Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Mumbai
Rpg Enterprises Ltd. vs Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax on 14 July, 2000
ORDER
M.A. Bakshi, J.M.
1. By this application for the asst. yr. 1996-97, the assessee seeks stay of the disputed demand and a direction for refund of Rs. 19,43,000 recovered by the AO from the Standard Chartered Bank. We have heard the parties and perused the records.
2. The relevant facts, in this case, are that the assessee was occupying tenanted commercial premises of 4,460 sq. ft. area. During the previous year relevant to the asst. yr. 1996-97, the assessee incurred an expenditure of Rs. 31,32,842, on repairs/renovation of the premises. The assessee was providing common pool services to various licencees. The costs incurred during the year including the cost of repairs and renovations of rented premises have been recovered by the assessee from the various licencees. Whereas the expenditure on repairs and renovations has been debited to the P&L a/c, the amounts recovered from the various licencees are credited to the P&L a/c. On making an assessment under Section 143(3), the AO issued the receipts from various licencees as income but in regard to expenditure on repairs and renovation, the AO was of the view that about 75 per cent of the expenditure is of capital nature. He accordingly disallowed the claim of the assessee on account of repairs to the extent of Rs. 23,49,631, but allowed depreciation at the rate of 10 per cent. Besides, some other additions were made in respect of expenditure on travelling, etc. The assessment order is dt. 15th March, 1999. The assessee had filed ah "appeal to the CIT(A). A request had been made to the AO under Section 220(6) for not treating the assessee as in default till the disposal of the appeal by the CIT(A). The CIT(A) disposed of the appeal of the assessee vide order dt. 24th Feb., 2000, copy of which was served upon the assessee on 7th March, 2000, confirming the addition on account of repairs and renovation. The AO issued a letter dt. 16th March, 2000, to the assessee informing about the rejection of the appeal by the CIT(A) in regard to the major item of dispute. By means of this letter, the assessee was asked to pay the demand within three days from the receipt of the letter. It is claimed by the assessee that the said letter was received by them on 27th March, 2000. The Revenue has not disputed this claim. Therefore, the time allowed by the AO for payment of the demand was up to 30th March, 2000.
3. On receipt of the order from the CIT(A), the assessee filed an appeal to the Tribunal on 27th March, 2000. An application was filed to the CIT requesting to keep the disputed demand in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal by the Tribunal. The AO was also informed on the same day, i.e., on 27th March, 2000, about the pendency of the application for stay before the CIT, with the request that no coercive action be taken against the assessee till the disposal of stay application. On 29th March, 2000, the assessee received a letter informing them that the CIT had rejected the request for grant of stay. The assessee was neither given a hearing by the CIT nor was any speaking order passed. This letter is claimed to have been received by the assessee at 5.55 p.m. The AO had already issued a notice under Section 226(3) to the Standard Chartered Bank, Chowpatty, attaching the bank account and requiring them to pay a sum of Rs. 19,43,000 forthwith. The bank complied with the direction of the AO. A letter withdrawing the notice of attachment was given to the Standard Chartered Bank, as per assessee's version at 5.10 p.m. All this has happened on the same day on 29th March, 2000, and before the assessee was informed about the rejection of stay by the CIT.
4. It is the case of the assessee that the amount of Rs. 19,43,000 has been recovered by the AO illegally in contravention of well-settled principles of law, equity and good conscience. The action of the AO is challenged on the following grounds. That when an application for stay of recovery was pending before the CIT, no action could be taken for recovery of the disputed demand.
That the CIT had not disposed of the application for stay of recovery filed by the assessee at the time the AO resorted to the coercive action of attachment of bank account and recovering the amount therefrom. That the AO had himself allowed three days' time for payment of the demand from the date of service of letter (i.e., 29th March, 2000) but had resorted to coercive action before the expiry of three days from the date of the service of his letter. That the CIT was wrong to dispose of the stay application without giving an opportunity of being heard to the assessee. That the recovery of the disputed demand was made by resorting to coercive action notwithstanding the decision of the jurisdictional High Court of Bombay in the case of Mahindia & Mahindia Ltd. v. Union of India (1992) 59 ELT 505 (Bom), where it was held that it was highly improper for the customs authorities to encash the bank guarantees before the expiry of the statutory period prescribed for appeal to the Tribunal.
5. It is further submitted that the Tribunal has the power to grant stay of recovery till disposal of appeal. The AO has recovered the demand illegally as a result of which the power of the Tribunal has been rendered nugatory. It was contended that when the demand is illegally recovered by the Revenue authorities, it is the duty of the Tribunal to pass such orders as to correct the administrative action of the Revenue authorities. In this connection, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Bansi Dhar & Sons (1986) 157 ITR 665 (SC). It was contended that the Supreme Court has held that the power of the Tribunal is of widest amplitude in dealing with the appeals before it and that it has the power of doing" all such acts or employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Baccarose Perfumes Beauty Products Ltd. v. Joint CIT and it was contended that it is established from the said decision of the Tribunal that the Tribunal has the power to remedy any wrong committed by the administrative authorities. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Madras Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Security & Detective Bureau Ltd, v. Asstt. CIT (1993) 45 TTJ (Mad) 229 : (1993) 46 ITD 86 (Mad). In this case it was held that the CIT having rejected the stay application of the assessee without giving any reasons, his order was untenable in law. In the case while granting interim stay the Tribunal revoked the attachment of the bank accounts. It was contended that the Tribunal has the power to undo the wrong committed by the Revenue authorities.
6. The learned counsel for the assessee further contended that the assessee has a very strong prima facie case in its favour and, therefore, the collection of the disputed demand by the Revenue authorities is highly unjust and unreasonable. The assessee has been deprived of the money, which was required for purposes of business. When the demand created by the Revenue is the subject-matter of appeal and the assessee has a fair chance of success, depriving the assessee from use of his own money is unjust and unreasonable. It was contended that the action of the AO to collect the disputed demand has made the process of appeal nugatory and ineffective. It was accordingly pleaded that the Tribunal may use its extraordinary power of granting stay and directing the AO to refund the tax, which has been recovered illegally. It was also pleaded that the appeal may be heard out of turn on priority basis.
7. The learned Departmental Representative, on the other hand, contended that the Tribunal has no power to direct the AO to refund the tax. It was contended that if the amount has been recovered illegally the assessee could approach the High Court for redress. However, the Tribunal in exercise of its powers for grant of stay does not have the power to grant refund of tax even when it is recovered illegally. The learned Departmental Representative further contended that in this case the amount has not been recovered illegally. The AO had waited till the decision of the CIT(A) for the recovery of the disputed demand. It was only when the CIT(A) had decided the appeal against the assessee that the AO recovered the amount from the bank. Referring to the provisions of Section 226(3), the learned Departmental Representative contended that the requirement of law is that the assessee should be given a copy of the notice issued under Section 226(3) but it was not necessary for the AO to first issue the notice to the assessee and then to the parties. In this case as and when action under Section 226(3) was taken by the AO necessary notice was given to the assessee. The CIT had also rejected the stay application of the assessee after the decision of the CIT(A) in favour of the Revenue. It was accordingly pleaded that, firstly, there was no illegality committed in recovering the amount and, secondly, the Tribunal has no power to grant refund of tax recovered by the Revenue pending in appeal for disposal.
8. We have given our careful consideration to the rival contentions. This application is peculiar in character in so far as the assessee not only seeks the stay of the disputed demand but also seeks a direction for the refund of Rs. 19,43,000 claimed to have been recovered without following the process of law. When the demand stands collected ordinarily we do not interfere. However, in this case it is noted with regret that the AO has been unfairly overenthusiastic by not following the procedure established by law, as a result of which the taxpayer has suffered humiliation and has been deprived of remedies available to it by law. We consider it our duty to arrest the wrong so that the taxpayer's confidence and faith in the rule of law is not shattered.
9. The issues broadly arising in this case are as under:
(i) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the AO resorting to coercive action under Section 226(3) for the recovery of Rs. 19,43,000 from the Standard Chartered Bank even before the expiry of three days time allowed by him and without giving effect to the CIT(A)'s order was unwarranted and bad in law ?
(ii) Whether the Tribunal in its ancillary and incidental powers of granting stay of recovery has also the power in appropriate cases to direct the refund of tax recovered without following the process of law ?
(iii) Whether the CIT has the power to grant stay of the disputed demand when the appeal is pending in the Tribunal and whether the Tribunal is justified in insisting the assessees approach the administrative authorities before exercising its powers for grant of stay ?
(iv) Whether the CIT in exercising his administrative/executive power in granting stay of the disputed demand pending an appeal in the Tribunal is required to give an opportunity of being heard to the assessee and is he required to pass a speaking order on the stay application of the assessee ?
10. We will first consider the scheme of the Act. When any sum is determined as payable in consequence of any order passed under the IT Act, 1961, the ITO is required to serve upon the assessee a notice of demand under Section 156 in the prescribed form specifying the sum so payable. After the service of the demand notice the assessee gets a right of appeal against the assessment order. If the decision of the AO is accepted, then the demand becomes absolute and the AO is free to recover the demand in accordance with the provisions of the Act relating to the recovery of the said demand. The assessee, however, may dispute the demand by filing an appeal under Section 246/246A of the Act against the assessment order within thirty days of the service of the demand notice/assessment order. Section 220(6) empowers the AO to treat the assessee as not being in default so long as the appeal under Section 250 of the IT Act, 1961, remains pending with the first appellate authority. The discretion vested in the AO may be exercised by him, subject to such conditions as he may think fit. When the assessee is in default or deemed to be in default in making the payment, a certificate may be drawn by the TRO for the purpose of effecting the recovery of demand by various modes specified under Section 222 of the Act. Even after the certificate is drawn, Section 225 of the Act empowers the TRO to grant time for payment of tax and to order stay of the proceedings until the expiry of time so granted.
11. An appeal is provided to the Tribunal under Section 253 against the orders of the CIT(A)/Dy. CIT, etc. Under Section 254 the Tribunal has the power to pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit in relation to an appeal filed before it. Though under the provisions of the Act, as also the ITAT Rules, 1963, the power of stay relating to the recovery of tax or penalty due from the assessee is not expressly provided in the Tribunal, the Supreme Court in the case of ITO v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi (1969) 71 ITR 815 (SC) held that Section 254 of the IT Act, 1961, which confers on the Tribunal powers of the widest amplitude in dealing with appeals before it grants by implication the power of granting stay of recovery of the disputed tax. It is thus evident that the Tribunal has the power to grant stay of recovery of the disputed demand. This power can be exercised only when an appeal is filed by the assessee against the decision of the first appellate authority. There is a period of sixty days allowed for filing of an appeal to the Tribunal against the decision of the first appellate authority. The question arises as to what is the fate of the assessee's right to seek stay of the disputed demand in the period which is available to them for filing an appeal against the decision of the first appellate authority. The answer to this question is found in the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. (supra). In this case the customs authorities had recovered the disputed demand by encashment of bank guarantee during the pendency of the stay application and before the expiry of the statutory period of three months for filing the appeal. Their Lordships of the Bombay High Court held that the customs authorities were not justified to recover the disputed demand by encashment of the bank guarantee during pendency of the stay application and before the expiry of the statutory period of three months for filing the appeal. The Department was accordingly directed by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court to pay back the entire amount recovered by encashing the bank guarantee. Therefore, it is evident that when the assessee is having a right to seek extension of time/stay of recovery of the disputed demand pending an appeal before the respective authorities, it will be unreasonable to hold that during the intervening period the AO has unfettered powers of resorting to coercive action for recovery of the disputed demand. The rationale behind the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. (supra), is that the authorities cannot by their actions render the provisions of the Act as ineffective and nugatory. If the AO is allowed to resort to coercive action within the time allowed for filing of appeal to the Tribunal, the power of the Tribunal to grant stay of recovery pending an appeal will be rendered ineffective.
12. Respectfully following the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mahindra & Mahindia Ltd. (supra), we hold that the AO is precluded from taking coercive action for the recovery of the disputed demand until the expiry of the period of limitation allowed for filing the appeal against the decision of the first appellate authority and also during the pendency of the stay application before any Revenue authority or the Tribunal.
13. In this case the assessee had filed an appeal to the CIT(A) against the decision of the AO. An application had also been filed under Section 220(6) to the AO for not treating the assessee as in default during the pendency of an appeal before the CIT(A). It is admitted case of the parties that no action was taken by the AO or the TRO for the recovery of the disputed demand during the pendency of the appeal before the first appellate authority. The AO informed the assessee about the decision of the CIT(A) vide his letter dt. 16th March, 2000, and asked them to pay the demand within a period of three days from the service of the letter. This, letter was received by the assessee on 27th March, 2000, and accordingly the assessee was required to pay the demand by 30th March, 2000. The assessee filed an appeal in the Tribunal on 27th March, 2000, and also filed an application for stay of the disputed demand before the CIT on the same day. Filing of stay application before the CIT was in compliance with the standing instructions of the Tribunal to approach the CIT for stay of the disputed demand before the application for stay is considered by the Tribunal. The AO was also informed on 27th March, 2000, about the filing of the appeal, stay application before the CIT, with a request that no coercive action be taken till the decision of the CIT/Tribunal on the readiest of the assessee for staying the disputed demand. However, the AO ignoring the pendency of the stay application of the assessee and his own letter giving three days time to the assessee for payment of the demand after the service of the said letter, issued a notice to the Standard Chartered Bank under Section 226(3) attaching the bank account and collecting the sum of Rs. 19,43,000 from them. This action of the AO is highly improper and contrary to various decisions of the Tribunal and High Courts. It has been impressed upon the AO, time and again, that coercive action for the recovery of the disputed demand should not be resorted to when an application for stay of recovery is pending before any authority. The Bombay High Court in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. (supra), has also held that it is highly improper for the Revenue authorities to recover the disputed demand when they are informed about the pendency of the stay application.
14. There is another instance of the AO's action demonstrating the high handedness and the callous approach. The AO had given effect to the order of the CIT(A) vide his order purported to have been passed on 21st March, 2000. This was followed by a demand notice pursuant to the said order. The order giving effect and the demand notice are both dt. 21st March, 2000. The outstanding demand after giving effect to the order of the CIT(A) was determined at Rs. 21,60,495. The following note was given on the demand notice :
"Out of the above demand Rs. 19,43,000 recovered through Standard Chartered Bank and refund of Rs. 1,60,644 for the asst. yr. 1999-2000 adjusted against above demand. Hence, balance of Rs. 66,854 is payable by you."
15. The fact that the AO has pre-dated these two documents is glaring from the note on the demand notice itself. It has been pointed out elsewhere in this order that the amount of Rs. 19,43,000 was recovered by the AO under Section 226(3) from the Standard Chartered Bank on 29th March, 2000. When the sum of Rs. 19,43,000 has been recovered from the Standard Chartered Bank on 29th March, 2000, it is beyond our comprehension as to how this fact is recorded in the demand notice issued on 21st March, 2000. It is established that the AO had pre-dated the order giving effect to the decision of the CIT(A), as also the notice of demand issued in pursuance thereto. We are living in a democratic set up and the taxpayers deserve to be respected for their contribution in the national development. Public servants are expected to discharge their functions dutifully but not unreasonably. The officers are supposed to work dilrgently but not harassingly. It is absolutely necessary for the Department of Revenue to gam public trust and confidence by acting judiciously and avoiding undue harrassment. We appreciate the scheme of rewarding honest and diligent officers of the Department but also feel that there is a necessity of identifying overzealous officers harassing the taxpayers by misusing their powers. In this case the action of the AO in pre-dating the demand notice and the recovery of the disputed demand from the Standard Chartered Bank before the expiry of three days time allowed by him for the payment of the demand, is highly improper, unwarranted and bad in law. The action of the AO is also unreasonable for the reason that the assesses had brought to his notice that an application for stay of the disputed demand was pending before the CIT. The coercive action of the AO was also improper in so far as the time for filing of the appeal to the Tribunal after the receipt of the order of the CIT(A) had not expired. The action of the AO was also highly improper in so far as he had been informed about the filing of the appeal in the Tribunal and pendency of the stay application. We accordingly hold that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the AO has unjustifiably recovered the sum of Rs. 19,43,000 from Standard Chartered Bank.
16. The question that arises is as to whether the Tribunal has the power to direct refund of the tax recovered by the AO without the authority of law. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ITO v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi (supra). In this case their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as under.
17. The statutory power under Section 254 carries with it the duty in proper cases to make such orders for staying recovery proceedings pending an appeal before the Tribunal, as will prevent the appeal; if successful, from being rendered nugatory." It has further been held "it is a firmly established rule that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant, effective". Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further observed that "if the ITO and the AAC have made assessments or imposed penalties raising very large demands and if the Tribunal is entirely helpless in the matter of stay of recovery, the entire purpose of the appeal can be defeated if ultimately the orders of the Departmental authorities are set aside. It is difficult to conceive that the legislature should have left the entire matter to the administrative authorities to make such orders as they choose to pass in exercise of unfettered discretion". Their Lordships of the Supreme Court quoted with approval at p. No. 819 from Domat's Civil Law as under:
"It is the duty of the Judges to apply the laws, not only to what appears to be regulated by their express dispositions, but to all the cases where a just application of them may be made and which appears to be comprehended either within the consequences that may be gathered from it."
18. Their Lordships further quoted from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes that: "'where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution'... An instance is given based on Ex parte, Martin : 'where an inferior Court is empowered to grant an injunction, the power of punishing disobedience to it by commitment is impliedly conveyed by the enactment, for the power would be useless if it could not be enforced'."
19. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further held that the Tribunal is not a Court but it exercises judicial powers. The Tribunal's powers in dealing with appeals are of the widest amplitude and have in some cases been held similar to and identical with the powers of an appellate Court under the CPC. Their Lordships quoted with approval the observations in the case of Polini v. Gray (1879) 12 Ch. D 438, that "it appears to me on principle that the Court ought to possess that jurisdiction because the principle which underlies all orders for the preservation of property pending" litigation is this, that the successful party in the litigation, that is, the ultimately successful party, is to reap the fruits of that litigation, and not obtain merely a barren success".
20. Considering the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the Tribunal has the power to grant stay of recovery and all other powers to make the power effective, we hold that in appropriate cases the Tribunal has all the powers relating to the subject-matter of appeal including the power of granting stay of recovery and refund of tax recovered by the Revenue authorities. In this view of the matter we are of the considered view that the Tribunal has the power to direct the Revenue authorities to refund the tax recovered by the AO by misusing his powers. Since the AO has misused his powers, we consider it our duty to curb such a trend. We are conscious of the fact that the power to direct refund of tax when the appeal is pending in the Tribunal is to be exercised only in exceptional cases. In our view, this case falls within the category of such exceptional cases. If we do not interfere in this case it would amount to allowing a public servant to circumvent the law and prevent the subjects from taking recourse to the legal remedies available to them. It will amount to our failure to discharge our duty.
We accordingly exercise our power and direct the AO to refund a sum of Rs. 19,43,000 recovered from the Standard Chartered Bank to the assessee within a period of fifteen days from the date of service of this order. The recovery of the amount of Rs. 19,43,000 is also stayed till the disposal of the appeal by the Tribunal. This is, however subject to the Mowing conditions :
(i) that the assessee shall furnish a security to the satisfaction of the AO for the said amount;
(ii) That the assessee shall not seek any adjournment on the date of hearing. In the case of contravention of this condition, the stay shall get automatically vacated.
21. We would now like to deal with another issue arising in this case, as to whether the CIT has the power to grant stay of the disputed demand when the appeal is pending in the Tribunal and whether the Tribunal is justified in insisting that the assessees approach the administrative authorities before exercising its powers for grant of stay. In the case of M.K. Mohammed Kunhi (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court had observed that "there is no provision in Section 220 under which the ITO or any of his superior Departmental officers can be moved for granting stay in the recovery of penalty or tax. It may be that under Section 225, notwithstanding that a certificate has been issued to the TRO for the recovery of any tax, the ITO may grant time for the payment of the tax. In this manner he can probably keep on granting extensions until the disposal of the appeal by the Tribunal. It may also be that, as a matter of practice prevailing in the Department, the CIT or the IAC, in exercise of administrative powers, can give the necessary relief of staying recovery to the assessee but that can hardly be put at par with a statutory power as is contained in Section 220(6) which is confined only to the stage of pendency of an appeal before the AAC".
22. The above observation of the Supreme Court clarifies two aspects of the matter. One is that there is no statutory power conferred upon the AO to grant stay of recovery of the disputed demand when the appeal has been disposed of by the first appellate authority. Nevertheless the prevailing practice in the Department and the existence of the administrative powers with the CIT and others for giving necessary relief of staying recovery to the assessee at the same time has been recognised. Thus, there is no doubt that the CIT, in his administrative capacity, has the power to grant stay of the disputed demand when the appeal is pending in the Tribunal. This is further supported by the fact that under Section 225 the TRO has been specifically empowered to extend the time for payment of the disputed demand. This power is not confined for the period during which the appeal is pending before the first appellate authority. Under Section 118 the CIT is having administrative control over the TRO working in his jurisdiction. It is, therefore, implicit that the CIT may direct the TRO to extend the time for the payment of the disputed demand.
23. The issue had also come up for consideration before the Madras Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Security & Detective Bureau Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT (supra). It was held by the Tribunal that the CIT has the power to grant stay of the recovery of the disputed demand.
24. It may be pertinent to mention that though the Tribunal has unfettered power to grant stay of recovery without the CIT having been approached or having passed an order in this regard, yet the practice of the Tribunal to insist that the assessee should approach the CIT for grant of stay of recovery of the disputed demand is for a dual purpose. Firstly, the Department would get an opportunity to study the situation and gather the necessary data for evaluating the application for stay and may also get an opportunity in protecting the interests of the Revenue. The second purpose that is sought to be served by this process is that the point of view of the Revenue will be incorporated in the speaking order which is required to be passed by the CIT on the application of the assessee, in certain cases the CIT may grant stay of recovery by imposing conditions suitable to the Department which may be agreed upon by the assessee. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that the measure is beneficial to the interests of the Revenue. As far as the Tribunal is concerned the possibility of distortion of facts is eliminated. It helps the Tribunal to take a fair view without spending much time on ascertaining the facts.
25. The next issue that has been raised before us is as to whether the CIT should pass a speaking order and whether he is required to give a hearing to the assessee before passing such order. In the case of Dunlop India Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT (1990) 183 ITR 532 (Cal) reversing Dunlop India Ltd. v. Asstt CIT (1990) 183 ITR 528 (Cal), it was held that the power to use the discretion which has been reposed in the officer concerned must be used and exercised as a reasonable man and the superior Tribunal or authority must be in a position to know after going through the order itself, why, how and in what manner such discretion has been exercised. This view is further supported by the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Mohammed Abdul Sattar Sait v. CBDT (1979) 120 ITR 653 (Ker) and the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Bharat Nidhi Ltd. v. Union of India (1973) 92 ITR 1 (Del). Respectfully following the aforementioned decisions it is held that the CIT is required to pass a speaking order giving reasons for the exercise of his discretion in the matter of stay application.
26. The issue as to whether an opportunity of being heard is required to be given to the assessee before the CIT passes an order on the stay application had come up before the Tribunal in the case of Security & Defective Bureau Ltd. (supra) and it was held that an order passed by the CIT without giving an opportunity of being heard is unreasonable and bad in law. Though the order of the CIT is in his administrative capacity, yet the principles of natural justice demand that an order affecting the party is passed after giving him an opportunity of being heard. We hold accordingly.
27. The contentions on behalf of the Revenue that the assessee should approach the High Court for redress in this is rejected as we consider it our duty not to burden the High Court with unnecessary litigation. When the Tribunal has the power to redress the grievance of taxpayers, it is our duty to exercise that power in the interests of justice, equity and good conscience. This contention is also accordingly rejected.
28. Since the demand of Rs. 19,43,000 is stayed till the disposal of appeal, we direct the Registry to fix the appeal for hearing on 11th Oct., 2000.
29. The application of the assessee is allowed.