Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
W.W.A.Cossipore English School vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors on 8 September, 2017
Author: Sambuddha Chakrabarti
Bench: Sambuddha Chakrabarti
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Sambuddha Chakrabarti
W.P. No. 23891 (W) of 2016
W.W.A.Cossipore English School
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
For the petitioner : Mr. Madhusudan Datta, Advocate
Mr. Amiya Kumar Roy, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Tapas Kumar Adhikari. Advocate
For the respondent : Mr.Lakshman Chandra Halder, Advocate
no. 3 Mr.Milan Nandi, Advocate
Heard on : 04.01.2017, 09.01.2017, 03.04.2017,
10.04.2017, 12.05.2017
Judgement on : 08.09.2017
Sambuddha Chakrabarti, J.:
The subject matter of challenge in this writ petition is order no. 93 dated June 30, 2016, passed by the learned judge, Second Industrial Tribunal, Kolkata in case no. VIII-44 of 2009. Before the Tribunal the petitioner challenged maintainability of the order of reference which was taken up for consideration along with the application for interim relief filed by the concerned workman.
The writ petitioner school was established in the year 1976 which is run by the Managing Committee with the help of the teaching and non-teaching staff. The respondent no. 3 was appointed on January 22, 1982, as an 'Aya'.
The case of the writ petitioner is that from the very start the respondent no. 3 was negligent in her duties and made false and malicious allegations against the management of this school. By a letter dated March 29, 2004, the respondent no. 3 and others made various false allegations to the Officer-in- charge of the Cossipore Police Station. They also filed a civil suit against the Principal and Managing Committee of this school before the 2nd Civil Judge, Junior Division, Alipore.
Because of the way the respondent no. 3 conducted herself the petitioner issued a show-cause notice on March 8, 2004, asking her to show-cause why disciplinary action would not be taken against her for removing important documents and equipments and for lodging false complaint against the Principal. Since the respondent no. 3 did not give any reply the school decided to hold an Enquiry over the charges levelled against her and appointed two persons as Enquiry Officers. Since she did not, despite being given opportunity, file any reply an enquiry report was submitted on March 26, 2004. On the basis of that report and in terms of the relevant rules the school authority terminated the service of the respondent no. 3 with effect from April 15, 2004.
The petitioner goes on to allege that about 3 years thereafter the respondent no. 3 made a false and frivolous complaint before the Labour Commissioner Government of West Bengal in the year 2007 and the school also clarified its position by a letter dated April 23, 2008.
The Government of West Bengal by an order, dated December 9, 2009, referred the dispute to the Second Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of whether the termination of service of the respondent no. 3 by way of refusal of employment by the management of this school was justified.
The parties filed their respective written statements before the Tribunal and the concerned workman had also filed an application under Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes [West Bengal (Second Amendment)] Act, 1980. Writ petitioner also herein filed a written objection against the said application wherein this school also raised objection about the maintainability of the order of reference on various grounds.
The Tribunal had passed an order on August 26, 2013, refusing to grant interim relief to the respondent no. 3. Against that order she filed a writ petition in this case which was disposed of by an order, dated July 17, 2014, remanding the matter to the Tribunal for a re-hearing of the application. The matter was, therefore, heard again and by the order impugned interim relief was granted to the respondent no. 3 and the reference was held maintainable.
The petitioner has challenged the said order with regard to the maintainability of the reference on several grounds. The school says that the financial benefits after the termination of service had been received by the respondent no. 3 without raising any objection and made a complaint before the Labour Commissioner during the pendency of the civil suit. It is the case of the petitioner against the maintainability of the reference is that the respondent no. 3 did not raise any dispute before the management of the school challenging the legality or justification of the order of termination.
The respondent no. 3 has contested the petition by filing an affidavit-in-opposition denying the allegations made in the writ petition. It has been the persistent case of the concerned workman that with an intention to break the resistance of the poor workman, as she was fighting against various acts of the management of this school, the writ petition has been filed by suppressing materials facts. The usual denials apart, a very specific case has been taken by the concerned workman that her termination from service was in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Act and, therefore, is not sustainable. Her very specific case is that the present Principal of this school used to harass the subordinate and the Group-D employees for which they made a joint complaint before the appropriate authority for which a criminal case was initiated.
There are various allegations against the Principal of the school to which it is not necessary to refer for the present purpose. However, it is her allegation that the Principal prevented 14 'Ayas' from entering the school premises and discharging their normal duties without assigning any reason for which they had to file a civil suit for a declaration and permanent injunction.
When the school had taken the point in the writ petition that the service of the respondent no. 3 had been terminated she realized that a suit would not be the proper forum for getting the complete relief of reinstatement with back wages. Therefore, she decided to withdraw the suit and approach the Labour Commissioner for intervening in the matter. The respondent no. 3 considered in worth mentioning that not only the 'Ayas' had filed a civil suit but also the guardians of the students resorted to the same for the way the Principal continued to manage and conducted herself which was clearly contrary to the interest of the school.
It is not necessary to go into the details of how she denied the allegations of misconduct brought against the respondent no. 3 in discharge of her duty which is not the issue involved in the present writ petition. However, suffice it to say that she has specifically alleged that no enquiry was ever held against her.
It is the further case of the workman that the Tribunal held that there was no document placed on record to show that the service of the respondent no. 3 had been terminated by way of dismissal after holding an enquiry. She has alleged that her service had been terminated without following the rules of natural justice and in clear violation of the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. The appropriate Government has rightly referred the dispute for adjudication to the Tribunal. She prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
The petitioner filed an affidavit-in-reply to the affidavit-in- opposition of the respondent no. 3, largely reiterating the stand taken by it in the writ petition. Reference will be made to the averments made in affidavit-in-reply, if necessary.
In this case the principal point of dispute between the parties is all about the maintainability of the reference by the Government to the Industrial Tribunal.
Mr. Dutta, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, has submitted that the respondent no. 3 could not produce any document to show that she ever raised any dispute with the management of this school with regard to her termination of service to transform the dispute into an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. Since there was no dispute raised with the management the dispute which have been referred to the Tribunal is no industrial dispute.
The petitioner also alleged that the dispute was a stale one as the respondent workman had been terminated from service with effect from April 16, 2004. The first time she approached the Labour Commissioner on November 17, 2007, i.e., after the lapse of more than three and half years and the appropriate Government after a lapse of two years issued the order of reference. This delay has not been properly explained by the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief.
The petitioner has argued that the Tribunal by its order impugned granted interim relief to the respondent workman holding the reference to be maintainable and in the process it had wholly relied on the decision of this Court in the earlier round of litigation. According to Mr. Dutta the order of the Tribunal is totally perverse as it had held that delay in raising the dispute had been properly explained. He has vehemently contested this observation submitting that there is nothing on record explaining any delay on the part of the respondent no. 3.
One of the major grievances of the petitioner is that the respondent no. 3 failed to show any law as to the maintainability of the order of reference and the staleness of the dispute. The petitioner submitted that the respondent no. 3 raised no dispute with the school, moved here and there and then after an inordinate lapse of time approached the Labour Commissioner for the reliefs. This factor has been totally missed by the tribunal.
From this the learned Advocate for the petitioner contended that the respondent no. 3 was not at all serious about her claim and in fact she received everything from this school including the letter of dismissal which came back from the postal authorities with endorsement "refused".
Mr. Dutta referred to certain documents annexed to the writ petition which is a letter written in Bengali by which the respondent no. 3 brought serious allegations about the Principal of this school in a rather uncharitable language. He also referred to various other letters written by the respondent no. 3 in support of the conduct of the workman. He has assailed the order of the tribunal for not attaching due importance to the same and for not appreciating that the whole purpose the workman was to malign the Principal of the school with unfounded baseless allegations.
Mr. Dutta submitted that even if one accepts the reference to be valid, the tribunal ought to have considered that the workman failed to make out any prima facie case which is required to be made out by a workman seeking an adjudication of an alleged dispute.
Mr. Dutta submitted that before the Tribunal the writ petitioner had cited and relied on several judgments but the Tribunal neglected to follow the law laid down in the said judgments which was a serious lapse on the part of the tribunal.
Mr. Halder, the learned Advocate for the respondent no. 3 workman, had relied on the observations made by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the earlier round of litigation. He submitted that the Supreme Court in the case of Shambu Nath Goyal Vs. Bank of Baroda, Jullundur, reported in 1978 (1) LLJ 484 after consideration of the case reported in Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Limited Vs. Industrial Tribunal, reported in 1968(1) LLJ 834, held that making a demand for reinstatement is not a sine-qua-non for an industrial disputes to come into existence. To insist on such a procedure would tantamount to rewriting the section.
Mr. Halder further relied on the case of Avon Services (Production Agencies) Pvt. Limited Vs. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana, Faridabad and others, reported in 1979(1) LLJ 1. There also the Supreme Court referred to the case in Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Limited (Supra) and upheld the reference made by the Government about the validity of the retrenchment and the relief to which the workmen would be entitled.
The respondent no. 3 also referred to the judgment in the case of M/s. Ramakrishna Mills (Coimbatore) Limited Vs. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others, reported in 1984 (2) LLJ
259. Mr. Halder submitted that in the said case a Division Bench of the Madras High Court had considered the decisions of Sindhu Resettlement (Supra), Shambu Nath Goyal (Supra) and Avon Services (Supra) and observed that there could not be any doubt that for the existence of an industrial dispute there ought to be a demand by the workman and refusal to grant by the management. How the demand should be raised should not and could not be a legal notion of fixity and rigidity. It was observed:
"the grievance of the workmen and the demand for its redressal must be communicated to the Management. The means and mechanism of communication adopted are not matters of much significance so long as the demand is that of the workmen and it reaches the management. A written demand on the Management is not in all cases a sine- quo-non. There must arise a dispute or difference within the meaning of Section 2(k) or 2(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act."
Mr. Halder next relied on a three-judge Bench decision in the case of M/s. Village Papers Private Limited Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, reported in 1993 Lab. I.C 1999 for a proposition that the demand need not be made directly upon the management but must be communicated. The majority view expressed in the judgment held that the demand need not be sent directly to the employer nor is it essential for it to be made expressly. It can be even implied or construed, e.g., by way of filing an appeal or from refusal of an opportunity to work when demanded by the workman. A demand can be made through the Conciliation Officers who can forwarded to the management and seek its reaction. If the reaction is negative and not forthcoming and the parties remain at logger-heads a dispute exists and a reference can be made.
Mr. Halder emphasized his submissions with reference to the evidence adduced by the workman before the tribunal wherein she had stated that the plaintiffs of the suit had withdrawn the same. From this he submitted that the grievance over non-employment was pending before the civil court and after withdrawal of the said suit she along with other 'Ayas' approached the office of the Labour Commissioner in the year 2007 and filed a formal representation on November 17, 2007, to which the management of the petitioner's school submitted their comments. Thus, according to Mr. Halder, there was a demand for reinstatement and refusal by the management of the school bringing the dispute within the scope of Section 2(k) of the said Act.
With regard to the second ground of challenge about the maintainability of reference, i.e., the staleness of the dispute. Mr. Halder submitted that the judgments relied on by the writ petitioner does not apply to the facts of the present case. He has quite emphatically submitted that the respondent no. 3 did not remain silent for three years. But she perused her grievance before the civil court as the management of the school without issuing any formal order of termination prevented her and other employees from entering the school. She might have been misadvised, but she was not inactive.
Even if it is considered for the sake of argument, Mr. Halder, submitted, that there was a delay of three years to raise the dispute the present dispute cannot be condemned to be stale nor can the respondent no. 3 be denied reliefs on the ground of delay. In support of his contention Mr. Halder referred to a judgment in the case of Raghubir Singh Vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar, reported in 2014 (4) LLJ 171 where the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the issue relating to delay. The Supreme Court quoted approvingly a part of the judgment in the case of Ajaib Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-processing Service Society Limited and another, reported in AIR 1999 SC 1351 and observed that in the said case the Supreme Court had opined that relief cannot be denied to a workman merely on the ground of delay. It was observed in Ajaib Singh (Supra) case that the plea of delay, if raised by the employer, is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing the tribunal or the labour court dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment or termination or dismissal. To make this case applicable to the facts of the present one Mr. Halder submitted that the management of this school had taken about two years to file its written statement before the learned tribunal.
The respondent no. 3 has contested the argument of Mr. Dutta that a suit on the self same issue was still pending, by referring to the written statement filed by the workman before the tribunal wherein the workman had specifically stated that she became misguided and filed a suit and when she found that relief of reinstatement could be granted by the civil court she did not pursue the case and the suit was dismissed on the ground of non-prosecution.
Mr. Halder has also supported the order of the tribunal in respect of the interim relief granted on consideration of material evidence on record. It is not necessary for the present purpose to enter into the said aspect, as the primary challenge of the petitioner is to the validity of the reference itself.
Industrial Dispute has been defined in Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act as meaning any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workman and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person.
A bare perusal of the section clearly shows that it has certain component parts into which it can be divided. The first such component is definitely the fact of dispute. The most crucial words in the definition are "dispute" or "difference". Successive judicial decisions have fairly established the law that this expression must relate to a controversy identifiable by its definitive character and marked by a dispute of substantive nature which has a connection with certain issues as mentioned in the definition itself which again may be classed as the subject matter of dispute. Mere identifiability of the substance of the grievance may not be sufficient to bring it within the penubra of an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act. In order to be a dispute, as contemplated in the Act, the power of remedy must ultimately rest in the hand of the employer. More than six decades ago Chief Justice Chagla of Bombai High Court in the case of N.K. Sen Vs. Labour Appellate Tribunal, reported in 1953 (1) LLJ 6 had laid down that it must be a grievance of the workmen which the employer as an employer is in a position to remedy or to set right.
From this it inexorably follows that a dispute is all about making a demand and refusal of its remedy by the employer. It may also be just the reverse as a dispute may also arise out of the demand made by the employer and rejected by the workman, as pointed out in the case of Burmah Sheel Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Limited Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu, reported in 1978(2) LLJ 230.
Mr. Dutta in his turn very heavily relied on the case of Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Limited Vs. Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat and others, reported in AIR 1968 SC 529, for a proposition that if no dispute at all is raised by the employee with the management, any request sent by them to the Government would only be a demand by them and not an industrial dispute between them and their employer. The Government has to come to an opinion that an industrial dispute does exist and that opinion can only be formed on the basis that there was a dispute between the employee and the employer.
A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Management, Ludlow Jute mills Vs. Sheikh Moymur and others, reported in 2005 LLR 606, relying on Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Limited (Supra), held that a reference can be made to the Industrial Tribunal by the State Government on the basis of the failure report by the Conciliation Officer, provided the State Government forms an opinion that an industrial dispute exists and the same is expedient to be referred to the Tribunal. An industrial dispute comes into existence only when a demand is made by the workmen to the employer and such demand remains unresolved giving rise to a dispute between the workmen and the employer.
A learned Single Judge of this Court also in the case of Capital Limited Vs. Eighth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal & Others, reported in 2006(3) CHN 120, held that an individual dispute between a workman and his employer relating to transfer of a workman does not constitute an industrial dispute within a meaning of Section 2(k) of the said Act. When such a dispute is raised by a group of workmen or by the Union to which the workman belongs such a dispute definitely constitutes an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the said Act. Again a learned Single Judge in the case of C.E.S.C Limited Vs. State of West Bengal and Others, reported in 2008(3) CHN 329 had occasion to consider the issue. The Court held that the position of law is clear that it is obligatory for the employee to raise a dispute with the employer before setting in motion both the administrative and the adjudicatory mechanism under the Act. The introduction of Section 2A cannot be construed to have diluted this fundamental requirement. From this Mr. Dutta argued that as the workman did not approach the management of the petitioner the reference is bad as no industrial dispute was raised.
Such a submission, however, cannot be entertained in view of what the Supreme Court had subsequently laid down in several judgments reference to which have already been made. Some of the subsequent judgments, for example, Shambu Nath Goyal, (Supra) did specifically take the judgment in the case of Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Limited (Supra) into consideration and held that after the dismissal the workman preferred an appeal to the appellate forum and contended that the order of dismissal was wrong. This also was to be treated as a demand for reinstatement. The appeal itself is a representation questioning the decision of the management dismissing the workman. The same has been the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Avon Services (Production Agencies) Private Limited (Supra) and M/s Village Papers Private Limited (Supra). The series of judgments ultimately had accepted the position that there is no standard form for raising a dispute with the employer. It varies from case to case. If it is made to an authority and is subsequently sent to the employer and if it is rejected it becomes an industrial dispute. All that is necessary is the requirement of making a demand by the workman to the employer which need not be in writing always and may be in any form and any manner. Such a demand can be an implied one as well.
Mr. Halder submitted very specifically that the suit filed by the respondent no. 3 and others did not constitute a demand. He made it very clear that he was not insisting on filing of the suit as a demand on the petitioner. However, he submits that when after the petitioner approached the Labour Commissioner and filed a formal application to which the petitioner had given its reply rejecting the demand of the petitioner, an industrial dispute was raised. There was a demand of reinstatement and refusal by the management, which was sufficient to bring the dispute within the definition of industrial dispute as defined in the Act.
It must be noted that the series of judgments referred to by the petitioner following the case of Sindhu Resettlement (Supra) have not taken into consideration the subsequent elucidation and clarification given by the Supreme Court to the effect that the dispute, even if not directly raised with the employer may still be considered fit for a reference to a tribunal or a labour court. These judgments do not run counter to the principle of law settled in Sindhu Resettlement. On the contrary, the judgments of the Supreme Court have accepted the position of the law and added that even if a dispute is not directly raised with the employer, there are cases and cases where the mode and method of raising the dispute through an independent machinery has been reckoned to be sufficient for the survival of the reference. These subsequent clarifications by the Supreme Court are equally binding on all courts subordinate to it.
This was the view expressed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Panjumal Hassomal Advani Vs. Harpal Singh Abnashi Singh Sawhney and Others, reported in AIR 1975 BOM 120 where it has been held to be a settled position of law that an interpretation and equally a misinterpretation of a binding decision of the Supreme Court will itself be binding subsequently on co-ordinate courts and must be got corrected by a higher court and no co-ordinate court on that ground may refuse to follow an earlier decision, opining that in its view the said earlier decision had wrongly understood or improperly applied a decision of a higher court. If such is the requirement of the course of action to be followed by a co-ordinate bench, the subsequent explanatory judgment by the Supreme Court must most certainly be binding on the High Court. Therefore, the judgments delivered after the case of Sindhu Resettlement (Supra), explaining the scope of it is binding on the High Court.
Mr. Dutta had assailed the reference on the ground that by the time the respondent no. 3 approached the Labour Commissioner the dispute had become stale. According to him the respondent no. 3 has not said anything why there was a lapse of 3 years and 8 months before approaching the Labour Commissioner. From this he has submitted that the workman was not diligent to raise the dispute, but must have made it very casually. This, according to the petitioner, disentitles the respondent no. 3 from seeking any relief in any forum whatsoever.
The petitioner relied upon Nedungadi Bank Limited Vs. K.P. Madhavankutty and Others, reported in 2000(1) LLJ 561 where the Supreme Court had observed that though the law did not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, such a power cannot be exercised at any point of time. There was a delay of seven years in that case and the Supreme Court said that the power was to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. Further, it could not be said at the time of reference that no industrial dispute existed or could be said to have been apprehended.
In Haryana State Co-operative Land Development Bank Vs. Neelam, reported in 2005(1) LLJ 1153, a typist was appointed on an ad-hoc basis and succeeded before the High Court in her challenge to discontinue her service which was after about 17 months. The appeal from the order of High Court was allowed mainly on the ground of delay on her part in raising the dispute. The Supreme Court observed the conduct of the respondent in approaching the labour court more than seven years after her losing the job, was a relevant factor for which the labour court refused to grant any relief to her.
Again in the case of All India Institute of Medical Sciences Vs. Sanjay Kumar and Another, reported in 2011(4) LLJ 207 a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court observed that the lapse of 9 years made the dispute extinct by efflux of time. Therefore, the reference was held to be unsustainable. Mr. Dutta next relied on the judgment in the case of Krishan Kumar Vs. Delhi Jal Board, reported in 2013(1) LLJ 469. In that case the respondent imposed a penalty on the petitioner on July 2, 1996, the petitioner sent a demand notice on September 6, 2006. The Tribunal had dismissed the claim of the workman on the ground of delay. A learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court had held that the law does not give an employee a right to raise claims as and when he fancies. The claimant cannot be allowed to remain idle for a long span of time and thereafter raise a dispute unless the cause of action arose at a belated stage or there is a continuous cause of action.
Lastly Mr. Dutta relied on the case of Metal Box India Limited Vs. Arup Kumar Roy, reported in 2017(1) LLJ 609 wherein the important question was whether an applicant seeking to espouse his claims was vigilant and acted with sufficient promptitude. It was held that the claim petition under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was grossly a belated and stale one rendering it liable to be dismissed on that ground alone.
It cannot be ignored that the delay referred to in the judgments relied on by the petitioner varied from 7 to 10 years. In the last case it was for about two decades. This cannot really take wind out of the sail of the respondent no. 3. It has been her persistent case that for the first time she came to know of her retrenchment from the written statement filed by the petitioner in the suit. When she realized that the relief of reinstatement could not be obtained in the suit filed by her she approached the Labour Commissioner. This statement she specifically made before the tribunal as well as in this Court. Therefore, in the present case, time should be computed from the date of knowledge of her termination from service. This has been their evidence before the tribunal as well.
Therefore the cases cited by Mr. Dutta have no factual similarity with the facts of the present case. Moreover even if there was any delay per se, that cannot be the criteria for quashing a reference unless the employer succeeds establishing that he has been prejudiced by it. As a matter of fact computed from the relevant date as mentioned earlier that there was no delay on the part of the respondent no. 3 in approaching the court.
Therefore, it cannot be contended by the petitioner that the respondent workman was not at all serious about her claim. The allegation against the workman of making derogatory remarks about the Principal of the school or the letters written by her cannot be matters for consideration for the present purpose. They by themselves do not vitiate the reference.
Mr. Dutta referred to various judgments to establish that the decisions of the Supreme Court have a binding effect upon all sub-ordinate Courts and passing any order contrary to the same would be against the judicial propriety. The point is so very well settled that it needs no reiteration with reference to the specific case.
Mr. Dutta also sought to distinguish the two of judgments relied on by the respondent no. 3, viz., Raghubir Singh (Supra) on the ground that the delay caused therein was properly explain but in the present case no explanation was offered by the workman. This distinction has no factual back-up. It is not correct to say that no explanation has been given by the workman. When she says that initially she availed herself of the remedy by way of a civil suit, the delay is adequately explained.
Shambu Nath Goyal, (Supra) has been sought to be distinguished on the ground that in the present case except writing some letters with derogatory words the workman never made any demand with employer for any relief in any manner whatsoever. This again is not a correct factual position. The demand placed before the Conciliation Officer on which the response of the management of this school was sought, it has been seen earlier, constitutes sufficient raising of demand with the management. The learned judge of the tribunal had rightly held that the reference was maintainable and also that the delay in raising the dispute has been properly explained.
Thus I find no merit in the writ petition. The order impugned does not call for any judicial intervention. The writ petition is dismissed.
There shall, however, be order as to costs.
Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.
(Sambuddha Chakrabarti, J.) Rider