Allahabad High Court
Dhyan Singh And 12 Others vs State Of U.P. Thru Collector And Another on 8 May, 2026
Author: Saral Srivastava
Bench: Saral Srivastava
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC:106444-DB
Reserved On: 01.12.2025
Delivered On: 08.05.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - C No. - 27709 of 2013
Dhyan Singh And 12 Others
.....Petitioner(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. Thru Collector And Another
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
:
J.J. Munir, Pooja Agarwal, R P Rajan
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
Abhinava Krishna Srivastava, Arun K. Singh Deshwal, C.S.C., Dharmendra Singh Chauhan, P K Singh
Court No. - 40
HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.
HON'BLE SUDHANSHU CHAUHAN, J.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhanshu Chauhan,J.)
1. Heard Ms. Pooja Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioners and Shri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Additional Advocate General, assisted by Shri Mohan Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel and Shri Abhinav Krishna Srivastava, learned counsel for respondent Development Authority.
2. The present writ petition has been filed for a direction to declare the proceedings of Ceiling Case No. 260/948 under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act, 1976) as abated and also for a direction to mutate the name of the petitioners in the revenue records in respect of land being Khasra Plot No. 772 measuring 0.55 hectares from Khasra Plot No. 787 measuring 0.73 hectares and Khasra Plot No. 878 measuring 0.78 hectares situated in Village Sonakpur, Tehsil and District Moradabad (hereinafter referred to as the 'land in question').
3. The petitioners state that Natthu was the original land holder of the land in dispute. Natthu had filed a ceiling return under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation ) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act, 1976) registered as Ceiling Case No. 260/948. The petitioners are descendants of late Natthu who was succeeded by four sons, Dhyan Singh- petitioner no.1, Murari- petitioner no.2, Hari Singh- petitioner No.3 and Late Chandar. Further the petitioners no. 4 to 13 are the legal heirs and successors of late Chandar.
4. Further it is stated that the notice issued under Section 8(3) of the Act, 1976 dated 19.06.1977 was never served upon Natthu and consequently an ex parte order dated 09.08.1977 was passed under Section 8(4) of the Act, 1976. Subsequently a notice under Section 10 (5) of the Act, 1976 was issued on 17.12.1983 but was never served upon Natthu. It is further stated that Natthu passed away sometime in the year 1974 and as such the proceedings under the Act, 1976 were conducted against a dead persons.. The names of successors of Late Natthu continued to remain recorded in the revenue records up to the Fasli year 1407. It is also stated that the petitioners had never received any compensation under the Act, 1976.
5. Hence, it is submitted that the petitioners having continued to remain in possession of the land in question even on the date of enforcement of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (herein after referred to as the 'Repeal Act, 1999) are entitled to remain in possession of the land in question. It is only on 03.05.2013 when the Naib Tehsildar along with local police had tried to interfere with the possession of the petitioners that the petitioners had made inquiries and came to know about the proceedings under the Act.
6. In response thereto it is contended on behalf of Moradabad Development Authority that notice under Section 8(3) was issued on 29.06.1977 and as no objection was filed, subsequently order dated 09.08.1977 was passed under Section 8 (4) of the Act, 1976. The final statement dated 14.03.1978 under Section 9 was issued and served upon Nanhiya, wife of late Chandar- petitioner no.10 on 24.03.1978. Thereafter notifications under Section 10 (1) and 10 (3) were published in the State Gazette on 31.03.1979 and 15.12.1978 respectively. Notice under Section 10 (5) of the Act was issued on 17.12.1983. The Competent Authority issued Parwana Amaldaramad for mutation of revenue entries in the name of State. Ultimately possession memo was issued on 06.01.1984 and the possession of the land in dispute was taken by the State. The vacant surplus land was duly recorded in the revenue records and possession thereof was transferred to the Moradabad Development Authority in pursuance to the Government Order dated 04.06.1987, the transfer/ possession memo in this regard being issued on 18.01.1990. The land in dispute was being utilized under the residential scheme of the Moradabad Development Authority.
7. It is further stated that the remaining land of Khasra Plot No. 772 measuring 0.180 hectares, which was left out of Urban Ceiling was also acquired by the Moradabad Development Authority for the purposes of the residential scheme and the notification under Section 4(1) and Section 6 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were issued on 17.02.2010 and 04.04.2011 respectively. It is also stated that the petitioners in the past had filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 27609 of 2013 (Dhyan Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others) in respect of the land left out of the proceedings under the Act, 1976 and the same was dismissed by this Court vide the judgment dated 16.05.2013.
8. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the possession of the land in question was never taken by the respondents till the enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999 or thereafter and as such the petitioners continued to remain in possession of the land. The proceedings under the Act, 1976 had taken place against a dead person as Natthu had passed away in the year 1974 and the names some of the legal heirs were duly recorded in the revenue records. The fact that names of legal heirs of Natthu continued to remain recorded in the revenue records up to the Fasli year 1407 itself shows that the petitioners were in possession of the land in dispute after the enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999.
9. It is further stated that no notice under Section 8(3) or under Section 10 (5) of the Act, 1976 were ever served upon the petitioners and in fact the petitioners had no knowledge whatsoever about the proceedings under the Act, 1976. Further no proceedings under Section 10 (6) of the Act, 1976 had ever taken place. Besides the date of taking possession is also not mentioned in the Form ULC-3 prepared under the U.P. Urban Land Ceiling (Taking of Possession, Payment of Amount and Allied Matters) Directions, 1983.
10. On the other hand it is contended on behalf of the respondents that there is nothing on record to show that Natthu had passed away in the year 1974. Moreover admittedly Natthu had filed ceiling return in the year 1976 and as such he could not have passed away in the year 1974 as alleged. Further the perusal of the order dated 09.08.1977 passed under Section 8(4) shows that the notice under Section 8(3) was sent through registered post but remained undelivered. Consequently the notice under Section 8(3) was served personally on Natthu on 08.04.1977 by Jeevan Ram, Chainman and the aforesaid is duly recorded in the order dated 09.08.1977 and there is only a bald denial of the same. It is further stated that final statement under Section 9 was duly served on petitioner No. 10 on 24.03.1978, which is also not refuted by the petitioners. Fact of taking possession is also recorded in ULC Form 1/ ULC Register. Thus, it cannot be said that the petitioners or the original land holder had no knowledge regarding the proceedings under the Act, 1976.
11. It is also contended that in respect of Khasra Plot No. 772M, 425.35 Sq. Meter of land was declared as vacant under the Act, 1976 and the balance land of 0.180 sq meter was also acquired in proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in the year 2010-2011. The vacant land under the Act, 1976 is now under the residential scheme by the name of "Sonakpur Awasiya Yojna" and substantial investment to the tune of about Rs79.41 crores has been made towards residential scheme by the respondent authority.
12. Further it is vehemently contended that the present writ petition is liable to be rejected solely on the ground of delay having been filed after a lapse of more than 29 years from the date of taking of possession of the land in question in pursuance of possession memo dated 06.09.1984.
13. Thus, the petitioners claim to remain in possession of the land in dispute and have placed reliance on the revenue records on this regard and as such the showing is that they are entitled to the benefit of the Repeal Act, 1999. However, as per own contention of the petitioners the land in dispute continued to be recorded in the name of Natthu upto the Fasli year 1407 (corresponding year 2000) even in the revenue records so relied upon by the petitioner in respect of the Fasli year 1410 (corresponding year 2003) the land has been recorded in the name of the State. Thus, atmost it can be said that there has been some delay in recording the land in dispute in the name of the State in the revenue records in view of the fact that the Repeal Act, 1999 came into force in the State of U.P. on 18.03.1999. The petitioners have failed to produce revenue records subsequent to the Fasli Year 1407 wherein the land in dispute is recorded in the name of petitioners.
14. Be that as it may, the petitioners do not dispute the contention raised by the respondent authority that the petitioners had knowledge of the proceedings under the Act, 1976 at some stage or the other and had never objected to the same. Further the fact that the remaining land of the petitioner in Khasra No. 772 was subsequently acquired for the purpose of residential scheme further fortifies the claim of the respondents that the land in dispute was already in possession of the respondent authority. Further the respondent authority has stated that several writ petitions were filed before this Court in respect of ceiling proceedings initiated in respect of the land situated in Village Sonakpur, Tehsil and District Moradabad under similar circumstances but the same were dismissed by this Court. .
15. Thus, there is no reason to doubt the fact that the possession of the land in dispute was taken by the respondents prior to coming into force of the Repeal Act, 1999. Moreover, we cannot lose sight of the fact that present writ petition has been filed after a delay of about 29 years from the date of taking over of the possession of the land. Further even if assuming that there was some delay in mutating revenue entries in the name of State in the revenue records even then the petitioners waited for another 13 years to file the present writ petition, although the parties themselves have relied upon the revenue records in the writ petition thereby showing that the petitioners had knowledge of the same.
16. It has been the consistent view of the Apex Court and this Court that writ petitions challenging the proceedings under the Act, 1976 filed after an inordinate delay after taking of possession of the land in dispute should not be entertained on the ground of delay. Even if, assuming that there have been lapses on the part of the respondents in taking possession of the disputed land and the provisions of the Act, 1976 have been contravened in the process. The petitioners having failed to object to the proceedings under the Act,1976 within reasonable time would have waived their right to object to the same after long passage of time, in the present case the petitioners having approached this Court after a lapse of 29 years from the date of taking over the possession of the land in dispute.
17. It is pointed out here that the respondents have relied upon the case, State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma and others, 2015 (5) SCC 321. In that case, submission was raised by the State of Assam that physical possession had been taken over by the competent authority and it was submitted on behalf of the landowner that procedure prescribed under Section 10 (5) of the Act, 1976 was not followed. It was contended on behalf of land owner before taking possession under Section 10 (6) of the Act, 1976, the notification under Section 10 (5) was necessary; thus no possession can be said to have taken under Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999. The question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether actual physical possession was taken over by the competent authority. The State of Assam submitted that though possession was taken over in the year 1991, may be unilaterally and without notice to the land owner. It was urged that mere non-compliance with Section 10 (5) would be insufficient to attract the provisions of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999. The Apex Court while repelling the submission of the landowner had held as under:- "14 We say so because in the ordinary course actual physical possession can be taken from the person in occupation only after notice under Section 10(5) is issued to him to surrender such possession to the State Government, or the authorised officer or the competent authority. There is enough good sense in that procedure inasmuch as the need for using force to dispossess a person in possession should ordinarily arise only if the person concerned refuses to cooperate and surrender or deliver possession of the lands in question. That is the rationale behind Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act. But what would be the position if for any reason the competent authority or the Government or the authorised officer resorts to forcible dispossession of the erstwhile owner even without exploring the possibility of a voluntary surrender or delivery of such possession on demand? Could such use of force vitiate the dispossession itself or would it only amount to an irregularity that would give rise to a cause of action for the aggrieved owner or the person in possession to seek restoration only to be dispossessed again after issuing a notice to him? It is this aspect that has to an extent bothered us. 15. The High Court has held that the alleged dispossession was not preceded by any notice under Section 10(5) of the Act. Assuming that to be the case all that it would mean is that on 7-12-1991 when the erstwhile owner was dispossessed from the land in question, he could have made a grievance based on Section 10(5) and even sought restoration of possession to him no matter he would upon such restoration once again be liable to be evicted under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act upon his failure to deliver or surrender such possession. In reality therefore unless there was something that was inherently wrong so as to affect the very process of taking over such as the identity of the land or the boundaries thereof or any other circumstance of a similar nature going to the root of the matter hence requiring an adjudication, a person who had lost his land by reason of the same being declared surplus under Section 10(3) would not consider it worthwhile to agitate the violation of Section 10(5) for he can well understand that even when the Court may uphold his contention that the procedure ought to be followed as prescribed, it may still be not enough for him to retain the land for the authorities could the very next day dispossess him from the same by simply serving a notice under Section 10(5). It would, in that view, be an academic exercise for any owner or person in possession to find fault with his dispossession on the ground that no notice under Section 10(5) had been served upon him. 16. The issue can be viewed from another angle also. Assuming that a person in possession could make a grievance, no matter without much gain in the ultimate analysis, the question is whether such grievance could be made long after the alleged violation of Section 10(5). If actual physical possession was taken over from the erstwhile landowner on 7-12-1991 as is alleged in the present case any grievance based on Section 10(5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession. If the owner did not do so, forcible taking over of possession would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. In any such situation the owner or the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act. Any other view would, in our opinion, give a licence to a litigant to make a grievance not because he has suffered any real prejudice that needs to be redressed but only because the fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal Act tempted him to raise the issue regarding his dispossession being in violation of the prescribed procedure. 17 Reliance was placed by the respondents upon the decision of this Court in Hari Ram case. That decision does not, in our view, lend much assistance to the respondents. We say so, because this Court was in Hari Ram case considering whether the word "may" appearing in Section 10(5) gave to the competent authority the discretion to issue or not to issue a notice before taking physical possession of the land in question under Section 10(6). The question whether breach of Section 10(5) and possible dispossession without notice would vitiate the act of dispossession itself or render it non est in the eye of the law did not fall for consideration in that case. In our opinion, what Section 10(5) prescribes is an ordinary and logical course of action that ought to be followed before the authorities decided to use force to dispossess the occupant under Section 10(6). In the case at hand if the appellant's version regarding dispossession of the erstwhile owner in December 1991 is correct, the fact that such dispossession was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not vitiate or obliterate the act of taking possession for the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That is because Bhabadeb Sarma, erstwhile owner, had not made any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at any stage during his lifetime implying thereby that he had waived his right to do so."
18. The aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma and others has also been relied upon by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Shiv Ram Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2015 SCC Online All 8853 wherein this Court while dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches had held as under:- "10. We must also advert to another aspect of the matter particularly. having regard to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra). The petitioner moved the first writ petition in 2002 nearly three years after the Repeal Act had come into force. After the earlier writ petition was disposed of by directing the District Magistrate to pass an order on the representation of the petitioner, an order was passed by the District Magistrate on 10 May 2007. The petitioner thereafter waited for a period of over two years until the present writ petition was filed in July, 2009. If the petitioner had been dispossessed of the land without due notice under section 10(5), such a grievance could have been raised at the relevant time. As a matter of fact, it has been the case of the State all along that a notice under section 10(5) was, in fact, issued in the present case which would be borne out from the original file which has been produced before the Court. The issue is whether such a grievance could be made long after, before the Court. The petitioner had waited for nearly three years after the Repeal Act came into force to file the first writ petition and thereafter for a period of over two years after the disposal of the representation despite the finding of the District Magistrate that possession was taken over on 25 June, 1993. In our view, such a belated challenge should not, in any event, be entertained. However, we would hasten to add that this is quite apart from the fact that we have, independent of this finding, held that possession was in fact taken over prior to 18 March, 1999 consequent upon which the petitioner would not be entitled to the benefit of the Repeal Act."
19. It is also pertinent to mention here that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma and others came up for consideration of a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal, (2020) 8 SCC 129, although the question involved in the said case pertained to interpretation of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency and Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, the Apex Court while considering paras 15 to 17 of the judgment in the case of State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma and others (supra) had held as under:- " This Court held that provisions of the Repeal Act could not be extended in such a case where possession has been taken without following the procedure, and the landowner cannot retain the land. This Court also observed that once possession has been taken over in the year 1991, any grievance as to non-compliance of Section 10 (5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession. By sheer lapse of time, the possession would acquire legitimacy. Thus, the owner or the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10 (5) of the Act. This Court also observed that only because of the fortuitous circumstances of a Repeal Act, which confers regarding his dispossession, being in violation of the prescribed procedure. It is clear from the aforesaid decision that such claim cannot be entertained, and any such dispute raised belatedly was repelled by this Court.".
20. In this regard, the Apex Court in the case of Kapilaben Ambalal Patel and others v. State of Gujarat and others, 2021 (12) SCC 95 where the writ petition had been filed after a lapse of 14 years from taking of possession of the land from the land holders. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while upholding the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court, inter alia dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay had held as under:- "17. The Division Bench, in our opinion, therefore, was right in concluding that the writ petition filed by the appellants after lapse of 14 year was hopelessly barred by delay and suffered form laches. We are in agreement with the said view taken by the High Court in the peculiar facts of the present case. 18. Strikingly, in this appeal by special leave, a vague ground has been raised to challenge the said conclusion of the Division Bench. Further, no substantial question of law has been formulated in the appeal by special leave in that regard. Furthermore, in the grounds all that is asserted is that the High Court erred in holding that there was delay of 14 years in filing of writ petition and in not appreciating that the notice under Section 10 (5) of the 1976 Act, dated 23.1.1986, was not served upon Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel as he had already expired on 31.12.1985 and the notice sent to him was returned back on 2.2.1986 unserved with remark "said owner has expired". Further, the legal heirs of Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel ought to have been served with the said notice. From the factual matrix already stated hitherto, these grounds, in our opinion, are of no avail to the appellants. It is manifest from the acknowledgement produced by the respondent-State that the first notice under Section 10(5) issued to Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel was duly served on 26.12.1985. By the time second notice under Section 10(5) was issued on 23.1.1986, Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel had died (on 31.12.1985). The second notice was also issued to others, namely Bhikhabhai Manganbhai Patel, Natvarbhai Bhailabhai Patel and Jayantibhai Babarbhai Patel. Be that as it may, we are not inclined to reverse the conclusion recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court that the writ petition filed by the appellants was hopelessly delayed and suffered from laches. That is possible view in the facts of the present case. 19. The respondents had additionally relied on the decision of this Court in Larsen & Turbo Ltd (supra), wherein the Court adverted to the exposition in Balwant Narayan Bhagde vs. M.D. Bhagwat & Ors, Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust vs. State of Punjab and Tamil Nadu Housing Board vs. A. Viswam (Dead) by Lrs. Regarding the settled legal position that it is difficult to take physical possession of the land under compulsory acquisition. Further, that the normal mode of taking possession is drafting the Panchnama in the presence of Panchas and taking possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries is accepted mode of taking possession of the land. Subsequent thereto, the retention of possession would tantamount only to illegal or unlawful possession. Reliance is also placed on paragraphs 14 to 16 of the Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra). However, it is not necessary for us to dilate on these aspects having agreed with the conclusion recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court that the writ petition filed in the year 2001 by the appellants with limited relief of questioning the Possession Panchnama dated 20.3. 1986, suffered from laches. The Division Bench of the High Court noted that the learned single Judge completely glossed over this crucial aspect of the matter, and we find no reason to depart from that conclusion ."
21. It is further pointed out that as far as the question of delay in filing of writ petition is concerned, the Apex Court in the case of Marinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and others, (2024) 15 SCC 215, which case although does not relate to proceedings under the Act, 1976 had held as under :- "9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is involved, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action of resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and laches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court?..."
22. It is also pertinent to mention here that a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Writ C No. 38977 of 2022 (Mithai Lal and others v. State of U.P and others), where the relief of abatement of proceedings under the Act, 1976 and correction of revenue records was sought on the ground that the petitioners were in possession of land in question and no proceedings under Section 10 (6) of the Act, 1976 had been initiated this Court had went on to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of delay vide judgment and order dated 16.02.2023 where in it was held as under:- "19. For the reasons aforestated and also in view of the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma (supra), Kapilaben Ambalal Patel (supra) and a coordinate Bench decision of this Court in the case of Shiv Ram Singh (supra), we do not find any merit in the writ petition. This writ petition is also highly time barred and no reason for the inordinate delay has been given in the writ petition. 20. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed. "
23. A similar view was also taken this Court in Writ C No. 32784 of 2023 (Ram Raj and others v. State of U.P. and others) decided on 31.10.2023 where the writ petition was filed after a lapse of about 42 years from the date the land was declared surplus and the Court went on to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of delay and in Writ C No. 29968 of 2018 (Ganga Singh v. State of U.P. and others) decided on 05.09.2018 where writ petition was filed almost after 33 years of taking over of the possession and was dismissed on the ground of delay.
24. Besides the respondents have relied upon judgments of Coordinate Benches of this Court, where the land in question was similarly situated in District Moradabad and possession thereof was transferred by the State to Moradabad Development Authority after culmination of proceedings under the Act, 1976. In Writ C No. 1106 of 2010 (Kailash and Another v. State of U.P. and others) decided on 01.06.2012 where too the land in question was situated in Village Sonakpur, this Court had held as under:- "Thus from the above legal position settled by the Supreme Court in the two cases, referred to hereinabove, and of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Chandra Pandey (Supra) in the facts of the present case, there is absolutely no doubt that possession had been duly and formally taken from the land holder/tenure holder Tej Ram in the presence of witnesses in the format as required by Form ULC-I and ULC-III and merely because Form ULC-I and ULC-III had not been mentioned or specific reference made thereto would not deflect from the unshakeable inference that possession has been taken nor would it imply that the petitioners could, therefore, be said to be continuing in possession over the plots in question. Moreover, as we have already noted above, after possession was taken from Tej Ram proceedings for mutation of the name and removing out the name of Tej Ram had also been taken up with the Tehsildar, Moradabad and the name of Tej Ram had been removed from the plots in question. The petitioners as well as Shri Om Prakash sons of Tej Ram as well as Shri Tara son of Chiranji (son of Tej Ram) had sold their shares of the land in question of plot no. 701 to MDA through sale deeds. In the Chauhaddi of one of the sale deeds of the present petitioners, the land in the north is clearly shown as ceiling land. Thus even when the sale deed was executed by the two petitioners in favour of MDA on 7.10.2009 it was quite well known to them that a part of the land of plot no. 701 had been declared surplus under ceiling proceedings and, therefore, the petitioners cannot now at this stage claim to be in possession over the plots which have already been taken possession of by the State Government under ceiling proceedings merely on the basis of some entry in the Fasli 1417 corresponding to the year 2010. In view of our findings on the question of fact recorded on the basis of the original documents produced by the respondents before us and documents on record and the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court, we cannot bring ourselves to hold that the petitioners are still in possession over the land in question or that they are therefore, entitled to the benefit of section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999. Having considered the matter in all its ramifications we find no merit in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. "
25. Subsequently the Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 23221 of 2012 (Kailash and another v. State of U.P. and others) arising out of judgment and order dated 01.06.2012 was also dismissed on 24.02.2014.
26. Similarly in the case of Babu and others v. State of U.P. and another, 2017 (2) AWC 1711, where too the possession of the land was transferred to Moradabad Development Authority by the State after the culmination of the proceedings under the Act, 1976 and the remaining land left out of ceiling in the plot in question was acquired by the Development Authority, this Court had held as under:- "We further find that plot No. 799 is situate in the midst of the Housing Scheme which was to be developed by the Moradabad Development Authority. We see no reason as to why the Development Authority will propose acquisition of small portion of plot No. 799 when the entire plot falls within the scheme unless of course the possession or parts of use plots was available to the Development Authority. We draw support from the Full Bench Judgment of this Court of Shiv Ram Singh Vs. State of U.P. And others reported in 2015 (5) AWC 4918 which in turn relies upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Assam Vs. Bhasker Jyoti Sarma and others reported in 2015 (5) SCC 321 wherein the judgment in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Hariram reported in [2013 (4) ESC 249 (SC)] has been considered and explained. In the totality of the circumstances, on record we are more than satisfied that the documents on record do reflect that the possession of the surplus land which had been taken by the State Government much prior to the enforcement of Repeal Act, 1999. Therefore, the relief as prayed in the present writ petitions are denied. We may record that the development was initiated over the plot in question and an scheme was announced on 24th January, 2013. It is only thereafter that the petitioner has chosen to approach this Court."
27. Further in similar circumstances Coordinate Benches of this Court in Writ C No. 20035 of 2013 (Polu and 2 others v. State of U.P and another) decided on 03.11.2016 and Writ C No. 20578 of 2013 ( Naresh and another v. State of U.P. and another) decided on 17.11.2016 had dismissed the writ petition, where too possession of vacant surplus land was transferred to Moradabad Development Authority and it was alleged that the petitioner had continued to remain in possession of the land.
28. Thus, in view of the finding that the possession of the land in dispute had been transferred to the State prior to enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999and further the present writ petition having been filed after a long delay of 29 years after taking over of the possession of the land in dispute, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the grounds detailed above.
29. Hence, the present writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.
(Sudhanshu Chauhan,J.) (Saral Srivastava,J.) May 8, 2026 Nadeem