Himachal Pradesh High Court
Hans Raj And Another vs Cr. Revision No. 244 Of 2019 on 3 July, 2025
2025:HHC:21080 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision Nos. 245, 244, 249 and .
462 of 2019 Reserved on: 24.04.2025 Date of Decision: 03.07.2025.
1. Cr. Revision No. 245 of 2019 Hans Raj and another ...Petitioners
2.
State of H.P.
r to
Versus
Cr. Revision No. 244 of 2019
...Respondent
Vakil Ram ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent
3. Cr. Revision No. 249 of 2019
Hans Raj and others ...Petitioners
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent
4. Cr. Revision No. 462 of 2019
Gian Chand ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent
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Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. .
For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Ajay Sharma, Senior Advocate, with Mr. R.P. Raina, Advocate, for the petitioner in Cr. Revision No. 245 of 2019, Mr. R.P. Raina, Advocate, for the petitioner(s) in Cr. Revision Nos. 244 and 249 of 2019 and M/s Narinder Sharma and Suraj Sharma, Advocates, for the petitioner in Cr. Revision No. 462 of 2019.
For the Respondent : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
Advocate General, for the
respondent-State, in all the
petitions.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revisions are directed against the order dated 22.3.2019, vide which the learned Trial Court ordered the framing of charges as under: -
Sr. No. Name of the accused Offence/Sections
1. Hans Raj S/o Sh. Munshi 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B Ram, R/o Village Hatli, of IPC and Section 13(2) of the P.O. Draman, Tehsil Prevention of Corruption Act.
Bhatiyat, District
Chamba, H.P.
2. Purshotam Chand S/o 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B Sh. Ved Prakash, R/o of IPC and Section 13(2) of the 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 3
2025:HHC:21080 Village Dhanoa, P.O. and Prevention of Corruption Act. Tehsil Badoh, District Kangra, H.P. .
3. Vakil Ram S/o Sh. 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B Munshi Ram, R/o of IPC and Section 13(2) of the Village Sachuien, Tehsil Prevention of Corruption Act.
Bharmour, District
Chamba, H.P.
4. Hans Raj S/o Sh. Madho 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B Ram, R/o Village Moda, of IPC and Section 13(2) of the Tehsil Salooni, District Prevention of Corruption Act. Chamba, H.P.
5. Om Raj S/o Sh. Bidhia 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B Ram, R/o VPO Jasur, of IPC and Section 13(2) of the Tehsil Nurpur, District Prevention of Corruption Act. Kangra, H.P.
6. Rajinder Kumar S/o Sh. 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B Sarba Nand, R/o of IPC and Section 13(2) of the Mohalla Hardaspura, Prevention of Corruption Act.
Tehsil and District
Chamba H.P.
7. Tilak Raj S/o Sh. Dumnu 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B Ram, R/o Village of IPC and Section 13(2) of the Dhampu, P.O. Saru, Prevention of Corruption Act.
Tehsil and District
Chamba, H.P.
8. Gian Chand S/o Sh. 120-B of IPC and Section 13(2) Chaman Lal, R/o Village of the Prevention of Dehra, Tehsil and Corruption Act.
District Chamba, H.P. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they are arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 4 2025:HHC:21080
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revisions are that the police presented a challan before the .
learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 379, 120-B, 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act (Forest Act) and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act). It was asserted that the informant, Divisional Forest Officer, Chamba, noticed the illicit felling of trees in Lot bearing No. 1/2013-15, comprising 1016 salvage trees in Chandruni Dhar DPF Almi Beat, Kundehal Block of Upper Chamba Range. This forest was handed over to the Forest Working Division, H.P. State Forest Development Corporation Limited, Chamba, for the felling of salvage-marked trees. The trees were marked with Hammer No. C/A 2012-13/3 during November 2012. The informant received a telephonic message from the Director, HPSFDC, Dharamshala on 14.11.2014 regarding the illicit felling. Range Officer, Upper Chamba and Assistant Manager, HPSFDC, Chamba inspected the area and found that 12 trees of Fir/Spruce were illicitly felled. A damage bill of ₹3,53,375/- was issued to the Divisional Manager, FWD, Chamba.
Another Committee headed by ACF, Chamba, Forest Division ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 5 2025:HHC:21080 inspected the forest area and reported that 88 numbers of trees (Deodar 13, Fir/Spruce 75) were illicitly felled. A damage bill of .
₹67,50,727/- was issued. The police registered the FIR and constituted a Special Investigation Team. The police seized various documents and inspected the jungle in the presence of forest officials. The counting could not be completed because of excessive snowfall. The police seized various documents regarding the allotment and the work carried out by the forest contractor. The police also found a report prepared by Nek Raj and signed by Gehra Ram, Om Kumar, Uttam Chand, Baldev Ram, Chattar Singh, Darshan Singh, Jeshi Ram and Contractor Dev Raj, in which no illicit felling was reported. These were sent to FSL for comparison with the specimen admitted signatures and were found to have been signed by the persons mentioned in the report. The Special Investigation Team carried out the demarcation and counting of the illicitly felled trees and found that the number of illicitly felled trees was much more than reported. 1843 trees of different categories were felled in Lot No. 1/2013-2015. The police also seized the samples of stumps, trees and the timber lying on the spot. These were also sent to the FSL, and the reports matched each other.
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3. It was found after the investigation that Gehra Ram was In-charge of Lot No.7/9-10, Lot No. 6/9-10 and Lot No. 1/13- .
15. He supervised the work of felling. He was to ensure that no illicit felling took place and to report any illicit felling to the higher authorities. He signed the report prepared by Nek Raj, in which no illicit felling was reported. This false report was prepared to benefit the Forest contractor.
4. It was found after the investigation that Hans Raj was assigned the additional charge of Chamba Unit. He, Om Raj, Rajinder Kumar and Tilak Singh were directed to report the illicit felling carried on the spot in Lot No.1/13-15. He issued a report dated 25.11.2014 in which 12 trees of Rai Tos Species were shown to have been illicitly felled, and 662 trees of different species duly marked and hammered were felled. However, 1843 trees of different species were felled till November 2014, out of which 438 stumps (402 green and 36 dried) were hammered. 1402 stumps did not have any hammers, and three stumps were burnt. He prepared a false report showing that only 12 trees were cut, and failed to mention the illicitly felled 1843 trees.
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5. Purshotam Chand was In-charge of Lot N. 1/13-15. He signed the report prepared by Nek Raj, Forest Guard, stating that .
no illicit felling was found by the Committee till 29.5.2014. A false report was prepared because 1843 trees were felled.
6. Gian Chand was posted as a Beat Officer in the Forest Department. He had prepared an incorrect Monthly Progress Report showing that only 12 trees were felled and no green tree was marked as cut in the forest. 1804 trees were illicitly felled and removed, which caused a loss of ₹9,46,59,044/- to the State.
7. Vakil Ram was posted as Range Officer, Chamba. Lot No. 1/12-13 was allotted during his tenure. 1909 trees were marked. He verified the marking list. He issued a certificate stating that no dry tree remained for marking in the Jungle. He forwarded an application filed by Baldev Prasad for allotting a marking hammer. The marking hammer was allotted by the DFO on 3.11.2012. 1016 trees were marked in Lot No. 1/13-15. He failed to check the trees on the spot and forwarded the marking list without verification. He was supposed to check 25% of the marked trees, and his lack of supervision led to the loss of ₹9,46,59,044/-.
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8. Hans Raj, son of Madho Ram, Om Raj, Rajinder Kumar and Tilak Raj, was given additional charge of the Chamba Unit.
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They were directed to report the illicit felling vide order dated 19.11.2014. They showed only 12 trees of Rai Tos were illicitly felled, whereas 662 of all different species were illicitly felled, duly marked and hammered. It was found during the investigation that 1843 trees of different species were felled till November 2014, out of which 438 stumps were hammered. 1402 stumps were not hammered, and 03 stumps were burnt.
9. Learned Trial Court held that the Court had to see a prima facie case while framing the charge. The findings regarding guilt or innocence were not required to be recorded. The material collected by the prosecution had to be accepted as correct. No full-fledged inquiry is to be conducted into the matter, and the evidence is not to be weighed as if the trial were being conducted.
The material on record made out a prima facie case against the accused for the commission of charged offences.
10. Being aggrieved by the orders framing charges, the petitioners filed separate revision petitions assailing the orders. It was asserted in the petitions filed by Hans Raj and Purshotam ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 9 2025:HHC:21080 Chand that the illicit felling was noticed by the Director (North) of the Corporation, but no action was taken. As per the agreement, .
recourse was to be had to arbitration to recover the damages.
Petitioners and other persons were made accused under the political influence. The material collected by the prosecution, even assuming to be correct, will not lead to the conviction of the accused. No theft was committed, and Section 379 of the IPC was wrongly invoked.
r The DM, Chamba, claimed a sum of ₹91,03,994/- from Mangi Ram. Lot No. 1/2013-15 was located at a high altitude, which was covered with snow. It was inaccessible, and no theft of trees or timber could be committed by any person.
No person intended to take away the Government property. One FIR was registered and three separate challans were prepared, which is contrary to the provisions of the law. There was no evidence of the conspiracy. The markings were not made in the trees allotted in the earlier lot. Ram Pal Sharma, ACF, sent a letter dated 28.11.2014 mentioning the list of 134 trees; however, this list did not form part of the record. The information under the Right to Information Act was sought to be produced under Section 91 of Cr.P.C., but the same was not taken on record. The statement of Kirpa Shanker recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is contrary to ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 10 2025:HHC:21080 the statement of Ram Pal Sharma, which made the prosecution's case highly suspicious. The quantity of timber to be extracted as .
per the agreement was fixed as 1317 M3 by converting 1016 trees.
The converted volume was shown as 1295.17 M3 after felling 1843 trees, which shows that the number of trees felled was more than marked. It cannot be reconciled with the volume extracted by the Forest Contractor. Joint Committee Report shows that 39 trees of sapling (no class), 286 trees of Class-5, 692 trees of Class-4 and 452 of Class-3, a total of 1469 trees, measuring 11 cms to 40 cms in diameter, were felled. The felling of these trees was not beneficial to the Labour Supply Mate. This type of timber is generally used by the shepherds to cross the rivulets (nallahs). As per the report, the hammer used for marking the trees was destroyed on 15.12.2014, which would have an adverse effect on the trial. Baldev Parshal, the Deputy Range Officer, was alleged to be marking the trees wrongly, and the possibilities of wrong marking in the present case could not be ruled out. The sale proceeds belong to the Government, and it was not the case of the prosecution that the contractor had taken the trees away. The petitioners were the Chairman or Members of different Committees. They completed the work assigned to them with ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 11 2025:HHC:21080 great zeal. The Divisional Manager did not find fault in the report prepared by the petitioners. The learned Trial Court failed to .
apply its mind; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
11. Almost similar pleas were taken in the petitions filed by Hans Raj, Om Raj, Rajinder Kumar and Tilak Raj. It was asserted that a damage bill of 12 illicit trees worth ₹3,53,375/-
was issued. Another bill of ₹67,50,727/- was sent to the Divisional Manager, Forest Corporation, for felling 88 trees.
These bills were not accepted. The illicit feeling came to the notice of higher authorities like the Director (North) of the Corporation, but no action was taken. The agreement between the Forest Corporation and Labour Supply Mate Shubh Karan provided for the arbitration. FIR could not have been registered in the present case. The area was inaccessible, and it was not possible to carry out the extraction. There were contradictions in the statements of witnesses. No person benefited from the felling of the trees. The Divisional Manager filed a false complaint to save himself. The investigation was not properly carried out. Relevant documents were not produced. The allegations against the petitioners could ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 12 2025:HHC:21080 have been made subject matter of the inquiry, but no criminal case could have been registered based on these allegations.
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Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the charges framed by the learned Trial Court be quashed.
12. Similar pleas were taken in the petition filed by Vakil Ram.
13. In the petition filed by Gian Chand, it was asserted that the ingredients of the Sections were not satisfied. The petitioner held four assignments and was not in a position to have direct supervision. He was dependent upon the report/information furnished by his subordinates. There is no evidence of a meeting of the minds. No theft was committed, and Sections 379 of the IPC and Section 33 of the Forest Act were wrongly mentioned. The penalty could be recovered from the Forest Contractor violating the conditions of the agreement. The petitioner was never interrogated to explain his position. The hammer was destroyed.
Baldev was habitual of marking the wrong trees or not marking the trees, and the possibility of wrong marking/non-marking in the present case could not be ruled out. Therefore, it was prayed ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 13 2025:HHC:21080 that the present petition be allowed and the charges framed by the learned Trial Court be quashed.
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14. I have heard Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. R.P. Raina, learned counsel for the petitioners in Criminal Revision No. 245 of 2012, Mr. R.P. Raina, learned counsel for the petitioners in Criminal Revision Nos. 244 and 249, and M/s Narinder Sharma and Suraj Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners in Criminal Revision No. 462 of 2012, and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, in all the petitions.
15. Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in Criminal Revision No. 245 of 2012 submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. The material collected by the prosecution, even if accepted to be true, does not make out a case for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 379 of the IPC. No person committed the theft of any tree. The trees of diameter 11 to 45 cms were alleged to have been felled but it is not economical to fell the trees of such small diameters. The possibility of the Shepherds felling the trees to cross the rivulet cannot be ruled out. The area is ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 14 2025:HHC:21080 inaccessible, and even the police could not reach it due to the snowfall. There is no possibility of the commission of theft in .
these circumstances. Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate these aspects. An application for producing the documents on record was filed under Section 91 of Cr.P.C., which was wrongly rejected by the learned Trial Court. There is no evidence of conspiracy. The allegations made against the petitioner can give rise to a departmental proceeding and not to a criminal case.
Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate this aspect. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
16. Mr. R.P. Raina and Mr. Narinder Sharma, learned counsel, adopted these submissions.
17. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that the Court is not to sift the evidence and is to see a prima facie case while framing the charges. The accused has no right to produce the document at the stage of framing the charges, and the learned Trial Court had rightly rejected the application to this effect. The contradictions ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 15 2025:HHC:21080 are not to be weighed at this stage. Therefore, he prayed that the present petitions be dismissed.
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18. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
19. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vishnu Kumar Shukla v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 502: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1582 that the Court framing the charges has to see a prima facie case. It is impermissible to examine the material threadbare to determine whether the accused is likely to be convicted or not. It was observed:-
12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of the existence of a prima facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of the prima-facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial.::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 16
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20. This position was reiterated in Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 520, wherein it was .
observed:
16. Section 227 CrPC deals with discharge. What Section 227 CrPC contemplates is that if upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that there is no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so. At the stage of consideration of discharge, the court is not required to undertake a threadbare analysis of the materials gathered by the prosecution. All that is required to be seen at this stage is that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. In other words, the materials should be sufficient to enable the court to initiate a criminal trial against the accused. It may be so that at the end of the trial, the accused may still be acquitted. At the stage of discharge, the court is only required to consider as to whether there are sufficient materials which can justify the launch of a criminal trial against the accused. By its very nature, a discharge is at a higher pedestal than an acquittal. Acquittal is at the end of the trial process, may be for a technicality or on the benefit of doubt, or the prosecution could not prove the charge against the accused; but when an accused is discharged, it means that there are no materials to justify the launch of a criminal trial against the accused. Once he is discharged, he is no longer an accused.
21. The present petitions have to be adjudicated as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
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22. It was submitted that the accused had filed an application under Section 91 of Cr.P.C. for producing the .
documents, which was wrongly rejected by the learned Trial Court. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Dilip Singh Kishor Singh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294 that the Judge has to examine the evidence collected by the prosecution while framing a charge and determine whether or not sufficient grounds exist to proceed against the accused based on the material placed before him or not. The accused does not have any right to produce the documents at the time of framing charges. It was observed: -
"7. It is trite law that the application of judicial mind is necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for proceeding with trial, and it would not be necessary to dwell on the pros and cons of the matter by examining the defence of the accused when an application for discharge is filed. At that stage, the trial judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to proceed against the accused on the basis of the charge sheet material. The nature of the evidence recorded or collected by the investigating agency or the documents produced in which prima facie reveal that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused, so as to frame a charge, would suffice, and such material would be taken into account for the purposes of framing the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, after such ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 18 2025:HHC:21080 consideration of the material there are grounds for presuming that the accused has committed the offence which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be framed.
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8. At the time of framing the charge and taking cognisance, the accused has no right to produce any material and call upon the court to examine the same. No provision in the Code grants any right to the accused to file any material or document at the stage of framing of the charge. The trial court has to apply its judicial mind to the facts of the case as may be necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for trial on the basis of charge-sheet material only.
9. If the accused is able to demonstrate from the charge- sheet material at the stage of framing the charge, which might drastically affect the very sustainability of the case, it is unfair to suggest that such material should not be considered or ignored by the court at that stage. The main intention of granting a chance to the accused of making submissions as envisaged under Section 227 of the Cr.
P.C. is to assist the court in determining whether it is required to proceed to conduct the trial. Nothing in the Code limits the ambit of such hearing to oral hearing and oral arguments only, and therefore, the trial court can consider the material produced by the accused before the I.O.
10. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on an assumption that the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate said material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged. This Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, adverting to the earlier propositions of law laid down on this subject has held:
"29. We have bestowed our consideration on the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 19 2025:HHC:21080 Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order .
to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the probative value of the materials has to be gone into, and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini-trial at this stage."
11. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged. The expression "the record of the case" used in Section 227 Cr. P.C. is to be understood as the documents and articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency." (Emphasis supplied) ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 20 2025:HHC:21080
23. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly rejected the application for producing the documents on record.
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24. It was submitted that one FIR was registered, and the learned Trial Court erred in entertaining three separate challans.
This submission is not acceptable. Section 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that for every distinct offence of which a person is accused, there shall be a separate charge, and every such charge shall be tried separately. Section 219 of the Cr.P.C. provides an exception to this principle and reads that a person accused of more offences than one of the same kinds committed within a space of 12 months from the first to the last of such offences may be charged with and tried at one trial for any number of them not exceeding three.
25. Thus, the normal rule is that every offence of which a person is charged is to be tried separately. The exception is that the offences committed within a space of twelve months can be tried together by taking recourse to Section 219 of Cr.P.C. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab, (2022) 2 SCC 89: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 361: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 924 that Section 218 provides for the separate trials and Sections ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 21 2025:HHC:21080 219 to 223 provide exceptions to this rule. It was observed at page 117:
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35. Chapter 17 CrPC, 1973 deals with "the charge". Part A, comprising of Sections 211 to 217, is titled "form of charges". Part B, comprising of Sections 218 to 224, is titled "joinder of charges".
36. Section 218 provides as follows:
"218. Separate charges for distinct offences.--(1) For every distinct offence of which any person is accused, there shall be a separate charge, and every such charge shall be tried separately:
Provided that where the accused person, by an application in writing, so desires and the Magistrate is of the opinion that such person is not likely to be prejudiced thereby, the Magistrate may try together all or any number of the charges framed against such person.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect the operation of the provisions of Sections 219, 220, 221 and 223."
Sub-section (1) of Section 218 stipulates first, that there must be a separate charge for every distinct offence of which any person is accused and second, that every such charge must be tried separately. However, under the proviso, where the person accused makes a request in writing to the Magistrate and the latter is of the opinion that such person is not likely to be prejudiced, the Magistrate may try all or any of the charges framed against the person together. Sub-section (2) of Section 218 stipulates that nothing in sub-section (1) would affect the operation of the provisions of Sections 219 to 221 and 223.
37. Section 219(1) stipulates that when a person is accused of more than one offence of the same kind of offences, all of which are committed within the space of twelve months whether in respect of the same person or otherwise, he may be charged with and tried at one trial for up to three of ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 22 2025:HHC:21080 them. Sub-section (2) of Section 219 provides that offences are of the same kind when they are punishable with the same amount of punishment under the same section of the IPC or of any special or local law.
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26. A similar view was taken in State of Jharkhand v. Lalu Prasad Yadav, (2017) 8 SCC 1: (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 569: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 551 wherein it was observed at page 23:
"28. Section 219 CrPC provides that three offences of the same kind within a year may be charged together. When a person is accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed within a period of one year, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, any number of them not exceeding three of the same kind of offence under Section 219(1). Section 219 is reproduced hereunder:
"219. Three offences of the same kind within a year may be charged together.--(1) When a person is accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last of such offences, whether in respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, any number of them not exceeding three.
(2) Offences are of the same kind when they are punishable with the same amount of punishment under the same section of the Penal Code, 1860 or of any special or local laws:
Provided that, for the purposes of this section, an offence punishable under Section 379 of the Penal Code, 1860 shall be deemed to be an offence of the same kind as an offence punishable under Section 380 of the said Code, and that an offence punishable under any section of the said Code, or of any special or local law, shall be deemed to be an offence of the same kind as an attempt to commit such offence, when such an attempt is an offence."::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 23
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29. It is apparent from Section 212 read with Section 219 that there have to be separate trials for different years covering the period of more than one year. The same kind of offence is a different thing from the "same offence" for .
the purpose of Sections 219, 220 or 300. The scheme of law is clear that separate charges for distinct offences must be framed separately, and they cannot be clubbed together for more than one year.
30. This Court in Natwarlal Sakarlal Mody v. State of Bombay [Natwarlal Sakarlal Mody v. State of Bombay, (1963) 65 Bom LR 660: 1964 Mah LJ 1: 1964 MP LJ 1 (SC)] considered the question of joint trial of persons and offences for conspiracy as per provisions contained in Section 239(d) of the old CrPC. This Court has laid down that a separate trial is the rule and a joint trial is an exception. Joint trial would be an irregular exercise of discretion if a court allows innumerable offences spread over a long period of time and committed by a large number of persons to be under the protecting wings of an all-embracing conspiracy, and if each or some of the offences can be separately tried, it would be appropriate and lawful. Joint trial prolongs the trial and causes waste of judicial time and complicates the matter, which might otherwise be simple, and it would confuse the accused and cause prejudice to them. The court should not be overzealous to provide a cover of conspiracy for a number of offences unless it is satisfied that the persons who committed separate offences were parties to the conspiracy and committed the separate acts pursuant to the conspiracy. This Court has laid down thus: (Bom LR p. 666) "This discussion leads us to the following legal position. Separate trial is the rule, and joint trial is an exception. While Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows a joint trial of persons and offences within defined limits, it is within the discretion of the Court to permit such a joint trial or not, having regard to the circumstances of each case. It would certainly be an irregular exercise of discretion if a court allows an ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 24 2025:HHC:21080 innumerable number of offences spread over a long period of time and committed by a large number of persons under the protecting wings of an all-embracing conspiracy, if each or some of the offences can .
legitimately and properly form the subject-matter of a separate trial; such a joint trial would undoubtedly prolong the trial and would be a cause of unnecessary waste of judicial time. It would complicate matters which might otherwise be simple; it would confuse the accused and cause prejudice to them, for more often than not accused who have taken part in one of the minor offences might have not only to undergo the long strain of protracted trial, but there might also be the likelihood of the impact of the evidence adduced in respect of other accused on the evidence adduced against him working to his detriment. Nor can it be said that such an omnibus charge or charges would always be in favour of the prosecution for the confusion introduced in the charges and consequently in the evidence may ultimately benefit some of the accused, as a clear case against one or other of the accused may be complicated or confused by the attempt to put it in a proper place in a larger setting. A Court should not be overzealous to provide a cover of conspiracy for a number of offences unless it is clearly satisfied on the material placed before it that there is evidence to prove prima facie that the persons who committed separate offences were parties to the conspiracy and they committed the separate acts attributed to them pursuant to the object of the said conspiracy." (emphasis supplied)
31. This Court in Ranchhod Lal v. State of M.P. [Ranchhod Lal v. State of M.P., AIR 1965 SC 1248: (1965) 2 Cri LJ 253] has also considered the question of joint trial in the case of criminal breach of trust. It has been observed that the normal rule is that there should be a charge for each distinct offence. The Court is authorised to lump up the various items with respect to which criminal breach of trust was committed and to mention the total amount ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 25 2025:HHC:21080 misappropriated within a year in the charge. When so done, the charge is deemed to be the charge of one offence. This Court has laid down that a separate trial with respect to each distinct offence of criminal breach of trust with .
respect to an individual item is the correct mode of proceeding with the trial of an offence of criminal breach of trust. This Court has laid down thus: (AIR p. 1250, paras 14-16) "14. Section 222 CrPC reads:
'222. Particulars as to time, place and person. --(1) The charge shall contain such particulars as to the time and place of the alleged offence, and the person (if any) against whom, or the thing (if any) in respect of which, it was committed, as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged.
(2) When the accused is charged with criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of money, it shall be sufficient to specify the gross sum in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed, and the dates between which the offence is alleged to have been committed, without specifying particular items or exact dates, and the charge so framed shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of Section 234:
Provided that the time included between the first and last of such dates shall not exceed one year.' Sub-section (2) is an exception to meet a certain contingency and is not the normal rule with respect to framing of a charge in cases of criminal breach of trust. The normal rule is that there should be a charge for each distinct offence, as provided in Section 233 of the Code. Section 222 mentions what the contents of the charge should be. It is only when it may not be possible to specify exactly particular items with respect to which criminal breach of trust took place or the exact date on which the individual items were misappropriated or in ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 26 2025:HHC:21080 some similar contingency, that the Court is authorised to lump up the various items with respect to which criminal breach of trust was committed and to mention the total amount misappropriated with a year in the .
charge. When so done, the charge is deemed to be the charge of one offence. If several distinct items with respect to which criminal breach of trust has been committed are not so lumped together, no illegality is committed in the trial of those offences. In fact, a separate trial with respect to each distinct offence of criminal breach of trust with respect to an individual item is the correct mode of proceeding with the trial of an offence of criminal breach of trust.
15. The learned counsel for the appellant also relied on Section 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and urged that three offences of criminal breach of trust could have been tried at one trial as Section 234 provides that when a person is accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last of such offences, whether in respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for any number of them not exceeding three. This again is an enabling provision and is an exception to Section 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If each of the several offences is tried separately, there is nothing illegal about it. It may also be mentioned that the total number of items charged in the four cases exceeded three.
16. Lastly, reference was made, on behalf of the appellant, to Section 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and it was urged that all these offences were committed in the course of the same transaction, and therefore, they should have been tried at one trial. Assuming, without deciding, that these offences could be said to have been committed in the course of the same transaction, the separate trial of the appellant for certain specific offences is not illegal. This section, too, is an enabling section."
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38. Section 218 deals with separate charges for distinct offences. Section 219 quoted above provides that three .
offences of the same kind can be clubbed in one trial, committed within one year. Section 220 speaks of a trial for more than one offence if it is the same transaction. In the instant case, it cannot be said that defalcation is the same transaction as the transactions are in different treasuries for different years, different amounts, different allotment letters, supply orders and suppliers. Thus, the provision of Section 221 is not attracted in the instant case. There are different sets of accused persons in different cases with respect to defalcation.
27. In the present case, the offences were committed in different years and could not have been tried together. They were to be tried separately, and the prosecution was entitled to file one charge sheet in respect of the offences committed within a space of twelve months. Therefore, no exception can be made out for filing three charge sheets.
28. It was submitted that no theft was committed, and Section 379 of the IPC was wrongly added. This submission is not acceptable. Section 378 of the IPC defines theft as taking any movable property dishonestly out of the possession of another without his consent, and the movement of the property to such taking. Explanation-I provides that a thing, so long as it is attached to the earth, not being movable property, is not the ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 28 2025:HHC:21080 subject of the theft, but it may be capable of being the subject of the theft as soon as it is severed from the earth. Explanation-II .
provides that a moving effected by the same act which affects the severance may be a theft. Illustration (a) to Section 378 of IPC reads that if 'A' cuts down the tree on Z's ground with the intention of dishonestly taking the tree out of Z's possession without Z's consent. Here, as soon as 'A' has severed the tree to such taking, he has committed the theft.
29. Thus, it is apparent that the cutting of a tree is sufficient to constitute theft. It was held by this Court in State of H.P. Vs. Prem Singh ILR 1989 HP 172, that when the accused cut the trees from the forest belonging to the State, the offence punishable under Section 379 of the IPC was proved. In the present case, the prosecution has come with the specific case that the accused had cut the trees from Chandruni Dhar Jungle, and these allegations are prima facie sufficient to attract Section 379 of the IPC.
30. Section 33 of the Forest Act deals with the felling of the trees reserved under Section 30 of the Forest Act. It was specifically stated in the FIR that the illicit felling was carried out ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 29 2025:HHC:21080 in Chandruni Demarcated Protected Forest, which means that the notification under Section 30 of the Forest Act was issued.
.
Therefore, prima facie, the provisions of Section 33 of the Forest Act are attracted to the present case.
31. It was submitted that there is a provision of arbitration in the agreement, and recourse could not be had to the criminal law. This submission will not help the petitioners. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686: 2000 SCC (Cri) 47 that the availability of the remedy of arbitration is no ground to quash the criminal proceedings. It was observed at page 690:
"9. We are unable to appreciate the reasoning that the provision incorporated in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act is an offence.
Arbitration is a remedy for affording relief to the party affected by a breach of the agreement, but the arbitrator cannot conduct a trial of any act which amounted to an offence, albeit the same act may be connected with the discharge of any function under the agreement. Hence, those are not good reasons for the High Court to axe down the complaint at the threshold itself. The investigating agency should have had the freedom to go into the whole gamut of the allegations and to reach a conclusion of its own. Pre-emption of such investigation would be justified only in very extreme cases as indicated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426]."::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 30
2025:HHC:21080
32. Professor Glanville Williams explained in his celebrated book Learning the Law (Tenth Edition, Stevens and Sons) .
that the facts by themselves cannot determine civil or criminal liability. The same set of facts may give rise to criminal or civil liability. The distinction between the two is not the nature of the act but the nature of the proceedings that are taken to seek redressal. It was observed:
"The distinction between a crime and a civil wrong, though capable of giving rise to some difficult legal problems, is in essence quite simple. The first thing to understand is that the distinction does not reside in the wrongful act itself. This can quite simply be proved by pointing out that the same act may be both a crime and a civil wrong.
Occasionally, at a bus station, there is someone who makes a living by looking after people's impedimenta while they are shopping. If I entrust my bag to such a person, and he runs off with it, he commits the crime of theft and also two civil wrongs--the tort of conversion and a breach of his contract with me to keep the bag safe. The result is that two sorts of legal proceedings can be taken against him: a prosecution for the crime, and a civil action for the tort and the breach of contract. (Of course, the plaintiff in the latter action will not get damages twice over merely because he has two causes of action; he will get only one set of damages.) To take another illustration, if a railway signalman, to dumb forgetfulness a prey, fails to pull the lever at the right moment, and a fatal accident occurs on the line, his carelessness may be regarded as sufficiently gross to amount to the crime of manslaughter, and it is also the tort of negligence towards the victims of the accident and their dependents and a breach of his contract with the Railway ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 31 2025:HHC:21080 Executive to take due care in his work. It will be noticed that this time, the right of action in tort and the right of action in a contract are vested in different persons.
.
These examples show that the distinction between a crime and civil wrong cannot be stated as depending upon what is done, because what is done may be the same in each case. The true distinction resides, therefore, not in the nature of the wrongful act but in the legal consequences that may follow. If the wrongful act is capable of being followed by what are called criminal proceedings, that means that it is regarded as a crime (otherwise called an offence). If it is capable of being followed by civil proceedings, that means that it is regarded as a civil wrong. If it is capable of being followed by both, it is both a crime and a civil wrong. Criminal and civil proceedings are (in the normal case) easily distinguishable: the procedure is different, the outcome is different, and the terminology is different."
33. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also held in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 626: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 942, that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong, as well as, the criminal offence and mere availability of civil remedies is no ground to quash the criminal proceedings. It was observed:
"34. The given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as well as a criminal offence. Only because a civil remedy is available may not be a ground to quash criminal proceedings. But as observed above, in this case, no criminal offence has been made out in the FIR read with the chargesheet so far as this appellant is concerned. The other accused, Rajan Kumar, has died."
34. A similar view was taken in V.R. Dalal v. Yougendra Naranji Thakkar, (2008) 15 SCC 625, wherein it was observed: -
::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 322025:HHC:21080 "13. It may be true that in the event the court finds that the dispute between the parties is civil in nature, it may not allow the criminal proceedings to go on. But, no law, in our opinion, as such can be laid down as in a given case both .
civil suit and criminal complaint would be maintainable although the cause of action for both the proceedings is the same."
35. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Puneet Beriwala Vs. State 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983 that simply because a remedy is provided under the civil law cannot lead to an inference that recourse cannot be had to the criminal law or that the civil law remedy is the only remedy available to the parties. It was observed:
28. It is trite law that the mere institution of civil proceedings is not a ground for quashing the FIR or to hold that the dispute is merely a civil dispute. This Court in various judgments, has held that simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract, that does not by itself clothe the Court to conclude that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the court.
This Court is of the view that because the offence was committed during a commercial transaction, it would not be sufficient to hold that the complaint did not warrant a further investigation and, if necessary, a trial. [See: Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admin.), (2009) 5 SCC 528, Lee Kun Hee v. State of UP, (2012) 3 SCC 132 and Trisuns Chemicals v. Rajesh Aggarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686]
36. In the present case, the allegations in the FIR show that the trees were illicitly felled, which constitutes the ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 33 2025:HHC:21080 commission of a cognizable offence. Therefore, the prosecution was within its right to file criminal proceedings before the .
learned Trial Court.
37. It was submitted that there are contradictions in the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C.
The hammer was also destroyed. These submissions will not help the petitioners. The Court is not to sift the evidence at the stage of framing the charges. It has to see a prima facie case. Hence, the contradictions between the statements of two witnesses are not sufficient to discharge a person when the other material on record shows the prima facie involvement of the petitioners.
38. It was submitted that there is no evidence of any conspiracy, and the charges under Section 120-B of the IPC were wrongly framed. This submission cannot be accepted. The offence of criminal conspiracy cannot be proved by direct evidence, as it is impossible to collect any direct evidence of the conspiracy in most cases. The Court has to draw an inference from the circumstances proved on record. In the present case, the allegations in the FIR show that the wrong reports were prepared.
The trees were stated to be existing when, in fact, the trees had ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 34 2025:HHC:21080 been cut and removed. This was done to benefit the contractor.
These allegations prima facie show the conspiracy between the .
accused and the learned Trial Court had rightly framed the charges for committing the conspiracy.
39. It was submitted that the area was inaccessible, as is evident from the report of the police, in which it was mentioned that the investigation could not be carried out because of the snowfall. Therefore, in these circumstances, the petitioners cannot be faulted for not visiting the spot. It was also submitted that the charge of multiple areas was given to the petitioner-Gian Chand, and he had to depend upon the report of the subordinate officials. These submissions will not help the petitioners. The petitioners did not express their inability to carry out the inspections due to the snowfall or the larger area. They signed and submitted the reports, which were found to be incorrect.
Therefore, they cannot escape from the liability on the ground that the area was inaccessible or a large area was put under their charge.
40. The inspection report shows that the forest officials failed to carry out the supervision, and when they were asked ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 35 2025:HHC:21080 specifically to report about the felling, they prepared the wrong reports showing that no illicit felling had taken place or that the .
number of trees illicitly felled was less than the actual number.
These wrong reports were submitted to the higher officials, and the State was deprived of the value of the trees that it would have gained by the submission of the correct reports. Therefore, the charges were rightly framed for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC.
41. The Forest officials prepared the wrong reports to benefit the Forest contractor. In this manner, they abused their official position to benefit a private person, and the charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act were rightly framed.
42. The charges were also framed for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC for submitting the wrong reports. These offences deal with the forgery of documents. The term forgery has been defined in Section 463 of the IPC as under:
"463. Forgery.--Whoever makes any false documents or electronic record part of a document or electronic record with, intent to cause damage or injury], to the public or any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 36 2025:HHC:21080 implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery."
43. It is apparent from the definition that a person has to .
make a false document before he can be said to have committed forgery. Making a false document is defined in Section 464 of the IPC. It reads as under:
464. Making a false document.--A person is said to make a false document or false electronic record.
First.--Who dishonestly or fraudulently--
(a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or r part of a document;
(b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record;
(c) affixes any electronic signature on any electronic record;
(d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the authenticity of the electronic signature, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document, electronic record or electronic signature was made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed; or Secondly.--Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document or an electronic record in any material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed with electronic signature either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or Thirdly.--Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 37 2025:HHC:21080 electronic record or to affix his electronic signature on any electronic record knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know .
the contents of the document or electronic record or the nature of the alteration.
44. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1594 that the prosecution is required to prove that the accused had forged a document by creating a false document to establish the offence of forgery. A false document is when a document is executed claiming to be executed by someone else or authorised by someone else, or a document is tampered with, or signatures are obtained by practising deception. It was observed at page 756: -
"14. An analysis of Section 464 of the Penal Code shows that it divides false documents into three categories:
1. The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made or executed.
2. The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed by either himself or any other person.
3. The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 38 2025:HHC:21080 knowing that such person could not by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b) intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him, know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration.
.
In short, a person is said to have made a "false document", if
(i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a document; or (iii) he obtained a document by practising deception, or from a person not in control of his senses.
15. The sale deeds executed by the first appellant clearly and obviously do not fall under the second and third categories of "false documents". It therefore remains to be seen whether the claim of the complainant that the execution of sale deeds by the first accused, who was in no way connected with the land, amounted to committing forgery of the documents with the intention of taking possession of the complainant's land (and that Accused 2 to 5 as the purchaser, witness, scribe and stamp vendor, colluded with the first accused in execution and registration of the said sale deeds) would bring the case under the first category."
45. In the present case, the Forest officials signed the reports in their name. It was not asserted that the signatures of some other persons were forged. The documents may be false as they are popularly understood; however, there is a distinction between a document whose contents are false and a false document as is understood in law. Therefore, these allegations are not sufficient to constitute the offences punishable under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC.
::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS 392025:HHC:21080
46. It was submitted that the contractor was not likely to benefit from the felling of small trees, and the trees might have .
been felled by the shepherds for laying the bridges over the rivulets. These submissions involve factual disputes, which cannot be adjudicated while considering the prayer for discharge.
47. No other point was urged.
48. Therefore, the order passed by the learned Trial Court framing charges is partly sustainable.
49. In view of the above, the present revisions are partly allowed, and the order passed by the learned Trial Court framing charges for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471 of IPC is set aside, while the rest of the order passed by the learned Trial Court is upheld.
50. The record of the learned Trial Court be returned.
51. The observation made hereinabove shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 3rd July, 2025 (Chander) ::: Downloaded on - 03/07/2025 21:20:57 :::CIS