Uttarakhand High Court
Smt Kanupriya vs Ashutosh Agrawal on 5 July, 2017
Equivalent citations: AIR 2017 UTTARAKHAND 166
Author: V.K. Bist
Bench: K.M. Joseph, V.K. Bist
Reserved Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Appeal from Order No. 99 of 2017
Smt. Kanupriya ............ Appellant
Versus
Ashutosh Agrawal. ............. Respondent
Mr. J.C. Belwal, Advocate for the appellant.
Mr. Tapan Singh, Advocate for the respondent.
JUDGMENT
Coram: Hon'ble K.M. Joseph, C.J.
Hon'ble V.K. Bist, J.
Dated: 5th July, 2017 K.M. JOSEPH, C.J.
This appeal is filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") against order dated 07.02.2017 passed by the Family Court, by which the Judge, Family Court, has allowed the amendment of the plaint. This is an appeal, which is maintained under Section 19 of the Act, which reads as follows:
"19. Appeal. -(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on law.
(2) No appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties or from an order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) :
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any appeal pending before a High Court or any order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 2 of 1974) before the commencement of the Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 1991.
(3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment or order of a Family Court.
(4) The High Court may, of its own motion or otherwise, call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which the Family Court situate within its jurisdiction passed an order under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order, not being an interlocutory order, and as to the regularity of such proceeding.
(5) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family Court.
(6) An appeal referred under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a Bench consisting of two or more Judges."
2. Therefore, it is clear that an appeal will not lie against an interlocutory order. We requested the learned counsel to address us on the issue whether the appeal is maintainable in view of the embargo against entertaining appeals against interlocutory orders.
3. We heard Mr. J.C. Belwal, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Tapan Singh, learned counsel for the respondent.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on a Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Rama Shanker Tiwari vs. Mahadeo & others, reported in 1968 ALJ 109. Therein, the question arose whether an order allowing an amendment application would amount to a case decided. The judgment is dated 15.12.1967. The court took the view that an order passed either allowing an amendment or refusing to allow an amendment is a case decided. The court, inter alia, took the view that, to hold otherwise, would be denying the parties relief where it is most needed and in the perpetuation of gross injustice as the parties will have to wait till the suit is decided on merits. The court also reasoned that the word "case" in Section 115 is a word of comprehensive import. An interlocutory order, which has a direct bearing on the rights of the parties, was found to be a case decided within the meaning of Section 115, though it does not finally disposes of the matter. The word 3 "case" has received a liberal interpretation and it was found to have a very wide import. We may, at once, notice that the court was considering the scope of the word "case decided".
5. In fact, learned counsel for the respondent also supported the stand of the appellant that allowing an amendment gives rise to a right of appeal under Section 19 of the Act.
6. We may also notice the judgment of the Bench of this Court in Rahul Samrat Tandon vs. Smt. Neeru Tandon, reported in 2010 (2) UD 4. Therein, the appeal was filed under Section 19 of the Act against an order passed on an application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The court referred to the decisions in the cases of Sunil Hansraj Gupta vs. Payal Sunil Gupta, reported in AIR 1991 Bombay 423; Radheshyam Gupta vs. Smt. Laxmi Bai, reported in AIR 1977 Madhya Pradesh 271; and Gurbaksh Singh vs. Smt. Taran Jit, reported in AIR 1977 Himanchal Pradesh 66. The court took the following view:
"11. A bare perusal of Section 19 (1) of 1984 Act shows that an appeal is only maintainable in two cases. Firstly, it is maintainable against a judgment. Secondly, it is also maintainable against an order, if that order is not an interlocutory order. Now even assuming for the sake of argument that the order presently impugned is an order of an interlocutory nature, then what has to be seen is as to whether the order stands in the category of a "judgment", as stated under Section 19 of the 1984 Act. The word "judgment" has not been defined in the Family Court Act. It is defined under Section 2 (9) of the Code of Civil Procedure as follows:
"2. Definitions.-
(9) "judgment" means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order ;"
This definition, referred above, is of no use to us as it does not define either the wide or narrow parameters within which the word "judgment" has to be construed nor does it state as to what are the characteristics of a 'judgment'. However, there are a catena of decisions defining the parameters of what would constitute a "judgment". Leading case on this issue is that of Shah Babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania and another AIR 1981 SC 1786. The Supreme Court in this seminal judgment had laid down the parameters within which the Court must examine as to when an order or even an 4 interlocutory order has the trappings of a judgment. Though the issue was as to what would constitute a "judgment" which would be appealable in a letter patent appeal, all the same, the broad principles laid down in the above case would equally apply to the present case as well. As per the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the above judgment, an order or an interlocutory order would be called a judgment, if it has the quality of "finality" to it. The Apex Court laid down that there can be three kinds of judgments. Relevant portion of the said judgment to that effect is as follows:
"(1) A final judgment--A judgment which decides all the questions or issues in controversy so far as the trial Judge is concerned and leaves, nothing else to be decided. This would mean that by virtue of the judgment, the suit or action brought by the plaintiff is dismissed or decreed in part or in full. Such an order passed by the trial Judge indisputably and unquestionably is a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent and even amounts to a decree so that an appeal would lie from such a judgment to a Division Bench.
(2) A preliminary judgment--This kind of a judgment may take two forms--(a) where the trial Judge by an order dismisses the suit without going into the merits of the suit but only on a preliminary objection raised by the defendant or the party opposing on the ground that the suit is not maintainable.
Here also, as the suit is finally decided one way or the other, the order passed by the trial Judge would be a judgment finally deciding the cause so far as the trial Judge is concerned and, therefore, appealable to the larger Bench. (b) Another shape which a preliminary judgment may take is that where the trial Judge passes an order after hearing the preliminary objections raised by the defendant relating to maintainability of the suit, e.g., bar of jurisdiction, res judicata, a manifest defect in the suit. Absence of notice under Sec. 80 and the like, and these objections are decided by the trial Judge against the defendant, the suit is not terminated but continues and has to be tried on merits but the order of the trial Judge rejecting the objections doubtless adversely affects a valuable right of the defendant who, if his objections are valid, is entitled to get the suit dismissed on preliminary grounds. Thus, such an order even though it keeps the suit alive, undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the trial which affects a vital right of the defendant and must, therefore, be construed to be a judgment so as to be appealable to a larger Bench.
(3) Intermediary or interlocutory judgment: Most of the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and have already been held by us to be judgments within the meaning of the Letters Patent and, therefore, appealable. There may also be interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order 43, Rule 1 but which also possess the characteristics and trappings of finality in that, the orders may adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an important aspect of the 5 trial in an ancillary proceeding. Before such an order can be a judgment the adverse affect on the party concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote..."
The court referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Shah Babulal Khimji vs. Jayaben D. Kania and another, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1786. Therein, the Apex Court had categorized the decisions as final judgments, preliminary judgments and intermediary or interlocutory judgments. Under the category of "intermediary or interlocutory judgment", the Apex Court observed as already referred to above. The court also referred to the judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Kiran Bala Srivastava vs. Jai Prakash Srivastava, reported in 2005 (23) LCD 1. The court further appreciated the importance of an order passed under Section 24 in the light of the aforesaid judgment noting that the provision is important from the point of view of the wife, as her survival during the pendency of the proceedings under the Act and right to prosecute or defend the proceedings depends on the outcome of the proceedings under Section 24. Agreeing with the Allahabad High Court judgment, the court held that the appeal is maintainable as the impugned order therein was in the nature of a judgment and is appealable under Section 19 of the Act.
7. In Major Raja P. Singh vs. Smt. Surendra Kumari, reported in AIR 1991 Rajasthan 133, a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court was considering whether an order passed in an application for comparing signature of the appellant on certain documents and of adding certain new grounds in the petition would be appealable under Section 19 of the Act. Finally, the court formulated the question as to whether an order allowing or rejecting an amendment is appealable. The court held as follows:
"11. The object of this Special Law of the Family Courts Act is to decide the matrimonial cases in a speedy manner. If, the order rejecting or allowing an amendment application will be termed as the case decided for the purpose of this Act and is appealable then, in ordinary course of law the decision of such cases would take years to come to reach the 6 finality of the matter. In order to achieve the object of the Act i.e. speedy settlement of dispute relating to marriage, the purpose of expeditious trial is frustrated. That apart if the legislature intended that all interlocutory order be appealable, it should not have used the word in S. 19 of the Act "not being an interlocutory order" and that is why no appeal or revision has been provided."
8. In Raj Kumar Shivhare vs. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement and another, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 772, dealing with a case under Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, which provided for appeal from any decision or order of the appellate authority, the court took the view that the word "any" would mean "all" and there was no reason, in the absence of a contrary statutory intent, to give it a restrictive meaning.
9. In the judgment of the High Court of Kerala in the case of Thankappan Nair vs. Prasannakumari & others in M.F.A. No. 1760/1994-B, decided on 30.06.1995, a Bench considered the question whether an order attaching the salary for failure to pay maintenance as ordered by the court was interlocutory. The court concluded that the order was interlocutory. The court, inter alia, held as follows and dismissed the appeal finally:
"6. In Webster's "New World Dictionary" the word "interlocutory order" has been defined as an order other than final decision. This expression "interlocutory order" has appeared differently in different statutes and received different construction by the courts depending upon the contexts and setting in which the expression has been used. Under Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, revisional jurisdiction is excluded in relation to an interlocutory order. However, the expression "interlocutory order" appearing in the said section has received wider meaning in a number of decisions (vide Amar Nath v. State of Hariyana MANU/SC/0068/1977 : 1977 (4) SCC 137, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/0103/1977 : (1977) 4 SCC 551 and Hariyana Land Reclamation and Development Corporation Ltd. v. State of Hariyana MANU/SC/0473/1990 :
(1990) 3 SCC 588.
8. With the help of legal principles discussed in the above decisions we can gauge the amplitude of the expression "interlocutory order" in Section 19 of the Act. We bear in mind that what is banned under the said Chapter is not only appeals 7 against interlocutory orders but even the revisional jurisdiction is also foreclosed in the sweep. Of course, it is unusual that in a statute wherein appellate jurisdiction is closed then revisional jurisdiction is also closed in respect of the same category of orders. What would have been the legislative intent in providing such a ban. The parties in Family Courts very often include destitute and orphaned wives and or children and perhaps poor widows also. If appeal or revision is provided against interlocutory orders the proceedings in the Family Court could successfully be scuttled by rich and contumacious opposite parties by taking the matter to the High Court against any order passed during interlocutory stages. Legislature would have intended to prevent it. In that perspective it can be construed that the interlocutory order envisaged in Chapter V of the Act is an order other than final orders. Hence the meaning of interlocutory order in Section 19 shall be understood as an order which is not a final order."
10. In K.A. Abdul Jaleel vs. T.A. Sahida, reported in AIR 1997 Kerala 269, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court was dealing with an appeal under Section 19 of the Act, wherein the appeal was filed against an order by which the petition filed by the respondent was held to be maintainable in terms of clause (c) of the Explanation to Section 7(1) of the Act. The Family Court took the view that it had jurisdiction to entertain the petition and, therefore, the appellate court took the view that it would affect the rights of the parties. The court took the view that the expression "interlocutory order" has to be understood in the context of the meaning of the expression "case decided" in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court in this regard referred to the judgment in Union of India vs. India Cements Ltd., reported in 1996 AIHC 3047. Referring to the decision in AIR 1991 Rajasthan 133, which we have already adverted to, where the specific issue was as to whether an order rejecting or allowing an application for amendment is appealable, the Division Bench held as follows:
"5. Learned counsel for the respondent made a reference to the decision reported in Major Raja P. Singh v. Surendra Kumari, (1993) 1 D.M.C. 285 : (AIR 1991 Rajasthan 133) wherein it was held that the order rejecting or allowing an amendment application could only be construed as an interlocutory order and no appeal is maintainable under Section 8 19(1) of the Family Courts Act. The said decision has no application to the facts of this case as the appellant therein had effective remedy of challenging the order in an appeal to be filed, if any, against the final judgment in the case. The Supreme Court also had occasion to consider the question of interlocutory order in V.C. Shukla v. State, AIR 1980 SC 962 therein it was held that:
"Ordinarily speaking, the expression interlocutory in legal parlance is understood in contra distinction to what is styled as final. In the course of a judicial proceeding before a court, for judicially determining the main dispute brought to the court for its resolution, a number of situations arise, when that court goes on disposing of ancillary disputes raised by parties to the proceeding by making orders and unless the order finally disposes of a proceeding in a court all such orders during the course of a trial would be broadly designated "interlocutory" orders. Such interlocutory orders are steps, taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceedings."
We do not think that the impugned order is an order passed like that. It has finally decided the rights of the parties as regards the maintainability of the petition. Therefore, we hold that an appeal would lie against such an order under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act."
11. We may notice the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shanti Kumar R. Canji vs. The Home Insurance Co. of New York, reported in (1974) 2 SCC 387. Therein, the Apex Court was considering the question whether an order of amendment would constitute a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court. The court, inter alia, held as follows:
"10. The locus classicus is the decision of the High Court of Calcutta in Justice of the Peace for Calcutta v. Oriental Gas Company, (1872) 8 Bengal L.R. 433 where Sir Richard Couch, C. J. said:
"We think that 'judgment' means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability. It may be either final or preliminary, or interlocutory, the difference between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit, 9 and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it, leaving other matters to be determined."
14. In finding out whether any decision is a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent each case must be looked into, in order to find out as to whether there is a decision determining the right or liability of the parties affecting the merits of the controversy between the parties. It is in that light that this Court in Asrumati Debi's case (supra) described the order refusing to rescind leave to be within the category of a judgment as laid down in the Calcutta cases though no final opinion was expressed as to the propriety of that view.
17. The right to claim that an introduction of a cause of action by amendment is barred by limitation is founded on immunity from a liability. A right is an averment of entitlement arising out of legal rules. A legal right may be defined as an advantage or benefit conferred upon a person by a rule of law. Immunity in short is no liability. It is an immunity from the legal power of some other person. The correlative of immunity is disability. Disability means the absence of power. The appellant in the present case because of the limitation of the cause of action has no power to render the respondent liable for the alleged claim. The respondent has acquired by reason of limitation immunity from any liability.
18. The views of the High Courts at Calcutta and Madras with regard to the meaning of 'judgment' are with respect preferred to the meaning of 'judgment' given by the Rangoon and Nagpur High Courts. We are in agreement with the view expressed by the High Court at Calcutta in the M. B. Sirkar case (supra) as to when an order on an application for amendment can become a judgment with in the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. If an amendment merely allows the plaintiff to state a new cause of action or to ask a new relief or to include a new ground of relief all that happens is that it is possible for the plaintiff to raise farther contentions in the suit, but it is not decided whether the contentions are right. Such an amendment does nothing more than regulate the procedure applicable to the suit. it does not decide any question which touches the merits of the controversy between the parties. Where, on the other hand, an amendment takes away from the defendant the defence of immunity from any liability by reason of limitation, it is a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The reason why it becomes a judgment is that it is a decision affecting the merits of the question between the parties by determining the right or liability based on limitation. It is the final decision as far as the trial court is concerned.
19. In finding out whether the order is a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent it has to be found out that the order affects the merits of the action between the parties by determining some right or liability. The right or liability is to be found out by the court. The nature of 10 the order will have to be examined in order to ascertain whether there has been a determination of any right or liability."
12. In fact, in Shah Babulal Khimji vs. Jayaben D. Kania & another, reported in (1981) 4 SCC 8, the Apex Court, inter alia, held as follows:
"120. Thus, these are some of the principles which might guide a Division Bench in deciding whether an order passed by the Trial Judge amounts to a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent. We might, however, at the risk of repetition give illustrations of interlocutory orders which may be treated as judgments:
(1) An order granting leave to amend the plaint by introducing a new cause of action which completely alters the nature of the suit and takes away a vested right of limitation or any other valuable right accrued to the defendant."
13. In the case of Amar Nath and others vs. State of Haryana & another, reported in (1977) 4 SCC 137, the court considered the concept of interlocutory order found in Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court, inter alia, held as follows:
"(3) The term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused on a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court."11
14. However, in V.C. Shukla vs. State through CBI, reported in AIR 1980 SC 962, the Apex Court was dealing with the connotation of the word "interlocutory order" in Section 11 of the Special Courts Act. The revision was sought to be maintained against an order directing framing of charge against the appellant. The attempt of the appellant was to establish that the word "interlocutory order" figuring in Section 11 of the Special Courts Act must receive the same interpretation as was given to the word "interlocutory order" in Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The majority, however, repelled the said contention. The court took the view that, having regard to the purpose of the Special Courts Act, the words "interlocutory and intermediary order" would be in contra-distinction to a final order. The court also took the view that the purpose of incorporating sub-section (2) in Section 397 was to avoid unnecessary litigation over orders and it was to actually benefit the accused in the ordinary criminal cases. The court, inter alia, held as follows:
"The dominant purpose of the Act is to achieve not only speedy determination but a determination with the utmost dispatch. Therefore, the provisions of the Act must be interpreted so as to eliminate all possible avenues of delay or means of adopting dilatory tactics by plugging every possible loophole in the Act through which the disposal of the case may be delayed. It was for this purpose that a non obstante clause was put in S.11 of the Act so as to bar appeals against any interlocutory order whether it is of an intermediate nature or is quasi final.
As the non obstante clause expressly excludes the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Courts cannot call into aid the provisions of S. 397(2) of the Code which would amount to frustrating the very object which S.11 seeks to advance. The absence of revision is more than compensated by giving the accused a right of an appeal against any judgment or order of the Special Judge as of right and open on facts and law. The trial is held by a sitting High Court Judge who also would have the power of revision if he was sitting in a High Court. Therefore, it would not be in keeping with the dignity, decorum and status of the Special Judge to provide for an appeal even against such an order which he is supposed to pass with full application of mind and due deliberation.
In order to construe the term 'interlocutory', it has to be construed in contradistinction to or in contrast with a final order. In other words, the words 'not a final order' must necessarily mean an interlocutory order or an intermediate 12 order. Thus, the expression 'interlocutory order' is to be understood and taken to mean converse of the term 'final order'.
An interlocutory order merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. An order framing of the charge being an intermediate order falls squarely within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term 'interlocutory order' as used in S. 11(1) of the Act."
15. Therefore, it can be seen that there is no uniform understanding of the word "interlocutory order". The word assumes the meaning from the context of the statute and the purpose of the statute. We have already noticed that the Apex Court in (1974) 2 SCC 387 took the view that an order of amendment can, in certain situations, be treated as a judgment. The court took the view that, if the amendment merely allows the plaintiff to state a new cause of action or ask a new relief or include a new ground of relief, all that happens is that it is possible for the plaintiff to make further contentions. The court does not decide the correctness of the contentions at that stage. It was found that such amendment merely regulates the procedure applicable. It does not decide any question touching the merit of the controversy. In a case, where, however, the defence of immunity available to the defendant is taken away in the matter of limitation, it becomes a judgment. That case, as already noticed, related to an intra-court appeal. Here, we are concerned with the Family Courts Act. Amendments of pleadings are of different kinds. If an appeal is allowed against amendments ordered, one way to look at it is that the matter would be decided at that stage and he does not have to wait for an opportunity, which he, undoubtedly, has to challenge the order of amendment in the course of the appeal against the final order, which would be passed. It could be that, at that stage, if the appellate court finds that the amendment was wholly unjustifiably allowed, the matter may merit a remand. If the intention of the Legislature in excluding interlocutory orders is to expedite the proceedings in the matrimonial causes, will not such a view hamper the object sought to be achieved by the Legislature? Even when a court allows an application for 13 amendment, it is settled law that the court does not sit in judgment over the correctness or the merit of the pleadings. The amended proceedings only will provide the framework within which the trial would proceed, evidence adduced, arguments canvassed and decision rendered. Further, the party has always a right to challenge the order of amendment in the appeal from the main judgment. Also, it is not irrelevant to notice that the party can, in appropriate cases, invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of 227. The advantage of taking the view that an order of amendment will not be treated as a judgment and will be treated only as interlocutory order is that the purpose of the Family Courts would, in one sense, be advanced, inasmuch as, the delay which attends the challenge of proceedings and before the appellate court would stand obviated. Ordinarily, amendments are to be allowed liberally. Therefore, an order allowing an amendment is rarely interfered with.
16. Coming to the facts, this is not a case, where any vested right by way of limitation or any other right as such, which is accrued to the defendant, is being taken away. Two paragraphs are added by way of amendment. In fact, in the original plaint itself, it is stated that the marriage took place on 21.05.2013 and that the appellant left on 28.05.2013 for her paternal house. English translation of paragraph 4 of the original plaint reads as follows:
"4. That the intention of the respondent was always to stay away from the petitioner and, on one pretext or the other, she never gave matrimonial pleasure to the petitioner and always tried to escape from cohabitation and, after one week, on 28.05.2013, she went to her paternal house along with her jewelry and clothes."
17. The amended paragraphs appear to suggest that the marriage was not consummated. As already noticed, the court does not sit in judgment over the correctness of the pleadings at the stage when amendment is allowed. Certainly, the burden is on the petitioner to establish his case with convincing evidence. We cannot even treat this as a case, even applying the tests applied in (1981) 4 SCC 8 or 14 (1974) 2 SCC 387, which would qualify as a decision, which is amenable to appellate jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Act.
18. In such circumstances, we hold that the present appeal is not maintainable and it is dismissed as not maintainable. This would be without prejudice to any other remedies open to the appellant. There will be no order as to costs.
(V.K. Bist, J.) (K.M. Joseph, C. J.)
05.07.2017 05.07.2017
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