Allahabad High Court
Smt Jyoti vs Ankit Dubey on 13 March, 2023
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Court No. - 6 Reserved A.F.R. Case :- CIVIL REVISION No. - 80 of 2022 Revisionist :- Smt Jyoti Opposite Party :- Ankit Dubey Counsel for Revisionist :- Mr. Gaurav Tripathi, Advocate Counsel for Opposite Party :- Mr. Puneet Bhadauriya, Advocate Hon'ble J.J. Munir,J.
This civil revision is directed against an order of Smt. Renu Singh, Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Etawah dated May the 31st, 2022, allowing the respondent's application, seeking amendment to his petition for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short, 'the HMA').
2. A petition under Section 13 of HMA was instituted by the sole respondent, Ankit Dubey against the revisionist, Smt. Jyoti Dubey before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Agra, which was numbered on the file of the Principal Judge, Family Court, aforesaid as HM Petition No.291 of 2017. A decree for divorce was sought on the ground of cruelty.
3. It appears that the wife, who is a resident of Etawah, has secured a transfer of proceedings from the Principal Judge, Family Court, Agra to the Family Court at Etawah. The petition for divorce as aforesaid is pending before the Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Etawah. This fact is not stated on record, but that is the only logical conclusion to be drawn considering that the proceedings commenced before the Family Court, Agra and are now pending at Etawah, where the revisionist-wife resides.
4. Pending the divorce petition, the respondent moved to amend it on the basis of certain supervening events that he sought to plead in order to establish his case of actionable cruelty. The aforesaid amendment application was made on 06.04.2022, which was assigned paper No. 57-Ka on the file of the Trial Court, that is to say, the Court of the Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Etawah. An objection to the amendment application was filed on behalf of the revisionist which was marked as paper No.65-Ga.
5. The thrust of the revisionist's objection before the Trial Court was that the amendment application being one made seeking to plead facts based on events that had occurred five years ago, the proposed amendment is highly belated which ought to be refused on that ground. Those events, even if true, would give rise to a cause of action to institute and pursue a criminal prosecution. Otherwise too, the facts sought to be pleaded were incorrect. The Trial Court by the order impugned has granted the amendment subject to payment of Rs.3000/- in costs by the respondent to the revisionist. The Trial Court has reasoned that cruelty is already a cause of action which the respondent has pleaded to found his claim for a decree of divorce, besides others. Since cruelty is already a ground pleaded in the petition, the facts sought to be brought in through amendment do not change the nature of the respondent's case. It was also remarked that issues have not been framed as yet, and, therefore, permitting the amendment would not prejudice the revisionist's case. It was also remarked that since the amendment has been sought after a long delay, it would be appropriate to compensate the other side by awarding costs.
6. Heard Mr. Gaurav Tripathi, learned Counsel for the revisionist in support of the motion to admit this Revision to hearing and Mr. Puneet Bhadauriya, Advocate who has opposed the motion on the question of maintainability.
7. Mr. Puneet Bhadauriya, learned Counsel for the respondent has raised an objection about the maintainability of this civil revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'the Code') urging that in the case of proceedings before the Family Court, governed by the Family Courts Act, 1984 (for short, 'the Act of 1984'), no revision lies from any of its orders under Section 115 of the Code, which may otherwise be maintainable on the ground that the order is a ''case decided' within the meaning of that provision in the Code, as amended in its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh. He submits elaborating that even if a civil revision be competent against the kind of the order impugned here, if passed by a Civil Court, it would not be maintainable since the order has been made by the Family Court governed by the provisions of the Act of 1984. The learned Counsel for the respondent in aid of his submissions has relied upon the decision of this Court in Sudhanshu Gupta v. Komal Gupta, 2019 (5) AWC 4434. It is urged that the said decision holds that an order rejecting an amendment application, where it is made by a Family Court, is not revisable but appealable.
8. Refuting the above submission advanced by Mr. Bhadauriya, Mr. Gaurav Tripathi, learned Counsel for the revisionist has relied upon a later decision of this Court in Smt. Raj Shri Agarwal @ Ram Shri Agarwal and another v. Sudheer Mohan and others, 2022 (5) AWC 4192. Learned Counsel for the revisionist submits that in Smt. Raj Shri Agarwal (supra), this Court has clearly held that against an order rejecting an application seeking amendment to the petition filed before the Court, the remedy of a revision under Section 115 of the Code is open, and a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution to challenge that order is not maintainable.
9. This Court has considered the rival submissions advanced on behalf of parties about the maintainability of this revision under Section 115 of the Code.
10. The Act of 1984, under which the Family Courts are established and function, is a special statute, which sets up a special class of courts for the trial and decision of a very specific and different kind of causes, to wit, matrimonial causes. Matrimonial causes are reputed to be very different about everything from other classes of litigation. This is so because matrimonial causes are concerned about resolving conflicts arising out of the relationship between a husband and wife, and, what is known to the contemporary society as the nuclear family. A nuclear family comprises the husband, the wife and their minor children. This family in contemporary times is the mainstay of society, in the absence of which the society itself may disintegrate or go irremediably wayward. Therefore, it is the pious duty of the Family Court to carefully and expeditiously resolve disputes relating to marriage and family affairs. The enacting clause of the Act of 1984 reads:
"An Act to provide for the establishment of Family Courts with a view to promote conciliation in, and secure speedy settlement of, disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith."
11. The statement of objects and reasons of the Act of 1984 are of much relevance here and, therefore, being quoted below:
"Statement of Objects and Reasons.--Several associations of women, other organisations and individuals have urged, from time to time, that Family Courts be set up for the settlement of family disputes, where emphasis should be laid on conciliation and achieving socially desirable results and adherence to rigid rules of procedure and evidence should be eliminated. The Law Commission in its 59th report (1974) had also stressed that in dealing with disputes concerning the family the court ought to adopt an approach radically different from that adopted in ordinary civil proceedings and that it should make reasonable efforts at settlement before the commencement of the trial. The Code of Civil Procedure was amended in 1976 to provide for a special procedure to be adopted in suits or proceedings relating to matters concerning the family. However, not much use has been made by the courts in adopting this conciliatory procedure and the courts continue to deal with family disputes in the same manner as other civil matters and the same adversary approach prevails. The need was, therefore, felt, in the public interest, to establish Family Courts for speedy settlement of family disputes.
2. The Bill inter alia, seeks to:--
(a) provide for establishment of Family Courts by the State Governments;
(b) make it obligatory on the State Governments to set up a Family Court in every city or town with a population exceeding one million;
(c) enable the State Governments to set up, such courts in areas other than those specified in (b) above;
(d) exclusively provide within the jurisdiction of the family Courts the matters relating to:--
(i) matrimonial relief, including nullity of marriage, judicial separation, divorce, restitution of conjugal rights, or declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person;
(ii) the property of the spouses or of either of them;
(iii) declaration as to the legitimacy of any person;
(iv) guardianship of a person or the custody of any minor;
(v) maintenance, including proceedings under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
(e) make it obligatory on the part of the Family Court to endeavour, in the first instance to effect a reconciliation or a settlement between the parties to a family dispute. During this stage, the proceedings will be informal and the rigid rules of procedure shall not apply;
(f) provide for the association of social welfare agencies, counsellors, etc., during conciliation stage and also to secure the services of medical and welfare experts;
(g) provide that the parties to a dispute before a Family Court shall not be entitled, as of right, to be represented by legal practitioner. However, the Court may, in the interest of justice, seek assistance of a legal expert as amicus curiae;
(h) simplify the rules of evidence and procedure so as to enable a Family Court to deal effectually with a dispute;
(i) provide for only one right of appeal which shall lie to the High Court.
3. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects."
12. The Family Courts though no doubt Courts in the sense understood in law as fora established for the hearing and determination of disputes between parties, are not Courts that are part of the general civil judicature. As already remarked, these are special courts established to decide a special class of disputes, that is to say, disputes relating to marriage and family affairs. These Courts are required to be established by the State Government by virtue of Section 3 of the Act of 1984 after consultation with the High Court by notification. The local limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a Family Court is also required to be specified by notification to be made by the State Government, also in consultation with the High Court. Judges to the Courts so established by the State Government are again required to be appointed by the State Government with the concurrence of the High Court. Section 4 provides for the appointment of the Judges to Family Courts, their qualifications and other matters. The provisions of Sections 3 and 4 if read together would remove every iota of doubt that Family Courts established under the Act of 1984 are not part of the general civil judicature, the latter being Courts which exist for the determination of every civil cause, where a civil right is affected, unless their jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly barred by statute. The Code applies to the established Civil Courts proprio vigore and all procedure to be followed in these Courts is exhaustively governed by it. In the case of the Family Courts, however, since these exercise a facet of the jurisdiction, which otherwise by its character was earlier vested in the established Civil Courts, the Statute (Act of 1984) in its wisdom provides vide Section 10 thus :
"10. Procedure generally.--(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) and of any other law for the time being in force shall apply to the suits and proceedings (other than the proceedings under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) (2 of 1974), before a Family Court and for the purposes of the said provisions of the Code, Family Court shall be deemed to be a civil court and shall have all the powers of such court.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or the rules made thereunder, shall apply to the proceedings under Chapter IX of that Code before a Family Court.
(3) Nothing in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall prevent a Family Court from laying down its own procedure with a view to arrive at a settlement in respect of the subject-matter of the suit or proceedings or at the truth of the facts alleged by the one Party and denied by the other."
(emphasis by Court)
13. Chapter V of the Act of 1984 is also of immense importance to the understanding of the issue that arises here. The Chapter is titled: "Appeals and Revisions". It comprises a single section, to wit, Section 19. Section 19 and Chapter V of the Act of 1984 is a complete code about the remedies available to a party aggrieved by an order made by the Family Court. It would profit to reproduce in extenso the provisions of Chapter V of the Act of 1984. These read:
"Chapter V APPEALS AND REVISIONS
19. Appeal.--(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code or Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every judgement or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on law.
(2) No appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties or from an order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974):
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any appeal pending before a High Court or any order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) before the commencement of the Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 1991.
(3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgement or order of a Family Court.
(4) The High Court may, of its own motion or otherwise, call for an examine the record of any proceeding in which the Family Court situate within its jurisdiction passed an order under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order, not being an interlocutory order, and as to the regularity of such proceeding.
(5) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family Court.
(6) An appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a Bench consisting of two or more Judges."
(emphasis by Court)
14. Sudhanshu Gupta (supra), upon which Mr. Puneet Bhadauriya has relied to say that a civil revision from an order of the Family Court, allowing an amendment application is not maintainable, holds:
"11. From a bare perusal of Section 10, it emerges that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the proceedings under the Family Courts Act. However, the provisions of CPC are subject to other provisions of this Act and the Rules framed, thereunder. Therefore, the provisions of the CPC are applicable to the proceedings before the Family Court but these provisions are subject to and circumcised by the provisions of the Family Courts Act itself as also the rules framed thereunder.
12. Section 19 on the other hand starts with a non-obstante clause, namely, "notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure." It therefore necessarily follows that an appeal lies against every order passed by the Family Court, which is not an interlocutory order, despite any provision of the CPC to the contrary.
13. The Full Bench decision cited by counsel for the revisionist, namely Rama Shanker Tiwari Vs. Mahadeo and Ors., 1968 (38) AWR 103, holds that an order under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, either allowing or refusing to allow an amendment, is a "case decided".
14. Although, this judgment has been relied upon by counsel for the revisionist to submit that the revision is maintainable, in my considered opinion, this judgment necessarily holds against the revisionist. Once it is accepted that an order rejecting an amendment application is a case decided, it necessarily follows that it is not an interlocutory order and is therefore, appealable under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act.
15. The revision is not maintainable also because sub-section 3 of Section 115 CPC as applicable in U.P. provides that the Superior Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. Even if the order impugned is set-aside and the amendment application of the revisionist is allowed, the proceedings before the Family Court shall not stand finally disposed of.
16. Under the circumstances, the order impugned in this revision being a final order and not an interlocutory order, it is clearly appealable under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act and for this reason alone, the revision is necessarily not maintainable. This is so because no revision lies against an order which is appealable."
15. In Sudhanshu Gupta, this Court has taken the view that a civil revision does not lie from an order of the Family Court rejecting an amendment application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code, because it amounts to a case decided and, therefore, not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 19 of the Act of 1984, making it appealable. It, therefore, excludes a revision. While agreeing with the conclusion in Sudhanshu Gupta, I am of opinion that there could be added or very different reasons to reach the same conclusion.
16. On the other hand, the decision relied upon by Mr. Gaurav Tripathi, learned Counsel for the revisionist in Smt. Raj Shri Agarwal (supra) shows that the said decision has no bearing at all on the point involved in this case. The reason is that the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, that was filed from an order of the Trial Court rejecting the amendment application in the aforesaid case, was an order made by the Civil Court, that is to say, the Additional District Judge, Agra in an original suit. The principles, therefore, laid down in Smt. Raj Shri Agarwal, do not have the remotest application to the issue that has arisen here.
17. A similar issue, though not identical to the one that arises here, fell for consideration before a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Major Raja P. Singh v. Smt. Surendra Kumari, AIR 1991 Raj 133. In Major Raja P. Singh (supra), the Family Court, Jodhpur had passed an order rejecting two separate applications made by the appellant in that case. The first was an application where the appellant, who was the petitioner before the Family Court, prayed that his signatures be compared with those on documents Exhibits 2, 15 and 52. By the other application, relief was sought to add new grounds to the divorce petition. Both the applications were rejected by the Family Court. As facts appear in the report, the order rejecting amendment application was impugned in appeal before the High Court under Section 19 of the Act of 1984. The issue precisely in the appeal before the Division Bench was whether the order of the Family Court could be regarded as final and amenable to appeal under Section 19. It was in that context that the Division Bench held:
"11. The object of this Special Law of the Family Courts Act is to decide the matrimonial cases in a speedy manner. If, the order rejecting or allowing an amendment application will be termed as the case decided for the purpose of this Act and is appealable then, in ordinary course of law the decision of such cases would take years to come to reach the finality of the matter. In order to achieve the object of the Act i.e. speedy settlement of dispute relating to marriage, the purpose of expeditious trial is frustrated. That apart if the legislature intended that all interlocutory order be appealable, it should not have used the word in S. 19 of the Act "not being an interlocutory order" and that is why no appeal or revision has been provided. This Court in D.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 107/90 Smt. Vijay Kaur v. Radhey Shyam decided on 1-8-1990 has held that the order relating to adjournment cost is an interlocutory order and appeal is not maintainable u/Sec. 19 of the Act. In this view of the matter, the order dated 6-4-1989 cannot be termed finally deciding the case i.e. the controversy being settled. The parties can agitate the point in appeal after final disposal of the case by the trial court. In our considered opinion, the allowing or refusing an amendment is an interlocutory order against which no appeal u/sec. 19 of Act is provided. In conclusion the preliminary objection is sustained and it is held that the order dated 6-4-1989 is an interlocutory order and no appeal lies to this Court."
(emphasis by Court)
18. The issue whether an order by the Family Court allowing amendment to the plaint is appealable under Section 19 of the Act of 1984 came up for decision before a Division Bench of Uttarakhand High Court in Kanupriya v. Ashutosh Agrawal, AIR 2017 Utt 166. In Kanupriya (supra) after an extensive review of the authority on the point, it was held :
"16. Therefore, it can be seen that there is no uniform understanding of the word "interlocutory order". The word assumes the meaning from the context of the statute and the purpose of the statute. We have already noticed that the Apex Court in (1974) 2 SCC 387 took the view that an order of amendment can, in certain situations, be treated as a judgment. The court took the view that, if the amendment merely allows the plaintiff to state a new cause of action or ask a new relief or include a new ground of relief, all that happens is that it is possible for the plaintiff to make further contentions. The court does not decide the correctness of the contentions at that stage. It was found that such amendment merely regulates the procedure applicable. It does not decide any question touching the merit of the controversy. In a case, where, however, the defence of immunity available to the defendant is taken away in the matter of limitation, it becomes a judgment. That case, as already noticed, related to an intra-court appeal. Here, we are concerned with the Family Courts Act. Amendments of pleadings are of different kinds. If an appeal is allowed against amendments ordered, one way to look at it is that the matter would be decided at that stage and he does not have to wait for an opportunity, which he, undoubtedly, has to challenge the order of amendment in the course of the appeal against the final order, which would be passed. It could be that, at that stage, if the appellate court finds that the amendment was wholly unjustifiably allowed, the matter may merit a remand. If the intention of the Legislature in excluding interlocutory orders is to expedite the proceedings in the matrimonial causes, will not such a view hamper the object sought to be achieved by the Legislature? Even when a court allows an application for amendment, it is settled law that the court does not sit in judgment over the correctness or the merit of the pleadings. The amended proceedings only will provide the framework within which the trial would proceed, evidence adduced, arguments canvassed and decision rendered. Further, the party has always a right to challenge the order of amendment in the appeal from the main judgment. Also, it is not irrelevant to notice that the party can, in appropriate cases, invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of 227. The advantage of taking the view that an order of amendment will not be treated as a judgment and will be treated only as interlocutory order is that the purpose of the Family Courts would, in one sense, be advanced, inasmuch as, the delay which attends the challenge of proceedings and before the appellate court would stand obviated. Ordinarily, amendments are to be allowed liberally. Therefore, an order allowing an amendment is rarely interfered with.
17. Coming to the facts, this is not a case, where any vested right by way of limitation or any other right as such, which is accrued to the defendant, is being taken away. Two paragraphs are added by way of amendment. In fact, in the original plaint itself, it is stated that the marriage took place on 21.05.2013 and that the appellant left on 28.05.2013 for her paternal house. English translation of paragraph 4 of the original plaint reads as follows:
"4. That the intention of the respondent was always to stay away from the petitioner and, on one pretext or the other, she never gave matrimonial pleasure to the petitioner and always tried to escape from cohabitation and, after one week, on 28.05.2013, she went to her paternal house along with her jewelry and clothes."
18. The amended paragraphs appear to suggest that the marriage was not consummated. As already noticed, the court does not sit in judgment over the correctness of the pleadings at the stage when amendment is allowed. Certainly, the burden is on the petitioner to establish his case with convincing evidence. We cannot even treat this as a case, even applying the tests applied in (1981) 4 SCC 8 or (1974) 2 SCC 387, which would qualify as a decision, which is amenable to appellate jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Act."
19. It must be noticed that both in Major Raja P. Singh and Kanupriya, the Court had before it the issue whether an application seeking amendment, rejected in one case by the Family Court and allowed in the other, would constitute a judgment within the meaning of Section 19 so as to be amenable to appeal under the aforesaid provision. The Rajasthan High Court and the Uttarakhand High Court both have laid down law mindful of the fact that the object of the Family Court is to provide speedy justice in causes matrimonial or those relating to the family. Their Lordships have been conscious that permitting interlocutory challenge to orders granting or refusing amendment, would work to place fetters on the fast-tracked procedure contemplated by the Statute. It has also been noticed that the person who is aggrieved by the order granting amendment can in the appeal from the final judgment, if the event goes against him/ her, assail that order too. No doubt, their Lordships of the Division Bench of the Uttarakhand High Court have found a dichotomy between classes of amendments, which may or may not constitute a judgment within the meaning of Section 19. This Court need not dilate much on the subtlety of principle about orders granting or refusing amendment being amenable to an appeal under Section 19 of the Act of 1984. This is so because in the present case that is not the point. The point here is whether from an order granting or refusing an amendment application by the Family Court, a revision lies to this Court under Section 115 of the Code. In the Rajasthan decision, there is a remark that the legislature did not intend all interlocutory orders passed by the Family Court to be appealable under Section 19 and that is why no appeal or revision has been provided under the Act of 1984.
20. The moot question, therefore, is whether that kind of a power can be inferred to be available to this Court under Section 115 of the Code. A reading of Section 10 of the Act of 1984 shows that the provisions of the Code are generally made applicable, but subject to other provisions of the Act of 1984 and the Rules. A juxtaposition of this provision with sub-Section (5) of Section 19 shows that sub-Section (5) expressly says that except as provided under sub-Sections (1) to (4) of Section 19, no appeal or revision would lie to any Court from any judgment or decree of a Family Court. The aforesaid provision expressly bars all kinds of revisions except an appeal envisaged under Section 19(1) of the Act of 1984 or a revision from a final order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. No other kind of revision is envisaged by the Act of 1984. Thus, upon a reading of Sections 10(1) and 19(5) of the Act of 1984 together, the position that emerges is that no revision from an order of the Family Court is competent except one that arises from a final order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The party, therefore, aggrieved by an interlocutory order may question it in appeal, if it has the trappings of a judgment, or so to speak is an order of moment pronouncing upon rights of parties. It is dwelling on that principle that the Full Bench of this Court in Smt. Kiran Bala Srivastava v. Jai Prakash Srivastava, 2005 (23) LCD 1 held that an order under Section 24 of the HMA granting maintenance pendente lite is a judgment, which is appealable under Section 19 of the Act of 1984.
21. Likewise, a learned Single Judge of this Court in Yogish Arora v. Smt. Jennette Yogish Arora @ Miss Jennettee Dsouza, 2018 (9) ADJ 379 held that an order of temporary injunction passed by a Family Court under Order XXXIX of the Code falls in the category of an intermediate order, to which finality is attached. It has been observed that finality has been attached at a particular stage of proceedings to such an order of temporary injunction, which would render it appealable under Section 19(1) of the Act of 1984.
22. By contrast, in Sana Afrin v. Zohaib Khan, AIR 2021 All 40, an order passed under Section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 pending custody proceedings under Section 25 of the last mentioned Act, granting visitation rights to enable the father to meet his child, was held to be purely interlocutory and not amenable to an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Act of 1984.
23. In summation, therefore, orders passed by the Family Court, if interlocutory, have to be established to be ones that have trappings of a judgment in order to enable a party to avail the remedy of an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Act of 1984. And, that is the only remedy available by way of appellate procedures under the Act of 1984. There is no avenue of a revision under Section 115 of the Code open to a party aggrieved by an order of the Family Court. The provisions of the Code though generally applicable, stand excluded as regards the remedy of a revision under Section 115 of the Code in view of the provisions of Sections 10(1) and 19(5) of the Act of 1984.
24. In view of what has been said above, this Court finds this revision to be not maintainable. It is, accordingly, dismissed as not maintainable. It is made clear that this order will not prejudice the revisionist's right to seek such remedy against the order impugned at the appropriate stage as advised.
25. Interim order dated 14.09.2022 is hereby vacated.
Order Date :- 13.3.2023 Anoop