them, the DHr simply cannot seek any relief against the respondents in this execution petition. The execution petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed.
f. The JDr No.4 filed counter and the same was adopted by JDr Nos.3, 14 & 26. The counter averments, in brief, are as follows:
The DHr is not entitled to execute the decree beyond the terms of the decree and is not entitled to claim the benefits that were not granted under the decree. The DHr is not entitled to get the sale deed for 1279.18 square yards from JDr No.2 only, contrary to the terms of the decree. As such, the execution petition is liable to be dismissed.
g. The JDr No.8 filed counter and the same was adopted by JDr Nos.6 & 27. The counter averments, in brief, are as follows:
The DHr cannot seek two reliefs in one execution petition. The person who signed the affidavit is not entitled to file the petition and to conduct the proceedings. The DHr is not in existence. This judgment debtor purchased the property from their vendors for a valuable consideration through registered sale deed, dated 25.01.2021 and since then; he has been in absolute possession and enjoyment of the property. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application 8 BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 to the present case. These judgment debtors are not parties to any of the prior proceedings and hence the decree passed by the Court is not binding on them. The DHr society has not shown the predecessors in title of the judgment debtors as parties. The DHr filed the execution petition with a mala fide intention to cause wrongful loss to the JDrs. As per the directions in the decree, the mode of execution of sale deed is subject to exemption from the concerned authority. The execution Court cannot order the mode of execution of the decree. The property shown in the E.P. schedule is not in existence. The DHr suppressed all true facts and filed the execution petition. The JDrs are bona fide purchasers of the properties. The relief prayed is misconceived. The execution petition is liable to be dismissed.
h. The JDr Nos.18 & 19 filed counter with the following averments:
The DHr has no locus standi to file the execution petition. The E.P. schedule property does not cover the property of the JDrs 18 & 19 who are bona fide purchasers. The DHr and the JDr no.2 colluded with each other and filed this execution petition for wrongful gain. The DHr did not take any steps to stop alienations of the E.P. schedule property to third parties. The execution petition is liable to be dismissed.
i. The JDr No.28 filed counter with the following averments;
This judgment debtor is neither a necessary nor proper party to the execution petition. After impleadment of this JDr, there are no consequential amendments to the execution petition and there is absolutely no relief sought against this judgment debtor, and therefore, the decree under execution is not binding on her. The E.P. schedule property is entirely different from the E.P. schedule. The E.P. schedule does not exist on ground as on today. Roads were laid according to 9 BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 master plan and several constructions were raised. Thus, the decree is unexecutable. The property purchased by this judgment debtor is not part and parcel of the E.P. schedule property. The JDr No.28 is a bona fide purchaser of an extent of 180 square yards in Plot No.22, R.S.No.8/4, Vidyadharapuram, Vijayawada, for a valuable consideration and since then, she has been in possession and enjoyment of the property. She paid the vacant land tax to the Corporation and as she is a bona fide purchaser, the sale deed executed by her vendor in her favour is not hit by the doctrine of lis pendense under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The JDr No.28 prayed to dismiss the petition with costs.
4. On the basis of the above pleadings, the execution Court framed the following points for determination:
1. Whether the DHr society is in existence?
2. Whether the DHr society and the original JDrs fulfilled the terms of the decree?
3. Whether the DHr is entitled to seek two reliefs in the same E.P.?
4. Whether the decree is binding on the JDrs 3 to 29 who are the pendent lite transferees?
5. Whether the Vijayawada Municipal Corporation is proper and necessary party to the E.P. proceedings?
6. Whether the DHr is entitled to the registration of the sale deed from the JDrs and delivery of possession of the E.P. schedule property, as prayed for?
5. On point No.1, the execution Court observed that during the pendency of the execution petition, the JDr No.1 filed claim petition in E.A.No.27 of 2015 under Order XXI, Rule 99 C.P.C. to declare that the 10 BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 execution petition is not maintainable in view of the non-existence of the DHr and due to lack of authority to represent the society. After elaborate enquiry, E.A.No.27 of 2015 was dismissed by order, dated 14.12.2015 and the said order was confirmed by this Court in C.R.P.No.875 of 2016, therefore, the execution Court held that the DHr society is in existence. On point No.2, it was held that as the JDrs specifically stated in their respective counters that the JDr No.2 obtained permission from the competent authority to execute the registered sale deed, the terms of the decree have been complied. On point No.3, the execution Court held that there is no need to file separate E.P. and the DHr is entitled to seek the relief of direction to the JDrs for registration of the sale deed including delivery of possession.
On point No.4, it held that the DHr is entitled to seek execution of the decree against JDrs No.3 to 29 and the decree is binding on them. On point No.5, the execution Court held that the Vijayawada Municipal Corporation is not a proper and necessary party to the execution proceedings. On Point No.6, it held that the DHr is entitled for registration of the sale deed from JDrs 2 to 17, 20 to 29 and also for delivery of possession of the E.P. schedule property.
6. The operative portion of the order impugned in these appeals read as under:
"In the result, this Execution Petition is allowed without costs. The Judgment Debtors Nos.2 to 17 and 20 to 29 are directed to execute the registered sale deed in favour of the Decree Holder within two months from the date of this order and deliver possession of the E.P. schedule property to the Decree Holder. Failing which the Decree Holder is entitled for the same in due process of law by filing necessary Execution 11 BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 Applications, in which the Decree Holder need not issue further notices to the Judgment debtors."
7. Aggrieved by the same, these two appeals are preferred by the judgment debtors.
8. The appellants in C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 raised the following grounds:-
a. The judgment debtors No.3 to 29 were not parties to the suit or the execution petition at the initial stage and their impleadment as judgment debtors is not permissible under law; b. Since the petitioners are not parties to the suit, the decree is not executable insofar as the petitioners are concerned; c. The provisions of Order XXI, Rule 34(5) CPC would apply only to the actual judgment debtor against whom a decree has been passed in terms of the definition given under Section 2(10) C.P.C.;
d. Two reliefs, i.e., for registration and delivery of the property are not maintainable in a single petition;
e. The DHr is aware of the development of the agricultural land in R.S.No.8/4 into house plots and having knowledge of the development of roads, the DHr has not taken any steps in bringing the same to the notice of the competent authority and thereafter, filed the execution petition; f. In view of the wrong description of the schedule property, the decree is inexecutable;
g. The predecessors-in-title to the DHr were not included as parties to the execution petition;12
BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 h. The appellants herein were bona fide purchasers of the property and were not parties to the suit proceedings and execution proceedings are not maintainable against them; i. The application filed by the DHr under Order XXI Rule 34(5) C.P.C. is not maintainable.
9. The appellants in C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 raised the following grounds:
a. The order impugned is contrary to law and the same is vitiated by material irregularity;
b. The finding that the DHr society and the original judgment debtor No.1 fulfilled the terms of the decree is based on no evidence on record;
c. The execution Court was in error in holding that the decree holder is entitled to seek two reliefs in the same execution petition;
d. The judgment debtors have constructed houses and the Municipal Corporation laid roads and street lights and therefore, the Municipal Corporation is proper and necessary party to the proceedings;
e. The prayer sought in the execution petition is beyond the relief granted in the execution petition and until the decree is amended, the 1st respondent cannot maintain the execution petition;
f. The reasoning assigned by the execution Court in overruling the objections raised by the petitioners and allowing the petition is not legal and correct.13
BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023
10. At the outset, it is apt to note Order XXI, Rule 34 C.P.C. and it reads as follows:
"34. Decree for execution of document, or endorsement of negotiable instrument.-(1) Where a decree is for the execution of a document or for the endorsement for a negotiable instrument and the judgment-debtor neglects or refuses to obey the decree, the decree-holder may prepare a draft of the document or endorsement in accordance with the terms of the decree and deliver the same to the Court. (2) The Court shall thereupon cause the draft to be served on the judgment-debtor together with a notice requiring his objections (if any) to be made within such time as the Court fixes in this behalf.
(3) Where the judgment-debtor object to the draft, his objections shall be stated in writing within such time, and the court shall make such order approving or altering the draft, as it thinks fit.
(4) The decree-holder shall deliver to the Court a copy of the draft with such alterations (if any) as the Court may have directed upon the proper stamp-paper, if a stamp is required by the law for the time being in force; and the Judge or such officer as may be appointed in this behalf shall execute the document so delivered.
(5) The execution of a document or the endorsement of a negotiable instrument under this Rule may be in the following form, namely-14
BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 C.D., Judge of the Court of (or as the case may be), for A.B. in suit by E.F. against A.B. and shall have the same effect as the execution of the document or the endorsement of the negotiable instrument by the party ordered to execute or endorse the same. (6) (a) Where the registration of the document is required under any law for the time being in force, the Court, or such officer of the court as may be authorized in this behalf by the Court, shall cause the document to be registered in accordance with such law.
(b) Where the registration of the document is not so required, but the decree-holder desires it to be registered, the Court may make such order as it thinks fit.
(c) Where the Court makes any order for the registration of any document, it may make such order as it thinks fit as to the expenses of registration."
11. The learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the 1st respondent / DHr reiterated their submissions as argued before the execution Court.
12. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent / DHr relied upon the decision in P. Jesaya (Dead) by LRs Vs. Sub-Collector and Another 1 wherein it was held at paragraph No.4 as follows:
"4. Though the arguments are attractive one must also keep in mind Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is obligatory on the pleader of a deceased to inform the court 1 (2004) 13 Supreme Court Cases 431 15 BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 and the other side about the factum of death of a party. In this case we find that no intimation was given to the court or to the other side that the first respondent had died. On the contrary a counsel appeared on behalf of the deceased person and argued the matter. It is clear that the attempt was to see whether a favourable order could be obtained. It is clear that the intention was that if the order went against them, then thereafter this would be made a ground for having that order set aside. This is in effect an attempt to take not just the other side but also the court for a ride. These sort of tactics must not be permitted to prevail. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere. The appeal stands dismissed. There will be no order as to costs."
(ii) In Manickam and Ors. Vs. Vasantha2, it was held at paragraph No.30 as follows:
"30. The Defendant in terms of the agreement is bound to handover possession of the land agreed to be sold. The expression "at any stage of proceeding" is wide enough to allow the plaintiffs to seek relief of possession even at the appellate stage or in execution even if such prayer was required to be claimed. This Court in Babu Lal Vs. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal [(1982) 1 SCC 525] has explained the circumstances where relief of possession may be necessary such as in a suit for partition or in a case of separate possession where the property conveyed is a joint property. In the suit for specific performance, the possession is inherent in 2 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2096 16 BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 such suit; therefore, we find that the decree-holders are in fact entitled to possession in pursuance of the sale deed executed in their favour."
(iii) In B. Gangadhar Vs. B.G. Rajalingam 3 , it was held at paragraph No.4 as follows:
"4. Rule 35(3) of Order 21 C.P.C. itself manifests that when a decree for possession of immovable property was granted and delivery of possession was directed to be done, the court executing the decree is entitled to pass such incidental, ancillary or necessary orders for effective enforcement of the decree for possession. That power also includes the power to remove any obstruction or super-structure made pendente lite. The exercise of incidental, ancillary or inherent power is consequential to deliver possession of the property in execution of the decree. No doubt, the decree does not contain a mandatory injunction for demolition. But when the decree for possession had become final and the judgment- debtor or a person interested or claiming right through the judgment-debtor has taken law in his hands and made any constructions on the property pending suit, the decree-holder is not bound by any such construction. The relief of mandatory injunction, therefore, is consequential to or necessary for effectuation of the decree for possession. It is not necessary to file a separate suit when the construction was made pending suit without permission of the court. Otherwise, the decree becomes in executable driving the plaintiff again for 3 AIR 1996 SC 780 # (1995) 5 SCC 238 17 BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 another round of litigation which the code expressly prohibits such multiplicity of proceedings."
(iv) In Mahadeo Vs. Anandrao4, it was held at paragraph No.7 as follows:
"7. Under provisions of Order XXI Rule 35(3) of the Code it is open for the judgment-debtor to remove or take away or do any other act so as to put the decree-holder in possession. The decree in question is one for possession. It is well settled that while executing a decree for possession the executing Court is entitled to pass such incidental, ancillary or necessary orders for effective enforcement of the decree for possession. A direction to judgment-debtor to remove the structure standing on the portion of the land of which possession is to be delivered to the decree-holder would naturally be an incidental direction. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the decree-holder support his contention in that regard. Moreover, provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 also permit such course to be followed.".
(v) In Dongala Venkaiah and others Vs. Dongala Raji Reddy5, it was held at paragraph No.11 as follows:
11. No doubt, in the above-cited judgment, the learned Judges used the word "Pendente lite", but this Court is not inclined to accept the contention made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners-defendants. In the factual scenario of that particular case, the learned Judges used the word, but 4 2019 (194) AIC 409 (Neutral citation) # MANU/MH/0766/2018 5 AIR 2007 AP 344 18 BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 it does not mean that if such constructions were made only during the pendency of the suit then the plaintiff can execute the decree without tortuous remedy of separate suit seeking mandatory injunction or possession. If really it is interpreted in the manner in which the learned Counsel for the petitioners-
defendants has contended, the very decree as well as the judgment becomes false, and in my considered view, it would amount to abuse of process of the Court. After all, here is a person (plaintiff) who has a decree whereby his title with regard to Ac.0.06 guntas of land was declared and recovery of possession was also ordered. Simply because, he has not sought for relief of mandatory injunction, in cannot be said that the decree is in executable. When once a decree declaring the plaintiff's title and recovery of possession is made by the Court, in my considered opinion, it is immaterial whether any structures were made in the suit schedule land either prior to the institution of the suit or during the pendency of the suit.
(vi) In Usha Sinha Vs. Dina Ram and others 6 , it was held at paragraph No.11 as follows:
"19. Rule 29 of Order XXI of the Code deals with cases wherein a suit has been instituted by the judgment-debtor against the decree- holder and has no relevance to cases of lis pendens wherein transfer of property has been effected by the judgment debtor to a third party during the pendency of proceedings. The High Court, in our opinion, rightly held that the appellant could not be said to be a 'stranger' to the suit 6 AIR 2007 AP 344 19 BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 inasmuch as she was claiming right, title and interest through defendant Nos. 4 and 5 against whom the suit was pending. She must, therefore, be presumed to be aware of the litigation which was before a competent Court in the form of Title Suit No. 140 of 1999 instituted by the present respondent against the predecessor of the appellant. As held in Bellamy, the fact that the purchaser of the property during the pendency of the proceedings had no knowledge about the suit, appeal or other proceeding is wholly immaterial and he/she cannot resist execution of decree on that ground. As observed in Silverline Forum, a limited inquiry in such cases is whether the transferee is claiming his right through the judgment-debtor. In our judgment, the High Court was also right in observing that if the appellant succeeds in the suit and decree is passed in her favour, she can take appropriate proceedings in accordance with law and apply for restitution. That, however, does not preclude the decree holder from executing the decree obtained by him. Since the appellant is a purchaser pendente lite and as she has no right to offer resistance or cause obstruction and as her rights have not been crystallized in a decree, Rule 102 of Order 21 of the Code comes into operation. Hence, she cannot resist execution during the pendency of the suit instituted by her. The order passed by the High Court, therefore, cannot be said to be illegal, unlawful or otherwise contrary to law."
13. First of all, the argument that the subsequent purchasers, claiming themselves to be bona fide purchasers cannot escape the liability under the decree as admittedly, the purchases were made 20 BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 pending litigation and the decree passed is binding on them. The execution Court rightly answered this objection.
14. It is also mainly contended that the nature of the property was changed and therefore, the decree cannot be executed. In the light of the aforesaid decisions relied by the 1st respondent, the property within the boundaries as shown in the decree can be delivered, by passing appropriate orders by the execution Court, if necessary by demolishing the structures raised on the schedule property pending the lis. Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim that they are the bona fide purchasers and the property is not now existing as in the decree.
15. Insofar as the condition required to implement the decree is concerned, the execution Court rightly noted that the necessary permissions wee secured as admitted by the JDrs. Therefore, a Court may not require an admitted fact to be proved. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention in this regard.
16. Insofar as impleadment of Municipality as a necessary party to the proceeding is concerned, the taxes being laid in relation to the existing properties, since all the developmental activity in the decree schedule property is subject to the decree, the status quo ante would be restored for delivering the property, if necessary. Further, the execution Court rightly answered this aspect in Point No.5. As such, it does not require any further elaboration. Though collusion was pleaded by some of the JDrs, the same has not been established.
17. The above-said decisions referred by the 1st respondent would clearly establish that the delivery of the property is incidental to the decree for specific performance with recovery of property, if necessary, 21 BSB, J C.M.A.No.74 of 2024 & C.M.A.No.300 of 2023 by taking steps to remove the structures made pendente lite, to handover the property as was agreed to be sold.
18. For all the above reasons, the appeals are liable to be dismissed.
19. Accordingly, both these appeals are dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
__________________
Dt.09.05.2025 B.S.BHANUMATHI, J
RAR