Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Karamveer vs Gnctd on 28 January, 2026
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Item No. 05/ C-II O.A. No. 3235/2022
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench: New Delhi
O.A. No. 3235/2022
This the 28th day of January, 2026
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. B. Anand, Member (A)
1. Karamveer, Age-33+ years,
Constable, Group-C,
S/o Sh. Raj Pal,
R/o-Village-Vihari Pur Dgpura,
Post Office-Dchalavas Ulabpura,
Police Station-Sadar Thana Rewari,
Distt-Rewari (Haryana)-123401
2. Narender Kumar Drall, Age-33+ years,
Constable, Group-C,
R/o-VPO-Hiran Kudna,
Police station-Mundka (Nangloi),
Distt-Outer (New Delhi)-110041
...Applicants
(By Advocate: Mr. Sachin Chauhan)
Versus
1. Govt. of NCTD
Through the Chief Secretary,
Govt. of NCTD,
A-Wingh, 5th Floor, Delhi Secretariat,
New Delhi-110003
2. The Commissioner of Police
PHQ, Jai Singh Road, New Delhi-110001
3. The Dy. Commissioner of Police,
West District, Delhi
Through the Commissioner of Police
Police Headquarters, MSO Building,
I.P. Estate, New Delhi-110002
4. Enquiry Officer,
(Inspector, PS Kirti Nagar)
1.
2.
3.
Delhi Police-110015.
4.
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. Amit Anand, Mr. R K Jain, Ms. Monika
Bhargava)
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ORDER (ORAL)
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J) We have heard the learned counsels for the parties and with their assistance; we have perused the pleadings available on record.
2. In the present OA filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicants have challenged the order dated 05.09.2022 (Annexure A-3) whereby the representation of the applicants (Annexure A-5) has been rejected alongwith summary of allegations, list of witnesses, list of documents etc. Under challenge is also the order dated 05.07.2022 to the extent that without considering the provisions of Rule 12 of Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as 'Rules'), the respondents have ordered initiation of departmental proceedings.
3. The applicants have prayed for the following relief in the present OA:
"8.1 To quash and set-aside the order dated 5.9.2022 alongwith Summary of allegation alongwith list of witness and list of document and order dated 19.9.2022 whereby the representation of applicant made against the order dated 5.7.2022 has been rejected.
8.2 To quash and setaside the order dated 5.7.2022 to an extent whereby it does not apply mind on Rule 12 of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rule while reserving its right to take departmental action against the applicants and further the applicant be entitled for all consequential benefits including seniority and promotion and pay and allowances.
AND/OR
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Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper may also awarded to the applicant."
4. The claim of the applicants has been contested by the respondents by filing counter reply. The applicants have filed rejoinder reiterating their claim and the grounds pleaded in support thereof.
5. The undisputed facts are that the applicants while working as Constable under Delhi Police were involved in a criminal case vide FIR No. 165/2017 registered with Police Station Vikas Puri, Delhi under Sections 384, 411, 34 of the IPC. The applicants were arrested in the said case FIR in view of the applicants' involvement in the said case FIR and taking into consideration these facts, the applicants were dismissed by the respondents from service by invoking the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. Aggrieved by their such dismissal, the applicants approached this Tribunal by way of OA No. 3027/2018 titled Karamveer & Others Vs. GNCT of Delhi & others as well as a few other OAs which were decided by this Tribunal vide order/judgment dated 10.02.2022 (Annexure A-7). While allowing the OAs, this Tribunal set aside the order passed by the Disciplinary as well as Appellate Authority and with consequential benefits to the applicants in accordance with the relevant Rules and law on the subject. However, liberty was accorded to the respondents to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicants in accordance with law.
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6. It is further undisputed that the applicants herein faced trial before the competent learned Trial Court in the said case FIR and vide order/judgment dated 24.09.2020 (Annexure A-6), the applicants were acquitted in the said case FIR.
7. The respondents in compliance of the directions of the Tribunal, contained in the order/judgment dated 10.02.2022 in OA No. 3027/2018 (Supra), reinstated the applicants with consequential benefits in accordance with law. The respondents vide order dated 05.07.2022, reinstated the applicants in service (Annexure A-2), however, without prejudice to their right to initiate disciplinary proceedings against them.
8. The applicants preferred representation(s) (Annexure A-5) urging therein that as they have been acquitted by the learned Trial Court in the said case FIR, to drop any disciplinary proceedings contemplated and/or initiated against them in view of the provisions of Rule 12 of the Rules. Pursuant to such representation(s), the respondents have passed the impugned order dated 19.09.2022 (Annexure A-1), communicating thereby that the representation(s) of the applicants have been considered by the competent authority but could not be acceded to.
9. In the meantime, vide impugned order dated 05.09.2022 (Annexure A-3), the respondents have initiated disciplinary proceedings against the applicants and pursuant thereto the KSHITIJ KSHITIJ SAXENA 2026.02.11 SAXENA 16:57:31+05'30' 5 Item No. 05/ C-II O.A. No. 3235/2022 impugned summary of allegations, list of witnesses etc. have also been issued to these applicants. Thus, the present OA.
10. Learned counsel for the applicants has submitted that undisputedly, the respondents have initiated disciplinary proceedings for the same incident and allegations which have been the subject matter of the aforesaid case FIR. He further submits that for the same set of allegations, the applicants have already faced trial and after taking into consideration material facts and the evidences, the learned Trial Court has acquitted the applicants in the said case FIR and, therefore, in light of the provisions of Rule 12 of the Rules, read with the order/judgment dated 18.02.2011 of Larger Bench of this Tribunal in OA No. 2816/2018 titled Sukhdev Singh and another Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others, the applicants cannot be punished and when the applicants cannot be punished, the initiation of disciplinary proceedings for inflicting punishment is not warranted. He has further argued that the applicants are not liable to be punished by way of the impugned disciplinary proceedings for the incident and allegations which have been the subject matter of trial in the said case FIR, particularly in view of the fact that the acquittal of the applicants does not fall under any of the exceptions of the provisions of Rule 12 of the Rules.
11. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the applicants has placed reliance on various judgments which are as follows:
KSHITIJ KSHITIJ SAXENA 2026.02.11 SAXENA 16:57:31+05'30' 6 Item No. 05/ C-II O.A. No. 3235/2022 i. Judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi dated 28.01.2025 in the matter of Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.
Vs. Satyapal Singh Yadav in W.P.(C) No. 12533/2024. ii. Judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi dated 26.05.2014 titled Ms. Nidhi Kaushik Vs. Union of India & Ors.
iii. Order/judgment dated 07.11.2022 of this Bench of the Tribunal in the matter of Rohtash Singh Vs. Govt. of NCTD & Ors. in OA No. 2266/2017.
12. Mr. Chauhan, learned counsel for the applicants, has further argued that on plain reading of the impugned order dated 19.09.2022, it is apparent that the respondents have not applied their mind inasmuch as despite the applicants' specific representations that in light of the provisions of Rule 12 of the Rules, they are not liable to be punished for the allegations and incidents which have been the subject matter of the said case FIR wherein they have been acquitted by the learned competent Trial Court, the respondents have mechanically rejected the representations of the applicants and they have gone ahead with the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. He further clarified that though the impugned orders do not deal with the provisions of the Rule 12 of the Rule, in the counter reply filed by the respondents, the respondents have asserted in para 4.6 that that prosecution witnesses turned hostile and, thereafter, benefit KSHITIJ KSHITIJ SAXENA 2026.02.11 SAXENA 16:57:31+05'30' 7 Item No. 05/ C-II O.A. No. 3235/2022 of doubt was accorded to the persons accused in the said case FIR (applicants herein).
13. Learned counsel for the applicants has argued that once the impugned orders have been passed mechanically without disclosing any reason, the infirmity in such order cannot be cured by the grounds pleaded in the counter reply. In support of this argument, he has placed reliance on the law laid down of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commissioner 1978 (1) SCC 405 AIR 1978 SC 851.
14. On the other hand, Mr. Jain, learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently opposed the contentions of the learned counsel for the applicants. By referring to the judgment dated 24.09.2020 of the learned Trial Court, particularly para 18 thereof, he submits that it has categorically been recorded by the learned Trial Court that on perusal of the DVD of CCTV footage, accused persons (applicants herein) were seen going upstairs to the office of the complainant. At one place one of the accused persons is seen grabbing collar of another person from complainant's side and the DVD does show that something suspicious was transpiring on the date of incident, however, the same in itself is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused persons because the alleged delivery of money is not seen in it. In the event of prosecution witnesses turning hostile, the benefits of doubt must accrue to the accused persons.
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15. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the aforesaid findings of the learned Trial Court clearly indicate about happening of the alleged incident. He submits that in a criminal trial, evidence beyond reasonable doubt is required to prove the guilt of the accused persons whereas disciplinary proceedings are based on preponderance of evidence. In this background, he submits that initiation of disciplinary proceedings is in accordance with law. He has further argued that even if ground for rejection of the representations of the applicants seeking dropping of disciplinary proceedings is not mentioned in the impugned order, however, the respondents have mentioned in para 4.6 of their counter reply that the prosecution witnesses had turned hostile in the relevant criminal trial which resulted in the acquittal of the applicants and thus, the case of the applicants falls under exception under Rule 12 (b) of the Rules. He has further argued that even otherwise, the respondents being a police department, in the larger public interest, it is always required that personnel of such organisations are disciplined and their antecedents are beyond doubt. In such view of the matter, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the impugned orders fall under exception of Clause (c) of the Provisions of Rule 12 of the Rules.
16. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the Hon'ble Apex Court in Assistant General Manager State Bank of India and another Vs. Tanya Energy Enterprises KSHITIJ KSHITIJ SAXENA 2026.02.11 SAXENA 16:57:31+05'30' 9 Item No. 05/ C-II O.A. No. 3235/2022 through its Managing Partner Shri Alluri Lakshmi Narasimha Varma 2025 SSC OnLine SC 1979 judgment had occasion to deal with the issue as to whether the orders passed by the administrative authorities can be supported by the grounds pleaded by such authorities in their pleadings/affidavits or not. He submits that the Hon'ble Apex Court, after considering its judgments in catena of cases, including the case of Mohinder Singh Gill (Supra) has held in paras 35 & 36 thereof that in the larger public interest, supporting the impugned orders by pleadings and affidavits are permissible. He further submits that in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Assistant General Manager State Bank of India (Supra), even if reasons have not been mentioned in the impugned orders and/or even in the relevant pleadings, the same can be supported by way of oral arguments, based on the relevant materials on record.
17. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties.
18. Rule 12 of the aforesaid Rules reads as under:
"Rule 12. Action following judicial acquittal When a police officer has been tried and acquitted by a criminal court, he shall not be punished departmentally on the same charge or on a different charge upon the evidence cited in the criminal case, whether actually led or not unless:---
(a) the criminal charge has failed on technical grounds, or KSHITIJ KSHITIJ SAXENA 2026.02.11 SAXENA 16:57:31+05'30' 10 Item No. 05/ C-II O.A. No. 3235/2022
(b) in the opinion of the court, or on the Deputy Commissioner of Police the prosecution witnesses have been won over; or
(c) the court has held in its judgment that an offence was actually committed and that suspicion rests upon the police officer concerned; or
(d) the evidence cited in the criminal case discloses facts unconnected with the charge before the court which justify departmental proceedings on a different charge; or
(e) additional evidence for departmental proceedings is available."
19. It is undisputed and also apparent from the impugned orders that the orders have been passed without considering the provisions of the aforesaid Rule. Of course in the counter reply of the respondents, particularly in para 4.6 thereof, it is asserted by them that the acquittal of the applicants by the learned Trial Court was in view of the fact that the prosecution witnesses have become hostile. However, on plain reading of the aforesaid provisions of Rule 12 of the Rules, it is apparent that such exception that the prosecution witnesses have become hostile, has not been provided under any of the exceptions under provisions of the Rule. However, such situation has come for consideration before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Satyapal Singh Yadav (Supra), paras 13 to 26 of which read as under:
" 13. Clause (b) of Rule 12 of the DPPAR applies only where the acquittal of the police officer concerned, in criminal proceedings, is because the witnesses against him have been won over. A hostile witness is defined, in P Ramanatha Aiyar‟s Advanced Law Lexicon, thus:
"Hostile witness. The witness who makes statements adverse to the party calling and examining him, and who may, with the permission of the Court, be cross-examined by that party. A witness who, when giving evidence, conducts KSHITIJ KSHITIJ SAXENA 2026.02.11 SAXENA 16:57:31+05'30' 11 Item No. 05/ C-II O.A. No. 3235/2022 himself in a manner hostile to the party calling him, such that the party calling him may, by leave of the presiding judge, cross-examine him as if he were a witness for the other side. A witness is not hostile merely because he gives evidence unfavourably to the party calling him."
14. A witness may turn hostile for a variety of reasons, and it cannot be presumed that hostility of the witness is, in every case, because he has been won over by the opposite party. Winning over of a witness is a positive act committed by the party who has won over the witness. In Shankar v State of UP (1975) 3 SCC 851, the Supreme Court held that the accused, in that case, had won over the witnesses, in the sense that the witnesses were not prepared to give evidence in the case for fear of their lives or otherwise. It is only, therefore, where the witness is unprepared to tender evidence or to support the case of the party who summons him into the witness box because of some overt or covert act committed by the opposite party, by threat, inducement or the like that the witness can be said to have been won over.
15. Witnesses may, turn hostile because they have been won over by the accused, or for any other reason. Clause
(b) of Rule 12 of the DPPAR would apply where the witnesses turn hostile because they have been won over by the accused charged officer. It is not sufficient, therefore, for the Court, or the DCP, to hold, or opine, that the acquittal of the officer was because the witnesses turned hostile. The Court, or the DCP, must go a step further and hold, additionally, that the hostility of the witnesses was because the officer had won them over.
16. This crucial latter requirement is not satisfied in the present case, either in the judgement of the learned MM or in the punishment order issued by the DCP.
17. It may not be necessary, for the purposes of the limited scope of this decision, to delve in detail into the degree of material which is required to be present in order for an inference, that a witness has been won over by the opposite party, to be drawn. What is clear in law, however, is that clause (b) of Rule 12 of the DPPAR requires a observation or a finding by the DCP, or the criminal court, that the acquittal of the charged police officer in the criminal proceeding was because he had won over the witness. A finding, or at least an observation, of such a positive misdemeanour having been committed by the police official, must figure in the opinion of the DCP.
18. A mere reference to witnesses having turned hostile does not, therefore, ipso facto or ipso jure lead to an KSHITIJ KSHITIJ SAXENA 2026.02.11 SAXENA 16:57:31+05'30' 12 Item No. 05/ C-II O.A. No. 3235/2022 inexorable inference that the witnesses had necessarily been won over by the charged police officer.
19. The DCP, in the present, has, therefore, obviously failed to appreciate the distinction between a finding that the witness had turned hostile and a finding that the witness had been won over.
20. We are in agreement with the finding of the learned Tribunal that, in fact, there is no observation by the DCP in his punishment order dated 9 March 2015 that the acquittal of the respondent in the criminal proceedings following FIR dated 3 June 2014 was because he had won over the witnesses who had earlier deposed against him.
21. While arriving at this finding, we have kept in mind the limited scope of our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are not sitting in appeal over the judgment of the Tribunal. It is not permissible for us, therefore, to overturn the judgment of the Tribunal merely on the ground that another possible, or even more appropriate, inference can be drawn, from the facts, than that drawn by the Tribunal. Our jurisdiction, over the Tribunal, is that of certiorari. The limits of certiorari jurisdiction stand classically delineated in the following passage, from Syed Yakoob v K.S. Radhakrishnan AIR 1964 SC 477:
"7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard, to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law KSHITIJ KSHITIJ SAXENA 2026.02.11 SAXENA 16:57:31+05'30' 13 Item No. 05/ C-II O.A. No. 3235/2022 which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.
8. It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said KSHITIJ KSHITIJ SAXENA 2026.02.11 SAXENA 16:57:31+05'30' 14 Item No. 05/ C-II O.A. No. 3235/2022 error; but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion, it neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have been misconducted or contravened."
(Emphasis supplied).
22. The Tribunal has not regarded the observation, by the DCP, in the punishment order dated 9 March 2015 to the effect that the acquittal of the respondent was because witnesses had turned hostile, as equivalent to the expression of opinion that the witnesses had been won over by the respondent. We do not feel that the said view suffers from any inherent jurisdictional infirmity or patent error of law or fact, as would justify inference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
23. We, therefore, find no reason to upset the view of the Tribunal that the present case does not fall within clause
(b) of Rule 12 of the DPPAR.
24. Though Ms. Bandhopadhyaya did not argue cause (a) of Rule 12, we deem it necessary to pen a word in that regard, as the said clause was invoked before the Tribunal, and the bulk of the impugned judgment devotes itself to the applicability of the said clause. Clause (a) of Rule 12 envisages acquittal of the charged police officer on technical grounds as one of the circumstances in which disciplinary proceedings against her, or him, could sustain, even if based on the same charges. On this aspect, the legal position is no longer res integra. This Court has, recently, examined the position in this regard in its judgment in Delhi Police v Krishan Kumar 2024 SCC OnLine Del 8862, in which, after noting the earlier decisions on the point in George N.S. v Commissioner of Police 183 (2011) DLT 226, Ex Ct. (CRPF) Prem Kumar KSHITIJ KSHITIJ SAXENA 2026.02.11 SAXENA 16:57:31+05'30' 15 Item No. 05/ C-II O.A. No. 3235/2022 Singh v UOI 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7563 and Additional Commissioner of Police Security v Dinesh Kumar 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2189, we have held thus:
"30. There is, therefore, a clear and discernible difference between acquittal on benefit of doubt and acquittal on technical grounds. A finding that the charge against the accused has not been proved, whether by returning a positive finding of innocence or even - as in many cases - by terming the acquittal to be by granting "benefit of doubt", is ipso facto not an acquittal "on technical grounds".
31. We may also refer in this context on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Lal v State of Rajasthan (2024) 1 SCC 175 in which Courts were cautioned against being swept away by the use of the words "benefit of doubt" in the operative portion of the judgment of acquittal by the Criminal Court and were advised to examine the judgment of acquittal holistically to determine for themselves as to whether the acquittal was actually on benefit of doubt or honourable.
32. That aspect may not, however, specifically arise in the present case, as the protocol regarding the effect of acquittal in criminal proceedings on disciplinary proceedings as contained in Rule 12
(a) of the DPPAR, is distinct and different. Where there is a statutory provision dealing with such an exigency, the Court has to be guided by the statute. The question of whether acquittal was honourable, or on benefit of doubt, is not a circumstance envisaged in any of the clauses of Rule 12 of the DPPAR. Rule 12 (a) does not use the expression "honourable" or "benefit of doubt". Instead, it uses the expression, "on technical grounds".
33. To repeat, there is a clear qualitative difference between an acquittal on technical grounds and an acquittal on benefit of doubt. An acquittal on technical grounds is an acquittal on the ground of nonfulfillment of some technical parameters or requirements, such as, for example, the need for obtaining sanction before launch of prosecution. Acquittal after appreciation of evidence, even if it is facially termed as acquittal on benefit of doubt is not an acquittal on "technical grounds". The decision in Prem Kumar Singh amply underscores this legal position."
25. The acquittal of the respondent by the learned MM was not, therefore, an acquittal on "technical grounds"
within the meaning of clause (a) of Rule 12 of the DPPAR.
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As already noted, Ms Bandopadhyaya, too, did not labour this point.
26. In our view, therefore, neither clause (a) nor clause
(b) of Rule 12 of the DPPAR applies in the present case. None of the other clauses, obviously, apply."
20. In the case of Satyapal Singh Yadav (Supra), before the Hon'ble High Court a judgment of this Tribunal was under
challenge where the Tribunal had set aside the disciplinary proceedings initiated in light of the fact that such disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the respondents in the said Writ Petition keeping in view the fact that prosecution witnesses in the relevant criminal case have become hostile. The Hon'ble High Court had not found any error in the judgment of the Tribunal and thus such judgment of the Tribunal was upheld by the Hon'ble High Court in the case of Satyapal Singh Yadav (Supra).
21. In view of such binding precedents, the present case cannot be construed, in any manner, that the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against the applicants in view of the exception under Sub Clause (b) of Rule 12 of the Rules. Now, the only defence, as argued by Mr. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, is that the impugned proceedings have been initiated in view of the provisions under Sub-Clause (c) of the Rule 12 of the Rules. On plain reading of para 18 of the order/judgment dated 24.09.2020, it is found that the learned Trial Court has categorically recorded that "...the prosecution has failed to prove KSHITIJ KSHITIJ SAXENA 2026.02.11 SAXENA 16:57:31+05'30' 17 Item No. 05/ C-II O.A. No. 3235/2022 that accused persons have committed the offence of extortion u/s 384/24 IPC. When there is no proof of commission of offence u/s 384/24 IPC, it is needless to say that charge u/s 411 IPC also cannot sustain.....". Admittedly, the allegations against the applicants herein were of commission of offences falling under Sections 384/411/34 of the IPC and on bare perusal of para 18 of the order/judgment dated 24.09.2020 of the learned Trial Court, it is evident that the learned Trial Court has categorically recorded that there was no proof of commission of such offences against the persons accused in the said case FIR (applicants herein). In this view of the matter, we are of the considered view that the initiation of disciplinary proceedings cannot be claimed to be falling under the exception 'c' under the provisions of Rule 12 of the Rules.
22. The last argument advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the initiation of disciplinary proceedings was found to be required by the competent authority keeping in view the larger public interest. We fail to understand that once the framers of the Rules, particularly Rule 12 of the Rules, have categorically provided that disciplinary proceedings can be initiated only in the circumstances as provided under the exceptions 'a to e', as to how the argument on behalf of the respondents that the proceedings are required under larger public interest is sustainable in law.
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23. So far as the reliance of the learned counsel for the respondents on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Assitant General Manager State Bank of India (Supra) is considered, we may reproduce paras 35 to 38 thereof which read as under:
"35. To refresh our memory, the aforesaid decisions are authorities for the proposition that validity of an order, which is under challenge in the proceedings, must be tested on the basis of the ground(s) mentioned in it in support thereof; and any additional ground, to support the order under challenge, cannot be allowed to be raised in the reply affidavit or in course of arguments. The underlying principle is that an order which is bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later 18 (1978) 1 SCC 405 19 AIR 1952 SC 16 20 (2021) 6 SCC 707 18 brought out. As Hon‟ble Vivian Bose, J. famously remarked in Commissioner of Police (supra), orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older. What was later held in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) drew inspiration from the principle of law laid down in Commissioner of Police (supra).
36. Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) has been considered by this Court in All India Railway Recruitment Board v. K. Shyam Kumar21. It has been held there that the principle laid down in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) is not applicable where larger public interest is involved and in such a situation, additional grounds can be looked into, to examine the validity of an order. To the same effect is the decision in PRP Exports v. State of Tamilnadu22. However, K. Shyam Kumar (supra) and PRP Exports (supra) have been considered in 63 Moons Technologies Ltd. v. Union of India23 where it has been held in paragraph 102 by a coordinate Bench that there is no broad proposition that the law laid down in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) will not apply where larger public interest is involved. The decisions in K. Shyam Kumar (supra) and P.R.P. Exports (supra) were distinguished on the ground that the coordinate Benches there had proceeded to consider subsequent materials that emerged for the purpose of validating the order under challenge.
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37. The need, thus, arises to reconcile the decisions noticed above.
38. The respective Benches in Commissioner of Police (supra), Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), Opto Circuits (India) Ltd. (supra) and 63 Moons Technologies Ltd. (supra), in our reading, while mandating what has been noticed above was not required to and, as such, rightly did not go that far in establishing the principle that, in all cases coming before it, the court is necessarily bound to confine itself to the grounds mentioned in the administrative order under challenge and cannot look beyond such grounds at all. While the courts, in course of reviewing administrative orders, may not permit additional grounds not found within the four corners of the said order to be raised in an affidavit or in oral arguments, we are inclined to the view that the factual narrative in such order and the documents referred to therein can certainly be considered together with the case set up in the writ petition, but in appropriate cases. Such cases could include a case, as the present, where the mentioned grounds are found to be untenable and, thus, unsustainable, but an alternative ground (appearing from the factual narrative in the order itself and/or from the records relevant thereto) is traceable which could have validly been mentioned as a ground to support the impugned rejection had there been a proper application of mind by the administrative authority. In all such cases, it would be open to the court to uphold it on such alternative ground subject, of course, to the affected party being put on notice and an opportunity to respond. This approach, which would prioritize fairness 19 and justice over technicalities, does not run contrary to or inconsistent with the law laid down in the afore referred precedents."
24. Furthermore, from para 2 of such judgment it is evident that the facts before the Hon'ble Apex Court in such case were entirely different inasmuch as the case relates to the State Bank of India being a secured creditor and the respondents being a borrower, having availed credit facilities from the State Bank of India by mortgaging seven immovable properties, the respondents failed to adhere to the payment schedule and defaulted in its obligation to KSHITIJ KSHITIJ SAXENA 2026.02.11 SAXENA 16:57:31+05'30' 20 Item No. 05/ C-II O.A. No. 3235/2022 repay it. The matter relates to policy decision and in such facts and circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court ruled that what has been laid down by the Hon'ble Court in Mohinder Singh Gill (Supra) cannot be applied ordinarily in every case. With regard to public policy, the framers of the Rules have already provided what is required to be done under provisions of Rule 12 of the Rules.
25. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the applicants belong to Delhi Police, which is expected to be a disciplined force, may not be of much importance for the reason that what has been provided under Rule 12 of the Rules specifically deals with the employees of Delhi Police only.
26. Furthermore, implication of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Mohinder Singh (Supra) and in few other cases including a few which have been considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in AGM State Bank of India (Supra) was considered by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in MS Nidhi Kaushik (Supra) and the Hon'ble High Court in paras 25.5, 25.6 has 25.17 has ruled as as under:
" 25.5. The respondent has cancelled the appellant's provisional appointment on the sole ground that she was involved in a criminal case. However, at the time of hearing of this appeal, an additional ground was raised. Since the appellants provisional appointment was cancelled on the sole ground that the proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act was a criminal case; the additional ground raised by the respondent at this stage before us can't be looked into in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Gordhandas Bhanji (supra), Mohinder Singh KSHITIJ KSHITIJ SAXENA 2026.02.11 SAXENA 16:57:31+05'30' 21 Item No. 05/ C-II O.A. No. 3235/2022 Gill (supra), Pavanendra Narayan Verma (supra), East Coast Railway (supra), Rashmi Metaliks Limited (supra), Dipak Babaria (supra) and Kerala High Court in Kunjumon Thankappan (supra).
25.6. An important requirement of a fair procedure is to consider all the relevant material and give reasons for the decision. It is well settled that even in administrative matters, the reasons are required to be given by the administrative authority as held by the Supreme Court in Cyril Lasrado (supra), Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. (supra) and Ravi Yashwant Bhoir (supra). We do not find compliance of the same in this case as no reasons have been given in the order as to how the case under Section 12 of the DV Act is a criminal case. .............................................................................................. 25.17. According to the Respondents, BHEL is a „maharatna‟ company of the Government and the management is very particular not to employ any person with doubtful integrity and tainted antecedents. However, we are shocked and pained to note that in resisting a small claim, the respondents have resorted to making false and misleading statement on oath and have dared to refuse to follow the law well settled by the Apex Court as well as by this Court, which has pricked our conscience. The respondents have failed in their duty to be fair and reasonable. It appears that something has gone seriously wrong in working of the Legal and HR departments of the respondents. The respondents need to do serious introspection."
27. We may further record that after considering various decisions, this Bench in Rohtash Singh (Supra), under para 20, has ruled as under:
"20. As recorded hereinabove, though the respondents in their impugned orders have nowhere recorded as to under which exceptions to the Rule 12, the case of the applicant falls to sustain the impugned orders passed against him, however, Sh. Rajnish Prasad, learned counsel for the respondents has extensively argued that the case of the applicant falls under the exception clause
(a), (c) and (e). The exception (a) of Rule 12 i.e. "the criminal charge has failed on technical grounds" is considered and interpreted by the Hon'ble High Court of KSHITIJ KSHITIJ SAXENA 2026.02.11 SAXENA 16:57:31+05'30' 22 Item No. 05/ C-II O.A. No. 3235/2022 Delhi in George N.S. (supra), paragraph 12 of which reads as under:
"12. The acquittal on account of prosecution failing to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt or on account of lack of evidence or no evidence cannot be termed as acquittal on technical ground. Such grounds i.e. technical ground, would be, to illustrate a few, limitation which has now been prescribed by recent amendment in Cr.P.C or trial without obtaining sanction as required under Section 197 Cr.P.C in cases where it is required and the trial being held without obtaining such sanction. If the legislature intended that acquittal on account of benefit of doubt or prosecution failing to prove a case beyond reasonable doubt etc. were not to be a bar in the departmental proceedings, it would have so specifically provided as Exception in Rule 12. The legislature could not be oblivious of the situation as mentioned above, particularly when we know that most of the acquittals are based on the failure of the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt or on account of benefit of doubt. The legislative wisdom only refers to acquittal on technical grounds as one of the exceptions for holding departmental proceedings. By any means we cannot hold that failure of the prosecution to lead evidence per se, would amount to acquittal on technical ground. The acquittal resulting on account of prosecution not leading evidence or leading insufficient evidence would definitely stand on different footing than acquittal resulting on technical ground. In the former case, the acquittal would be clean acquittal and even the words like "benefit of doubt" or "failing to prove beyond reasonable doubt" would be superfluous. The petitioner was acquitted by learned MM because there was no evidence led by the prosecution for many years and even the case property was also not produced for any justifiable reason. Such acquittal could not be said to be on a technical ground since the charges were not proved and the decision was arrived at on the basis of no evidence to prove the criminal charge, mere mention of "benefit of doubt" by a criminal court is superfluous and baseless and such an acquittal is an "honourable acquittal". Another Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashikumari vs. Uttari Haryana Bijli KSHITIJ KSHITIJ SAXENA 2026.02.11 SAXENA 16:57:31+05'30' 23 Item No. 05/ C-II O.A. No. 3235/2022 Vitran Nigam 2005 (1) ATJ 154 has taken the same view. The instant case, however, appears to be on a better footing. Thus, (a) to the prohibition was not attracted in the present case."
29. In view of the aforesaid, the present OA deserves to be allowed and the same is accordingly allowed with following orders:
i. The impugned orders dated 05.09.2022 alongwith summary of allegations, list of witnesses, list of documents; orders dated 19.09.2022 and 05.07.2022 are set aside;
ii. The applicants shall be entitled for all consequential benefits;
iii. The aforesaid directions shall be complied by the respondents as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this Order.
30. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
(B. Anand) (R.N. Singh)
Member (A) Member (J)
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KSHITIJ KSHITIJ SAXENA
2026.02.11
SAXENA 16:57:31+05'30'