Jharkhand High Court
Anosh Ekka vs State Through Central Bureau Of ... on 18 December, 2025
Author: Sanjay Prasad
Bench: Sanjay Prasad
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 850 of 2025
Anosh Ekka, S/o Late Anand Kumar Ekka, aged about 55 years,
R/o Thakur Toli, Simdega, PO & PS-Simdega, District-Simdega,
Jharkhand .... Appellant
Versus
State through Central Bureau of Investigation ..... Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
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For the Appellant : Mr. Rajeev Awasthi, Advocate Mr. Anjani Kumar, Advocate For the CBI : Mr. Deepak Kumar Bharti, Advocate ......
C.A.V. on 02.12.2025 Pronounced on 18.12.2025 I. A. No. 13857 of 2025 This Criminal Appeal has been filed on behalf of the appellant challenging the impugned judgment of conviction dated 29.08.2025 and sentence dated 30.08.2025 passed by the court of Shri Shyam Nandan Tiwari, the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-XVIII-cum-Judge C.B.I, Ranchi in Case No. R.C. 04 (A)/2010-AHD-R (C) by which learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-XVIII-cum-Judge C.B.I, Ranchi has convicted the appellant for the offences for under Sections 120-B r/w 193 of I.P.C, 13(2) r/w 13 (1) (d) of P.C. Act, 1988 and as u/s 120 -B r/w 13 (1)
(d) of P.C. Act and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment of seven (7) years u/s 120-B IPC r/w 13 (1) (d) of P.C. Act and to pay the fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-(Rupees One Lakh only) and sentenced to Rigorous Imprisonment of seven (7) years u/s 13 (2) r/w 13 (1) (d) of P.C. Act and to pay the fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-(Rupees One Lakh only) and sentenced to Rigorous Imprisonment (R.I.) of two (2) years u/s 120-B IPC r/w 193 IPC with a fine of Rs.10,000/-(Rupees 1 Ten Thousand only).
However, all the sentences have been directed to run concurrently and the period already undergone during trial and investigation shall be set off according to law.
2. I. A. No. 13857 of 2025 has been filed on behalf of the appellant under Section 430 (1) of BNSS for the suspension of sentence and for grant of bail, during the pendency of this Criminal Appeal.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that earlier this case has been registered as Vigilance Bureau P.S. case No. 26/2008 which was registered on the basis of complaint filed by one Kumar Binod but in the compliance of order dated 04.08.2010 of the Hon'ble High Court of Jharkhand passed in WP(PIL) No. 4700/2008 and 2222/2009, this case has been taken up by the CBI for investigation. In this case Vigilance Bureau has already been filed interim charge sheet for possession of disproportionate assets by accused Ex- Minister Hari Narain Rai and Anosh Ekka notwithstanding, the case was transferred to CBI for a comprehensive investigation. As per complaint. Sri Hari Narain Rai acquired assets disproportionate to his known source of income, as against the pre-check asset of Rs. 1,90,000/- and 5.5 acres of agricultural land and income of Rs. 15.39 lakhs, he acquired assets worth of Rs. 30.18 crore. The property include houses worth Rs. 20 crore in Bompas Town, Deoghar and worth Rs. 7.5 crores in Seth Surjmal Jalan Road, Deoghar.
4. It is further alleged that the appellant- Anosh Ekka acquired assets disproportionate to his known source of income, as against the pre-check asset of Rs. 10,48,827/-, he acquired assets worth Rs. 57.01 crore. The properties include land in and around Ranchi and 2 the Majestic Bunglow. Anosh Ekka after becoming Minister, floated a construction company and got it registered in the Rural Development Department, so that he can legalize his illegal income. Huge tribal land was acquired in violation of C.N.T. Act in the name of his wife by way of forging her address. Anosh Ekka also after becoming a Minister floated a construction firm in the name and style of M/s Mahamaya Construction in which his wife was the major shareholder. This firm was registered as a Class IA contractor by the Rural Works Department (erstwhile REO) of Govt. of Jharkhand, in spite of the fact that he did not fulfill the eligibility criteria. These firms got huge work order from the Rural Development Department and Rural Works Department of Govt. of Jharkhand. These departments were under the control of Sri Anosh Ekka and Sri Hari Narain Rai respectively. Hari Narain Rai also floated another construction firm in the name of M/s Maa Gauri Construction in which his brother is the major shareholder. This firm was registered as a Class- 1A contractor by the Rural Works Department (erstwhile REO) of Govt. of Jharkhand, in spite of the fact that he did not fulfill eligibility criteria. This firm got huge work order from the Rural Development Department and Rural Works Department of Govt. of Jharkhand. These departments were under the control of Sri Anosh Ekka and Sri Hari Narain Rai respectively.
The appellant-Anosh Ekka after becoming a Minister, also floated a construction company in the name and style of M/s Ekka Construction Pvt. Ltd. in which his wife Mrs. Menon Ujjana Ekka is the major shareholder. This firm was registered as a Class 1A contractor by the Rural Works Department (erstwhile REO) of Govt. of Jharkhand, in spite of the fact that it did not fulfill the eligibility 3 criteria. This firm got huge work orders from the Rural Development Department and Rural Works Department of Govt. of Jharkhand. These departments were under the control of the appellant-Anosh Ekka and Sri Hari Narain Rai purchased several plots of land in the name of his wife Mrs. Menon during years 2006- 08 and 2008 from the members of Scheduled Tribes. The details of property through respective sale deeds and valuation of scheduled properties for fifteen (15) different properties and deed value total amounting to Rs. 1,12,66,083/- and miscellaneous expenditure like Stamp Duty, Registry Charges etc. comes to Rs. 5,37,600.64/-.
5. Investigation revealed that the aforesaid land was purchased by gross violation of section 46 and 48 of the CNT Act and sellers of the above plots of land obtained the permission from the Land Reforms Deputy Collector (LRDC), Ranchi. The purchasers Mrs. Menon Ekka though member of Scheduled Tribe, is not a resident of the area within the jurisdiction of the police station in which these plots of land are situated. She, dishonestly and fraudulently, deceived the sellers for believing that she was the resident of the same police station as sellers, in order to achieve her fraudulent goal, she mentioned false residential address, and in few instances, submitted false affidavits also to this effect. The LRDC and their staffs and the Circle Offices, connived with Mrs. Menon Ekka and the appellant- Anosh Ekka and in spite of the fact that Mrs. Ekka was not the resident of the area under the jurisdiction of the concerned police station, the recommended transfer of land to her. In a few cases, when the concerned Circle Office, did not send any report, the LRDC obtained favourable report from, the staffs posted under him and accorded the permission for transfer of the land.
46. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the CBI.
7. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Court below are illegal, arbitrary and not sustainable in law. It is submitted that the appellant is innocent and has been falsely implicated in this case deliberately. It is submitted that although the case was instituted on 26.11.2008 by ACB against the appellant and others and even the appellant had surrendered on 17.08.2009 and in the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court has granted bail to the appellant on 13.12.2012.
However, in the meantime, CBI has taken the investigation of the Vigilance Case No. 26 of 2008 on the direction of the Hon'ble High Court vide order dated passed in W. P. (PIL) No. 4700 of 2008 and 2222 of 2009 by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court and the CBI instituted the R. C. Case 04 (A) 2010/AHD/Ranchi on 11.08.2010 under Sections 406/420/467 and allied Sections of Indian Penal Code and Sections 13 (2) r/w 13 (1) (d) of P.C. Act.
8. It is submitted that the police has submitted charge sheet against the appellant under Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 13 (2) r/w 13 (1) (d) of P.C. Act.
9. It is submitted that prior to institution of this case, the appellant has already been convicted and sentenced under Sections 13(2) r/w 13 (1) (e) of P.C. Act, 1988 in the similar nature of case instituted by the CBI while submitting charge sheet against him and the appellant was convicted vide judgment dated 25.02.2020 and sentenced to R. I. for a period of seven (7) years and to pay the fine of Rs. 50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs). However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has granted bail to the appellant in SLP (Crl) No. 5 5004 of 2023 on 28.04.2023 on completion of seven (7) years and also due to long incarceration. The above judgment and sentence dated 25.02.2020 passed in R. C. Case 04 (A) 2010/AHD/R (B) was marked as Ext.-A as defence documents on behalf of the appellant in the said R. C. Case 04 (A) 2010/AHD/R (C).
10. It is submitted that once the appellant has completed the sentence and had come out, then the CBI has submitted fresh charge sheet against him for the same cause of action leading to institution of R. C. Case 04 (A) 2010/AHD/R (C) and hence, thereafter during trial of the said case instituted on the basis of 2 nd charge sheet, the appellant has been convicted.
11. It is submitted that there is no provision as per the CrPC for filing fresh charge sheet for the commission of the same offence and at best the CBI could have filed the supplementary charge sheet for adding the additional offence in the said R. C. Case 04 (A) 2010/AHD/Ranchi by filing supplementary charge sheet during the trial and hence, the Trial against the appellant is vitiated. It is submitted that there cannot be two charge sheets for the similar offence and this amounts to double jeopardy to the appellant for the institution of fresh case on the basis of 2nd charge sheet by the CBI for the same cause of action.
12. It is submitted that even in the first trial, the appellant is alleged to have purchased property approx. Rs. 57.01 Crores in the name of his wife Mrs. Menon Ekka and property mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 15. It is submitted that in the instant case also the property mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 15 of the impugned judgment at para- 3 and 4 of the same and similar properties amounting to Rs. 57.01 Crores. It is submitted that same and similar properties have been referred in the earlier case i.e. R. C. Case 04 (A) 2010/AHD-R 6 (B) and also in the present case i.e. Case No. R.C. 04 (A)/2010- AHD-R (C). It is submitted that the appellant has already undergone imprisonment under Sections 13 (2) r/w 13 (1) (e) of P.C. Act. for a period of seven (7) years earlier. It is submitted that even in the present case, the appellant has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for the offences under Sections 120 -B r/w 13 (1) (d) of P.C. Act and under Sections 13 (2) r/w 13 (1) (d) of P.C. Act and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of seven (7) years and to pay the fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) and Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of seven (7) years and to pay the fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) and Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of two (2) years and which should not have been counted for the purpose of this conviction and as the appellant has already undergone the said period.
13. It is submitted that the appellant has also been convicted under Sections 120-B IPC r/w 193 of IPC and sentenced to Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of two (2) years and to pay the fine of Rs.10,000/-(Rupees Ten Thousand only) and at best, Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of two (2) years for the offence under Sections 120-B IPC r/w 193 of IPC. It is submitted that the appellant has served seven (7) years sentence in the first trial and the appellant has already undergone seven (7) months in the instant case and hence, in view of the above the appellant may be enlarged on bail.
14. Learned counsel for the CBI (Union of India) has submitted that the impugned judgment and sentence passed by the learned Trial below are fit and proper and no interference is required from this Court. It is submitted that I. A. No. 13857 of 2025 for suspension of sentence is devoid of merit. It is submitted that the 7 appellant has been convicted initially in R. C. Case 04 (A) 2010/AHD-R (B) by the learned Trial Court, which pertains to disproportionate assets whereas the present conviction has been made on the basis of 2nd charge sheet submitted by the police in the regular trial. It is submitted that offences levelled against the appellant are distinct and for separate offences and trial can proceed separately for the said offences. It is submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Neera Yadav v. CBI reported in (2017) 8 SCC 757 has held that fresh case can be instituted upon the said person, if distinct offences is found and has relied upon Para- 55, 56, 57 and 63 to 73 of the above judgment. It is submitted that there are different offences against the appellant and two charge sheet can be submitted and trial has to be done separately. It is submitted that the appellant has crossed that stage also and he had not taken the plea of 2nd trial and after conclusion of trial, there is no merit in the argument that 2nd charge sheet or 3rd charge sheet have been submitted against the appellant for the same FIR and this was subject matter of proceeding under Section 482 of the CrPC and or any other law, but not in Criminal Appeal.
15. It is submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Jharkhand through CBI Versus Lalu Prasad Yadav @ Lalu Prasad reported in (2017) 8 SCC 01 has held at para-40.8 that for distinct offence, the principle of double jeopardy is not attracted.
16. It is submitted that the appellant cannot take the plea of double jeopardy as he has faced different trial for distinct offences and separate charge sheet can be filed, if distinct offences are found against any accused persons and thus, there is no merit in this Interlocutory Application and hence, prayer for bail of the appellant 8 may be rejected.
17. In reply the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that separate charge sheet and 2nd charge sheet is not maintainable in the same R. C. Case 04 (A) 2010/AHD/Ranchi. It is submitted that the principle laid down in the case of Neera Yadav v. CBI reported in (2017) 8 SCC 757 and in the case of State of Jharkhand through CBI Versus Lalu Prasad Yadav @ Lalu Prasad reported in 2017 (8) SCC 01 are not applicable in this case, because in both the cases separate FIRs were lodged by the CBI and hence, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that separate trial will be maintainable, whereas in the instant case under Appeal, no separate FIR was lodged and hence the appellant may be enlarged on bail.
18. Perused the Lower Court Records and considered the submissions of both the sides.
19. It transpires that one Kumar Binod has filed Complaint on 25.10.2008 before the Court of Vigilance-cum-Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi and the said case was forwarded under Section 156 (3) of the CrPC on 24.11.2008 for institution of the FIR. Thereafter the Vigilance Department instituted Vigilance Bureau P.S. Case No. 26 of 2008 for the offences under Sections 406/409/420/423/424/465/120-B of the Indian Penal Code and also under Sections 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (e) of the P. C. Act.
20. Thereafter the Vigilance Department has submitted interim charge sheet on 05.10.2009 vide charge sheet no. 21/2009 and Vigilance Court has taken cognizance against the appellant.
21. Thereafter the appellant has surrendered.
22. It further transpires that in light of the order dated 04.08.2010 passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in W. P. (PIL) No. 4700 of 2008 and W. P. (PIL) No. 2222 of 2009 and 9 the CBI took over the investigation of the case on the direction of the High Court and the CBI re-registered the case on 11.08.2010 against the appellant as R. C. Case 04 (A) 2010/AHD/Ranchi.
23. It transpires that the CBI has filed 1st Charge sheet initially bearing charge sheet no. 02/2012 dated 27.01.2012 only under Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 13 (2) read with 13 (1) (e) of the P. C. Act, 1988 as no other substantive commission of crime could be found.
24. It transpires that the appellant was convicted by the learned Trial Court below under Sections 13 (2) read with 13 (1) (e) of the P. C. Act, 1988 and sentenced to undergo R. I. for a period of seven (7) years.
25. Thereafter the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal before this Court by challenging the judgment of conviction dated 25.02.2020 and sentence dated 25.02.2020 passed by Sri Anil Kumar Mishra No. 1, learned Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi in R. C. Case No. 04 (A) 2010/AHD-R (B) by filing appeal before this Court vide Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 332 of 2020 and however, vide judgment dated 20.01..2023, the said Criminal Appeal was dismissed.
26. Thereafter the appellant had preferred SLP (Criminal) No. 5004 of 2023 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 28.04.2023 passed in SLP (Criminal) No. 5004 of 2023 has granted bail to the appellant as the appellant had completed the period of seven (7) years of sentence in CBI Case.
27. Thereafter it transpires that in the meantime, CBI has filed another charge sheet on 11.12.2012 against the appellant in the said R. C. Case bearing R. C. Case 04 (A) 2010/AHD/Ranchi on 10 11.08.2010 under Sections 120-B read with 420/193 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 13 (2) r/w 13 (1) (d) of P.C. Act.
28. It transpires that during trial the prosecution got examined eighteen (18) witnesses and who are as follows:-
I. P.W-1 is Vinay Kumar Choubey, CEO, Jharkhand, Ranchi, II. P.W-1A is Vinay Kumar Choubey, Principal Secretary, Panchayati Raj, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, III. P.W-2 is Kumar Binod Social Worker, IV. P.W-3 is Narsingh Narayan Pandey, then Retired State Election Commissioner, Jharkhand, V. P.W-4 is Ashok Kumar, Bench Clerk at Deputy Commissioner Court, Ranchi, VI. P.W-4A is Ashok Kumar, Bench Clerk at Deputy Commissioner Court, Ranchi (Retired on 30.04.2024), VII. P.W-5 is Sabita Devi, Mukhiya Karma Panchayat, VIII. P.W-6 is Lakeshwar Oraon, Mukhiya, Irba Panchayat & Cultivator, IX. P.W-7 is Sandeep Ranjan, Typist-cum-Computer Operator, Department of Law, X. P.W-8 is Sahdeo Mehra, District Sub Registrar, Giridih, XI. P.W.-8A is Sahdeo Mhera, Retired District Sub Registrar, XII. P.W.-9 is Sadho Oraon, Mukhiya Neori Panchayat/Cultivation, XIII. P.W.-10 is Shailendra Kumar Ambashta, Retired Sub- Inspector from Budmu Circle Office, XIV. P.W.-11 is Jainath Munda, Seller of Land, XV. P.W.-12 is Sunita Minz, Seller of Land, XVI. P.W.-13 is Kinuwa Oraon, Seller of Land, XVII. P.W.-14 is Parwati Devi, Seller of Land, 11 XVIII. P.W.-15 is Anuj Kumar Tiru, Seller of land (Section Officer. Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Cooperative Department, Jharkhand Secretary), XIX. PW-16 is Albinus Tirkey, Seller of land (Retired Additional Commissioner, Income Tax, Ahmedabad), XX. PW-17 is Anupam Tiru, Seller of land (Special Assistant, SBI Doranda Branch, Ranchi), XXI. PW-18 is Ashesh Kumar, I.0. (Retired SP. CBI, ACB, Ranchi).
29. It transpires that prosecution got proved following documents as the Exhibits:-
I. Ext. 1 is Revised Sanction order, II. Ext. 1/1 is Notification issued by Revenue and Land Reform Section Jharkhand, Govt. of Jharkhand, III. Ext. 2 is Complaint, IV. Ext. 3 is Sanction order for prosecution in 10 sheets, V. Ext. 3/1 is Certified Notification vide no. 727 dt. 09.02.2002, VI. Ext. 4 is certified copy of Permission Case No. 1996 R. 8 11/2005-06, VII. Ext: 4/1 to 4/4 are signature of Ravi Ranjan Vikram, Goverdhan Baitha, Sanjay Bharti and Ratikant Jha inquiry of permission case, VIII. Ext 4/5 and 4/6 are Signature of PW 12 in application and Power of Permission case (Ext. 4), IX. Ext. 4/7 and 4/8 are Signature of PW 13 in Deposition and application of Permission Case (Ext. 4), X. Ext. 5 is copy of Permission Case No. 71 R 8 11/2006-07, XI. Ext. 5/1 is Signature in Enquiry report of Ram Kumar Mandal, XII. Ext. 5/2 is Signature of Kartik Kumar Prabhat, 12 XIII. Ext. 5/3 and 5/4 are Signature of Manilal Mahto and Raj Kishore Singh in Ext. 5, XIV. Ext. 5/5 is Signature of PW 14 in Permission Case (Ext. 5), XV. Ext. 6 is Certified copy of Permission Case No. 187 R 8 II/2006-07, XVI. Ext. 6/1 is Signature of Ram Kumar Mandal in Enquiry report, XVII. Ext. 6/2 is Signature of Kartik Kumar Prabhat, XVIII. Ext. 6/3 and 6/4 is Signature of Manilal Mahto and Firoz Akhtar in Ext. 6, XIX. Exi. 7 is Certified copy of Permission Case No. 188 R 8 II/2006-07, XX. Ext. 7/1 is Signature of Ram Kumar Mandal, XI. Ext. 7/2 is Signature of Kartik Kumar Mandal, XXI. Ext. 7/3 and 7/4 are Signature of Manilal Mahto and Firoz Akhtar in Ext. 7, XXII. Ext. 7/5 and 7/6 are Signature of PW-11 in deposition and application of Ext. 7, XXIII. Ext. 8 is Permission Case No. 109 R 8 II/2006-07, XXIV. Ext. 8/1 is Signature of Ram Kumar Mandal in Enquiry report, XXV. Ext. 8/2 is Signature of Kartik Kumar Prabhat, XXVI. Ext. 8/3 and 8/4 are Signature of Manilal Mahto and Brajesh Mishra in Ext. 8, XXVII. Ext.- 8/5 is Signature of PW 14 in Permission Case (Ex. 8), XXVIII. Ext.- 9 is Permission Case No. 111 R 8 II/2006-07, XXIX. Ext.-9/1 is Signature of Ram Kumar Mandal, XXX. Ext.-9/2 and 9/3 are Signature of Kartik Kumar Prabhat in order dated 05.04.2007, XXXI. Ext.-9/4 and 9/5 are Signature of Manilal Mahto and Brajesh 13 Mishra in Ext. 9, XXXII. Ext.-9/6 is Signature of PW 14 in Permission Case (Ext. 9), XXXIII. Ext.-10 is Permission Case No. 72 R 8 II/2006-07, XXXIV. Ext 10/1 is Signature of Ram Kumar Mandal in Enquiry report, XXXV. Ext. 10/2 is Signature of Kartik Kumar Prabhat, XXXVI. Ext. 10/3 and 10/4 are Signature of Manilal Mahto and Raj Kishore Singh in Ext. 10, XXXVII. Ext. 11 is Certified copy of Permission Case No. 153 R 8 II/2007-08, XXXVIII. Ext 11/1 is Signature of Brajeshwar Mahto in Enquiry report, XXXIX. Ext. 11/2 is Signature of Kartik Kumar Prabhat, XL. Ext. 12 is Certified copy in Permission Case No. 156 R 8 II/2007-08, XLI. Ext.-12/1 is Signature of Brajeshwar Mahto, XLII. Ext.- 12/2 is Signature of Kartik Kumar Prabhat, XLIII. Ext.-13 is Certified Copy of Case No. 73 R 8 II/2006-07, XLIV. Ext.-13/1 is Signature of Ram Kumar Mandal, XLV. Ext.- 13/2 is Signature of Kartik Kumar Prabhat, XLVI. Ext.- 13/3 and 13/4 are Signature of Manilal Mahto and Raj Kishore Singh in Ext.-13, XLVII. Ext.- 13/5 is Signature of P.W.-11 in Ext.-13, XLVIII. Ext.- 14 is Case No. 74 R 8 II/2006-07, XLIX. Ext. 14/1 is Signature of Ram Kumar Mandal, L. Ext. 14/2 is Signature of Kartik Kumar Mandal, LI. Ext. 14/3 and 14/4 are Signature of Manilal Mahto and Raj Kishore Singh in Ext. 14, LII. Ext. 14/5 and 14/6 are Signature of PW 11 in application and 14 Power of Ext. 14, LIV. Ext. 15 is Permission Case No. 155 R 8 II/2007-08 LV. Ext. 15/1 is Signature of Brajeshwar Mahto, LVI. Ext. 15/2 is Signature of Kartik Kumar Prabhat, LVII. Ext. 15/3 is Signature of PW 16 in deposition of Ext. 15 (Permission File), LVIII. Ext. 15/4 is Signature of PW 16 in application of permission file Ext. 15, LIX. Ext. 16 is Permission Case No. 1554 R 8 II/2007-08, LX. Ext. 16/1 is Signature of Brajeshwar Mahto in Enquiry report, LXI. Ext. 16/2 is Signature of Kartik Kumar Prabhat, LXII. Ext. 16/3 is Signature of PW 16 in Ext. 16, LXIII. Ext. 17 is Letter No. 2489/Bhu.Su. Dated 20.10.2010, LXIV. .Ext. 17/1 is Letter No. 1080 dated 19.05.2011, LXV. Ext. 17/2 is Letter No. 1941(D) dt. 17.08.2011, LXVI. Ext. 18 is Permission Case No. 2412 R 8 II/2007-08, LXVII. Ext. 18/1 is Signature of Ashif Ekram in Enquiry report, LXVIII. Ext. 18/2 is Signature of Parshuram Kerketta, LXIX. Ext. 18/3 is Signature of Anil Kumar, LXX. Ext 18/4 is Signature of Kartik Kumar Prabhat, LXXI. Ext. 18/5 is Signature of PW 15 in Application of Ext. 18, LXXII. Ext. 18/6 is Signature of PW 15 in Deposition of Ext. 18, LXXIII. Ext. 19 is Permission Case No. 2413 R II/2007-08, LXXIV. Ext. 19/1 is Signature of Asif Ekram, LXXV. Ext. 19/2 is Signature of Parshuram Kerketta, LXXVI. Ext. 19/3 is Signature of Anil Kumar, LXXVII. Ext 19/4 is Signature of Kartik Kumar Prabhat, LXXIX. Ext. 19/5 to 19/7 is Signature of PW 17 Anupam Tiru in application affidavit and deposition of Ext. 19, 15 LXXX. Ext. 20 is Sanction order of Kartik Kumar Prabhat and others, LXXXI. Ext 20/1 is Forwarding Letter attached with Sanction Order, LXXXII. Ext. 20/2 is Notification of Executive 2000, LXXXIII. Ext. 21 is Sale deed No. 4434 dt. 27.03.2006, LXXXIV. Ext. 21/1 and 21/2 are Signature of PW 12 in Sale Deed (Ext. 21), LXXXIV. Ext 21/3 is Signature of PW 13 in Sale Deed (Ext. 21), LXXXV. Ext 22 is Sale Deed No. 17223 dt. 04.12.2006, LXXXVI. Ext. 22/1 is Signature of PW 14 in Ext. 22, LXXXVII. Ext. 23 is Sale Deed No. 16602 dt. 15.10.2007, LXXXVIII. Ext. 24 is Sale Deed No. 16603 di 15.10.2007, LXXXIX. Ext. 24/1 is Signature of P.W. 11 in Ext. 24, XC. Ext. 25 is Sale Deed No. 15675 dt. 10.08.2007, XCI. Ext. 25/1 is Signature of PW 14 in Ext. 25, XCII. Ext. 26 is Sale Deed No. 13535 dt. 10.08.2007, XCIII. Ext. 26/1 is Signature of PW 14 in Ext. 26, XCIV. Ext. 27 is Sale Deed No 17017 dt. 19.11.2006, XCV. Ext. 28 is Sale Deed No. 16986 dt. 29.10.2007, XCVI. Ext. 29 is Sale Deed No. 17305 dt. 02.11.2007, XCVII. Ext. 30 is Sale Deed 17019 dt. 29.11.2006, XCVIII. Ext. 31 is Sale Deed No. 17018 dt. 29.11.2006, XCIX. Ext. 31/1 is Signature of PW 11 in Ext. 31, C. Ext. 32 is Sale Deed No. 695 dt. 16.01.2008, CI. Ext. 32/1 is Signature of Divya Tirkey in Sale Deed, CII. Ext. 33 is Sale Deed No. 16837 dt. 23.10.2007, CIII. Ext. 33/1 is Signature of Divya Tirkey in Sale Deed (Ext. 33) in 1st page 16 CIV. Ext. 34 is Sale Deed No. 7718 dt. 10.05.2008, CV. Ext. 34/1 is Signature of PW 15 in Sale Deed (Ext. 34), CVI. Ext. 35 is Sale Deed No. 94 dt. 07.05.2008, CVII. Ext. 35/1 is Signature of P.W. 17 in 1st page of Ext. 35, CVIII. Ext. 36 is C.C. of F.I.R. of R.C. 4(A)/2010-AHD-R CIX. Ext. 37 is Charge sheet No. 08/2012 dt. 10.12.2012
30. Thereafter the appellant was examined under Section 313 of the CrPC and he denied the circumstances put forth against them.
31. However, no witness was examined on behalf of the appellant, but one document i.e. judgment and sentence dated 25.02.2022 passed in R.C. 4(A)/2010-AHD-R (B) has been marked as Ext.-A.
32. It transpires that the FIR was lodged against the appellant- Anosh Ekka and several others on the basis of order dated 04.08.2010 passed in W. P. (PIL) No. 4700 of 2008 and W. P. (PIL) No. 2222 of 2009 by the High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi.
33. Thereafter the police has submitted charge sheet against the appellant and others for the offences under Sections 120-B, 193 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 13 (2) read with 13 (1) (e) of the P. C. Act, 1988 and cognizance was taken against them. Thereafter charges were framed against the appellant and others on 19.09.2019 under Sections 120-B, 193 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 13 (2) read with 13 (1) (e) of the P. C. Act, 1988 by which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
34. It further reveals that P.W.-1, Vinay Kumar Choubey, CEO, Jharkhand, Ranchi and PW.-1(A)-Vinay Kumar Choubey, Principal Secretary, Panchayati Raj, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi has 17 proved the sanctioned order whereas P.W.-3, Narsingh Narayan Pandey, was the Secretary of the Rural Development Department and has proved the sanctioned order against the appellant- Anosh Ekka whereas P.W.-7, Sandeep Ranjan has proved the signature of the Secretary.
35. It further reveals that Ext.- 6, 6/1, 6/2, 7, 7/1, 7/2, 19/1 and 19/2 respectively are the permission granted by the Authorities concerned to sale the land in favour of Mrs. Menon Ekka. The learned Trial Court has come to conclusion that neither Halka Karmchari nor the Circle Inspector had visited the area in question nor they had verified the sites and they have submitted false report to facilitate the superior officers to grant permission to sale the land in favour of wife of the appellant- Menon Ekka.
36. Although, it has also been on record that the sellers i.e. the vendors of Menon Ekka i.e. the buyers were not the resident of the same area.
Thus, this Court finds that no illegality has been committed by the learned Court below while observing that the appellant has misused his official position in the capacity of Minister Approval, Rural Development Department and has abused and misused his official position.
37. Learned Trial Court has also given chart showing details of properties, case numbers and permission granted by DCLR and permission granted by Karamchari, Circle Inspector and Circle Officer and granted by respective DCLR.
38. From perusal of provisions of Section 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is clear that for every distinct offence for which any person is accused, there shall be separate charge and every such charge shall be tried separately.
18It is relevant to quote Section 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads as follows:-
"Section -218:- Separate charges for distinct offences. - (1) For every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge, and every such charge shall be tried separately; Provided that where the accused person, by an application in writing, so desires and the Magistrate is of opinion that such person is not likely to be prejudiced thereby, the Magistrate may try together all or any number of the charges framed against such person.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect the operation of the provisions of sections 219, 220, 221 and 223."
39. Further Sections 219 to 221 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are the exceptions to the said provision. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Nasib Singh versus State of Punjab and Another, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 89 has formulated the principles on joint trial and separate trial at paragraph 51 as follows:-
"Para-51:- From the decisions of this Court on joint trial and separate trials, the following principles can be formulated:
Para-51.1:- Section 218 provides that separate trials shall be conducted for distinct offences alleged to be committed by a person. Sections 219-221 provide exceptions to this general rule. If a person falls under these exceptions, then a joint trial for the offences which a person is charged with may be conducted. Similarly, under Section 223, a joint trial may be held for persons charged with different offences if any of the clauses in the provision are separately or on a combination satisfied.
Para-51.2:- While applying the principles enunciated in 19 Sections 218-223 on conducting joint and separate trials, the trial court should apply a two-pronged test, namely, (i) whether conducting a joint/separate trial will prejudice the defence of the accused; and/or (ii) whether conducting a joint/ separate trial would cause judicial delay. Para- 51.3:- The possibility of conducting a joint trial will have to be determined at the beginning of the trial and not after the trial based on the result of the trial. The appellate court may determine the validity of the argument that there ought to have been a separate/joint trial only based on whether the trial had prejudiced the right of accused or the prosecutrix.
Para- 51.4:- Since the provisions which engraft an exception use the phrase "may" with reference to conducting a joint trial, a separate trial is usually not contrary to law even if a joint trial could be conducted, unless proven to cause a miscarriage of justice.
Para- 51.5 A:- conviction or acquittal of the accused cannot be set aside on the mere ground that there was a possibility of a joint or a separate trial. To set aside the order of conviction or acquittal, it must be proved that the rights of the parties were prejudiced because of the joint or separate trial, as the case may be."
40. Although learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously argued that this is a case of double jeopardy and the appellant cannot be convicted for the same offence for the same set of charges.
However, this Court finds that this aspect has 20 meticulously dealt with in para-30 and 31 and onwards paragraphs of the impugned judgment where the leaned Trial Court below has given its clear finding that this is not a case of double jeopardy as charges are different, the accused persons are different and set of witnesses are also different.
41. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case State of Jharkhand through CBI Versus Lalu Prasad Yadav @ Lalu Prasad reported in (2017) 8 SCC 01 has held at para-40.8 as follows:-
"Para- 40.8:- In Monica Bedi v. State of A.P. [Monica Bedi v. State of A.P., (2011) 1 SCC 284 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 22] this Court considered the meaning of the expression "same offence" employed in Article 20(2) and observed that second prosecution and conviction must be for the same offence. If the offences are distinct, there is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable. This Court has observed thus: (SCC pp. 293 & 295, paras 26 & 29) "26. What is the meaning of the expression used in Article 20(2) "for the same offence"?
What is prohibited under Article 20(2) is, that the second prosecution and conviction must be for the same offence. If the offences are distinct, there is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable.
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29. It is thus clear that the same facts may give rise to different prosecutions and punishment and in such an event the protection afforded by Article 20(2) is not available. It is settled law that a person can be prosecuted and punished more than once even on substantially same facts provided the ingredients of both the offences are totally different and they did not form the same offence."21
42. Thus, the above judgment supports the case of CBI by which it has held that there is no question of double jeopardy for the same offence, if offences are distinct. This supports the case of the CBI.
43. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Neera Yadav v. CBI reported in (2017) 8 SCC 757, Para- 55, 56, 57 and 63 to 73 as follows:-
Para-55:-. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Manoj Narula v. Union of India [Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1] , held that corruption erodes the fundamental tenets of the rule of law and quoted with approval its judgment in Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal v. State of Maharashtra [Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 642 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 737 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 187] , it was held as under: (Manoj Narula case [Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1] , SCC pp. 25-26, para 16) "16. ... '26. It can be stated without any fear of contradiction that corruption is not to be judged by degree, for corruption mothers disorder, destroys societal will to progress, accelerates undeserved ambitions, kills the conscience, jettisons the glory of the institutions, paralyses the economic health of a country, corrodes the sense of civility and mars the marrows of governance.' (Niranjan Hemchandra case [Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 642 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 737 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 187] , SCC pp. 654-55, para 26)"
Para-56:-. In Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh [Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1041 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 666] , it was held as under: (SCC p. 100, para 68) "68. Today, corruption in our country not only poses a grave danger to the concept of constitutional governance, it also threatens the very foundation of the Indian democracy and the Rule of Law. The magnitude of corruption in our public life is incompatible with the concept of a socialist secular democratic republic. It cannot be disputed that where corruption begins all rights end. Corruption devalues human rights, chokes development and undermines justice, liberty, equality, fraternity which are the core values in our Preambular vision. Therefore, the duty of the court is that any anti-corruption law has to be 22 interpreted and worked out in such a fashion as to strengthen the fight against corruption. ..."
Para-57:- In K.C. Sareen v. CBI [K.C. Sareen v. CBI, (2001) 6 SCC 584 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1186] , it was observed: (SCC p. 589, para 12) "12. Corruption by public servants has now reached a monstrous dimension in India. Its tentacles have started grappling even the institutions created for the protection of the republic. Unless those tentacles are intercepted and impeded from gripping the normal and orderly functioning of the public offices, through strong legislative, executive as well as judicial exercises the corrupt public servants could even paralyse the functioning of such institutions and thereby hinder the democratic polity. ..."
Para-63:-. . In Special Case No. 28 of 2002 for the conviction of the appellant Neera Yadav under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years with a fine of Rs 1,00,000 with default clause. In Special Trial No. 19 of 2002 for conviction under Section 120-B IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, appellant Neera Yadav was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years with a fine of Rs 50,000 and similar imprisonment for conviction under Section 120-B IPC [Ed.: See Rajiv Kumar v. State of U.P., (2017) 8 SCC 791] . Para-64:-. Mr Viswanathan, the learned Senior Counsel also submitted that even though the conviction of the appellant is in two different cases, involving two different transactions, in exercise of power of discretion, the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon the appellant Neera Yadav in the above two cases may be ordered to run concurrently. It was submitted that the direction to order sentences to run concurrently can be passed by the appellate court. In support of his contention, the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance upon Nagaraja Rao v. CBI [Nagaraja Rao v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 302 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 589] and V.K. Bansal v. State of Haryana [V.K. Bansal v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 211 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 498 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 282] .
Para-65:-. On behalf of CBI, learned Solicitor General Mr Ranjit Kumar submitted that the conviction of the appellant relates to two different transactions -- one abusing the appellant's official position to get the plots allotted to herself and her two daughters and one conspiring with Rajiv Kumar to get him allotment of a plot and the irregularities committed thereon, and therefore, the sentences imposed upon the appellant cannot be ordered to run concurrently. Para-66:-. Section 31 CrPC relates to the quantum of punishment that the court has jurisdiction to pass where the accused is convicted of two or more offences at one trial (joinder of charges at one trial 23 vide Sections 218-223 CrPC). Where accused is convicted and sentenced for several offences at one trial, the court may direct that the sentences shall run concurrently. In the absence of such direction by the court, sentences shall run consecutively. It is not obligatory for the trial court to direct in all cases that the sentences shall run concurrently. Para-67:-. This Court considered the scope of Section 31 CrPC and concurrent or consecutive running of sentence in O.M. Cherian v. State of Kerala [O.M. Cherian v. State of Kerala, (2015) 2 SCC 501 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 123] . The appellant thereon was convicted for the offences under Section 498-A and Section 306 IPC. The trial court ordered substantive sentences imposed on the appellant thereon to run consecutively and the same was affirmed [O.M. Cherian v. State of Kerala, 2013 SCC OnLine Ker 22312] by the High Court. Considering the scope of Section 31 CrPC and the discretion of the court in directing concurrent running of sentences, this Court directed sentences to run concurrently. It was held as under: (SCC pp. 509 & 511, paras 10, 12 &
20) "10. Section 31 CrPC relates to the quantum of punishment which may be legally passed when there is (a) one trial, and (b) the accused is convicted of "two or more offences". Section 31 CrPC says that subject to the provisions of Section 71 IPC, the court may pass separate sentences for two or more offences of which the accused is found guilty, but the aggregate punishment must not exceed the limit fixed in provisos (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 31 CrPC. In Section 31(1) CrPC, since the word "may" is used, in our considered view, when a person is convicted for two or more offences at one trial, the court may exercise its discretion in directing that the sentence for each offence may either run consecutively or concurrently subject to the provisions of Section 71 IPC. But the aggregate must not exceed the limit fixed in provisos (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 31 CrPC, that is; (i) it should not exceed 14 years; and (ii) it cannot exceed twice the maximum imprisonment awardable by the sentencing court for a single offence.
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12. The words in Section 31 CrPC '... sentence him for such offences, to the several punishments prescribed therefor which such court is competent to inflict; such punishments when consisting of imprisonment to commence the one after the expiration of the other in such order as the court may direct' indicate that in case the court directs sentences to run one after the other, the court has to specify the order in which the sentences are to run. If the court directs running of sentences concurrently, order of running of sentences is not required to be mentioned. Discretion to order running of sentences concurrently or consecutively is judicial 24 discretion of the court which is to be exercised as per the established law of sentencing. The court before exercising its discretion under Section 31 CrPC is required to consider the totality of the facts and circumstances of those offences against the accused while deciding whether sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently.
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20. Under Section 31 CrPC it is left to the full discretion of the court to order the sentences to run concurrently in case of conviction for two or more offences. It is difficult to lay down any straitjacket approach in the matter of exercise of such discretion by the courts. By and large, trial courts and appellate courts have invoked and exercised their discretion to issue directions for concurrent running of sentences, favouring the benefit to be given to the accused. Whether a direction for concurrent running of sentences ought to be issued in a given case would depend upon the nature of the offence or offences committed and the facts and circumstances of the case. The discretion has to be exercised along the judicial lines and not mechanically."
(emphasis supplied) Para-68:-. Section 31 CrPC deals with quantum of punishment which may be legally passed when there is: (a) one trial; and (b) the accused is convicted of two or more offences. The ambit of Section 31 is wide, covering not only a single transaction constituting two or more offences but also offences arising out of two or more transactions provided that those transactions/charges were framed together at one trial. Para-69:-. Section 31 relates to the quantum of the punishment that the court has jurisdiction to pass that the accused is convicted of two or more offences at one trial. Section 427 CrPC deals with sentence passed on an offender who is already sentenced for another offence. The power conferred on the court under Section 427 to order concurrent sentence is discretionary. The salutary principle adopted by the court is the totality of the sentences. The maximum sentence awarded in one case against the same accused is relevant consideration while giving concurrent sentence in another case. The policy of the legislature is that normally the sentencing should be done consecutively. Only in appropriate cases, considering the facts of the case, the court can make the sentence concurrently with an earlier sentence imposed. A person sentenced to imprisonment must, for the purpose of Section 427 CrPC, be deemed to be undergoing that sentence from the very moment the sentence is passed. The accused may be on bail or in custody in the earlier case at the time of passing of the subsequent sentence. Para-70:- The sentencing court has the discretion to direct concurrency. The investiture of such discretion, presupposes that it will be exercised on sound principles and not on whims. In the Criminal Procedure Code, there are no guidelines or specific provisions to 25 suggest under what circumstances the various sentences of imprisonment shall be directed to run concurrently or consecutively. There is no straitjacket formula for the court to follow in the matter of issue or refusal of a direction within the contemplation of Section 427(1) CrPC. Whether or not a direction ought to be issued in a given case would depend upon the nature of the offence or offences committed. In para 69 in K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan [K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan, (2005) 1 SCC 754 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 451] , contains a discussion on the topic. To quote: (SCC p. 785) "69. In the case of the respondent, the Magistrate ordered that the sentence on various counts shall run consecutively. That does not mean that the respondent had been convicted of any offence, for which the sentence of imprisonment is two years or more. The direction for the sentence to run concurrently or consecutively is a direction as to the mode in which the sentence is to be executed. That does not affect the nature of the sentence. It is also important to note that in the Code of Criminal Procedure, there are no guidelines or specific provisions to suggest under what circumstances the various sentences of imprisonment shall be directed to run concurrently or consecutively. There are no judicial decisions, to my knowledge, by superior courts laying down the guidelines as to what should be the criteria for directing the convict to undergo imprisonment on various counts concurrently or consecutively. In certain cases, if the person convicted is a habitual offender and he had been found guilty of offences on various counts and it is suspected that he would be a menace if he is let loose on the society, then the court would direct that such person shall undergo the imprisonment consecutively. ..."
(emphasis supplied) Para-71:-. It is well settled that where there are different transactions, different crime numbers and cases have been decided by different judgments, concurrent sentences cannot be awarded under Section 427 CrPC. In Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector of Customs [Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector of Customs, (1988) 4 SCC 183 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 921] , it was held as under: (SCC p. 187, paras 10 & 12) "10. The basic rule of thumb over the years has been the so-called single transaction rule for concurrent sentences. If a given transaction constitutes two offences under two enactments generally, it is wrong to have consecutive sentences. It is proper and legitimate to have concurrent sentences. But this rule has no application if the transaction relating to offences is not the same or the facts constituting the two offences are quite different.
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12. The submission, in our opinion, appears to be misconceived. The material produced by the State unmistakably indicates that the two 26 offences for which the appellant was prosecuted are quite distinct and different. The case under the Customs Act may, to some extent, overlap the case under the Gold (Control) Act, but it is evidently on different transactions. The complaint under the Gold (Control) Act relates to possession of 7000 tolas of primary gold prohibited under Section 8 of the said Act. The complaint under the Customs Act is with regard to smuggling of gold worth Rs 12.5 crores and export of silver worth Rs 11.5 crores. On these facts, the courts are not unjustified in directing that the sentences should be consecutive and not concurrent." Para-72:-. The above general rule that there cannot be concurrency of sentence if conviction relates to two different transactions, can be changed by an order of the court. There is no straitjacket formula for the court to follow in the matter of issue or refusal of a direction within the contemplation of Section 427(1) CrPC. Depending on the special and peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it is for the court to make the sentence of imprisonment in the subsequent trial run concurrently with the sentence in the previous one. In Benson v. State of Kerala [Benson v. State of Kerala, (2016) 10 SCC 307 : (2017) 1 SCC (Cri) 108] , this Court directed the substantive sentences imposed on the appellant to run concurrently. In V.K. Bansal v. State of Haryana [V.K. Bansal v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 211 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 498 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 282] , some sentences were to run concurrently and some consecutively. In paras 14 and 16 in V.K. Bansal case [V.K. Bansal v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 211 :
(2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 498 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 282] , it was held as under: (SCC p. 217) "14. We may at this stage refer to the decision of this Court in Mohd.
Akhtar Hussain v. Collector of Customs [Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector of Customs, (1988) 4 SCC 183 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 921] in which this Court recognised the basic rule of convictions arising out of a single transaction justifying concurrent running of the sentences. The following passage is in this regard apposite: (SCC p. 187, para 10) '10. The basic rule of thumb over the years has been the so-called single transaction rule for concurrent sentences. If a given transaction constitutes two offences under two enactments generally, it is wrong to have consecutive sentences. It is proper and legitimate to have concurrent sentences. But this rule has no application if the transaction relating to offences is not the same or the facts constituting the two offences are quite different.'
16. In conclusion, we may say that the legal position favours exercise of discretion to the benefit of the prisoner in cases where the prosecution is based on a single transaction no matter different complaints in relation thereto may have been filed as is the position in 27 cases involving dishonour of cheques issued by the borrower towards repayment of a loan to the creditor."
Para-73:-. This instant case is one covered under Section 427 CrPC. As noted earlier appellant Neera Yadav has been convicted in two different cases, one of abusing the official position in getting the plots allotted to herself and her daughters and other irregularities in making changes in the site plan and another one in abusing her position as CEO, Noida conspired with Rajiv Kumar in allotting plot to him. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the nature of allegations, in our view, it is not justifiable to direct concurrency of sentence. Any unprincipled exercise of judicial discretion and casual direction made regarding concurrency would go against the express provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the Criminal Procedure Code.
44. Thus the above judgment supports the stand of the C.B.I.
45. Even from perusal of Ext.-A, which is certified copy of the judgment and sentence dated 25.02.2020 passed in RC Case No. 04 (A)/2010-AHD-R (B), this Court finds that there were seven (7) accused persons including the appellant-Anosh Ekka and his wife Menon Ekka and they were charged for the offence under Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 13 (2) read with 13 (1)
(e) of the P. C. Act, 1988 and even the prosecution had examined 153 witnesses whereas in the instance case, the prosecution got examined only 18 witnesses.
46. In the above case, the prosecution had proved volumes of documents marked as Ext.-I to Ext.-122 respectively and even some Material Exhibits were marked and defence had also got examined 141 defence witnesses and thus this Court finds that the learned Trial Court has correctly opined that this case is different from the case of RC Case No. 04(A)/2010-AHD-R(B), which was marked as Ext.-A as defence documents on behalf of the appellant- Anosh Ekka and others.
2847. It further reveals that P.W.-5, Sabita Devi, P.W.-6, Lakeshwar Oraon and P.W.-9, Sadho Oraon are the Mukhia of villages namely Karma panchayat, Irba Panchayat and Neori Panchayat respectively during the period in the year 2010-15 and they had stated that Menon Ekka wife of the appellant- Anosh Ekka is neither lived/living in their panchayat nor any parental properties are situated in their villages falling in their panchayats.
48. It transpires that Ext. 21 is Sale deed dated 27.03.2006 executed in favour of Smt. Menon Ekka i.e. wife of the appellant- Anosh Ekka and 22 Kathas of land at Ranchi was transferred in favour of the wife of the appellant, Smt. Menon Ekka by one Gutwa Oraon and Chedu Oraon and Others on payment of consideration amount of Rs. 1,85,000/-.
49. It transpires that Ext 22 is Sale Deed dated 04.12.2006 executed in favour of Smt. Menon Ekka i.e. wife of the appellant- Anosh Ekka and 2.32 acres of land at Ranchi was transferred in favour of the wife of the appellant, Smt. Menon Ekka by one Kalua Munda and Others on payment of consideration amount of Rs. 3,92,080/-.
50. It transpires that Ext. 23 is Sale Deed dated 15.10.2007 executed in favour of Smt. Menon Ekka i.e. wife of the appellant- Anosh Ekka and 3.05 acres of land at Ranchi was transferred in favour of the wife of the appellant, Smt. Menon Ekka by one Ram Kishun Munda and Others on payment of consideration amount of Rs. 9,77,000/-.
51. It transpires that Ext. 24 is Sale Deed dated 15.10.2007 executed in favour of Smt. Menon Ekka i.e. wife of the appellant- Anosh Ekka and 4.06 acres of land at Ranchi was transferred in favour of the wife of the appellant, Smt. Menon Ekka by one Nanku 29 Munda and Others on payment of consideration amount of Rs. 14,04,000/-.
52. It transpires that Ext. 25 is Sale Deed 10.08.2007 executed in favour of Smt. Menon Ekka i.e. wife of the appellant- Anosh Ekka and 2.52 acres of land at Ranchi was transferred in favour of the wife of the appellant, Smt. Menon Ekka by one Kalua Munda and Others on payment of consideration amount of Rs. 11,00,000/-.
53. It transpires that Ext. 26 is Sale Deed dated 10.08.2007, executed in favour of Smt. Menon Ekka i.e. wife of the appellant- Anosh Ekka and 3.78 acres of land at Ranchi was transferred in favour of the wife of the appellant, Smt. Menon Ekka by one Kalua Munda and Others on payment of consideration amount of Rs. 13,00,000/-.
Thus, total 6.30 acres of land were acquired on 10.08.2007 in favour of the wife of the appellant, Smt. Menon Ekka on consideration amount of Rs. 24,00,000/- of her vendors.
54. It transpires that Ext. 27 is Sale Deed dated 29.11.2006 executed in favour of Smt. Menon Ekka i.e. wife of the appellant- Anosh Ekka and 84 decimals of land at Ranchi was transferred in favour of the wife of the appellant, Smt. Menon Ekka by one Ram Kishun Munda and Others on payment of consideration amount of Rs. 1,41,960/-.
55. It transpires that Ext. 28 is Sale Deed dated 29.10.2007 and Ext. 29 is Sale Deed dated 02.11.2007 executed in favour of Smt. Menon Ekka i.e. wife of the appellant- Anosh Ekka and 83 decimals of land and 38 decimals of land at Ranchi was transferred in favour of the wife of the appellant, Smt. Menon Ekka by one Jagnu Munda and Others on payment of consideration amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- and Rs. 87,500/- respectively.
3056. It transpires that Ext. 30 is Sale Deed dated 29.11.2006 and Ext. 31 is Sale Deed dated 29.11.2006 executed in favour of Smt. Menon Ekka i.e. wife of the appellant- Anosh Ekka and 39 decimals of land and 88 decimals of land at Ranchi was transferred in favour of the wife of the appellant, Smt. Menon Ekka by one Nanku Munda and Others on payment of consideration amount of Rs. 66,000/- and Rs. 1,48,720/- respectively.
57. It transpires that Ext. 32 is Sale Deed dated 16.01.2008 executed in favour of Smt. Menon Ekka i.e. wife of the appellant- Anosh Ekka and 1.74 acres of land at Ranchi was transferred in favour of the wife of the appellant, Smt. Menon Ekka by one Albinus Tirkey and Others on payment of consideration amount of Rs. 19,75,000/-.
58. It transpires that Ext. 33 is Sale Deed dated 23.10.2007 executed in favour of Smt. Menon Ekka i.e. wife of the appellant- Anosh Ekka and 1.09 acres of land at Ranchi was transferred in favour of the wife of the appellant, Smt. Menon Ekka by one Divya Tirkey wife of Albinus Tirkey on payment of consideration amount of Rs. 2,21,000/-.
59. It transpires that Ext. 34 is Sale Deed dated 10.05.2008 executed in favour of Smt. Menon Ekka i.e. wife of the appellant- Anosh Ekka and 5 decimals of land at Ranchi was transferred in favour of the wife of the appellant, Smt. Menon Ekka by one Anuj Kumar Tiru on payment of consideration amount of Rs. 7,60,000/-.
60. It transpires that Ext. 35 is Sale Deed dated 07.05.2008 executed in favour of Smt. Menon Ekka i.e. wife of the appellant- Anosh Ekka and 4 decimals of land at Ranchi was transferred in favour of the wife of the appellant, Smt. Menon Ekka by one Anupam 31 Tiru on payment of consideration amount of Rs. 6,12,000/-.
61. Therefore, it is evident that the appellant -Anosh Ekka while he was Minister of Rural Development Department and Rural Engineering Department got big chunk of land transferred in the name of his wife Smt. Menon Ekka to the extent of 22 Kathas of land, 2.32 acres of land, 3.05 acres of land, 4.06 acres of land, 2.52 acres of land, 3.78 acres of land, 84 decimals of land, 83 decimals of land, 38 decimals of land 39 decimals of land, 88 decimals of land, 1.74 acres of land, 1.09 acres of land, 5 decimals of land and 4 decimals of land respectively on the payments as mentioned above by misusing his official position and by influencing them.
The above details of such properties mentioned at para-2 of the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court below.
62. It further transpires that P.W.-11, Jainath Munda, P.W.-12 Sunita Minz, P.W.-13, Kinuwa Oraon, P.W.-14, Parwati Devi, P.W.-15, Anuj Kumar Tiru, PW-16. Albinus Tirkey and PW-17, Anupam Tiru are the vendors of the wife of the appellant and who have supported the execution of the aforesaid lands in favour of Smt. Menon Ekka i.e. the wife of the appellant on different dates as mentioned above. Although they have stated that they were not aware the appellant and consequences of transferring their land in favour of the wife of the appellant.
63. It further transpires that the appellant -Anosh Ekka had exercised his influence over the other co-convict of this case at the time of obtaining permission from the office of LRDC and also in connivance with the Halka Karmchari (i.e. Revenue Karmachari) namely Mani Lal Mahto, Circle Inspector- Firoz Akhtar, Raj Kishore Singh, LRDC, Kartik Kumar Prabhat and Rati Kant Shukla.
3264. P.W-1 and P.W-1A is Vinay Kumar Choubey, CEO, Jharkhand, Ranchi and Principal Secretary, Panchayati Raj, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi has been examined on the point of proving sanctioned order of Brajesh Mishra i.e. co-convict, Manilal Mahto i.e. co-convict, Goverdhan Baitha i.e. co-convict, Parshuram Kerketta, Circle Inspector (Trial separated due to Hospitalization) .
65. P.W-2, Kumar Binod Social Worker and Complainant and Informant of this case, who has proved his Complaint Petition marked as Ext.-2 and he has instituted the case against the appellant- Anosh Ekka and one Hari Narayan Rai for purchasing the land in violation of CNT Act and also got license of various Companies.
66. P.W-3, Narsingh Narayan Pandey, then Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department and he has been examined on the point of proving sanctioned order against co-convict- Raj Kishore Singh, then Circle Inspector, co-convict- Firoz Akhtar, then circle Inspector, Sunil Bharti, then Circle Inspector and Anil Kumar, then Circle Inspector.
67. P.W-4, Ashok Kumar is Bench Clerk at Deputy Commissioner Court, Ranchi and who has proved the Enquiry Report of permission marked as Ext.- 4 to 4/4, Ext.-5 to 5/2, Ext.- 6 to 6/2, Ext.- 7 to 7/2, Ext.- 8 to 8/2, Ext.- 9 to 9/3, Ext.-10 to 10/2, Ext. 11 to 11/2, Ext. 12 to 12/2, Ext. -13 to 13/2, Ext. -14 to 14/2, Ext. -15 to 15/2, Ext. -16 to 16/2 are the case records of permission cases and also signatures of Halka Karamchari and Circle Inspectors.
68. Ext. -17 is the letter of office of Deputy Commissioner, of the letter dated 20.10.2010 sent to CBI, Ranchi by then Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi.
Ext.-17/1 is the signature of Letter No. 1080 dated 19.05.2011.
3369. Ext.-18 to 18/4 are the records of the permission case and the signature of Circle Inspector and Revenue Karamchari in the Enquiry Report.
Ext.-19 is the records of the permission case.
Ext. 19/1, 19/2 and 19/3 are the signature of Revenue Karamchari, Circle Inspector.
70. P.W.-4 A is same Ashok Kumar, who has proved the signature of the accused Parshuram Kerketta marked as Ext.-17/1, Ext.-18/1 and Ext.-19/1 respectively.
71. P.W-5 is Sabita Devi, Mukhiya Karma Panchayat, P.W-6 is Lakeshwar Oraon, Mukhiya, Irba Panchayat & Cultivator and P.W.-9 is Sadho Oraon, Mukhiya Neori Panchayat/Cultivation, and they have stated that Smt. Menon Ekka, wife of the appellant has never lived in their respective villages namely Karma, Hutup, Rukka, Siyatoli, Bantoli and Irba, Pahantoli, Bartoli and Koilari within Ormanjhi P. S and Neori, Bantoli, Kenduatoli and Vikash village and they also stated that Smt. Menon Ekka, wife of the appellant has not got any ancestral properties in their respective villages.
72. P.W.-8 and P.W.-8A is Sahdeo Mehra, who was Sub- Registrar, Ranchi from 28.05.2007 to 24.01.2012 and has proved the registered Sale Deed marked as Ext.-21 to Ext.-35 respectively executed in favour of Smt. Menon Ekka, wife of the appellant by different vendors on payment of consideration amount as has been mentioned in para-2 of the impugned judgment.
73. P.W.-10 is Shailendra Kumar Ambashta , who has proved the signature of Manilal Mahto, Halka Karmarchari, Raj Kishore Singh, Circle Inspector, Ram Kumar Mandal, Circle Officer, Firoz Akhtar, Circle Inspector, Ram Kumar Mandal, Circle Officer, Manilal Mahto, Revenue Karamchari, Firoz Akhtar, Circle Inspector, Manilal Mahto, 34 Revenue Karamchari, Brijesh Mishra, Circle Inspector, Manilal Mahto, Revenue Karamchari Brijesh Mishra, Circle Inspector, Ram Kumar Mandal, Circle Officer, Manilal Mahto, Revenue Karamchari, Raj Kishore Singh, Circle Inspector, Ram Kumar Mandal, Circle Officer, Manilal Mahto, Revenue Karamchari, Raj Kishore Singh, Circle Inspector, Ram Kumar Mandal, Circle Officer, Manilal Mahto, Revenue Karamchari, Raj Kishore Singh, Circle Inspector, Ram Kumar Mandal, Circle Officer marked as Ext .-5/3, Ext/5/4, Ext. 5/1, Ext.-6/4, Ext.-6/1, Ext.-7/3, Ext.-7/4, Ext.-8/3, Ext.-8/4, Ext.-9/4, Ext.- 9/5, Ext.-9/1, Ext.-10/3, Ext.-10/4, 10/1, Ext.-13/3, Ext.-13/4, Ext.- 13/1, Ext.- 14/3, Ext.-14/4 and Ext.-14/1 respectively.
74. P.W.-11 , Jainath Munda, P.W.12, Sunita Minz, P.W.-13, Kinuwa Oraon, P.W.-14, Parwati Devi, P.W.-15, Anuj Kumar Tiru, P.W.-16 is Albinus Tirkey, P.W.-17 is Anupam Tiru are the vendors of the land and they have stated that Smt. Menon Ekka, wife of the appellant was not the resident of their respective villages.
75. P.W.-18 is Ashesh Kumar, who is the part IO of this case and has submitted charge sheet against the appellant marked as Ext.-37 for the offences under Sections 120-B, 193 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 13 (2) read with 13 (1) (e) of the P. C. Act, 1988.
Thus, from the evidence of P.W.-18, Ashesh Kumar, it is evident that huge lands were transferred in the name of Smt. Menon Ekka i.e. the wife of the appellant through various sale deeds marked as Ext.-21 to Ext.-35 respectively on various consideration amount.
76. From going through the impugned judgments and records of this case, it is evident that the appellant Anosh Ekka after he became the Minister, had opened Construction Company and got Registered in Rural Development Department. It has come during the investigation 35 that in the Rural Development Department, he got registered Company in the name of M/s Mahamaya Construction and M/s Ekka Construction and in which his wife Smt. Menon Ekka was a major share holder of the same Firm and the said Firm was registered as Class-I A Contractor by the Rural Works Department (erstwhile REO) although she did not fulfil the eligibility criteria.
77. Thus, this Court finds that prima facie no case of suspension of sentence is made out.
78. In view of the above, this Court finds that there is no merit in this case and hence the prayer for bail of the appellant- Anosh Ekka is, hereby, rejected.
79. Accordingly, I. A. No. 13857 of 2025 is dismissed and stands disposed of.
(Sanjay Prasad, J.) Dated 18.12.2025 Kamlesh/ 36