Kerala High Court
Mr.Hiran Venugopalan vs Mrs.Indira Jyothi Prasad
Author: Alexander Thomas
Bench: Alexander Thomas
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALEXANDER THOMAS
FRIDAY, THE 4TH DAY OF AUGUST 2017/13TH SRAVANA, 1939
Crl.MC.No. 6594 of 2015
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C.C.NO. 339/2014 OF JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS MAGISTRATE COURT(MOBILE),
ERNAKULAM
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PETITIONER(S)/3RD ACCUSED :
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MR.HIRAN VENUGOPALAN,
S/O.VENUGOPALAN, FLAT NO.602, NATIONAL BUILDERS,
REGENT COURT, THAMMANAM, COCHIN - 682 025.
BY ADVS. SRI.AMEER.K.M.
SMT.D.SMITHA
RESPONDENT(S)/COMPLAINANT & ACCUSED 1,2 & 4 :
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1. MRS.INDIRA JYOTHI PRASAD,
W/O.JYOTHI PRASAD, 41/81-A, JYOTHI,
MULLASERY CANAL ROAD ERNAKULAM, COCHIN -682 011.
2. M/S.THE SALTMANGOTREE CREATIVE MARKETING
COMMUNICATIONS PVT.LTD, FUNCTIONING AT 2ND FLOOR,
KANNANKERY ESTATE, SHANMUGHAM ROAD, ERNAKULAM,
COCHIN-682 031, REPRESENTED BY DIRECTOR
MR.ANDRINE MENDEZ.
3. MR. ANDRINE MENDEZ, S/O.ANTONY MENDEZ,
DIRECTOR & AUTHORISED SIGNATORY,
M/S.THE SALTMANGOTREE CREATIVE MARKETING
COMMUNICATIONS PVT.LTD, 4/843, SHINE VILLA,
VALIYAPARAMBIL, EDAPPALLY P.O.
4. MR. SUNIL RAJ S.,
S/O.SUKUMARAN, SWATHI HOUSE NO.78, CHANDRATHIL LANE,
CHANDRATHIL ROAD, EDAPPALLY, COCHIN -682 024.
5. STATE OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM, KOCHI -682 031.
..2/-
..2..
Crl.MC.No. 6594 of 2015
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* ADDITIONAL R6 IMPLEADED
6. THE REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES,
KERALA.
* IS IMPLEADED SUO MOTU AS ADDITIONAL R6 AS PER ORDER
DATED 06.02.2017 IN CRL.M.A.NO. 9823 OF 2015.
R1 BY ADVS. SRI.P.B.ASOKAN
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (ADUKKATH)
SRI.P.B.AJOY
SRI.K.G.RAJEESH
SMT.M.K.SAMYUKTHA
R4 BY ADVS. SRI.A.JAYASANKAR
SRI.C.V.MANUVILSAN
SRI.MANU GOVIND
SMT.A.ANJANA
R5 BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI. SAIGI JACOB PALATTY
ADDL.R6 BY ADV. SRI.N.NAGARESH, ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL
THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON 04-08-2017, ALONG WITH Crl.MC.No. 5373 OF 2017, THE COURT
ON THE SAME DAY PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
Msd.
Crl.MC.No. 6594 of 2015
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APPENDIX
PETITIONER(S)' ANNEXURES :
ANNEXURE A1 TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT FILED BY
THE 1ST RESPONDENT DATED 26.03.2014.
ANNEXURE A2 TRUE COPY OF EXTRACT SHOWING THE LIST OF
DIRECTORS OF THE 1ST RESPONDENT COMPANY TAKEN
FOR THE WEB PORTAL OF THE MINISTRY OF CORPORATE
AFFAIRS, GOVT. OF INDIA.
RESPONDENT(S)' ANNEXURES :
ANNEXURE R6(A): TRUE COPY OF THE ANNUAL RETURN.
ANNEXURE R6(B): TRUE COPY OF THE BALANCE SHEET AS ON 31.03.2013.
ANNEXURE R6(C): TRUE COPY OF THE SIGNATORY INFORMATION
//TRUE COPY//
P.A.TO JUDGE
Msd.
ALEXANDER THOMAS, J.
==================
Crl.M.C.Nos.6594/2015 & 5373/2017
==================
Dated this the 4th day of August, 2017
O R D E R
The petitioner in Crl.M.C.No.6594/2015 is accused No.3 for offence punishable under Sec.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in C.C.No.339/2014 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court (Mobile), Ernakulam, instituted on the basis of a complaint filed by the 1st respondent herein. Whereas the petitioner in Crl.M.C.No.5373/2017 is accused No.4 for the same offence in the abovesaid complaint. Both the petitioners would seek quashment of the impugned complaint, which led to the institution of C.C.No.339/2014 on the file of the abovesaid trial court. In both the Crl.M.Cs, Anx.A-I is the copy of the impugned complaint.
2. Heard Sri.K.M.Ameer, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Crl.M.C.No.6594/2015, Sri.P.B.Ajoy, learned counsel appearing for R-1 (complainant), who appears for R-2 in Crl.M.C.No.5373/2017. Though notice has been duly served on R-2 and R-3 in Crl.M.C.No.6594/2015 (who are accused 1 and 2), both parties have not entered appearance. Heard Sri.A.Jayasankar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Crl.M.C.No. 5373/2017 and Sri.P.B.Ajoy, Crl.M.C.6594/15 & C.C - : 2 :-
learned counsel appearing for R-2 (complainant) in that petition. Sri.Saigi Jacob Palatty, learned Prosecutor has appeared for the respondent State in both these petitions. Sri.N.Nagaresh, learned Assistant Solicitor General, who appeared on behalf of additional R-6 (ROC, Kerala) in Crl.M.C.No. 6594/2015 has also been heard.
3. The basic case set up in the impugned Anx.A-1 complaint is that the cheque issued in favour of the complainant dated 15.1.2014 for Rs.1,75,000/- has been dishonoured as per memo dated 17.1.2014. It is stated that the said cheque has been drawn from the account maintained by accused No.1 company and that accused No.2 is the signatory of the said cheque. It is further stated that accused Nos.2, 3 and 4 are Directors of the 1st accused company and from 24.9.2013, they are conducting the business of the firm and conducting the day to day affairs of the 1st accused firm. The petitioners in these Crl.M.Cs. would contend that they have never been appointed as Directors of the abovesaid company either before 24.9.2013 or thereafter, and that the allegation in the complaint that they were Directors of the 1st accused company, who were conducting the business of the firm and conducting its day to day affairs, is totally incorrect and wrong and that there were no materials whatsoever before the learned Magistrate to proceed against these two petitioners (A-3 and A-4) on the premise that they were Directors who were in charge of and responsible for the affairs of the company as Crl.M.C.6594/15 & C.C - : 3 :-
envisaged in Sec.141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It is urged that the very action of the learned Magistrate in taking cognizance against the petitioners is illegal and improper and further that the complaint is liable to be quashed in the light of the legal principles laid down by this Court in various decisions.
4. It is the case of the complainant that A-3 and A-4 have been arrayed as accused on account of their vicarious liability in the commission of the offence of dishonour of cheque by the accused drawer company, as envisaged in Sec.141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Sec. 141 of the abovesaid Act reads as follows:
"Sec.141: Offences by companies.-- (1) If the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.
Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.] (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Crl.M.C.6594/15 & C.C - : 4 :-
Explanation.-- For the purposes of this section,--
(a) "company" means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
(b) "director", in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm."
5. It is by now well established in terms of Sec.141 of the Act, that where the dishonoured cheque in question has been issued from an account maintained by a company, then the drawer of the said cheque is the company and therefore the principal offender in such cases is the company and the complaint can be maintained only if the principal offender (drawer company) is arrayed as an accused. Further it has also been now well established that the other Directors and officials of the company/partnership firm, as the case may be, who were in charge of and responsible for the affairs of the business of the company at the time of the commission of the offence, could also be arrayed as co-accused by roping in the concept of vicarious liability as envisaged in Sec.141 of the N.I. Act. In order to rope in such co-accused Directors/employees for vicarious liability, there must be clear averment that such persons were in charge of and responsible for the affairs and conduct of the business of the company at the time of the commission of the offence. This Court in the decision in Kairali Marketing and Processing Co-op. Society Ltd. v. Pullengadi Service Co-op. Society Ltd. reported in 2007 (1) KLT 287, has held that the offence under Sec.138 of the N.I.Act must be held to be committed on the day when the bank on which the cheque is drawn, Crl.M.C.6594/15 & C.C - : 5 :-
returns the cheque unpaid for the reasons referred to in Sec.138 and that is the specific date and time of commission of offence and the person, who has signed the cheque as the Secretary, who was admittedly not the Secretary of the accused Co-operative Society concerned as on the day of the dishonour of cheque cannot be held to be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of its affairs on the date when the offence was committed and that the signatory/the then Secretary of the accused Co-operative Society, cannot be prosecuted. Later, the 3-Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court in the celebrated case in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. reported in (2014) 9 SCC 129, has placed reliance on the abovesaid decision in Kairali Marketing and Processing Co-op. Society Ltd. v. Pullengadi Service Co-op. Society Ltd. reported in 2007 (1) KLT 287, as can be seen from paras 57 and 58 of the abovesaid decision of the Apex Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case supra. In Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case supra the Apex Court has categorically held that the offence under Sec.138 of the N.I. Act is committed at the time of the dishonour of the cheque by the drawer bank. This Court in the decision in Achankunju.P.C. v. House of Tiles reported in 2017 (3) KLT 44 = 2017 (3) KHC 440, after placing reliance on the abovesaid decision in Kairali Marketing and Processing Co-op. Society Ltd.'s case supra as well as the decision of the Apex Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case supra has held that the Directors/employees of the company, who are Crl.M.C.6594/15 & C.C - : 6 :-
sought to be arrayed as co-accused on the basis of vicarious liability, can be so arrayed only if such persons were in charge of the affairs of the conduct of the business of the company at the time the offence was committed and that the said co-accused directors or the employees of the company should have been Directors, who were in charge of and responsible for the affairs of the company at the time crucial time of the dishonour of the cheque. In the decision in Achankunju's case supra it was found, based on the affidavit filed by the Registrar of Companies, that the petitioner therein had demitted the office as Director of the company well before the date of dishonour of the cheque and, therefore, this Court had held that the said co-accused cannot be made liable for vicarious liability under Sec.141 of the N.I. Act and this Court had quashed the complaint to the extent the said party was arrayed as co-accused therein. In the present case, the dishonour of the cheque is stated to be on 17.1.2014.
6. Earlier, based on the application filed by the petitioner, the Registrar of Companies, Kerala, who is the statutory functionary appointed by the Central Government under the Companies Act, 1956, was impleaded as additional respondent No.6 in Crl.M.C.No.6594/2015. The Registrar of Companies has filed an affidavit dated 1.3.2017 before this Court stating that, after verification of the records of the 1st accused company, it is revealed that the said company has filed statutory returns only upto the year 2013 and the last balance sheet filed by the company Crl.M.C.6594/15 & C.C - : 7 :-
for the financial year that ended on 31.3.2013 and the last annual return filed by the company as on the date of the annual general meeting of the financial year that ended on 31.3.2013. The date of the annual general meeting for the financial year ended on 31.3.2013, was 30.9.2013 and subsequent to this, the company has not filed any balance sheet and annual returns for which, show cause notice has been issued by the Registrar of Companies, Kerala, on 23.2.2017, it is averred. It is further stated in the said affidavit of the ROC that the 1st accused company was incorporated on 14.9.2011 and promoters of the company were Sri.Andrine Mendez (Accused No.2) and one Sri.Arun Jyothi Prasad. It is common ground that the said Sri.Arun Jyothi Prasad is the son of the complainant. That the abovesaid persons were appointed as the first Directors of the company and that F32 documents have also been filed in pursuance of Sec. 303(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 and subsequent to the said F32, the company has not intimated any changes in the Board of Directors to the ROC, Kerala. It is further stated that the particulars of the Directors of the company as on 30.9.2013 have been furnished in the annual returns, which were filed as per Ext.R-6(a), which show that the abovesaid first Directors are continuing as the Directors of the company as on 30.9.2013. A perusal of internal page 3 of Anx.R-6(a) would show that both Sri.Andrine Mendez (accused No.2) and Sri.Arun Jyothi Prasad (son of the complainant) have signed the annual return Crl.M.C.6594/15 & C.C - : 8 :-
concerned on 30.9.2013. Anx.R-6(b) produced along with the abovesaid affidavit of the ROC is the balance sheet as on 31.3.2013, in which both Sri.Andrine Mendez (accused No.1) and Sri.Arun Jyothi Prasad (son of the complainant) have signed that document on 1.9.2013. Further it is stated in the affidavit of the ROC that the names of the petitioner in Crl.M.C.No.6594/2015 (accused No.3) and that of the complainant are shown as creditors in Anx.R-6(b).
7. The signatory information as available in the website system of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has been produced as Anx.R-6(c) in the said affidavit, etc. Whereas the case set up in the impugned Anx.A-1 complaint is to the effect that accused Nos.2, 3 and 4 are Directors of the 1st accused company from 24.9.2013 and that they were conducting the business of the firm, etc. and that the son of the complainant, Sri.Arun Jyothi Prasad, was a Director of the 1st accused company till 23.9.2013, etc.
8. As mentioned herein above, the ROC, Kerala is the statutory functionary appointed by the Central Government in terms of the provisions contained in the Companies Act and the materials available with such statutory functionary have to be treated as one of unimpeachable and sterling quality, unless proved otherwise. The said details contained in the affidavit of the ROC would show that accused No.2 and the son of the complainant, were the only two Directors of the Crl.M.C.6594/15 & C.C - : 9 :-
company as on 30.9.2013 and Anx.R-6(b) are singed by both these Directors including the abovesaid son of the complainant. Therefore, those materials would show that the averment in para 3 of the complaint that the son of the complainant was a director of the 1st accused firm till 23.9.2013, prima facie may not be correct, inasmuch as Anx.R-6(a) would clearly show that the son of the complainant has been shown as one among the only two Directors of the company at least as on 30.9.2013. Those materials with the ROC do not in any manner show that on 24.9.2013 or thereafter, the petitioners herein (accused Nos.3 and 4) have been the Directors of the said company, etc.
9. It is also clearly stated in para 5 of the affidavit of the ROC that there is nothing in the records of the office of the said statutory functionary to show that Sri.Hiran Venugopal, (petitioner in Crl.M.C. No.6594/2015/accused No.3) and Sri.Sunilraj (petitioner in Crl.M.C.No. 5373/2017/ accused No.4) have functioned as Directors of accused No.1 company.
10. Therefore, the abovesaid materials and the information furnished by the ROC would clearly show that the case set up by the complainant that accused Nos.3 and 4 were Directors of the company, who were in charge of and responsible for the affairs of the company, etc. appears to be clouded with suspicion. At least this Court can certainly take the view that the learned Magistrate did not have sufficient Crl.M.C.6594/15 & C.C - : 10 :-
and proper materials for coming to a considered conclusion as to whether or not, cognizance could have been taken so as to issue summons as against these petitioners.
11. Sri.P.B.Ajoy, learned counsel appearing appearing for respondent complainant would submit that internal page 6 of Anx.R-6(a) would show that the digital signature of the abovesaid two Directors of the company were appended on 1.9.2013 and that Anx.R-6(a) could not contradict the case of the complainant that her son had functioned as Director of the company only till 23.9.2013. This is rebutted by the learned Advocates appearing for both the petitioners by stating that the said entry on internal page 6 of Anx.R-6(a) only states to the following effect: "I have been authorized by the Board of directors' resolution number (NIL) dated 01.09.2013 to sign and submit this form" and that it only shows that the resolution taken by the Board authorising two officers to sign Anx.R-6(a) was taken on 1.9.2013 and that, that will not in any manner show that signatures were appended by the two directors on Anx.R-6(a) on 1.9.2013, and that whereas internal page 6 of Anx.R-6(a) would show that those two directors have signed that document on 30.9.2013. In the nature of the orders proposed to be passed in this petition, this Court need not adjudicate on any of these aspects for those are matters best left to be decided by the trial court during the remit that is proposed in this order.
Crl.M.C.6594/15 & C.C - : 11 :-
12. While considering the scope and ambit of the inquiry contemplated in Sec.202 of the Cr.P.C., this Court has held in the decisions as in H.D.F.C. v. Jaleel, reported in 2008 (3) KLT 869 and Usha Sanghi v. George Jacob, reported in 2008(4) KLT 649, that in cases where the Directors of the company have been arrayed as co-accused on account of vicarious liability envisaged in Sec.141 of the N.I. Act, it would be most appropriate and relevant for the Magistrate to conduct Sec.202 inquiry apart from Sec.200 Cr.P.C. preliminary inquiry, in order to equip the learned Magistrate with proper materials to decide as to whether or not the matter should be proceeded with, by issuing summons to such co-accused persons, etc.
13. The affidavit of the ROC would show that accused No.1 company has failed to furnish the statutory returns after the financial year ended on 31.3.2013 and the materials available with the ROC are only with reference to the financial year that ended on 31.3.2013 and not thereafter. Therefore, based on the materials provided by the ROC, one cannot conclude with any certainty as to whether or not these petitioners (accused 3 and 4) were later inducted as Directors of the company and as to whether or not they were Directors of the said company, who were in charge of and responsible for the affairs of the company, as on 17.1.2014 (date of dishonour of the cheque in question). But, at any rate, this Court is constrained to hold that the cognizance taken in this case Crl.M.C.6594/15 & C.C - : 12 :-
leading to issuance of the summons to these 2 petitioners, is not proper and correct and the learned Magistrate ought to have conducted Sec.202 inquiry as observed by this Court in the abovesaid decisions.
14. Sri.P.B.Ajoy, learned counsel appearing for the complainant would also submit that the issuance of summons to accused No.1 company and accused No.2 cannot be faulted with in any view of the matter, as accused No.1 is the company, from whose account cheque has been drawn and is thus the principal offender and accused No.2 is the Director as well as the authorized signatory of the cheque.
15. In this context, it will also relevant to note the provisions contained in Sections 200, 202, 203 and 204 of the Cr.P.C., which read as follows:
Sec. 200: Examination of complainant.- A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate:
Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses--
(a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint; or
(b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under Section 192:
anotherProvided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to Magistrate under Section 192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not re-examine them.
xxx xxx xxx Sec. 202: Postponement of issue of process.- (1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take Crl.M.C.6594/15 & C.C - : 13 :-
cognizance or which has been made over to him under Section 192, may, if he thinks fit, and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction] postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding:
Provided that no such direction for investigation shall be made--
(a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions; or
(b) where the complaint has not been made by a Court, unless the complainant and the witnesses present (if any) have been examined on oath under Section 200.
(2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witness on oath:
Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath.
(3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is made by a person not being a police officer, he shall have for that investigation all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer in charge of a police station except the power to arrest without warrant.
Sec. 203: Dismissal of complaint.- If, after considering the statements on oath (if any) of the complainant and of the witnesses and the result of the inquiry or investigation (if any) under Section 202, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall dismiss the complaint, and in every such case he shall briefly record his reasons for so doing.
Sec. 204: Issue of process.- (1) If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to be--
(a) a summons-case, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused, or
(b) a warrant-case, he may issue a warrant, or, if he thinks fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if he has no jurisdiction himself) some other Magistrate having jurisdiction. (2) No summons or warrant shall be issued against the accused under sub-section (1) until a list of the prosecution witnesses has been filed.
Crl.M.C.6594/15 & C.C - : 14 :-
(3) In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made in writing, every summons or warrant issued under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of such complaint.
(4) When by any law for the time being in force any process-fees or other fees are payable, no process shall be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees are not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint.
(5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of Section 87."
16. In the light of the above discussion, this Court is not inclined to grant main prayer for quashment of the impugned complaint. However, it is ordered in the interest of justice that the impugned decision taken by the Magistrate in taking cognizance of the offence in this case as well as the issuance of summons as against the present petitioners herein (accused 3 and 4) will stand quashed and the complaint will stand remitted to the trial court for consideration of the matter afresh. The trial court will conduct a preliminary inquiry as envisaged in Sec.200 Cr.P.C. with the participation of the complainant and her witnesses. The complainant will be at liberty to produce cogent and relevant materials at that stage of the inquiry. Thereafter the learned Magistrate should also conduct an effective and proper Sec.202 inquiry. The learned Magistrate may summon the necessary documents and official witness/witnesses from the Registrar of Companies, Kerala and any other evidence, which are deemed fit and proper by the learned Magistrate to decide whether there are reliable materials to show that the petitioners are Directors of the company, who were in charge of and Crl.M.C.6594/15 & C.C - : 15 :-
responsible for the affairs of the company as on 17.1.2014. The complainant will have right to participate in the said process. Needless to say, the accused will not have any right to participate in such inquiry process. Learned counsel for the petitioners (A-3 and A-4) would raise an apprehension that the complainant's son may manipulate documents in the company to falsely show that the petitioners are also the Directors of the company, etc. This Court need not get into any of those matters, except to observe that the learned Magistrate will have to prudently assess the materials and documents, for taking a just and fair decision in the matter.
17. After completing Sec.202(2) inquiry process, the learned Magistrate will take a considered decision whether based on the materials so collected during such inquiry, the trial court could proceed to take cognizance and also to issue summons to these 2 petitioners (A-3 and A-4), etc. Entire process in this regard will be completed without much delay and all necessary endeavours will be taken by the learned Magistrate to ensure expeditious conclusion of such inquiry process as directed above. The Registry will forward a certified copy of this order along with a certified copy of the affidavit and enclosed documents as produced by additional respondent No.6 (ROC) filed in Crl.M.C.No. 6594/2015, to the trial court. The complainant will appear before the trial court at 11 a.m. on 14.9.2017 and may produce a certified copy of Crl.M.C.6594/15 & C.C - : 16 :-
this order.
With these observations and directions, the aforecaptioned Criminal Miscellaneous Cases stand finally disposed of.
Sd/-
sdk+ ALEXANDER THOMAS, JUDGE
///True Copy///
P.S. to Judge