Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
State vs Bheru Singh on 12 June, 2025
Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
[2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 855/2013
State of Rajasthan
----Appellant
Versus
Bheru Singh s/o Gopal Singh, r/o Raisinghpura, P.S. Mandalgarh,
District Bhilwara (Raj.).
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. C.S. Ojha, PP
For Respondent(s) : Mr. R.S. Chundawat
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHAH Judgment Reserved on 25/04/2025 Pronounced on 12/06/2025 Per Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J:
1. In the instant criminal appeal, the appellant-State has challenged the judgment of acquittal dated 24.11.2012 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Women Atrocities Cases, Bhilwara ('Trial Court') in Sessions Case No.65/2005 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Bheru Singh), whereby the accused-respondent herein was acquitted of the charges against him under Sections 498A & 302/306 IPC.
2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the year 2005 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 2013.
3. Brief facts of this case, as placed before this Court by the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf the appellant-State, (Downloaded on 12/06/2025 at 06:40:04 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB] (2 of 11) [CRLA-855/2013] are that on 12.05.2005, one Devi Singh (complainant) submitted a written report (Ex.P.4) before the Aarakshi Kendra (Reserve Centre), Mandalgarh, District Bhilwara alleging therein that one Hemkanwar, wife of the accused-respondent was often being subjected to abuse at the hands of the accused-respondent in drunken state, who was also complainant's paternal aunt's son (cousin). It was further alleged that on 11.05.2005 at around 5:00 p.m., the accused-respondent, with an intention to kill Hemkanwar, set her on fire after pouring kerosene on her as a result of which, she got burnt. Thereupon, she was taken to Bhilwara Hospital by Mahendra Singh, Hans Kanwar and Chandra Kanwar. The said incident, as alleged, was informed to the complainant by Hemkanwar herself. The marriage of the accused-
respondent with Hemkanwar was solemnized 14-15 years prior to the incident in question and two children were born out of the said wedlock.
3.1. On the basis of the aforementioned information, a case was registered under Sections 307 & 498A IPC and the investigation began accordingly. While the investigation was going on, Hemkanwar died under treatment, and the accused-respondent was arrested. Upon completion of the investigation, a charge- sheet was filed against the accused-respondent under Sections 498A & 302/306 IPC before the concerned Court, and after hearing arguments on the stage of framing of charge, the said charges were read over to the accused-respondent, who denied the same and claimed trial, and the trial commenced accordingly. (Downloaded on 12/06/2025 at 06:40:04 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB] (3 of 11) [CRLA-855/2013] 3.2. Owing to the nature of offences charged, the matter was committed to the Court of Sessions, wherefrom the case was transferred to the learned Trial Court for the necessary trial. 3.3. During the course of trial, the statements of 22 witnesses (P.W. 1 to P.W. 22) were recorded, and documents (Ex.P.1 to 29) were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution; in defence, witnesses D.W. 1 & D.W. 2 were examined and document Ex.D.1 was exhibited; whereafter, the accused-respondent was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which he pleaded innocence and false implication in the criminal case in question. 3.4. After conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court, while finding that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts, acquitted the accused-respondent herein of the charges framed against him, as above, vide the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 24.11.2012; against which, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant-State.
4. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant-State submitted that the learned Trial Court has erred in passing the impugned judgment of acquittal as on the basis of the testimony of the witnesses and other evidence on record, the case against the accused respondent is proved beyond all reasonable doubts.
4.1. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the deceased in her Parchabayan (Ex.P. 12), which was recorded by Jagdish Chandra (PW.21) Head Constable, at Police Station Mandalgarh, has clearly stated that her husband accused- respondent after consuming liquor, quarreled with her and on the (Downloaded on 12/06/2025 at 06:40:04 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB] (4 of 11) [CRLA-855/2013] date of incident, set her on fire after pouring kerosene on her. The Parchabayan is corroborated by the testimony of Jagdish Chandra (PW.21).
4.2. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that Smt. Mamta Vyas (PW.20) ACJM, Bhilwara, recorded the dying declaration of the deceased, wherein it has been clearly stated that there was a dispute between the deceased and the accused-respondent, which escalated to the situation leading to pouring of kerosene and setting the deceased on fire.
4.3. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that Chandrakanwar (PW.1) sister of the deceased, Devi Singh (PW. 3) and Mahendra Singh (PW.2) neighbour of the deceased, in their statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. have clearly stated that the accused-respondent was upset with the deceased as she refused to give money for liquor and therefore, in the fit of anger, the accused-respondent poured kerosene on the deceased and set on her fire. Furthermore, the Post-Mortem Report (Ex.P.13) reveals that the deceased was severely burnt.
4.4. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that the Naksha- Mauka (Ex.P. 3) reveals that the deceased was set on fire within the four walls of house of the accused-respondent and the half burnt clothes of the deceased were found at the place of incident. It was further submitted that the F.S.L. Report (Ex.P. 26) reveals that kerosene residue was detected in partially burnt clothes of the deceased.
4.5. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the F.I.R. (Ex.P. 4) was lodged by Devi Singh (PW.3) cousin of the accused- (Downloaded on 12/06/2025 at 06:40:04 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB] (5 of 11) [CRLA-855/2013] respondent, narrating the entire incident at early hours (around 6:30 a.m.) on 12.05.2005, after the alleged incident happened on 11.05.2005.
5. On the other hand, Mr. R.S. Chundawat, learned counsel for the accused-respondent while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond all reasonable doubts against the accused-respondent. Thus, the learned Trial Court after due consideration of all the material on record has rightly acquitted the accused-respondent of all the charges leveled against him. 5.1. Learned counsel also submitted that the prosecution witnesses, namely, Chandra Kanwar (PW.1), Mahendra Singh (PW.2), Debi Singh (PW.3), Ladu Jat (PW.4), Nand Singh (PW.5), Lakshman Singh (PW.7), Bansilal (PW.8), Smt. Neeru (PW. 13), Smt. Bhanwar (PW.14), Pratap Singh (PW.15), Bhagwan Singh (PW.17) have been declared hostile and rest of the prosecution witnesses do not allege anything against the accused-respondent. 5.2. Learned counsel further submitted that the Parchabayan (Ex.P. 12) was recorded on 12.05.2005, around 9:00 a.m. by the Head Constable Jagdish Chandra (PW.21), thereafter, at 10:00p.m. on the same day, the dying declaration (Ex.P. 25) was recorded by Smt. Mamta Vyas (PW. 20) in a question-answer format, after ascertaining the mental fitness of the deceased Hemkanwar, wherein it has been clearly stated that it was not the accused-respondent who set the deceased on fire, rather the deceased herself who lit the match-stick. Dr. V.D. Sharma (PW. (Downloaded on 12/06/2025 at 06:40:04 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB] (6 of 11) [CRLA-855/2013]
22) in his testimony admits that he gave the fitness certificate as asked from him.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case.
7. This Court observes that the present case pertains to an incident dated 11.05.2005, wherein one Hemkanwar, wife of the accused-respondent, suffered burn injuries. Pursuant to a written report submitted by Debi Singh on 12.05.2005, an FIR was registered, and subsequent investigation led to the filing of a charge-sheet under Sections 498A and 302/306 IPC. The Trial Court proceeded with the case and, upon full consideration of the evidence, found that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond all reasonable doubts. Accordingly, the accused- respondent was acquitted by judgment dated 24.11.2012, against which the present challenge has been laid by the appellant-State.
8. This Court observes that the deceased gave two statements on 12.05.2005. In the Parchabayan (Ex.P-12) recorded by PW-21, she alleged that the accused-respondent poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. Later that day, a formal dying declaration (Ex.P-25) was recorded by the Magistrate (PW-20), after a medical fitness certificate was issued by PW-22, wherein the deceased stated that she herself lit the matchstick following a quarrel. Both statements were recorded within close proximity of time. However, the two versions were materially inconsistent on the core issue of how the fire was ignited. In the absence of corroborative evidence and due to this contradiction, this Court (Downloaded on 12/06/2025 at 06:40:04 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB] (7 of 11) [CRLA-855/2013] finds that the benefit of doubt has to be granted to the accused- respondent.
8.1. This Court further observes that a significant number of prosecution witnesses, including Chandrakanwar (PW-1), Mahendra Singh (PW-2), Devi Singh (PW-3), Ladu Jat (PW-4), Nand Singh (PW-5), Lakshman Singh (PW-7), Bansilal (PW-8), Smt. Neeru (PW-13), Smt. Bhanwar (PW-14), Pratap Singh (PW-
15), and Bhagwan Singh (PW-17), were declared hostile by the prosecution during trial. These witnesses have failed to support the prosecution case on material points. The lack of consistent and supportive testimony from these key witnesses considerably weakened the prosecution's case, and thus created a reasonable doubt about the involvement of the accused-respondent in the incident.
8.2. In view of these inconsistencies and lack of credible evidence, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving the accused-respondent's guilt under Sections 302/306 IPC.
9. This Court further observes that the charge under Section 498A IPC, which relates to cruelty by the husband or his relatives, was not established by the prosecution. The evidence on record did not demonstrate any cruelty, harassment, or mental or physical torture on the deceased by the accused-respondent for any unlawful demand. Apart from isolated allegations, there was no reliable and consistent testimony indicating that the accused- respondent subjected the deceased to cruelty as envisaged under Section 498A. Moreover, the majority of witnesses relevant to this (Downloaded on 12/06/2025 at 06:40:04 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB] (8 of 11) [CRLA-855/2013] charge were declared hostile and did not support the prosecution's version. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-respondent committed the offence punishable under Section 498A IPC.
10. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on 12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-:
Mallappa & Ors. (Supra):
"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:
(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary;
(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;
(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;
(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;
(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically (Downloaded on 12/06/2025 at 06:40:04 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:20353-DB] (9 of 11) [CRLA-855/2013] address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court."
Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra):
"38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows:
"8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible."
39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:
(a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;
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(b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record;
(c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."
11. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused- respondent under Sections 498A, 302/306 IPC which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analysed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal.
12. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no interference by this Court in the instant appeal. (Downloaded on 12/06/2025 at 06:40:04 PM)
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13. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court.
14. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed.
15. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./481 B.N.S.S., the accused-respondent is directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the accused-respondent, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as soon as they would be called upon to do so.
16. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.
(SANDEEP SHAH),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J SKant/-
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