Madhya Pradesh High Court
Vishnoo Kumar Budhan And Ors. vs Liladhar Hari Ram Agarwal And Anr. on 2 November, 1993
Equivalent citations: 1994ACJ727, 1994(0)MPLJ511, 1995 A I H C 511, (1994) MPLJ 511, (1994) 2 TAC 563, (1994) 2 CIVLJ 669, (1994) 2 ACJ 727
Author: P.P. Naolekar
Bench: P.P. Naolekar
ORDER P.P. Naolekar, J.
1. This order shall also govern disposal of M.C.C. No. 4/93, Vinod Kumar v. Liladhar and Ors., M.C.C. No. 5/93, Smt. Gayatri Devi v. Liladhar and M.C.C. No. 6/93, Kapoor Chand v. Liladhar. The question involved in these petitions is of general public importance and is of every day occurrence, and therefore, I requested Shri Deepak Verma and Shri Ravindra Shrivastava, Advocates, to appear as Amicus Curiae. I must record my thanks for their able assistance to this Court at a short notice in spite of their pre-occupation and responsibilities. The question is whether the High Court has power and jurisdiction to transfer a case from Jabalpur Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to Bilaspur Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted by the State Government for a particular area by notification issued under Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, exercising powers under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Arguments of the Counsel were spread over on three aspects. Whether the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred as the Act'), with the rules framed thereunder, is a self-contained code and therefore, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has application only, so far as the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are expressly made applicable under the Act or the rules framed under Section 176 of the Act. Whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a Court subordinate to the High Court; whether the transferee Court can be said to be a Court competent to entertain an application for compensation in view of Section 166(2) of the Act.
2. Under Section 165 of the Act, Motor Accident Claims Tribunals are constituted by the State Government by issuance of the notification in the Official Gazette for the area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of third party so arising, or both. Section 166 provides procedure and locus in moving an application for compensation; sub-section (2) of Section 166 provides that every application shall be made to the claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred; Section 168 gives power to the tribunal to pass an award determining the amount of compensation; Section 169 gives the procedure and powers of the Claims Tribunal wherein the Claims Tribunal has been vested with the powers of the Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing attendance of witnesses and compelling the discovery and production of the documents. The Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 171 gives authority to the Tribunal to award simple interest over the amount of compensation and Section 172 is in respect of award of compensatory costs. Section 173 is a provision whereundcr an appeal against the award lies to the High Court. Section 174 is a provision whereunder an order can be passed by the Claims Tribunal for recovery of money from the insurer as arrears of land revenue. Section 175 bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for an area, in respect of any question relating to any claim for compensation. Section 176 authorises the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Sections 165 to 174 and the rules may provide for a form of application for claims for compensation, the procedure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal in holding an inquiry under Chapter XII. The powers vested in the Civil Court which may be exercised by the Claims Tribunal; the form and the manner in which and the fees if any on payment of which an appeal may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal; and any other matter which is to be, or may be prescribed.
3. The distinction between the concepts of a Court and a tribunal consists in that, though both are vested with and exercise, the "judicial power" of the State, a Court as an ordinary Civil Court of the land, exercises the "judicial power" to try all cases of a civil nature excepting those whose cognisance is either expressly or by implication barred, while the tribunal has and exercises "judicial power" in special matters statutorily conferred. The "judicial power" of the State is transferred to and exercised by ordinary Courts of the land. They are part of the ordinary hierarchy of Courts of Civil judicature but there is nothing to prevent the State from entrusting its "judicial power" in special matters and in special disputes to judicial Tribunals. The Tribunal and the Courts derive their powers from and, partake of, a common source - the "judicial power" of a sovereign State. The line of distinction between a Court and a Tribunal in some cases is indeed fine though real. All Courts arc Tribunals but the converse need not necessarily be true. Their procedures may differ, but their functions are not necessarily different. The mere lack of general jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature does not necessarily yield the inference that the tribunal is not a Court. A Court can also be constituted with a limited jurisdiction. Reliance is placed in Noreen v. L. Dasarath, AIR 1985 Karnataka 208. In Krishan Gopal v. Dattatraya, 1972 MPLJ 485 = AIR 1972 M. P. 125, Full Bench of this Court has held :-
"A statutory Tribunal, by whatever name is described, would be treated as a Court of judicature if it is called upon to discharge the judicial functions of the sovereign State, untrammelled by executive considerations and in reaching its conclusions it is required to follow the well recognised judicial principles. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunals constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, is a special Tribunal appointed to decide certain claims arising out of Motor accidents and satisfies the tests of a Court of judicature and is a Court".
Thus although the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, it is a Court of Civil judicature. The Code of Civil Procedure applies to the proceedings of all Courts of civil judicature except that it does not affect any special or local law or any special jurisdiction or power conferred or any special procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force. It is only if there is a conflict between Civil Procedure Code and special law, the latter should prevail, being special law. There is no conflict between the procedure of the tribunal prescribed in the Act and Civil Procedure Code. In the Motor Vehicles Act, or rules framed thereunder, there is no provision like Section 24, Civil Procedure Code whereunder powers are given to a Tribunal to transfer the case from one Court to another Court and therefore, Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code has any application for transfer of claim petition from one Accident Claims Tribunal to another Accident Claims Tribunal. The High Court has jurisdiction to transfer the case exercising powers under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code.
4. Relevant provision of Section 24, Civil Procedure Code reads as under:-
"24. (1) On the application of any of the parties and after notice to the parties and after hearing such of them as desired to be heard, or of its own motion without such notice, the High Court or the District Court may at any stage -
(a) transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before it for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same, or
(b) withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any Court subordinate to it, and
(i) try or dispose of the same, or
(ii) transfer the same for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same; or
(iii) re-transfer the same for trial or disposal to the Court from which it was withdrawn.
On an application moved by any parties, the High Court may at any stage transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before it for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try and dispose of the same. Sub-clause (a) of Section 24 applies to the matter pending in the High Court. Clause (b) of Section 24 is for withdrawing any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any Court subordinate to High Court for trial by the High Court itself or to be transferred for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same. The question is whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a Court subordinate to the High Court. In Amar Kaur and Anr. v. Kulbir Singh and Ors., AIR 1989 Jammu and Kashmir 7; Raju Das v. Sunil Kumar and Ors., AIR 1991 Gauhati 71; Kanniammal and Anr. v. P. Narayanan and Anr., AIR 1989 Madras 350 and Mrs. Noreen R. Srikantaiah v. L. Dasarath Ramaiah, Gulbarga and Anr., AIR 1985 Karnataka 208, it is held that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Section 24, Civil Procedure Code. In Bhagwati Devi v. I. S. Goel, 1983 ACC. C.J. 123, it is held as under :-
"In view of the observations of this Court in State of Haryana v. Dharshan Devi, 1979 A.C.J. 205 (SC), we are of the view that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the M.V. Act is a Civil Court for the purpose of Section 25 of the Civil Procedure Code. We are satisfied that the cases before us are fit cases for being transferred from the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Moradabad to the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Delhi................"
In Bhagwati Devi v. I. S. Goel, reported in 1983 ACC C.J. 123, the question arose in the context of the power of the Supreme Court under Section 25 to transfer suits and other proceedings, inter alia, from one Civil court in one State to another Civil Court in any other State. The pronouncement of the Supreme Court put the controversy at rest that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a Court subordinate to the High Court. If for the purposes of Section 25, Civil Procedure Code, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a Civil Court, it shall also be a Court for the purposes of Section 24, Civil Procedure Code as well.
5. By virtue of Section 166(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 the application for compensation is required to be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred. The State Government by notification establishes a Motor Accident. Claims Tribunal for an area specified in that notification. Can there be an order of transfer of a case from one Motor Accident Claims Tribunal having territorial jurisdiction over an area particularly, to another Motor Accident Claims Tribunal having territorial jurisdiction over a different area? Section 24, Civil Procedure Code authorises High Court to transfer any suit, appeal or other proceedings from one Court to another Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same. Now the question is whether Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur, is Court competent to try and dispose of an application for compensation filed in the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jabalpur.
6. Jurisdiction of the Court depends on 3 circumstances, viz., territorial, pecuniary and jurisdiction over the subject matter. The existence of jurisdiction is different than exercise of jurisdiction. The territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court can be said, to be exercise of jurisdiction, this is so, because of Section 21(1) and (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. An objection that court has no jurisdiction to try the suit because of the territorial incompetence of the Court or because of the value of the subject matter of the suit has to be raised in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, otherwise no objection is permissible subsequently, unless it is demonstrated that the exercise of the jurisdiction has resulted in failure of justice. The objection to the Court's jurisdiction, territorial or pecuniary, are both technical and does not amount to absence of inherent jurisdiction. There is no inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Court if the order is passed in absence of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. However, in the third category when the Court has no jurisdiction upon the subject matter then there is inherent lack of jurisdiction to decide the matter. The objection of absence of such jurisdiction can be raised at any stage. The competence of the Court to try the proceedings as mentioned under Section 24 therefore has necessarily, reference to "subject matter of dispute". When there is jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision of all other questions in the case are only exercise of that jurisdiction. Want of territorial jurisdiction is not one of those defects which renders the Court's decision a nullity. But when there is want of inherent jurisdiction, nothing can cure it, neither consent nor waiver nor estoppel. Want of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction is not fatal defect to a suit or proceeding, it is only an irregularity and is curable. In Hiralal Panti v. Shri Kali Nath, AIR 1962 SC 199, in paragraph 4, the Supreme Court has held :
"It is well settled that the objection as to the local jurisdiction of a Court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a Court to try a case. Competence of a Court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a Court can be waived and this principle has been given a statutory-recognition by enactments like Section 21 of Code of Civil Procedure."
7. The Supreme Court has quoted with approval what is meant by jurisdiction, as held in H. Nath Roy v. Ram Chandra Barna Sarma, AIR 1921 Calcutta 34. In Official Trustee, West Bengal and Ors. v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee and Anr., AIR 1969 SC 823 :-
"This jurisdiction of the Court may be qualified or restricted by a variety of circumstances. Thus, the jurisdiction may have to be considered with reference to place, value and nature of the subject matter. The power of a tribunal may be exercised within defined territorial limits. Its cognizance may be restricted to subject-matters of prescribed value. It may be competent to deal with controversies of a specified character, for instance, testamentary or matrimonial causes, acquisition of lands for public purposes, record of rights as between landlords and tenants. This Classification into territorial jurisdiction, pecuniary jurisdiction and jurisdiction of the subject-matter is obviously of a fundamental character. Given such jursidiction, we must be careful to distinguish exercise of jurisdiction from existence of jurisdiction; 'for fundamentally different are the consequences of o failure to comply with statutory requirements in the assumption and in the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all not the decision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction; and when there is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction."
In Mulraj Doshi v. Gangadhar Singhania, AIR 1982 Orissa 191, it has been held that the words 'competent to try' used in Section 24, Civil Procedure Code has a reference to the pecuniary jurisdiction and not the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. That is also the view taken in P. M. Unni v. M. J. Nadar, AIR 1973 Madras 2 (KB.) and Kishorilal v. Balkishan, AIR 1932 Allahabad 660, Suleman, C.J. while considering the words used in Section 24, Civil Procedure Code held that : "It is open for a High Court or a District Judge to transfer a case pending in a subordinate Court to another Court which has pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit, although it may not at the moment possess territorial jurisdiction to try it."
8. That the competence of the Court with reference to words used in Section 24 is with reference to the competence of the Court to try a case as to the subject matter of dispute and not the territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. Sub-section (2) of Section 166 of the Act requires that every application under sub-section (1) for compensation shall be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred. This sub-section speaks about the territorial jurisdiction of the Accident Claims Tribunal and not the subject matter to be tried by that Court. Every Claims Tribunal established under the Act has jurisdiction to entertain the claims for compensation in respect of an accident involving death or bodily injury to a person arising out of the use of the Motor Vehicle or damage to any property of a third party so arising, or both.
9. Having considered the legal aspects, 1 now consider the individual cases, on merits. Jeep MQL 2896 belonging to Leeladhar non-applicant No. 1 and registered with R.T.O., Bilaspur and insured with National Insurance Co. met with an accident on 12-5-1992 and the persons travelling in it have sustained injuries and some of them died near Jabalpur. Smt. Manju in M.C.C. 3/93 and Smt. Sudha in M.C.C. 6/93 have died. One Vinod in M.C.C. 4/93 and Smt. Gayatri Devi in M.C.C. 5/93 have sustained injuries. As a result of the accident, Vinod and Gayatri Devi were confined to the wheel chair, their movements are restricted on account of injury sustained by them. The persons who sustained injuries and their witnesses are residents of Janjgir which is near Bilaspur. The counsel appearing for the owner of the vehicle has expressly made a statement in this Court that he has no objection if the matter is transferred to the Bilaspur Claims Tribunal. The Insurance Company has also Branch Office at Bilaspur, as it is under the Motor Vehicles Act, they have very limited defence available.
10. The Bilaspur Court has no territorial jurisdiction to try proceedings arising out of accident occurred within an area assigned to the Claims Tribunal, Jabalpur but it has jurisdiction to try the subject matter, i.e. claim for compensation for an accident caused by a motor vehicle and, thus, it is a Court competent within the meaning of Section 24, Civil Procedure Code. The High Court can exercise its jurisdiction to transfer cases of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jabalpur to Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur.
11. Looking to all these circumstances it is most convenient for all the parties that the matter should be tried at Bilaspur, particularly so when Vinod and Gayatri Devi have sustained severe injuries and that their travel from Bilaspur to Jabalpur will be very painful task, physically and mentally. In the interest of justice and equity, I feel that the matter should be transferred from Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jabalpur to Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur and accordingly I direct that the Motor Accident Claim Case No. 147/92, Vishnu Kumar Budhan and Ors. v. Leeladhar and Anr., Motor Accident Claim Case No. 148/92, Vinod Kumar v. Leeladhar and Anr., Motor Accident Claim Case No. 149/92, Smt. Gayatri Devi v. Leeladhar and Anr. and Motor Accident Claim Case No. 150/92, Kapoor Chand and Ors. v. Leeladhar be transferred from Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jabalpur to Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur. The Presiding Judge of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jabalpur is directed to send the records immediately to the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Bilaspur. The parties shall appear before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur on 30th November, 1993 to participate in the proceedings. The Court at Bilaspur shall proceed further from the stage the petitions have reached in accordance with law. The Insurance Company shall pay cost of Rs. 300/- to the applicants in each case.