Karnataka High Court
Smt Laxmi Kumari Bai vs The Housing Commissioner on 26 February, 2020
Bench: Chief Justice, Hemant Chandangoudar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 26TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2020
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR.ABHAY S. OKA, CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE HEMANT CHANDANGOUDAR
WRIT APPEAL No.2275 OF 2017 (LA-KHB)
BETWEEN:
1. Smt Laxmi Kumari Bai
W/o R Vijaykumar Rao
Aged about 60 years,
2. Vasantha Bai
D/o R Vijaykumar Rao
Aged about 44 years,
3. Gopinath Rao
S/o R Vijaykumar Rao
Aged about 40 years,
4. Ravindranath
S/o R Vijaykumar Rao
Aged about 37 years,
SL.No.1 to 4 r/o of Karekel
Kamakshipalya, Bangalore.
5. V Manjunath Rao
S/o R Vijaykumar Rao
Since deceased by his LRs,
5.a. Smt. Latha
W/o Late V. Manjunath Rao
2
Aged about 39 years,
R/o 242, 16th Block,
SMIG-A Ground Floor, 5th Phase,
Yelhanka New Town, Bangalore-64
5b. Mukesh
S/o Late V. Manjunath Rao
Aged about 13 years,
5c. Bindushree
D/o Late V. Manjunath Rao
Aged about 10 years,
Since 5b and 5c are
Minors they are represented by
their mother guardian
5a. Smt. Latha
W/o Late V. Manjunath Rao
Aged about 39 years,
R/o 242, 16th Block,
SMIG-A Ground Floor, 5th Phase,
Yelhanka New Town, Bangalore-64
6. V Asha
D/o R Vijaykumar Rao
Aged about 34 years,
7. Murlidhar
S/o R Vijaykumar Rao
Aged about 30 years,
Sl.No.6 and 7 r/o of Karekel
Kamakshipalya,
Bangalore-560 079.
Through General Power of Attorney
Sri. Syed M Gouse,
S/o Late Syed Mastan,
Aged about 63 years,
R/o No.456,2nd Cross,
3
M.M.Layout, R.T.Nagar,
Bangalore-32.
...Appellants
(By Smt. Sona Vakkund, Advocate)
AND:
1. The Housing Commissioner
Karnataka Housing Board,
KHB Building,
Bengaluru -560 001.
2. The Spl Land Acquisition Officer
Karnataka Housing Board
Bengaluru-560 001.
...Respondents
(By Sri. Basavaraj V Sabarad, Advocate For R-1 AND R-2)
***
This Writ Appeal is filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka
High Court Act, 1961 praying to set aside the order passed by the
learned Single Judge on 06.03.2017 in Writ Petition Nos.10893-
10894/2009 (LA-KHB) on the file of the High Court of Karnataka
and determine reasonable compensation to be paid to the
appellants by the KHB (respondent No.1) by allowing this writ
appeal in the interest of justice and equity.
This Writ Appeal coming on for Preliminary Hearing, this Day,
Chief Justice delivered the following:
4
JUDGMENT
I.A.No.2/2017 is filed for condonation of delay of ten days in filing the appeals. As there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay of ten days in filing the appeals, I.A.No.2/2017 is allowed. Delay of ten days in filing the appeals is condoned.
2. By this writ appeal, the appellants have challenged the impugned order dated 6th March 2017 passed by the learned Single Judge, by which their writ petitions were rejected.
3. The appellants are claiming to be the owners of the lands in Survey Nos.157/1 and 157/2, measuring 10 guntas and 02 acres and 05 guntas respectively, situated at Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk. In the writ petitions filed in the year 2009, the appellants have themselves disclosed that in two separate acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "the said Act of 1894), awards were made in relation to the said two lands on 5 23rd March 1978 and 12th May 1980. It is mentioned in the petitions that the Land Acquisition Officer made a reference under Section 30 of the said Act of 1894 to Civil Court for deciding the dispute regarding the apportionment. The prayers in the writ petitions filed by the appellants on 12th April 2009 were to issue a writ of mandamus, directing the respondents (the acquiring body and the Special Land Acquisition Officer) to pay compensation to the appellants at the present market value with interest and damages. Thus, the writ petitions were filed after lapse of thirty-one years from the date of the award in relation to land in Survey No.157/1 and after lapse of twenty-nine years from the date of the award in relation to Survey No.157/2.
4. In the Statement of Objections filed by the first and second respondents, it was pointed out that, as regards land in Survey No.157/1, a reference was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 30th May 1981 under Section 30 of the said Act of 1894 and compensation amount was deposited with the Civil Court. It was pointed out that even as regards 6 the land in Survey No.157/2, a reference under Section 30 of the said Act of 1894 was made which was numbered as L.A.C.No.351/1978 (which was re-numbered as L.A.C.No.1088/1980). As regards land in Survey No.157/1, the reference was numbered as L.A.C.No.313/1981.
5. It was also pointed out in the Statement of Objections that the appellants challenged the acquisition proceedings by filing a writ petition in the year 1998 which was dismissed on 25th March 1998. In the writ appeal, the same was confirmed. In the writ petitions filed by the appellants, it is pointed out that, a liberty was granted to the appellants while dismissing the writ petitions challenging the acquisition to seek compensation by approaching the Civil Court. Even while disposing of the writ appeals, similar liberty was granted.
6. The learned Single Judge held that, as references under Section 30 of the said Act of 1894 were made, no relief could be granted of payment of compensation and therefore, the learned Single Judge rejected the petitions. 7
7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that, L.A.C.No.313/1981 was returned without recording any finding on 2nd March 1985 and though the said order was produced before the learned Single Judge, it is not referred in the impugned judgment. She submitted that, as notice of the said reference was not served to the appellants though while submitting the reference, the Special Land Acquisition Officer had shown them as a party. She also submitted that as far as Survey No.157/2 is concerned, the appellants were not made parties to L.A.C.No.351/1978 and therefore, they were not served with notice. She submitted that though there may be a delay in filing the writ petitions, the case will be governed by the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi and others through Power of Attorney Holder Vs. M.I.D.C. and others1. She drew our attention to the law laid down by the Apex Court in various paragraphs including paragraphs No.10 to 12. She would, therefore, submit that this is a fit case to 1 AIR 2013 SC 565 8 grant compensation, especially when valuable properties of the appellants have been compulsorily acquired.
8. We have considered the submissions. Firstly, as stated earlier, there was a delay of more than twenty-nine years in filing the petitions from the dates of the awards under Section 11 of the said Act of 1894. Secondly, it is repeatedly held by the Apex Court that the Act of 1894 is a complete Code by itself. Even according to the case of the appellants, during the pendency of the writ petitions before the learned Single Judge, they were aware about the disposal of L.A.C.No.313/1981. The appellants had a remedy to challenge the decision of the Civil Court in the reference under Section 30 of the said Act of 1894. However, the remedy was not availed by the appellants.
9. As regards Survey No.157/2, if under the award under Section 11 of the said Act of 1894, compensation was denied to the appellants, they could have obviously applied under Section 18 of the said Act of 1894 for a reference. 9 Moreover, in a pending reference under Section 30, in view of Section 20 of the said Act, the Civil Court was required to issue notice to all persons interested in the objection. Therefore, the appellants could have always appeared before the Civil Court and sought a notice in accordance with Clause
(b) of Section 20 of the said Act of 1894. That was not done by the appellants.
10. Now coming to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi and others (supra), the facts were peculiar. A Notification under Section 4 of the said Act was issued on 6th June 1964. However, the acquisition proceedings were allowed to lapse. Though the possession of the land notified was taken over by the State Government and was handed over to Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC), it was pointed out by the appellants before the Apex Court that similarly situated persons were granted compensation in 1966. Subsequently, a fresh Notification under Section 4 of the said Act of 1894 was issued on 14th May 1981, but no further steps were taken. 10 Subsequently, MIDC handed over the acquired land to the City Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra (CIDCO). Though the appellants before the Apex Court had applied to the Special Land Acquisition Officer and Revenue authorities for grant of compensation, they were denied the compensation and therefore in 2009, they had filed a writ petition before the High Court, which was dismissed on the ground of delay. Thus, this was a case where the possession of the land notified for acquisition was taken over though the acquisition proceedings were not completed and had lapsed. Therefore, this was a case where there was a clear violation of constitutional rights of the appellant under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Moreover, in paragraph 3 of the judgment, it is noted by the Apex Court that the predecessors- in-interest of the appellants were illiterate farmers who were absolutely unaware of their rights.
11. In the present case, immediately after the acquisition was completed, the appellants being very much conscious about their rights filed a writ petition in the year 11 1988 for challenging the acquisition proceedings which was dismissed. Therefore, the appellants are not entitled to be shown any leniency by ignoring the delay of more than twenty- nine years in filing the petitions.
12. In fact in the same decision, the Apex Court held that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction on the ground of delay. Ultimately, it all depends on the facts of the case. Thus, this is a case where the appellants were very much conscious about their rights as they rushed to this Court by filing writ petitions for challenging the acquisition. They failed to adopt appropriate proceedings under the said Act of 1894 as regards compensation. Hence, we concur with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the appellants were not entitled to any relief. Moreover, in case of both the lands, the compensation amount determined under Section 11 of the said Act of 1894 was deposited with the Civil Court, The prayer made in the petitions filed in the year 2009 was for 12 grant of market value at the current rate, which prayer could not have been granted at all. Hence, for the reasons which we have recorded above, there is no merit in the appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed.
Sd/-
CHIEF JUSTICE Sd/-
JUDGE BMV*