Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P.Throu.Prin.Secy.Excise ... vs Shri Awadhesh Kumar Singh And Another on 14 February, 2020
Bench: Anil Kumar, Saurabh Lavania
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH Reserved Court No. - 9 Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 2589 of 2019 Petitioner :- State Of U.P.Throu.Prin.Secy.Excise Department Lko.And Ors. Respondent :- Sri Avdhesh Kumar Singh And Another Counsel for Petitioner :- C.S.C. Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Hemendra Pratap Hon'ble Anil Kumar,J.
Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania,J.
(As per Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania,J.) Heard Sri Amit Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Hemendra Pratap, learned counsel for the respondent.
By means of the present writ petition, State has challenged the judgment and order dated 11.05.2017 passed by U.P. State Public Services Tribunal (in short "Tribunal") in Claim Petition No.1753 of 2012 (State of U.P. Vs. Avdhesh Kumar Singh) and also the judgment and order dated 20.04.2018 passed by the Tribunal in Review Petition No.107 of 2017 (State of U.P. & Others Vs. Avdhesh Kumar Singh), whereas the Tribunal dismissed the Review Petition filed by the State.
Facts, in brief, of the present case, reads as under:-
Sri Avdhesh Kumar Singh-respondent No.1 was appointed as Sub-Inspector Excise on 29.05.1974, and he continued till 31.12.1975. The service of Sri Avdhesh Kumar Singh-respondent No.1 was dispensed with effect from 01.01.1976.
The persons similarly situated to respondent No.1, whose services too were dispensed with, approached the Tribunal by means of Claim Petition No.24(T)/III/80. The Claim Petition was allowed, vide judgment and order dated 02.09.1981, holding that the petitioners of the claim petition deemed to have continued in service. It was also held that they were also entitled to benefits arriving out of continuance in service. The operative portion of the judgment and order dated 02.09.1981 read as under:-
"Admittedly a departmental selection was held wherein the petitioners also appeared. It is not disputed that the petitioners did not qualify in the departmental test. It is not clear from the perusal of the written statement as to how the holding of a departmental test was devised by the department. The opposite parties have not placed reliance on any government order empowering the appointing authority or any departmental authority to hold a departmental test for recruitment of 16 Sub Excise Inspectors. In any case we do no feel it necessary to discuss in details the impact of the departmental test on the termination orders because admittedly the departmental test and the results thereof were cancelled by the State Government vide its order dated 27.10.77. Otherwise the petitioners were not to be affected by the results of the departmental test because admittedly this departmental test could not be equated to a regular selection conducted by the U.P. Public Service Commission. It is admitted on both sides that no rules have been framed prescribing the method of recruitment, but it appears accepted on both sides that the post in question, was under the purview of the Public Service Commission. It is presumably because of the posts being under the purview of the Public Service Commission that the State Government had by its G.O. dated 2.2.72 asked the appointing authority to make temporary appointments on the posts of Sub Excise Inspectors till regular selections were held by the Public Service Commission. There is yet another reasons why we are not inclined to up-hold the termination orders. At the time of making the appointments of the petitioners. They were not told by the appointing authority that they will be required to appear as departmental examination to be conducted by the department. Even if, therefore the two petitioners appeared at the departmental test, the result declared could hardly affect their continuance in the post. Besides as we have pointed out the State Government did not favorably considered the procedure adopted in connection with the departmental test. The allegation has been made on behalf of the petitioners that an enquiry was held in connection with the departmental test and the Enquiry Officer found a lot of bugling in the said test. Even thought the Enquiry report his not before us, but it is not necessary for us to look into the report because admittedly the selection were cancelled by the State Government. If the selections could not be held to have been regularly made, the department cannot be permitted to rely on the result of the selections at the time of dealing with the petitioners. The cancellation of the selections by the State Govt. in fact lends support to the petitioners in stating that their services could not have been terminated on the basis of the result declared.
In view of our finding on the above questions, we do not consider it necessary to deal with other points raised in the petitions.
In the result, we find that the termination orders cannot be sustained and the petitioners must be deemed to have continued in service. They are also held entitled to benefits arising out of continuance in service. The opposite parties are directed to re-instate the petitioners. Accordingly we allow the petitions. Costs on parties."
Thereafter, on 04.08.1990 the State Government took a decision to appoint the persons (all the Sub-Inspector Excise) who could not succeed in the examination held in the year 1975 and their services were dispensed with in the year 1976.
Thereafter, the persons similarly situated to the petitioners of the Claim Petition No.24(T)/III/1980, were given appointment and the appointment to respondent no.1 was given vide order dated 25.08.1990 (Annexure No.8 to the Claim Petition) on the post of Deputy Excise Inspector, and pursuant to the same the respondent No.1 joined on 30.08.1990.
Vide order dated 07.07.1994, respondent No.1 was declared permanent on the post of Deputy Inspector Excise w.e.f. 31.08.1993.
Vide order dated 07.07.1994, the respondent No.1 was provided higher scale of pay on completing 16 years of regularization.
Vide order dated 19.06.1997 respondent No.1 was promoted to the post of Excise Inspector.
The respondent No.1-Sri Avdhesh Kumar Singh, an attaining the age of superannuation retired on 31.01.2011.
After retirement of respondent no.1, the Additional Director Treasures & Pension has passed an order dated 13.03.2012 raising objection to the effect that Sri Avdhesh Kumar Singh-respondent no.1 was re-appointed vide order dated 25.08.1990 on ad-hoc basis only, hence, it is necessary to get ascertained that when his ad-hoc services were regularized and from what date. In the letter dated 13.03.2012 it has also been stated that as per provisions of Rule 7 of the 1979 Regularization Rules, there is no provision for regularization of the services from the date prior to the dated of the order on which the regularization is made. Further stated that the pension papers submitted by Sri Awadesh Kumar Singh-respondent no.1 was not examined by the Department, hence he requested the Department (Excise Department) to make available the Service Book and pension papers of Sri Avdhesh Kumar Singh-respondent no.1 at an early date, so that pension of Sri Avdhesh Kumar Singh-respondent no.1 be determined.
In the aforesaid factual background the claimant-respondent no.1 approached the Tribunal for redressal of his grievances by filing Claim Petition No.1753 of 2012 (State of U.P. Vs. Avdhesh Kumar Singh), the main reliefs sought by the claimant-respondent no.1 are as under:-
"(i) To pass order or direction quashing the objections raised by O.P. No.4 in the impugned order dated 13.03.2012 contained in annexure No.1.
(ii) To pass order or direction for treating the period from 29.05.1974 to 30.08.1993 as qualifying service for the purposes of pension and the same may be added to the service rendered by the petitioner from 31.08.1993 to 31.01.2011 and further pass order or direction to O.P. No.4 for issuing pension payment order accordingly.
(iii) To pass order allowing interest @ 18% p.a. on each component of retiral benefits i.e. pension, gratuity and commuted amount of pension for the period from 01.02.2011 till the date of its actual payment."
Before the Tribunal, respondent no.1 opposed the claim petition by filing written statement.
The Tribunal allowed the Claim Petition filed by the respondent no.1 vide order dated 11.05.2017, the relevant portion of the same reads as under:-
layXud la0&6 ls ;g Li"V gS fd ;kph ds lkFk tks vU; deZpkjh lsok ls i`Fkd fd;s x;s Fks] mudks lsok esa fy;s tkus dk vkSj mUgsa cjkcj lsok esa cus jgus dk ykHk bl vf/kdj.k }kjk vkns'k fnukad 2&9&81 layXud la0&6 ls fn;k x;kA layXud la0&7 o 8 ;g Li"V djrk gS fd mDr fu.kZ; ds vuqikyu esa lHkh i`Fkd fd;s x;s mi vkcdkjh fujh{kdksa dks iqu% lsok esa fy;s tkus ds vkns'k vkSj lsok fujUrjrk ds lkFk osru HkRrksa vkfn dk ykHk fn;s tkus dk vkns'k fd;k x;kA mDr ds vuqikyu esa ;kph dks iqu% rnFkZ ,oa vLFkk;h :i ls fuoyh phuh fey ,Vk esa fu;qDr dj fn;k x;kA ;kph us tks vfHkys[k i=koyh ij nkf[ky fd;k gS] mlls ;g Hkh Li"V gksrk gS fd ;kph dh ofj"Brk Hkh r; dj nh x;h vkSj layXud la&10 vkns'k fnukad 7&7&1993 ls ;g Li"V gks tkrk gS fd 12 mi vkcdkjh fujh{kdksa esa ;kph dks fnukad 31&8&1993 ls LFkk;h dj fn;k x;k A blds i'pkr ;kph dks 16 o"kZ ds mijkUr le;eku osrueku dk ykHk fnukad 1&7&1992 ls vkSj 19 o"kZ dh lsok ds mijkUr izksUur osrueku fnukad 1&7&1995 ls iznku fd;k x;k rFkk 24 o"kZ dh lsok ds i'pkr izksUur osrueku fnukad 1&7&2000 ls iznku fd;k x;k A Lohd`r :i ls ;kph fnukad 31&1&2011 dks lsok fuo`Rr gqvkA Li"V gS fd bl vf/kdj.k ds vkns'k fnukad 2&9&1981 rFkk blds vuqikyu esa tkjh fd;s x;s 'kkluk ns'k fnukad 4&8&1990 ,oa 25&8&1990 ds vuqlkj ;kph lesr lHkh fudkys x;s vkcdkjh mi fujh{kdksa dks lsok esa fujUrjrk ds lkFk osru ykHk nsrs gq, iqu% lsok esa ys fy;k x;kA ,sls esa Li"V gksrk gS fd ;kph dks mDr vof/k ds ykHk u nsus dk dksbZ volj ugha gSA bl lUnHkZ esa ekuuh; bykgkckn mPp U;k;ky; dh y[kuÅ ihB 2008 ¼26½ ,y-lh-Mh- 1760 jkT; m0iz0 izfr Jh jktsUnz ukFk ik.Ms gekjk ekxZ n'kZu djrs gSa ftlesa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; us ou foHkkx esa fnukad 1&5&1979 dks uydwi vkijsVj ds in ij fu;qDr deZpkjh ftls fnukad 6&12&01 dks fu;fer fd;k x;k] dks fnukad 1&5&79 ls lsok esa ekurs gq, lsokuSo`fRrd ykHk iznku fd;sA fjV , ua0&61974@2011 Mk0 vejsUnz ujk;u JhokLro izfr jkT; m0iz0 ,oa vU; tks fnukad 1&3&2012 dks fu.khZr gqvk] esa ;g dgk x;k gS fd rnFkZ fu;qfDr dh vof/k lsok uSo`fRrd ykHkksa ds fy, tksM+h tk;sxhA mDr ekeyk vk;qosZfnd ,oa ;wukuh fpfdRlk ls lEcfU/kr FkkA mDr ds izdk'k esa ge bl fu"d"kZ ij igaaqprs gSa fd ;kph dh rnFkZ fu;qfDr dh lsok Hkh mlds lsokuSo`fRrd ykHkksa gsrq tksM+h tk;sxhA ;kph o"kZ 2011 esa lsokfuo`Rr gks pqdk gSA ;kph dks vUrfje isa'ku] vUrfje xzsP;qVh izkIr djk;h tk pqdh gSA o"kZ 2013 esa foyEc ls xzsP;qVh o isa'ku nsus ds dkj.k ;kph bl vof/k dk lk/kkj.k C;kt Hkh 8 izfr'kr okf"kZd dh nj ls izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gSA vkns'k ;kfpdk vkf'kad :i Lohdkj dh tkrh gSA foi{khx.k }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 13&03&2012 fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA foi{khx.k dks funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd bl fu.kZ; dh izekf.kr izfr izkIr gksus ds 3 ekg ds vUnj ;kph dh rnFkZ lsok dks tksM+rs gq, mls leLr lsok uSo`fRrd ykHk fn;s tkus gsrq fopkj djsaxsA ;kph dks fn;s x;s lsok uSo`fRrd ykHkksa ij 8 izfr'kr okf"kZd lk/kkj.k dh nj ls okLrfod Hkqxrku rd C;kt Hkh Hkqxrku djsaxsA i{kdkj viuk&viuk O;; Lo;a ogu djsaxsA Being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 11.05.2017, State filed Review Petition No.107 of 2017 (State of U.P. Vs. Avdhesh Kumar Singh) and the same was also dismissed vide judgment and order dated 20.04.2018.
Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 11.05.2017 passed in Claim Petition No.1753 of 2012 and the Review Petition No.107 of 2017 respectively, present writ petition has been filed before this Court.
On the following facts and reasons, the State is opposing the claim of respondent no.1 and challenging the impugned order:-
(i) The respondent no.1 was initially appointed on the post of Sub-Inspector Excise on 29.05.1974 and he joined the duties in the department. The appointment was on purely ad-hoc and temporary. He worked in the department on the post of Sub-Inspector Excise till the order dated 31.12.1975, whereby the services of the respondent no.1 were dispensed with w.e.f. 01.01.1976 along with other Sub-Inspector Excise. The order dated 31.12.1975 was challenged by similarly situated persons before the Tribunal and the same was allowed in the Claim Petition No.24(T)/III/80 vide judgment and order dated 02.09.1981.
(ii) Being aggrieved by the judgment and order 02.09.1981 passed by the Tribunal, the State filed the Writ Petition No.90 of 1982 and the same was dismissed vide judgment and order dated 14.04.1982.
(iii) Being aggrieved, by the judgment and order dated 14.04.1982 the State filed the Special Appeal (Civil) No.11004 of 1982 and the same was also dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court vide judgment and order dated 11.04.1988. Thereafter, a decision was taken by the State Government vide order dated 04.08.1990 for providing appointment to all Sub-Inspector Excise, whose services were dispensed with in the year 1976 including respondent no.1.
(iv) In view of the decision taken by the State Government on 04.08.1990, the respondent no.1 was appointed vide order dated 25.08.1990 on purely ad-hoc and temporary. Subsequently, the services of the respondent no.1 was confirmed vide order dated 07.07.1993 w.e.f. 31.08.1993. During the tenure of his service, the respondent no.1 was promoted on the post of Inspector Excise and on attaining the age of superannuation retired on 31.01.2011 from the post of Inspector Excise, District-Raibarely.
(v) The services rendered by the respondent no.1 on ad-hoc and temporary capacity, are not liable to be taken into account/considered for the purposes of post retiral/ pensionary benefits in view of the Articles 361, 368 and 370 of the Civil Services Regulations. Article 361, 368 and 370 of the Civil Services Regulations reads as under:-
"361. The service of an officer does not qualify for pension unless it confirms to the following three conditions:-
First-The service must be under Government.
Second-The employment must be substantive and permanent Third-The service must be paid by the Government.
These three conditions are fully explained in the following section.
368. Service does not qualify unless the officer holds a substantive office on a permanent establishment.
370. Continuous temporary or officiating service under the Government of Uttar Pradesh followed without interruption by confirmation in the same or any other post shall qualify except-
(i) periods of temporary officiating service in non-pensionable establishment;
(ii) periods of service in work-charged establishment; and
(iii) periods of service in a post paid from contingencies."
Assailing the impugned orders, learned counsel for the State Sri Amit Sharma, on the basis of the provision envisaged in the Civil Services Regulations i.e. Articles 361, 368 and 370 submits that the services rendered by the respondent no.1 on ad-hoc and temporary basis can not be treated as permanent service and being so the period in which the respondent no.1 was serving in the department on ad-hoc and temporary capacity can not be taken into account/counted for the purposes of post retiral benefits/ pensionary benefits.
It has also been stated that the respondent no.1 was out of service w.e.f. 01.01.1976 to 29.08.1990 and the services rendered prior to the date of confirmation i.e. 31.08.1993 can not be counted for the purpose of retiral benefits/ pensionary benefits.
In rebuttal, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 submitted that pursuant to the decision taken by the State Government, the respondent no.1 was appointed on 29.05.1974 along with other and the services of the respondent no.1 was dispensed with vide order dated 01.01.1976 and the order of dispensing was interfered by the Tribunal vide judgment and order dated 02.09.1981. The said judgment was affirmed by this Court vide judgment and order dated 31.08.1993 and the Special Leave Petition No.11004 of 1982 filed by the State against vide judgment and order dated 11.04.1988.
Thereafter, on 04.08.1990 the State Government took a decision to appoint the persons (all the Sub-Inspector Excise) who could not succeed in the examination held in the year 1975 and their services were dispensed with in the year 1976 and pursuant to the same, the persons (all the Sub-Inspector Excise) whose services were dispensed with in the year 1976, were appointed in terms of order/decision dated 04.08.1990 on the post of Sub-Inspector Excise vide order dated 25.08.1990 and he joined the duties on 30.08.1990. Thereafter, the services of respondent no.1 was confirmed vide order dated 07.07.1994 w.e.f. 31.08.1993 and he rendered services in the department till attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 31.01.2011.
It has been stated that in view of the decision taken by the State Government dated 04.08.1990, the services of the respondent no.1 prior to the date of confirmation are liable to be counted for the purposes of pensionary benefits/retiral benefits. It is in view of the fact that the decision taken by the State Government dated 04.08.1990 specifically provides for giving benefit of continuity in service and other service benefits such as salary and allowances.
It has also been stated that the respondent no.1 is entitled to the pensionary benefits/retiral benefits after counting the services rendered by the respondent no.1 prior to date of the confirmation i.e. 31.08.1993.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and going through the records.
The admitted facts of the case are that the respondent no.1 was appointed on 29.05.1974 on ad-hoc and temporary capacity and the services of the respondent no.1 was dispensed with vide order dated 31.12.1975 w.e.f. 01.01.1976.
After litigation with respect to the order dated 31.12.1975, whereby the services of respondent no.1 alongwith others were dispensed with, which went upto the Hon'ble Apex Court and the judgment and order dated 02.09.1981 passed by the Tribunal in favour of the employees was upheld, the State Government took the decision vide order dated 04.08.1990 for appointing the Sub-Inspector Excise, whose services were dispensed with vide order dated 31.12.1975.
It is also an admitted position of the present case that vide order dated 04.08.1990, the State Government took the decision to provide benefit of continuity in service and other service benefits. The order dated 04.08.1990 being relevant, is reproduced hereunder:-
mi;qZDr fo"k;d vkids i= la[;k ,&3776@vf/k"Bku@pkj&Mh&2111 fnukad 26-06-1990 ,oa i= la[;k , 5118 vf/k"Bku@pkj&Mh&2---- fnukad 20-07-1990 ds lanHkZ esa eq>s vkils ;g dgus dk funs'k gqvk gS fd iz'uxr izdj.k esa 'kklukns'k la[;k 1126 bZ&1 rsjg&154@80 fnukad 22-04-90 dk iqu% ijh{k.k djds 'kklu ls jk; izkIr dh xbZ ftlds ifjis{; esa 'kklu us lE;d :i ls fopkjksijkUr ;g fu.kZ; fy;k gS fd izlaxr ekeys ls lacaf/kr izR;kosnu nsus okys lHkh mi vkcdkjh fujh{kdksa dks iqu% lsok esa ys fy;k tk; rFkk ekuuh; yskd lsok vf/kdkj.k ds vkns'kksa ds ifjis{; esa o"kZ 1975 esa gqbZ ijh{kk esa vlQy rFkk o"kZ 1976 esa lsok ls fudkys x;s mi vkcdkjh fujh{kdksa esa ls iqu% lsok esa fy;s x;s leLr mi vkcdkjh fujh{kdksa dks lsok fujUrjrk rFkk osru HkRrs vkfn dk ykHk fn;k tk;A vuqjks/k gS fd d`i;k bl laca/k esa rn~uqlkj dk;Zokgh lqfuf'pr djus dk d"V djsaA Thereafter, vide order dated 25.08.1990 the respondent no.1 was appointed and the service was confirmed vide order dated 30.08.1990, thereafter, respondent no.1 was promoted on the post of Sub-Inspector Excise and on attaining the age of superannuation retired on 31.01.2011 from the post of Inspector Excise, District-Raibarely.
Needless to say that the respondent no.1 was directed to submit an affidavit regarding his employment during the intervening period, which was also submitted by the respondent no.1-Avdhesh Kumar Singh.
In the case of Sudama Prasad Vs. State of U.P. and Others reported in 2018 (3) ESC 1754 the Division Bench of this Court considered the Regulation 361 and 368 of the Civil Services Regulations and the fact of the case, in brief, to the effect that the petitioner, therein, was appointed on adhoc basis in substantive capacity in a permanent established and after considering the same, the Division Bench of this Court interfered in the order whereby the claim of the petitioner, therein, for the counting of period of adhoc service for the purpose of pensionary benefits was rejected. The relevant paras are quoted herein below for ready reference.
"In view of the facts and circumstances of the case as has been discussed herein above and the stand taken by the respondent in not extending the benefit of full pension as claimed by the petitioner by not including the period of service on ad hoc basis by the impugned order dated 15.10.2014, we find it appropriate to quote Regulations 361 and 368 of the CSR: Regulation 361: The service of an officer does not qualify for pension unless it conforms to the following three conditions: First: The service must be under Government. Second: The employment must be substantive and permanent. Third: The service must be paid by Government. Regulation 368: Service does not qualify unless the officer holds a substantive office on a permanent establishment. From the perusal of Regulation 361 of the CSR it transpires that the service of an officer does not qualify for pension unless the service is under the Government, the employment is substantive and permanent and the service benefit is paid by Government. Whereas from the perusal of Regulation 368 of the CSR it transpires that the service of the officer does not qualify for pension unless the officer holds a substantive office in a permanent establishment.
From the facts narrated herein above and the conditions imposed under Regulations 361 and 368 of the CSR for full pension we find that it is not in dispute that the service of the petitioner is under the Government and it is paid by Government. Further the initial appointment of the petitioner was made against the substantive post in the permanent establishment. Learned standing counsel although contended that the initial appointment of the petitioner was not against substantive post in permanent capacity as the petitioner continued on ad hoc basis with effect from 9.1.1984 till 10.12.1993 , therefore, he will not be covered under the second condition of Regulation 361 of the CSR. We are of the view that the argument advanced by the learned standing counsel is fallacious having no weight as the nature of vacancy and capacity has to be seen on the date of retirement and not on the date of initial appointment.
Another question which requires our consideration is as to whether the petitioner was appointed against the substantive post in the permanent establishment or not. For testing that we have to go through the pleadings of the petitioner as made in the writ petition. For this purpose we would like to quote paragraph no. 22 of the writ petition, which reads as under:
"22. That in spite of the ad hoc appointment of the petitioner was in the substantive capacity in a permanent establishment and which ultimately resulted into regularization on 10.12.1993 without any break in service, the fixation of pension of the petitioner has been done after calculating the services of the petitioner from the date of his regularization of his service i.e. 10.12.1993. The said act of the respondent is absolutely arbitrary, illegal and unjustified."
Reply of paragraph 22 of the writ petition has been made in paragraph 14 of the counter affidavit, which reads as under:
"14. That the contents of paragraphs 21,22 and 23 of the writ petition has already been replied in the preceding paragraph of this counter affidavit, hence need no comments. It is further submitted that according to paragraph 368 and 361 of CSR, pension is not payble on ad hoc services of the petitioner." It is stated that the appointment of the petitioner was in substantive capacity in the permanent establishment. The factum of nature of the vacancy and establishment has not been denied in the counter affidavit. What has been stated in the counter affidavit is that the petitioner will not be entitled for the relief claimed in view of the provisions contained under Regulations 361 and 368 of the CSR. We have already interpreted the wordings contained in Regulations 361 and 368 of the CSR, meaning thereby the nature of employment and vacancy has to be seen at the time of retirement and not prior to that. Here in this case when the petitioner was retired, he was holding the permanent post in substantive capacity. In view of the averments made in paragraph 22 of the writ petition the appointment of the petitioner was made against substantive post in the permanent establishment which has not been denied by the respondents, therefore, the stand taken by the respondents in the impugned order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The view taken by us finds support from the judgment rendered by this Court in Writ A No. 61974 of 2011 (Dr. Amrendra Narain Srivastava vs. State of U.P. and others). In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 15.10.2014 passed by the Principal Secretary (Planning) U.P. Government, Lucknow, respondent no.1 is hereby quashed. The respondent no.1 is directed to pass a fresh order in view of the observations made herein, above."
In the case of Dr. Madan Gopal Pandey and Others Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2018 (11) ADJ 92 (DB), the Division Bench of this Court considered the Article 361, 368 and 370 of the Civil Services Regulations and Retirement Benefits Rules, 1961 as well as the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court and after considering the same, the Division of this Court directed the State to count the period of adhoc service for the purpose of pensionary benefits and other retiral dues. While issuing the directions, the Division Bench of this Court also considered the fact of the case, to the effect that the petitioners, therein, were appointed on adhoc basis on substantive post in a permanent establishment and after rendering continuous and uninterrupted service were regularized and thereafter they were superannuated as any other permanent confirmed employee. The relevant paras are quoted hereinbelow for ready reference.
"The case of the petitioners is that Death-cum-Retirement Benefit Rules, 1961 (in short Rules, 1961) are applicable to the petitioners where under the gratuity in question has been computed and paid to the petitioners. Rule 5 (1) of Rules, 1961 provides: an officer may, on retirement, be paid an additional gratuity, the amount of which shall, subject to a maximum of 16-1/2 times the emoluments, be an amount equal to one-fourth of the emoluments multiplied by the total number of completed six monthly periods of qualifying service. Qualifying service is defined in Rule 3(8) of the Rules, 1961 as follows:-
"Qualifying Services" means service which qualifies for pension in accordance with the provisions of Article 368of the Civil Service Regulations:
Provided that continuous temporary or officiating service under the Government of Uttar Pradesh followed without interruptions by confirmation in the same or any other post shall qualify except--
(i) periods of temporary or officiating service in non- pensionable establishment;
(ii) periods of service in work charged establishment; and
(iii) periods of service in a post paid from contingencies, shall also count as qualifying service."
NOTE- If service rendered for a non-pensionable establishment, work charged establishment or in a post paid from contingencies falls between two periods of temporary service and permanent service in a pensionable establishment or between periods of temporary service and permanent service in a pensionable establishment, it will not constitute an interruption of service."
It is the case of the petitioners, that Rule 3(8) of Rules, 1961 is pari materia Article 370 of the Civil Service Regulations, which is as follows:
"370. Continuous temporary or officiating service under the Government of Uttar Pradesh followed without interruptions by confirmation in the same or any other post shall qualify except--
(i) periods of temporary or officiating service in non- pensionable establishment;
(ii) periods of service in work charged establishment; and
(iii) periods of service in a post paid from contingencies.
Note- If service rendered for a non-pensionable establishment, work charged establishment or in a post paid from contingencies falls between two periods of temporary service in a pensionable establishment or between periods of temporary service and permanent service in a pensionable establishment, it will not constitute an interruption of service."
Relying on the aforesaid provisions, the learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that all the petitioners were appointed on a substantive post in a permanent establishment under the Government therefore there temporary/ officiating service rendered uninterruptedly since the date of their initial ad hoc appointment be counted, as they were subsequently confirmed, towards qualifying service. It has been urged that earlier the qualifying service was rightly computed by including the temporary / officiating service rendered by the petitioners as ad hoc appointee. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioners invited attention of the Court to paragraphs 3 and 24 of the writ petition in which it has been specifically stated that the petitioners were appointed on ad hoc basis on a substantive post in a permanent establishment. Attention of the Court was also invited to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the writ petition wherein it has been stated that the petitioners had been continuously working since the date of their initial ad hoc appointment without any break in service till their regularization and even thereafter. It has been submitted that there is no specific denial to the averments made in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 24 of the writ petition and therefore it is admitted to the respondents that the petitioners were appointed on a substantive post in a permanent establishment and had rendered uninterrupted service since the date of their initial appointment till their confirmation and, thereafter, till superannuation.
In support of their case, the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court dated 01.03.2012 rendered in Writ A No. 61974 of 2011 (Dr. Amrendra Narain Srivastava v. State of U.P. and others), where, in similar circumstances, after examining the provisions of Rule 3(8) of the Rules, 1961 as well as Articles 368 and 369 of the Civil Service Regulations, the Court had taken the view that qualifying service would include temporary service rendered by an ad hoc appointee except when it is in connection with: (a) a non-pensionable establishment; or (b) a work-charged establishment; or (c) on a post paid from contingencies.
In response to the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned Standing Counsel placed reliance on Articles 361 and 368 of the Civil Service Regulations which provides as follows:-
"Article 361- The service of an officer does not qualify for pension unless it conforms to the following three conditions-
a) the service must be under Government,
b) the employment must be substantive and permanent and c) the service must be paid by Government.
Article 368-Service does not qualify unless the officer holds a substantive office on a permanent establishment."
Placing reliance on the aforesaid provisions it has been urged that service must be substantive and permanent before any benefit of such service could be provided.
Learned Standing Counsel further submitted that though continuous temporary or officiating service may be counted as perArticle 370of Civil Service Regulations or Rule 3(8) of the Rules, 1961 but ad hoc service cannot be counted. It has been submitted that since admittedly the petitioners were appointed on ad hoc basis, they cannot be treated at par with temporary or officiating government servants. It has thus been submitted that the respondents were justified in counting the qualifying service only from the date of regularisation and not from the date of initial ad hoc appointment.
Before we proceed to address the rival submissions, it would be appropriate to observe that on perusal of the pleadings of the parties, we find that the plea taken by the petitioners in the writ petition that they were appointed ad hoc on a substantive post in a permanent establishment of the Government has not been rebutted. It has also not been rebutted that the petitioners had continued in service uninterruptedly since their initial ad hoc appointment till attaining the age of superannuation and, in between, they were regularised under the Rules, 1979. Further, there is no plea of the respondents that the service rendered by the petitioners right from their initial ad hoc appointment till attainment of the age of superannuation was in any of the three excepted categories of service as referred to in the proviso to Rule 3(8) of the Rules, 1961.
The question that arises for our consideration in this petition is whether continuous service as an ad hoc appointee followed, without interruption, by regularisation, rendered on a substantive post in a permanent establishment can be counted towards qualifying service, as defined by Rule 3(8) of the Rules, 1961, for the purpose of computation of gratuity payable under the Rules, 1961. To answer the aforesaid question, two incidental questions arise for our consideration. The first would be as to what would be the true import of the words "service does not qualify unless the officer holds a substantive office in a permanent establishment" as used inArticle 368of the Civil Service Regulations; and the second would be whether the phrase "temporary or officiating service" as used in Rule 3(8) of the Rules, 1961, which is pari materia Article 370 of the Civil Service Regulations, would include service rendered as an ad hoc appointee.
Addressing the first question first, it would be apposite to notice the stand of the state-respondent. The contention of the learned standing counsel on behalf of state-respondents is that a conjoint reading of Articles 361 and 368 of the Civil Service Regulations along with Rule 3(8) of the Rules, 1961 would suggest that the appointment should be substantive, and not ad hoc, to enable counting of service rendered as such as part of qualifying service. The above submission of the learned standing counsel is unacceptable because it fails to notice that Article 368 of the Civil Service Regulations speaks of holder of a substantive office in a permanent establishment and not about substantive appointment of its holder. In service jurisprudence, an office is ordinarily understood as a position of duty, trust, or authority. Often the term office/ post/ vacancy, in service jurisprudence, is used interchangeably depending on the context in which it is used. Substantive appointment can only be on a substantive post/ vacancy /office after due selection by any of the methods of recruitment prescribed by the rules/ law. However, holder of a substantive office need not be substantively appointed inasmuch as in a given situation there may be an ad hoc or officiating or temporary arrangement/ appointment on a substantive post/ office. Accordingly, we are of the considered view that Article 368 of the Civil Service Regulations can not be understood as to have excluded consideration of service rendered by an ad hoc appointee on a substantive post /office in a permanent establishment. What it does is that it declares that the service rendered by the holder of an office would not qualify unless the service is in connection with a substantive office in a permanent establishment. The aforesaid position stands fortified when we read Article 368 along with Article 370 of the Civil Service Regulations, which is pari materia Rule 3(8) of the Rules, 1961.
In so far as Article 361 of the Civil Service Regulations is concerned it relates to eligibility for pension, of which there is no dispute here. Otherwise also, Rule 3(8) of the Rules, 1961, with which we are concerned, does not refer to it.
Now, the question that falls for our consideration is whether the phrase "temporary or officiating service" as used in Rule 3(8) of the Rules, 1961 would include service rendered as an ad hoc appointee.
Before we address the said question it would be apposite to examine the true import of the phrase "temporary or officiating service" as used in Rule 3(8) of Rules, 1961 and Article 370 of the Civil Service Regulations. In order to understand the true import of the aforesaid phrase it would be useful for us to first examine as to how the term "ad hoc", "temporary" and "officiating" have been understood by courts in the context of service jurisprudence.
In Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, 1958 SCR 828 : AIR 1958 SC 36 : (1958) 1 LLJ 544, a constitution bench comprising five-judges of the apex court had dealt with various types of appointment that could be made on a permanent post as also the nature of a substantive appointment, appointment on probation and officiating appointment. It was held/ observed as follows:
"The appointment of a government servant to a permanent post may be substantive or on probation or on an officiating basis. A substantive appointment to a permanent post in public service confers normally on the servant so appointed a substantive right to the post and he becomes entitled to hold a "lien" on the post. This "lien" is defined in Fundamental Rule Section 3, Chapter II Rule 9(13) as the title of a government servant to hold substantively a permanent post, including a tenure post, to which he has been appointed substantively. The Government cannot terminate his service unless it is entitled to do so (1) by virtue of a special term of the contract of employment, e.g., by giving the requisite notice provided by the contract, or (2) by the rules governing the conditions of his service, e.g., on attainment of the age of superannuation prescribed by the rules, or on the fulfilment of the conditions for compulsory retirement or, subject to certain safeguards, on the abolition of the post or on being found guilty, after a proper enquiry on notice to him, of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or any other disqualification. An appointment to a permanent post in government service on probation means, as in the case of a person appointed by a private employer, that the servant so appointed is taken on trial. The period of probation may in some cases be for a fixed period, e.g., for six months or for one year or it may be expressed simply as "on probation" without any specification of any period. Such an employment on probation, under the ordinary law of master and servant, comes to an end if during or at the end of the probation the servant so appointed on trial is found unsuitable and his service is terminated by a notice. An appointment to officiate in a permanent post is usually made when the incumbent substantively holding that post is on leave or when the permanent post is vacant and no substantive appointment has yet been made to that post. Such an officiating appointment comes to an end on the return of the incumbent substantively holding the post from leave in the former case or on a substantive appointment being made to that permanent post in the latter case or on the service of a notice of termination as agreed upon or as may be reasonable under the ordinary law. It is, therefore, quite clear that appointment to a permanent post in a government service, either on probation or on an officiating basis, is, from the very nature of such employment, itself of a transitory character and, in the absence of any special contract or specific rule regulating the conditions of the service, the implied term of such appointment, under the ordinary law of master and servant, is that it is terminable at any time. In short, in the case of an appointment to a permanent post in a government service on probation or on an officiating basis, the servant so appointed does not acquire any substantive right to the post and consequently cannot complain, any more than a private servant employed on probation or on an officiating basis can do, if his service is terminated at any time. Likewise an appointment to a temporary post in a government service may be substantive or on probation or on an officiating basis. Here also, in the absence of any special stipulation or any specific service rule, the servant so appointed acquires no right to the post and his service can be terminated at any time except in one case, namely, when the appointment to a temporary post is for a definite period. In such a case the servant so appointed acquires a right to his tenure for that period which cannot be put an end to unless there is a special contract entitling the employer to do so on giving the requisite notice or the person so appointed is, on enquiry held on due notice to the servant and after giving him a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, found guilty of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or any other disqualification and is by way of punishment dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank. The substantive appointment to a temporary post, under the rules, used to give the servant so appointed certain benefits regarding pay and leave, but was otherwise on the same footing as appointment to a temporary post on probation or on an officiating basis, that is to say, terminable by notice except where under the rules promulgated in 1949 to which reference will hereafter be made, his service had ripened into what is called a quasi-permanent service."
Another constitution bench of the apex court comprising five- judges in Rudra Kumar Sain v. Union of India, (2000) 8 SCC 25, had the occasion to examine the meaning of the terms "ad hoc", "stop-gap" and "fortuitous" used in service jurisprudence. It was held/ observed as follows:
"16. The three terms "ad hoc", "stopgap" and "fortuitous" are in frequent use in service jurisprudence. In the absence of definition of these terms in the Rules in question we have to look to the dictionary meaning of the words and the meaning commonly assigned to them in service matters. The meaning given to the expression "fortuitous" in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary is "accident or fortuitous casualty". This should obviously connote that if an appointment is made accidentally, because of a particular emergent situation and such appointment obviously would not continue for a fairly long period. But an appointment made either under Rule 16 or 17 of the Recruitment Rules, after due consultation with the High Court and the appointee possesses the prescribed qualification for such appointment provided in Rule 7 and continues as such for a fairly long period, then the same cannot be held to be "fortuitous". In Black's Law Dictionary, the expression "fortuitous" means "occurring by chance", "a fortuitous event may be highly unfortunate". It thus, indicates that it occurs only by chance or accident, which could not have been reasonably foreseen. The expression "ad hoc" in Black's Law Dictionary, means "something which is formed for a particular purpose". The expression "stopgap" as per Oxford Dictionary, means "a temporary way of dealing with a problem or satisfying a need".
17. In Oxford Dictionary, the word "ad hoc" means for a particular purpose; specially. In the same dictionary, the word "fortuitous" means happening by accident or chance rather than design.
18. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon (2nd Edn.) the word "ad hoc" is described as: "For particular purpose. Made, established, acting or concerned with a particular (sic) and or purpose." The meaning of word "fortuitous event" is given as "an event which happens by a cause which we cannot resist; one which is unforeseen and caused by superior force, which it is impossible to resist; a term synonymous with Act of God".
19. The meaning to be assigned to these terms while interpreting provisions of a service rule will depend on the provisions of that rule and the context in and the purpose for which the expressions are used. The meaning of any of these terms in the context of computation of inter se seniority of officers holding cadre post will depend on the facts and circumstances in which the appointment came to be made. For that purpose it will be necessary to look into the purpose for which the post was created and the nature of the appointment of the officer as stated in the appointment order. If the appointment order itself indicates that the post is created to meet a particular temporary contingency and for a period specified in the order, then the appointment to such a post can be aptly described as "ad hoc" or "stopgap". If a post is created to meet a situation which has suddenly arisen on account of happening of some event of a temporary nature then the appointment of such a post can aptly be described as "fortuitous" in nature. If an appointment is made to meet the contingency arising on account of delay in completing the process of regular recruitment to the post due to any reason and it is not possible to leave the post vacant till then, and to meet this contingency an appointment is made then it can appropriately be called as a "stopgap" arrangement and appointment in the post as "ad hoc" appointment. It is not possible to lay down any strait-jacket formula nor give an exhaustive list of circumstances and situation in which such an appointment (ad hoc, fortuitous or stopgap) can be made. As such, this discussion is not intended to enumerate the circumstances or situations in which appointments of officers can be said to come within the scope of any of these terms. It is only to indicate how the matter should be approached while dealing with the questions of inter se seniority of officers in the cadre.
20. In service jurisprudence, a person who possesses the requisite qualification for being appointed to a particular post and then he is appointed with the approval and consultation of the appropriate authority and continues in the post for a fairly long period, then such an appointment cannot be held to be "stopgap or fortuitous or purely ad hoc"..........".
In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's treatise Advanced Law Lexicon (4th Edition) the phrase "Ad Hoc Appointment" is described as temporary appointment made without selection of the candidate by any of the methods of recruitment provided under the relevant service rules or any orders of the Government where no service rules exist and otherwise than on the recommendations of the Commission if the post is in its purview. The treatise goes on to state that ad hoc appointment is made as a stop-gap arrangement to carry on the governmental work before the regular selection is made. "Officiating appointment" has been described in the aforesaid treatise as an appointment, not made substantively, which is temporary until further arrangements are made for filling the post permanently. "Officiating service" has been described therein as service rendered as a non-permanent holder.
Having taken notice of the constitution bench decisions of the apex court as well as the meaning of the terms "officiating" and "ad hoc" in the context of appointment, we find that there is a common thread in both types of appointment which is that both appointments are temporary made to serve a purpose. The discernible difference between the two is that in a case of officiating appointment, ordinarily, a post exists from before whereas in a case of ad hoc appointment it is not necessary that a post may exist from before because an ad hoc appointment may be made by way of an arrangement to serve a purpose/ exigency that may have arisen.
However, what remains to be examined is whether the phrase "continuous temporary or officiating service under the Government followed without interruption by confirmation", as used in Rule 3(8) of Rules, 1961, on a substantive post in a permanent establishment, as envisaged by Article 368 of the Civil Service Regulations, would include continuous service rendered by an ad hoc appointee on a substantive post in a permanent establishment, under the Government, followed without interruption by regularisation.
Before examining the said issue, it would be appropriate to observe that award of gratuity to retired government servant is a social welfare measure hence provisions relating to it come across as a social welfare legislation. It is well settled that liberal construction of a social welfare legislation is to be adopted to achieve the object of the legislation. The object of counting continuous temporary or officiating service of an employee, under the Government, followed without interruption by his confirmation, in computing qualifying service for availing/computing gratuity is to ensure that all such employees, who are rendering temporary or officiating service, are given benefit of their full length of service regardless of its nature. It is important to notice that neither Rule 3(8) of the Rules, 1961 norArticle 370 of the Civil Service Regulations use the phrase "temporary service" or "officiating service" rendered as a "temporary government servant" or "officiating government servant". The use of the word "temporary service" or "officiating service" is therefore suggestive of the legislative intent to include all kinds of temporary or officiating service, except those which are excepted, namely, (i) temporary or officiating service in non- pensionable establishment; (ii) periods of service in work charged establishment; and (iii) periods of service in a post paid from contingencies. In the aforesaid contextual background, could it be said that service rendered by an ad hoc appointee in a permanent establishment is in any way different from temporary service. The answer to it is an obvious no. The service rendered by an ad hoc appointee is by all means a temporary service until his regularisation. Therefore, the period of continuous temporary service rendered by him as an ad hoc appointee on a substantive post in a permanent establishment under the government followed without interruption by regularisation is eligible to be counted towards qualifying service as defined by the Rule 3(8) of the Rules, 1961. We, accordingly, hold that service rendered by an ad hoc government servant on a substantive post in a permanent establishment is nothing but temporary service of the nature contemplated by Rule 3(8) of the Rules, 1961 and would be countable towards qualifying service if it is continuous and is followed without interruption by regularisation/confirmation provided it is not in any one of the three excepted categories i.e. (i) temporary or officiating service in non- pensionable establishment; (ii) periods of service in work charged establishment; and (iii) periods of service in a post paid from contingencies."
In addition to above, the Hon'ble Apex Court, recently, in the judgment and order dated 02.09.2019 passed in the case of Prem Singh Vs. State of U.P. (Civil Appeal No. 6798 of 2019), considered the Rule 3(8) of U.P. Retirement Benefits Rules, 1961 and the Regulations 361, 368 and 370 of U.P. Civil Services Regulations, wherein the issue was related to counting of period of services rendered by the employee(s) in the work charged establishment prior to their regularization. The Hon'ble Apex Court after considering the relevant provisions held that the services rendered in the work charged establishment shall be treated as qualifying service. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment dated 02.09.2019 read down relevant provisions of U.P. Retirement Benefits Rules, 1961 as well as Civil Services Regulations.
The relevant portion of the judgment and order of the Hon'ble Apex Court dated 02.09.2019 reads as under:-
"32. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it was unfair on the part of the State Government and its officials to take work from the employees on the work-charged basis. They ought to have resorted to an appointment on regular basis. The taking of work on the work- charged basis for long amounts to adopting the exploitative device. Later on, though their services have been regularized. However, the period spent by them in the work-charged establishment has not been counted towards the qualifying service. Thus, they have not only been deprived of their due emoluments during the period they served on less salary in work charged establishment but have also been deprived of counting of the period for pensionary benefits as if no services had been rendered by them. The State has been benefitted by the services rendered by them in the heydays of their life on less salary in work- charged establishment.
33.. In view of the note appended to Rule 3(8) of the 1961 Rules, there is a provision to count service spent on work charged, contingencies or non pensionable service, in case, a person has rendered such service in a given between period of two temporary appointments in the pensionable establishment or has rendered such service in the interregnum two periods of temporary and permanent employment. The work-charged service can be counted as qualifying service for pension in the aforesaid exigencies.
34. The question arises whether the imposition of rider that such service to be counted has to be rendered in-between two spells of temporary or temporary and permanent service is legal and proper. We find that once regularization had been made on vacant posts, though the employee had not served prior to that on temporary basis, considering the nature of appointment, though it was not a regular appointment it was made on monthly salary and thereafter in the pay scale of work-charged establishment the efficiency bar was permitted to be crossed. It would be highly discriminatory and irrational because of the rider contained in Note to Rule 3(8) of 1961 Rules, not to count such service particularly, when it can be counted, in case such service is sandwiched between two temporary or in-between temporary and permanent services. There is no rhyme or reason not to count the service of work-charged period in case it has been rendered before regularisation. In our opinion, an impermissible classification has been made under Rule 3(8). It would be highly unjust, impermissible and irrational to deprive such employees benefit of the qualifying service. Service of work-charged period remains the same for all the employees, once it is to be counted for one class, it has to be counted for all to prevent discrimination. The classification cannot be done on the irrational basis and when respondents are themselves counting period spent in such service, it would be highly discriminatory not to count the service on the basis of flimsy classification. The rider put on that work-charged service should have preceded by temporary capacity is discriminatory and irrational and creates an impermissible classification.
35. As it would be unjust, illegal and impermissible to make aforesaid classification to make the Rule 3(8) valid and non discriminatory, we have to read down the provisions of Rule 3(8) and hold that services rendered even prior to regularisation in the capacity of work-charged employees, contingency paid fund employees or non- pensionable establishment shall also be counted towards the qualifying service even if such service is not preceded by temporary or regular appointment in a pensionable establishment.
36. In view of the note appended to Rule 3(8), which we have read down, the provision contained in Regulation 370 of the Civil Services Regulations has to be struck down as also the instructions contained in Para 669 of the Financial Handbook.
37. There are some of the employees who have not been regularized in spite of having rendered the services for 30-40 or more years whereas they have been superannuated. As they have worked in the work-charged establishment, not against any particular project, their services ought to have been regularized under the Government instructions and even as per the decision of this Court in Secretary,State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Uma Devi2006 (4) SCC 1. This Court in the said decision has laid down that in case services have been rendered for more than ten years without the cover of the Court's order, as one time measure, the services be regularized of such employees. In the facts of the case, those employees who have worked for ten years or more should have been regularized. It would not be proper to regulate them for consideration of regularisation as others have been regularised, we direct that their services be treated as a regular one. However, it is made clear that they shall not be entitled to claiming any dues of difference in wages had they been continued in service regularly before attaining the age of superannuation. They shall be entitled to receive the pension as if they have retired from the regular establishment and the services rendered by them right from the day they entered the work-charged establishment shall be counted as qualifying service for purpose of pension.
38. In view of reading down Rule 3(8) of the U.P. Retirement Benefits Rules, 1961, we hold that services rendered in the work-charged establishment shall be treated as qualifying service under the aforesaid rule for grant of pension. The arrears of pension shall be confined to three years only before the date of the order. Let the admissible benefits be paid accordingly within three months. Resultantly, the appeals filed by the employees are allowed and filed by the State are dismissed."
Taking into account the law propound by this Court as well as by the Hon'ble Apex Court, referred hereinabove, as also the decision of the State Government dated 04.08.1990, which provides for giving benefit of continuity of service and other service benefits, and the operative portion of the judgment and order passed by the Tribunal, quoted above, we are of the view that the service rendered by the respondent no.1 as ad-hoc and temporary employee, is liable to be counted for the purposes of post retiral dues and there is no illegality and infirmity in the impugned order.
For the foregoing reasons, we are not inclined to interfere in the judgment and order dated 11.05.2017 in Claim Petition No.1753 of 2012 (State of U.P. Vs. Avdhesh Kumar Singh) and also the judgment and order dated 20.04.2018 passed by the Tribunal in Review Petition No.107 of 2017 (State of U.P. & Others Vs. Avdhesh Kumar Singh).
Accordingly, the writ petition for it, is dismissed. No order as to costs.
Order Date:14.02.2020 Vinay/-