Telangana High Court
T. Prabhakar Rao vs The State Of Telangana on 2 May, 2025
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE J. SREENIVAS RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION No.4207 of 2025
ORDER:
This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, 'BNSS') by the petitioner/accused No.1, seeking anticipatory bail in PRC No. 260 of 2024 on the file of the XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad (Crime No. 243 of 2024 of Panjagutta Police Station, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 166, 409, 427, 201, 120(B) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'IPC'), Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (for short 'PDPP Act') and Sections 65, 66, 66(F)(1)(B)(2) and 70 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (for short 'I.T.Act').
2. The case of prosecution in brief is that on 10.03.2024 at 13.45 hours Sri D.Ramesh, Additional Superintendent of Police, Special Investigation Branch (SIB), Telangana State, Hyderabad lodged English written complaint in which he reported that during his tenure, the accused person D.Praneeth Kumar @ Praneeth Rao joined SIB as an Inspector in 2018 and got accelerated promotion as Deputy Superintendent of Police in 2 2023. He came to know that Praneeth Kumar occupied three rooms, which were exclusively given to SOT along with 11 officers, 17 systems, 2 laptops, 3 hard disks, 8 pen drives and 2 phone numbers issued to Special Officers Team (SOT). They were also given a dedicated leased line with internet connection through which he developed profiles of unknown persons and monitored the same clandestinely. During 2024, complainant D.Ramesh noticed about the disappearance of records, both physical and electronic form from SIB. On their enquiry, they came to know that accused No.2 abused his official position and used to always copy intelligence information into his personal drives illegally most likely with the collusion of his unknown associates in order to shield his criminal acts and also resorted to erasing of the entire information by the way of removing hard disks and destroying them. Further, the complainant stated that on 4th December, 2023, accused No.2 turned off the Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras and destroyed old hard drives, containing data gathered over the decades which clandestinely obtained from him. He replaced the new hard drives in place of old drives. Hence, the complainant requested for necessary action against accused No.2 and others. Based on the said 3 complaint, the present crime was registered for the aforesaid offences.
3. Heard Sri T.Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, representing Sri V.Surender Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Siddarth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel, representing Sri Palle Nageshwara Rao, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-State.
4. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has not committed any offence, as alleged against him, and the petitioner is a senior citizen, aged about 65 years and retired as Inspector General of Police (IPS) in June, 2020 after completion of his unblemished service for a period of 30 years. After his superannuation, he discharged his duties as Chief of Operations in SIB. The petitioner is having vast experience of working in SIB even prior to 2014 and during his tenure, his significant contribution in curtailing the left-wing extremism and Islamic terroristic activities in the State and in the country. The State and Central Government recognized his services and he was awarded Indian Police Medal in 2012, Indian Police Medal for Gallantry in 2016, President's Police Medal for distinguished service in 2019 and Union Home Minister's Medal 4 for collection of top-quality intelligence inputs in 2019 while he was working as Inspector General of Police in SIB. He was falsely implicated in the present crime as accused No.1. 4.1. He further submitted that the police registered the Crime No.243 of 2024 on 10.03.2024 based on the report lodged by one D.Ramesh, Additional Superintendent of Police, SIB, Hyderabad, who alleged to have reported the destruction of certain official records and equipment in addition to erasing of electronic data by one D.Praneeth Kumar, Deputy Superintendent of Police, SIB, who was shown as accused along with unknown other accused. He further submitted that there are no allegations against the petitioner in the complaint dated 10.03.2024 and he was not made as an accused in the present crime. Subsequently, the investigation agency filed memo dated 29.04.2024 before XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad adding the petitioner as accused No.1. 4.2. He also submitted that the petitioner has submitted his resignation on 04.12.2023 and on the very same day, the in- charge Officer was appointed to the post of Chief of Operations in SIB and his resignation was accepted on 11.12.2023. Even 5 before the petitioner was added as accused through memo dated 29.04.2024, he left India for his treatment.
4.3. He further submitted that the main accusation against the petitioner is that while he worked as Inspector General of Police/Chief of Operations in SIB along with accused Nos.2 to 4, who are also working in SIB/Intelligence, developed the profiles of several persons unauthorizedly to intercept their telephonic communications etc., to help the then ruling party and that accused No.4 was involved in illegal acts/omissions by acting upon the information, which was collected by accused Nos.2 to 4.
4.4. He further submitted that the only allegations made in the complaint that the petitioner with collusion of other accused destructed important and sensitive information is not true and correct. The petitioner resigned to his post on 04.12.2023 and he left the office at 4-00 p.m. and on the very same day another Officer was appointed in his place. 4.5. He further submitted that there is no direct evidence of record linking the petitioner to the alleged crime and only basing on the statement given by the SIB Officials, implicated the 6 petitioner as accused No.1. He also submitted that based on the confessional statements given by the accused No.2, the petitioner was implicated in the present crime as accused No.1 and the same is not permissible under law.
4.6. He further submitted that the allegations made in the complaint that the petitioner has destructed the sensitive information of SIB and the product of hard work of hundreds of police officers is lost, is absolutely false. Any destruction of interception records was always done following due process prescribed in SOP of Department of Telegraphs communicated by Ministry of Home Affairs as confirmed in the affidavits filed by the Union Home Secretary and Principal Secretary of Home, Government of Telangana. He further submitted that deletion/erasing the interception records was at the instance of the competent authority only and the petitioner has nothing to do with the said destruction. As on the date of destruction, the petitioner has resigned the said post and the same was done subsequently. With an intention to implicate the petitioner as accused, it was alleged that the destruction of the records was done at the instance of the petitioner and the same is not true and correct.
74.7. As per the provisions of The Indian Telegraph, 1885 and Indian Telegraphic Rules, 1951, (for short 'the Rules') only the Review Committee is having the power to intercept the telephonic messages. As per Rule 419-A of sub-Rule 17 of the Rules, the Review Committee is having power to issue necessary directions and as per Rule 18 of the Rules, the Review Committee has to issue directions for interception and to delete the messages by the relevant competent authority and the authorized security only. The petitioner is not having any authority or competency to delete or destroy the intercepted messages. As per the norms of the Review Committee, the Committee has to conduct meeting for every six months and the said Committee has to conduct meeting in the month of January, 2024, however, the same was pre-poned to 02.12.2023. Whereas the petitioner resigned to his post on 04.12.2023. On the very same day, he left the office at 4-00 p.m. and another Officer was appointed and taken charge on the very same day. The alleged destruction is subsequent to his resignation. It clearly shows that the alleged destructions are at the instructions given by the Review Committee.
84.8. Admittedly, the petitioner has already resigned his post on 04.12.2023 and on the very same day, in-charge officer was appointed and the resignation was accepted on 11.12.2023 and the record further reveals that the alleged destruction of data was done, subsequent to the Review Committee meeting on 02.12.2023. Hence, the ingredients of Sections 166, 409, 427, 201, 120(B) read with Section 34 of IPC, Section 3 of PDPP Act and Sections 65, 66, 66(F)(1)(B)(2) and 70 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 are not attracted against the petitioner. 4.9. He further submitted that the Government issued G.O.Rt.No.1671, General Administration (Special.B) Department, dated 19.12.2023, wherein one Smt.B.Sumathi, IPS was transferred and posted as Deputy Inspector General of Police, SIB, Intelligence in the existing vacancy. He further submitted that upon the letter dated 06.12.2023 issued by the Nodal Officer, Reliance Jio Info Communications Limited, to Smt.B.Sumathi, IPS, Deputy Inspector General of Police, wherein it was stated that they have receipt request letters from legal interception of Mobile/IMEI/ILD numbers and they sought authenticity of the said letter. Thereafter, the complaint was lodged by LW.1-D.Ramesh, Additional Superintendent of Police, 9 SIB, on 10.03.2024 against accused No.2 and others. In the said complaint, there are no specific allegations against the petitioner and he was made as accused No.1 based on the confessional statement of accused No.2.
4.10. He further submitted that new Government came into existence on 07.12.2023 and after lapse of more than three months, the alleged complaint was filed on 10.03.2024 and basing on the same, the present crime was registered with an oblique motive. He further submitted that LW.69 filed memo before the Court below implicating the petitioner as well as accused No.6 on 29.04.2024, basing on the statement given by LW.2, who in her statement stated about the promotion of the petitioner. LW.3 in his statement stated that as per the instructions of accused No.2, out of 50 new hard disks, they used 36 hard disks to replace the hard disks of 17 computers and two laptops of accused No.2's SOT, 7 computer systems of accused No.4, Addl. S.P. team, 8 computer systems of CAT, one system of social media lab and one system of CC/PA of Prabhakar Rao (A1) under the instructions of accused No.2 on 04.12.2023. On the same day, they were made to remove 26 hard disks from the main server of SIB and replaced the same 10 with 7 new hard disks. Basing on the statements given by LWs.2 to 4, 7, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, which were recorded by the police under Section 161 of Cr.P.C., the petitioner is an accused and the said statements are inadmissible into evidence. 4.11. He further submitted that the petitioner is not a member in the Review Committee. Solely based on the Review Committee proposals, the destruction has taken place. The petitioner is no way concerned with the interception done on the instructions of the Revenue Committee. In the absence of any report from the Review Committee, the allegation against the petitioner that on his instructions only, the other officers destructed the data, is not reliable according to the provisions of the Indian Telegraph Act and Rules made there under. 4.12 He further submitted that the Investigating Officers after completion of investigation filed charge sheet and the same was numbered as PRC No.260 of 2024 on the file of the XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. The petitioner is ready and willing to come to India and to cooperate with the investigation. He also submitted that the very same allegations are levelled against accused No.6, who approached this Court and filed anticipatory bail application and the same 11 was dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, accused No.6 had approached the Hon'ble Apex Court and filed SLP, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court granted interim protection to accused No.6 to come back India and accused Nos.1 and 6 were stand on the very same footing. Therefore, the petitioner is also entitled for the same order.
4.13. In support of his Contentions, he relied upon the following Judgments:
1. Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others v. State of Punjab 1;
2. Smt. Parisha Trivedi and another v. State of Chhattisgarh (MCRCA No. 944 of 2024);
3. N. Raghavender v. State of Andhra Pradesh, CBI 2;
4. Sushila Aggarwal and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another 3; and
5. Common Cause v. Union of India 4
5. Sri Siddarth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent State, submitted that the petitioner has committed a grave offence and a crime was registered on 10.03.2024. The petitioner booked tickets to go to USA on 07.05.2024, however, it was pre-poned and he left India on 11.03.2024. Since 1 (1980) 2 SCC 565 2 (2021) 18 SCC 70 3 (2020) 5 SCC 1 4 (1999) 6 SCC 667 12 11.03.2024, the petitioner was absconding. The petitioner conspired along with other accused on 04.12.2023 and switched off CCTV cameras, removed 36 hard disks from the SOT, CAT and another team systems and replaced them with new hard disks, subsequently, they removed 26 hard disks and replaced them with 7 new hard disks from the main server of SIB. Later on all these hard disks, which contains the confidential data was destroyed.
5.1. He further submitted that the petitioner is hale and healthy and therefore, after his retirement he was appointed as Chief of Operations (Intelligence), SIB, on 01.07.2022 and he continued in the said post up to 04.12.2023. He has not filed any documents in support of his contention that he is suffering with tongue cancer. The documents which are filed by the petitioner is prior to his appointment in the post of Chief of Operations (Intelligence) SIB. There are specific allegations levelled against the petitioner to attract the ingredients of Section 409 of the IPC. The witnesses specifically stated in their statements, who are the subordinate officers, the role of the petitioner. He further submitted that the petitioner is not having passport and his passport was already revoked by the competent 13 authority on 02.04.2024 and the Investigating Officer has filed application before the learned XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for Trial of Communal Disturbances Control at Nampally, Hyderabad for issuance of warrant of arrest and the said application was allowed on 15.07.2024. The petitioner has not questioned the said order and it became final. Further, the Central Government had issued proclamation and also issued Red Corner Notice on 10.03.2025.
5.2. He further submitted that the allegations made by the petitioner that the Investigating Officer has not issued notice under Section 41-A of the Cr.P.C. to the petitioner does not arise on the ground that crime was registered on 10.03.2024, the petitioner left India on 11.03.2024 itself and as per the provisions of the Cr.P.C., Section 41-A of the Cr.P.C., notice has to be issued to the accused person directly. In that view of the matter, the Investigating Officer has issued the notice under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. on 19.04.2024 to the son of the petitioner directing him to furnish the particulars of the petitioner. Pursuant to the same, the son of the petitioner has given reply. After that the Investigating Officer, issued another 14 notice to the son of the petitioner on 24.04.2024 directing him to provide correct travel details.
5.3. He further submitted that the Investigating Officer has issued notice under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. on 19.04.2024 to the son of the petitioner and he has issued reply on 20.04.2024, however, he has not enclosed any documents regarding the alleged health condition of the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed a memo on 07.05.2024. He also submitted that as per the Scan report dated 25.03.2024 given by the Doctors in U.S.A., it reveals that his Nasopharynx, oropharynx, hypopharynx as well as the larynx are normal and he is having some dental problems. The concerned Doctor, who treated the petitioner, had issued certificate on 08.12.2004 and as per the said certificate, the petitioner is fit, hale and healthy. The petitioner filed this criminal petition seeking anticipatory bail basing on his health condition and the same is not permissible under law, especially the petitioner is absconding and not cooperating with the investigation more than one year. 5.4. He further submitted that LW.1 specifically stated in his. statement about the tenure and role of the petitioner. Similarly, LW.2 along with LWs.3, 5, 14 and 32 also specifically 15 deposed the role of the petitioner in the present crime. The petitioner is not entitled to claim the benefit, which was given in favour of accused No.6 and accused No.6 is a private person, whereas the petitioner is arrayed as accused No.1 and he is a public servant. At the instance of the petitioner, entire information belonging to the State of Telangana was destroyed and facilitated to the political party intentionally. The petitioner intentionally committed the offence of intercepting the telephonic communications of several people and destroyed the confidential and sensitive information that has been collected by the Police Department over a decade. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled for grant of bail.
5.5. In support of his contention, he relied upon the following judgments:
1. Serious Fraud Investigation Office v Aditya Sarada 5;
2. Srikant Upadhyay and Others v State of Bihar 6;
3. Prem Shankar Prasad v. State of Bihar 7;
4. Lavesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) 8,
5. Tarsem Lal v. Enforcement Directorate 9; and 5 2025 SCC OnLine SC 764 6 2024 SCC OnLine 282 7 (2022) 14 SCC 516 8 (2012) 8 SCC 730 9 (2024) 7 SCC 61 16
6. Hyeoksoo Son, Authorized Representative for Deachang Seat Automotive Pvt.Ltd v Moon June Seok and Another 10;
6. Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, by way of reply submitted that the petitioner has undergone three surgeries and he is suffering with cancer. He further submitted that the petitioner filed appeal before the Chief Passport Officer, New Delhi, on 10.04.2025 questioning the revocation of his passport and the said appeal is pending. Hence, the contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent that the petitioner has not taken any steps questioning the revocation of the passport is not true and correct.
6.1. He further submitted that the petitioner filed a Memo before the XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad in PRC No.260 of 2024 explaining the reasons for his visit to USA and urged the Court to consider the same. However, the Court below without considering the same, issued Non- Bailable Warrant against the petitioner on 15.07.2024 and also issued Red Corner Notice on 10.03.2024.
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2025 SCC OnLine 759 17 6.2. He further submitted that the petitioner has worked as Sub Divisional Officer from 1993 to 1999 of highly extremist affected and challenging sub-divisions in Telangana at Jagitial, Mancherial, Nalgonda and Saroornagar Districts. On promotion as Additional Superintendent of Police, he worked as Additional Superintendent of Police Operations at Nalgonda and effectively contained extremist activities in the District. In 2001-2003 he assumed charge of Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police (Traffic), Hyderabad City and undertook several initiatives in traffic regulations and management. In the year 2003 he got promotion as Superintendent of Police and he worked in Special Intelligence Branch and turned out outstanding work and won appreciation of all senior officials and Government and brought laurels in the department till 2007. From 2009 to 2013, the petitioner as Superintendent of Police in the Special Intelligence Branch for the second term and turned out outstanding results in containing extremist activities in Telangana and from 2013 to 2015, he contributed richly in bringing out reforms in the functioning of police and building cordial police. The petitioner promoted as Deputy Inspector General in the year 2015 took charge as Joint Commissioner Crimes, Hyderabad city and 18 successfully contained organized crime in both economic offences and cyber crimes till 2016. In 2016 he worked as DIG, Intelligence, in Warangal Range and later worked as DIG, Intelligent, Telangana State. On 14.03.2018, the petitioner was transferred and posted as DIG, SIB (Intelligence), Telangana State holding full Additional Charge of DIG, Intelligence, Telangana State. On 24.04.2019, on promotion the petitioner took charge as Inspector General of Police, SIB Intelligence. On 01.07.2022, he took charge as Chief of Operations, SIB (Intelligence) till resignation on 04.12.2023. The petitioner rendered his unblemished service of 30 years in the interests of the State.
6.3. As per the provisions of Rule 419(A)(17) of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951, records of interception orders and messages should be destroyed every six months, unless required for functional purposes and this decision has to be taken by the Review Committee only. On 29.11.2023, the Telangana State Government, Home Department has issued proceedings to pre- pone the Review Committee meeting. Basing on the said instructions only, the Review Committee conducted meeting on 02.12.2023 and basing on the same, the destruction of the data 19 has taken place subsequent to resignation of the petitioner. It is alleged that the destruction of data was done at the instigation of the petitioner but he is not having any authority to issue such instructions to the subordinates to the intercept and destruct the data.
6.4. He further submitted that accused No.6 filed Memo before the Sessions Judge that the confessional statement recorded by the Investigating Officer is a concocted document and the same is being retracted. The petitioner went to USA for taking treatment and not for any other purpose and the petitioner voluntarily intending to come to India and he is ready and willing to cooperate with the investigation and also abide by the conditions, which are going to be imposed by this Court. 6.5. He further submitted that the judgments which are relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.1 are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case and those judgments are relating to the offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and the same are not applicable to the IPC offences. Similarly, the ingredients of Section 409 of the IPC are also not applicable to the petitioner. 20 6.6. In support of his contention, he relied upon the following judgments:
1. Sidhartha Vashisht Alias Manu Shrama v. State (NCT of Delhi) 11 and
2. Harendra Rai v. State of Bihar and others 12,
7. Sri Palle Nageshwar Rao, learned Public Prosecutor, submitted that the petitioner was appointed as Inspector General of Police. After his retirement on superannuation, he was appointed as Chief of Operations, SIB, Intelligence on 01.07.2020 contrary to the India Police Service Cadre Rules, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') He further submitted that according to Rule 7 of the Rules, for making any temporary appointment, only appointment should be not exceeded for three months. However, the petitioner was initially appointed in the said post for a period of three years and subsequently, it was extended. The said appointment itself is contrary to the Rules. 7.1. He further submitted that the petitioner has taken an undue advantage of his official position and he along with other accused committed the offence of intercepting the telephonic communications and destruction of hard disks that contained 11 (2010) 6 SCC 1 12 (2023) 13 SCC 563 21 crucial information. The petitioner is absconding ever since the date of registration of this crime and against him Non-Bailable Warrant and Red Corner notice were also issued and extradition application has been filed by the Investigating Officer on 06.01.2025. He further submitted that the Special Chief Secretary to Government of Telangana, Home Department has filed detailed counter in Suo Motu W.P.No.2 of 2025 about the role of the petitioner and the petitioner is not entitled to seek for grant of anticipatory bail merely basing on his health conditions and on the ground of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
7.2. In support of his contention, he relied upon the judgment in P. Chidambaram supra, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the appellant contended that denial of anticipatory bail, particularly when custodial interrogation is unnecessary, violates the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. However, the Court, relying on State of M.P. v. Ram Kishna Balothia, clarified that anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is a statutory right introduced in 1973, and not a fundamental right under Article 21. While Section 438 aims to protect individuals from arbitrary arrest and 22 humiliation, it is not absolute. The Court highlighted the need to balance personal liberty with the interest of effective investigation, noting that refusal of anticipatory bail does not inherently amount to a violation of Article 21. The Solicitor General emphasized the investigative importance of custodial interrogation, supported by precedents like State v. Anil Sharma, where it was held that custodial interrogation is more effective than questioning under the protection of anticipatory bail. The Court reiterated that anticipatory bail should not impede the discovery of material facts and that responsible use of custodial interrogation is presumed unless proven otherwise.
8. Having considered the rival submissions made by the respective parties and after perusal of the material available on record, it reveals that basing on the complaint lodged by LW.1 D.Ramesh, Additional Superintendent of Police, SIB, Crime No.243 of 2024 was registered on 10.03.2024 for the offences under Sections 166, 409, 427, 201, 120(B) read with Section 34 of the IPC, Section 3 of the PDPP and Sections 65, 66, 66(F)(1)(B)(2) and 70 of the I.T.Act. The Investigating Officer after conducting investigation filed charge sheet on 10.06.2024, wherein there are specific allegations levelled against the 23 petitioner and other accused that they conspired with together and illegally intercepted the telephonic communications of several people to do wrongful gain and as per the instructions given by the petitioner, accused Nos.2 and 3 along with few technicians, removed and replaced 36 hard disks from SOT, CAT and another team. Further they also removed 26 hard disks and replaced 7 new hard disks from the main server of SIB. These hard disks containing crucial and sensitive information that has been gathered over a decade have been destroyed by them.
9. The record further reveals that the petitioner has submitted resignation to the post of Chief of Operations SIB on 04.12.2023 and he booked tickets to travel Tirupathi on 08.03.2024 and he proceeded to Thirputhi and from there to Chennai and he left to USA on 11.03.2024.
10. The record further discloses that the prosecution filed Memo seeking issuance of the Non-Bailable Warrant against the petitioner and the learned XIV Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Nampally, Hyderabad, allowed the said application on 15.07.2024. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has not questioned the said order by recalling Non-Baiable Warrant and the said order is in force.
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11. It further reveals from the record that the passport issued in favour of the petitioner was revoked by the competent authority on 02.04.2024. Even according to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, on 10.04.2025 aggrieved by the revocation of the passport, the petitioner filed appeal before the appellate Court i.e., Chief Passport Officer, New Delhi. However, the appellate authority has not passed any order and the same is pending. Even according to the learned Public Prosecutor, extradition request, which has been filed on 06.01.2025, is pending for consideration.
12. The record further reveals that the Investigating Officer has not issued notice under Section 41-A of the Cr.P.C., It is settled law that the said notice has to be issued to the accused directly, as per judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Satendra Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation and another 13.
13. The record further reveals that when the petitioner was not present, the Investigating Officer has issued notice under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. to the son of the petitioner on 19.04.2024. Pursuant to the same, the son of the petitioner as well the petitioner has informed the Investigating Officer that the 13 (2024) 9 SCC 177 25 petitioner is intending to come back to India on or before 26.06.2024. However, the petitioner did not return to India.
14. Even according to the prosecution, the crucial part of the investigation in this case is still pending and the presence of the petitioner is very much required. Even according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Home Secretary has issued orders preponing the Review Committee meeting and in the said meeting necessary directions were given to the concerned officers to destruct the intercepted information. However, neither of the parties has placed the said orders before this Court.
15. Even otherwise destruction of data has been done at the instance of the petitioner by the other accused or as per the instructions of the Review Committee, the same has to be revealed during the course of investigation and also during the course of trial. The record reveals that since 11.03.2024 the petitioner is not available in India and investigation is pending.
16. In Sidhartha Vashisht Alias Manu Shrama supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the critical importance of conducting fair and impartial investigations in the criminal justice system. The Court further held that both the investigating 26 agency and the courts share the responsibility to ensure that investigations do not infringe upon individual freedoms and are free from bias. The court highlighted that investigations must be thorough, systematic, and aligned with legal standards, rejecting any reports that are unfair or contravene established legal principles. The overarching principle established in this case is that the integrity of the investigation is paramount, as it is essential for upholding justice, protecting the rights of the accused under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution, and ensuring that no one is above the law, regardless of their position or influence in society.
17. In Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure serves as protection against arbitrary arrest, safeguarding individual liberty. The Court held that the grant of anticipatory bail should not depend solely on whether the accusation is made with mala fide intentions but must take into account multiple factors such as the seriousness of the charges, the risk of the accused fleeing, the possibility of witness tampering, and the larger public interest. The Court emphasized that the person seeking anticipatory bail is 27 presumed innocent and entitled to freedom, subject to reasonable conditions imposed by the court. This ruling highlights the need to carefully balance the rights of the individual with the interests of justice when deciding anticipatory bail applications.
18. In Smt. Parisha Trivedi supra, the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur held that the allegations of theft and robbery against the petitioners related to an incident in 2016. I affirmed that personal liberty is a fundamental right that must be protected, and anticipatory bail should be granted more liberally under Section 482 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, especially when there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused will not abscond or misuse their liberty; the court emphasized that unnecessary detention should be avoided and bail granted with appropriate conditions to ensure the accused's cooperation and fairness of the trial.
19. In N. Raghavender supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in paragraph Nos. 48 and 49 reads as follows:
"48. No sooner are the two fundamental ingredients of "criminal breach of trust" within the meaning of Section 405 IPC proved, and if such criminal 28 breach is caused by a public servant or a banker, merchant or agent, the said offence of criminal breach of trust is punishable under Section 409 IPC, for which it is essential to prove that:
(i) The accused must be a public servant or a banker, merchant or agent;
(ii) He/She must have been entrusted, in such capacity, with property; and
(iii) He/She must have committed breach of trust in respect of such property.
49. Accordingly, unless it is proved that the accused, a public servant or a banker, etc. was "entrusted" with the property which he is duty-bound to account for and that such a person has committed criminal breach of trust, Section 409IPC may not be attracted. "Entrustment of property" is a wide and generic expression. While the initial onus lies on the prosecution to show that the property in question was "entrusted" to the accused, it is not necessary to prove further, the actual mode of entrustment of the property or misappropriation thereof. Where the "entrustment" is admitted by the accused or has been established by the prosecution, the burden then shifts on the accused to prove that the obligation vis-à-vis the entrusted property was carried out in a legally and contractually acceptable manner."
20. In Sushila Aggarwal supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in paragraph Nos.52.2 and 52.3 reads as follows: 29
"52.2. Grant of an order under Section 438(1) does not per se hamper investigation of an offence; Sections 438(1)(i) and (ii) enjoin that an accused/applicant should cooperate with investigation. Sibbia [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] also stated that courts can fashion appropriate conditions governing bail, as well. One condition can be that if the police makes out a case of likely recovery of objects or discovery of facts under Section 27 (of the Evidence Act, 1872), the accused may be taken into custody. Given that there is no formal method prescribed by Section 46 of the Code if recovery is made during a statement (to the police) and pursuant to the accused volunteering the fact, it would be a case of recovery during "deemed arrest". (Para 19) 52.3. The accused is not obliged to make out a special case for grant of anticipatory bail; reading an otherwise wide power would fetter the court's discretion. Whenever an application (for relief under Section 438) is moved, discretion has to be always exercised judiciously, and with caution, having regard to the facts of every case."
21. In Harendra Rai supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held in paragraph No.123 reads as follows:
"123. Insofar as the Public Prosecutors are concerned, a lot of comments have been made, not only by this Court but also by the Law Commission, highlighting the role and importance of a Public Prosecutor. We may quote with profit the role of the 30 Prosecutors as stated in the 197th Law Commission of India Report on Public Prosecutors' Appointments (2006):
"The Prosecutor has a duty to the State, to the accused and to the court. The Prosecutor is at all times a minister of justice, though seldom so described. It is not the duty of the prosecuting counsel to secure a conviction, nor should any prosecutor even feel pride or satisfaction in the mere fact of success.""
22. In Common Cause supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paragraph No.170, reads as follows:
"170. The expressions "entrusted with property" and "with any dominion over property" used in Section 405 came to be considered by this Court in CBI v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045 : AIR 1996 SC 2452] and the view earlier expressed was reiterated. It was held that the expression "entrusted"
has wide and different implication in different contexts and the expression "trust" has been used to denote various kinds of relationships like trustee and beneficiary, bailor and bailee, master and servant, pledger and pledge".
23. The judgments relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case, as the violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India does not arise at this stage, since 31 there are serious allegations are levelled against the petitioner and Non-Bailable Warrants are pending, Red Corner notice has been issued and also the passport of the petitioner was revoked and extradition request is also under consideration.
24. The judgment relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent in Tarsem Lal supra is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case, as it relates to the offence under PMLA Act. Insofar as the other judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent in Hyeoksoo Son referred supra is also not applicable, as the said judgment was filed by the complainant Company against the quashing of the charge sheet and acquitting the accused.
25. In Serious Fraud Investigation Office supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that :
"18. Now, so far as anticipatory bail is concerned, this Court has consistently emphasized that anticipatory bail should not be granted as a matter of routine, particularly in serious economic offences, involving large-scale fraud, public money, or complex financial crimes.
23. In view of the above settled legal position, it is no more res integra that economic offences constitute a class apart, as they have deep rooted conspiracies involving huge loss 32 of public funds, and therefore such offences need to be viewed seriously. They are considered as grave and serious offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threats to the financial health of the country. The law aids only the abiding and certainly not its resistants. When after the investigation, a charge sheet is submitted in the court, or in a complaint case, summons or warrant is issued to the accused, he is bound to submit himself to the authority of law. If he is creating hindrances in the execution of warrants or is concealing himself and does not submit to the authority of law, he must not be granted the privilege of anticipatory bail, particularly when the Court taking cognizance has found him prima facie involved in serious economic offences or heinous offences. In such cases when the court has reason to believe that the person against whom the warrant has been issued has absconded or is concealing himself so that warrant could not be executed, the concerned court would be perfectly justified in initiating the proclamation proceedings against him under Section 82 Cr. P.C. The High Courts should also consider the factum of issuance of non-bailable warrants and initiation of proclamation proceedings seriously and not casually, while considering the anticipatory bail application of such accused.
27. In none of the impugned orders, the High Court has bothered to look into the proceedings conducted, and the detailed orders passed by the Special Court for securing the presence of the Respondents - Accused. It cannot be gainsaid that the judicial time of every court, even of Magistrate's Court is as precious and valuable as that of 33 the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The accused are duty bound to cooperate the trial courts in proceeding further with the cases and bound to remain present in the Court as and when required by the Court. Not allowing the Courts to proceed further with the cases by avoiding execution of summons or warrants, disobeying the orders of the Court, and trying to delay the proceedings by hook or crook, would certainly amount to interfering with and causing obstruction in the administration of justice. As held in Srikant Upadhay's case (supra), when warrant of arrest is issued or proclamation proceedings are initiated, the accused would not be entitled to invoke, except in exceptional cases, the extraordinary power of the court to grant anticipatory bail. Granting anticipatory bail is certainly not the rule. The respondents-accused, who have continuously avoided to follow the due process of law, by avoiding attendance in the Court, by concealing themselves and thereby attempting to derail the proceedings, would not be entitled to the anticipatory bail. If the Rule of Law is to prevail in the society, every person would have to abide by the law, respect the law and follow the due process of law."
26. The Hon'ble Apex has held that anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of course, particularly in cases involving serious economic offences, large-scale fraud, misuse of public funds, or complex financial crimes. Judicial time is deemed equally valuable across all levels of the judiciary, including the 34 Magistrate's Court. Accused persons have a legal obligation to cooperate with trial proceedings and appear before the court as required. Avoidance of legal process such as evading service of summons or warrants, disobeying court orders, or attempting to delay proceedings constitutes obstruction of justice. When non- bailable warrants or proclamation proceedings are initiated against an accused, the grant of anticipatory bail is generally impermissible, save for exceptional circumstances. Anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy and not the norm. Respondents who persistently evade the legal process and attempt to frustrate judicial proceedings are not entitled to such relief. Upholding the Rule of Law necessitates that all individuals comply with and respect the legal process.
27. In Srikant Upadhyay supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that :
"24. There can be no room for raising a contention that when an application is filed for anticipatory bail, it cannot be adjourned without passing an order of interim protection. A bare perusal of Section 438 (1), Cr. P.C., would reveal that taking into consideration the factors enumerated thereunder the Court may either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail. The proviso thereunder would reveal that 35 if the High Court or, the Court of Sessions, as the case may be, did not pass an interim order under this Section or has rejected the application for grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be open to an officer in-charge of a police station to arrest the person concerned without warrant, on the basis of the accusation apprehended in such application. In view of the proviso under Section 438(1), Cr. P.C., it cannot be contended that if, at the stage of taking up the matter for consideration, the Court is not rejecting the application, it is bound to pass an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail. In short, nothing prevents the court from adjourning such an application without passing an interim order. This question was considered in detail by a Single Bench of the High Court of Bombay, in the decision in Shrenik Jayantilal Jain v. State of Maharashtra Through EOW Unit II, Mumbai6 and answered as above and we are in agreement with the view that in such cases, there will be no statutory inhibition for arrest. Hence, the appellants cannot be heard to contend that the application for anticipatory bail filed in November, 2022 could not have been adjourned without passing interim order. At any rate, the said application was rejected on 04.04.2023. Pending the application for anticipatory bail, in the absence of an interim protection, if a police officer can arrest the accused concerned how can it be contented that the court which issued summons on account of non-obedience to comply with its order for appearance and then issuing warrant of arrest cannot proceed further in terms of the provisions under Section 82, Cr. P.C., merely because of the pendency of an application for anticipatory bail. If the said position is accepted the 36 same would be adopted as a ruse to escape from the impact and consequences of issuance of warrant for arrest and also from the issuance of proclamation under Section 82, Cr. P.C., by filing successive applications for anticipatory bail. In such circumstances, and in the absence of any statutory prohibition and further, taking note of the position of law which enables a police officer to arrest the applicant for anticipatory bail if pending an application for anticipatory bail the matter is adjourned but no interim order was passed. We have no hesitation to answer the question posed for consideration in the negative. In other words, it is made clear that in the absence of any interim order, pendency of an application for anticipatory bail shall not bar the Trial Court in issuing/proceeding with steps for proclamation and in taking steps under Section 83, Cr. P.C., in accordance with law.
25. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is an extraordinary power. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion by the Court depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious as the grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation to a great extent as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the Court shall not pass an 37 interim protection pending consideration of such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest and we say that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases. At any rate, when warrant of arrest or proclamation is issued, the applicant is not entitled to invoke the extraordinary power. Certainly, this will not deprive the power of the Court to grant pre-arrest bail in extreme, exceptional cases in the interest of justice. But then, person(s) continuously, defying orders and keep absconding is not entitled to such grant."
28. From the above, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reaffirmed that anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is an exceptional relief intended to prevent undue harassment, not a routine shield against lawful arrest. It held that the appellants' repeated non-appearance and withdrawal of bail applications indicated a deliberate attempt to evade the legal process, amounting to 'absconding' under Section 82 Cr.P.C. Consequently, such conduct disqualifies them from seeking anticipatory bail. The Court also clarified that the mere pendency of a bail application does not preclude the prosecution from initiating proclamation proceedings, thereby preventing abuse of process and undue delay in the administration of justice.
38
29. In Prem Shankar Prasad supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that "10. It is required to be noted that after investigation a charge-sheet has been filed against Respondent 2-accused for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420IPC also. Thus it has been found that there is a prima facie case against the accused. It has come on record that the arrest warrant was issued by the learned Magistrate as far back as on 19-12-2018 and thereafter proceedings under Sections 82/83CrPC have been initiated pursuant to the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate dated 10-1-2019. Only thereafter Respondent 2 moved an application before the learned trial court for anticipatory bail which came to be dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Saran, by a reasoned order.
10.2. Despite the above observations on merits and despite the fact that it was brought to the notice of the High Court that Respondent 2-accused is absconding and even the proceedings under Sections 82/83CrPC have been initiated as far back as on 10-1-2019, the High Court has just ignored the aforesaid relevant aspects and has granted anticipatory bail to Respondent 2-accused by observing that the nature of accusation is arising out of a business transaction. The specific allegations of cheating, etc. which came to be considered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge has not at all been considered by the High Court. Even the High Court has just ignored the factum of initiation of proceedings under Sections 82/83CrPC by simply observing that "be that as it may". The aforesaid 39 relevant aspect on grant of anticipatory bail ought not to have been ignored by the High Court and ought to have been considered by the High Court very seriously and not casually.
12. Even the observations made by the High Court while granting the anticipatory bail to Respondent 2-accused that the nature of accusation is arising out of a business transaction and therefore the accused is entitled to the anticipatory bail is concerned, the same cannot be accepted. Even in the case of a business transaction also there may be offences under the IPC more particularly Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, etc. What is required to be considered is the nature of allegation and the accusation and not that the nature of accusation is arising out of a business transaction. At this stage, it is required to be noted that Respondent 2-accused has been charge- sheeted for the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 420, etc. and a charge-sheet has been filed in the court of the learned Magistrate Court."
30. The Supreme Court emphasized that while considering an application for anticipatory bail, courts must assess the seriousness of the allegations, the conduct of the accused, and the nature of the offence. In this case, Respondent 2 was charge- sheeted under Sections 406 and 420 IPC, an arrest warrant had been issued, and proceedings under Sections 82/83 CrPC were initiated demonstrating that the accused was absconding. The 40 Court reiterated the principle that anticipatory bail should not be granted routinely or mechanically, especially where the accused has evaded the legal process and the High Court for ignoring these material facts and for erroneously relying on the nature of the transaction being "business-related" without evaluating the specific allegations of criminal breach of trust and cheating. It held that even business transactions can give rise to offences under the IPC and that the High Court's casual approach undermined the settled principles governing the exercise of discretion under Section 438 Cr.P.C.
31. Whether, at the instance of the petitioner, the subordinate officers switched off the CCTV cameras, replaced the 36 old hard disks with new hard disks, replacing 26 hard disks with 7 new hard disks from SIB main server and destroyed the information contained in the old hard disks; and whether these actions were carried out basing on the instructions given by the Review Committee or not, the said aspects need to be revealed during the course of the investigation pertaining to the petitioner and during the course of trial.
32. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the gravity of the offence and plethora of the 41 judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner is not entitled for grant of pre- arrest bail and the same is liable to be dismissed.
33. Accordingly, the criminal petition is dismissed.
Miscellaneous applications, pending if any, shall stand closed.
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J.SREENIVAS RAO, J
Date: 02.05.2025
mar