Allahabad High Court
Jhinka Devi vs State Of U.P. And 4 Others on 12 May, 2022
Author: Y.K.Srivastava
Bench: Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR Court No. - 19 Case :- WRIT - C No. - 25616 of 2021 Petitioner :- Jhinka Devi Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 4 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Shailendra Kumar Pandey Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Pankaj Kumar Gupta,Shrawan Kumar Tripathi Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava,J.
1. Heard Sri Piyush Shukla appearing along with Sri Shailendra Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Neeraj Tripathi, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Sri Shashank Shekhar Singh, Sri J.P.N.Raj, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel and Sri Surya Bhan Singh, learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents, Sri Pankaj Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 and Sri Shrawan Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondent no. 5.
2. The present petition has been filed seeking to assail the order dated 08.09.2021 passed by the Commissioner Basti, Division Basti/respondent no. 2 in an appeal filed under sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 20061 being Appeal No. 00631/2020 and the earlier order dated 26.10.2019 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Tehsil Harraiya, District Basti/respondent no. 3 in Case No. 06482/2019 under Section 24 of the Code whereby the application of the respondent no. 5 under Section 24 of the Code has been allowed.
3. An objection with regard to the entertainability of the writ petition was raised on behalf of the State respondents by pointing out that the order passed in appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the Code is subject to the remedy of revision under Section 210 of the Code.
4. Counsel for the petitioner has sought to refute the aforesaid contention by submitting that the remedy of revision under Section 210 of the Code is available only in a situation where no appeal lies and in the instant case since the petitioner is seeking to assail an order passed in appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 24, the remedy of revision would not be available.
5. The question which thus falls for consideration in the present case is as to whether an order passed in an appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the Code, would be subject to a revision under Section 210 of the Code,
6. Counsel for the parties have referred to the relevant statutory provisions under the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 and the amendments made to the Code in terms of U.P. Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 2016 [U.P. Act No. 4 of 2016] and the U.P. Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 2019 [U.P. Act No. 7 of 2019]. For ease of reference the relevant statutory provisions under the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 together with their legislative history, would be required to be adverted to.
7. The Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code Bill, 2006 was passed by the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly and assented to by the President on 29 November, 2012 and published in the U.P. Gazette (Extra.), Part I, Section (ka) on 12 December 2012, vide Vishay Anubhag-1-Noti. No. 1044 (2) 179-v-12-1 (ka) 33/2006, dated 12 December, 2012 as U.P. Act No. 8 of 2012. Vide Noti. No. 1879/1-1-2015-15(1)/1998-19T.C.III dated 18 December 2015, Sections 1, 4-19, 233 and 234 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 (U.P. Act No. 8 of 2012) came into force on 18 December, 2015 and the remaining provisions of the said Act came into force on 11 February 2016.
8. The provisions with regard to settlement of boundary disputes are contained under Section 24 of the Code. Section 24 of the Code, as it originally stood, is being extracted below :-
"24. Disputes regarding boundaries.─(1) The Sub-Divisional Officer may, on his own motion or on an application made in this behalf by a person interested, decide, by summary inquiry, any dispute regarding boundaries on the basis of existing survey maps or, where they have been revised in accordance with the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, on the basis of such maps, but if this is not possible, the boundaries shall be fixed on the basis of actual possession.
(2) If in the course of an inquiry into a dispute under sub-section (1), the Sub-Divisional Officer is unable to satisfy himself as to which party is in possession or if it is shown that possession has been obtained by wrongful dispossession of the lawful occupant, the Sub-Divisional Officer shall─
(a) in the first case, ascertain by summary inquiry who is the person best entitled to the property, and shall put such person in possession;
(b) in the second case, put the person so dispossessed in possession, and for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary and shall then fix the boundary accordingly.
(3) Every proceeding under this section shall, as far as possible, be concluded by the Sub-Divisional Officer within six months from the date of the application.
(4) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer may prefer an appeal before the Commissioner within 30 days of the date of such order. The order of the Commissioner shall be final."
9. The Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code Rules, 20162 were made in exercise of powers under Section 233 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 [U.P. Act No. 8 of 2012], read with Section 21 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904. The English translation of the Rules, 2016 was published in the U.P. Gazette, Part 4, Section (Kha) dt. 10.02.2016. Rule 22 of the aforesaid Rules, which relates to settlement of boundary dispute, is as follows :-
"22. Settlement of boundary dispute (Section 24).- (1) Every application for settlement of boundary dispute under Section 24 (1) of the Code shall be made to the Sub-Divisional-Officer and it shall contain the following, particulars:
(a) The names, parentage and addresses of the parties;
(b) Plot number, area and boundaries of the land, along with its location;
(c) Precise nature of the dispute.
(2) No application for demarcation of boundaries under Section 24 (1) of the Code shall be entertained unless it is accompanied by certified extracts from the maps, khasras and Record-of-Rights (khatauni) on the basis of which demarcation is sought, and the required amount calculated at the rate of Rs. 1000/- per survey number of the applicant as fee for demarcation has been paid by the applicant.
(3) If the application is for demarcation of two or more than two adjoining plots, only one set of demarcation fee shall be payable but where the survey numbers sought to be demarcated are not adjoining, separate sets of demarcation fee shall be paid.
(4) On the receipt of the application the concerned official shall check the application as to whether the requirements have been fulfilled or not. If there is any defect of formal nature, the applicant or his counsel shall be permitted to remove the defect at once but where the requirements of the application have not been fulfilled, the applicant shall be afforded opportunity as sought for to fulfil the requirements.
(5) As soon as the requirements are fulfilled the official concerned shall register the application in the register concerned and put up the same before the Sub-Divisional-Officer for appropriate order.
(6) The Sub-Divisional-Officer shall pass order on the same day or on the next working day, directing the Revenue Inspector or other revenue officer to demarcate the plot or plots as the case may be after fixing a date and serving the notice in respect thereof to all the tenure-holders concerned. This exercise shall be completed within a period of one month from the date of order passed by Sub-Divisional-Officer.
(7) The notice under sub-rule (6) of this rule shall be served on the concerned tenure-holder or in his absence on his adult family member. The notice shall also be served on the Chairman of the Land Management Committee.
(8) At the time of demarcation of the plot the spot-memo shall be prepared by the Revenue Inspector or other Revenue Officer and the same shall be signed by all the parties concerned and by the Chairman of the Land Management Committee or any two independent witnesses present at the time of the demarcation. If any party refuses to sign the spot-memo, the endorsement to the effect shall be made by the Revenue Inspector.
(9) The Revenue Inspector or other Revenue Officer shall submit his report of demarcation with spot-memo within a period of fifteen days from the date of demarcation. The name and address of the every affected party shall be disclosed in the report.
(10) On receipt of the report under sub-rule (9), the notices shall be issued within one week to all the affected parties inviting the objections on the report and the date shall be fixed which shall not be later than 15 days from the date of issuing the notice.
(11) On the date fixed or on any other date to which the hearing is adjourned, the Sub-Divisional Officer shall decide the dispute regarding the boundaries in accordance with the provisions of the sub-section (2) of the Section 24 of the Code and pass the appropriate order after considering the report and the objections, if any, filed against the report and affording opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned.
(12) If the report is confirmed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, the boundary pillars shall be fixed accordingly within a period of one week and report in respect thereof shall be submitted which shall be part of the record.
(13) Where boundaries of plots/survey numbers are not identifiable or damaged, due to alluvion or diluvion or heavy rain or for any other reasons, the Sub-Divisional Officer may, on the application of the Chairman of the Village Revenue Committee of the village or on the report of Revenue Inspector or Lekhpal of the Circle or on the joint application signed by all the tenure-holders concerned, direct, by general or special order in writing, the Revenue Inspector or Lekhpal concerned to demarcate the boundaries on the spot on the basis of the existing survey map or where it is not possible, on the basis of the possession and to redress the grievance, if any, on the basis of the conciliation in consultation with the Village Revenue Committee. The Revenue Inspector or the Lekhpal shall comply with the such order within two weeks from the date of the order and submit the report thereof to the Sub-Divisional Officer.
(14) If any party is aggrieved by the demarcation under sub-rule (13) of this rule, he may move application for demarcation of the boundaries under sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Code and the demarcation under sub-rule (13) will be subject to demarcation under sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Code.
(15) The Sub Divisional Officer, at the time of passing the order for the demarcation under section 24 of the Code or under sub-rule (13) of this rule, may direct the Station Officer of the police station concerned to make the police force available for maintaining the law and order on the spot at the time of demarcation.
(16) The Sub-Divisional Officer shall make an endeavour to conclude the proceeding within the period specified in Section 24 (3) and if the proceeding is not concluded within such period the reason for the same shall be recorded."
10. The power to call for the records, conferred on the Board of Revenue3 or the Commissioner, in respect of any suit or proceedings decided by any subordinate revenue court, is provided for under Section 210 of the Code. Section 210 of the Code, as it originally stood, is as follows :-
"210 Power to call for the records.―The Board or the Commissioner may call for the record of any suit or proceeding decided by any sub-ordinate revenue court in which no appeal lies, or where an appeal lies but has not been preferred, for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed in such suit or proceeding; and if such subordinate court appears to have―
(a) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or
(b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or
(c) acted in the exercise of such jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity;
the Board, or the Commissioner, as the case may be, may pass such order in the case as it or he thinks fit.
(2) If an application under this section has been moved by any person either to the Board or to the Commissioner, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.
(3) No application under this section shall be entertained after the expiry of a period of thirty days from the date of the order sought to be revised or from the date of commencement of this Code, whichever is later."
11. The Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 was amended in terms of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 2016 [U.P. Act No. 4 of 2016]. The amendments made to Section 24 and Section 210 in the amending Act of 2016 are as follows :-
"18. Amendment of Section 24.─ In Section 24 of the said Code─
(a) in Hindi version, in sub-section (1), for the word "Lo&çsj.kk" the word "Lo&çsj.kk" and for the words "tkap }kjk fofu'p; dj ldrk gS" the words "tkap }kjk dj ldrk gS" shall be substituted;
(b) in sub-section (3), for the words "six months" the words "three months" shall be substituted."
"162. Amendment of Section 210.─ In Section 210 of the said Code─
(a) for the figures and words "210. The Board" the figures, brackets and words "210. (1) The Board" shall be substituted.
(b) in sub-section (1), the words and punctuation mark "or where an appeal lies but has not been preferred," shall be omitted;
(c) after sub-section (2) and before sub-section (3), the following explanation shall be inserted, namely ─ Explanation.─ For the removal of doubt it is, hereby, declared that when an application under this section has been moved either to the Board or to the Commissioner, the application shall not be permitted to be withdrawn for the purpose of filing the application against the same order to the other of them.
(d) in sub-section (3), for the words "thirty days" the words "sixty days" shall be substituted."
12. The provisions under Section 24 and Section 210 consequent to the amendment made in terms of the U.P. Act No. 4 of 2016, stood as follows :-
"24. Disputes regarding boundaries.─(1) The Sub-Divisional Officer may, on his own motion or on an application made in this behalf by a person interested, decide, by summary inquiry, any dispute regarding boundaries on the basis of existing survey map or, where the same is not possible in accordance with the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953, on the basis of such maps.
(2) If in the course of an inquiry into a dispute under sub-section (1), the Sub-Divisional Offices is unable to satisfy himself as to which party is in possession or if it is shown that possession has been obtained by wrongful dispossession of the lawful occupant, the Sub-Divisional Officer shall─
(a) in the first case, ascertain by summary inquiry who is the person best entitled to the property, and shall put such person in possession;
(b) in the second case, put the person so dispossessed in possession, and for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary and shall then fix the boundary accordingly.
(3) Every proceeding under this section shall, as far as possible, be concluded by the Sub-Divisional Officer within three months from the date of the application.
(4) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer may prefer an appeal before the Commissioner within 30 days of the date of such order. The order of the Commissioner shall be final."
"210 Power to call for the records.-(1) The Board or the Commissioner may call for the record of any suit or proceeding decided by any sub-ordinate Revenue Court in which no appeal lies, for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed in such suit or proceeding, and if such subordinate Court appears to have-
(a) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or
(b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or
(c) acted in the exercise of such jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity;
the Board, or the Commissioner, as the case may be, may pass such order in the case as it or he thinks fit.
(2) If an application under this section has been moved by any person either to the Board or to the Commissioner, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.
Explanation.- For the removal of doubt it is, hereby, declared that when an application under this section has been moved either to the Board or to the Commissioner, the application shall not be permitted to be withdrawn for the purpose of filing the application against the same order to the other of them.
(3) No application under this section shall be entertained after the expiry of a period of sixty days from the date of the order sought to be revised or from the date of commencement of this Code, whichever is later."
13. The U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 was subject to further amendments made in terms of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 2019 [U.P. Act No. 7 of 2019], which was deemed to come into force on March 10, 2019.
14. In terms of the aforesaid amending Act of 2019, the amendment of Section 24 of the U.P. Act No. 8 of 2012 was made in the following terms :-
"2. In Section 24 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 hereinafter referred to as the principal Act, in sub-section (4) for the words, "the order of the Commissioner shall be final," the words "The order of the Commissioner shall, subject to the provisions of Section 210, be final" shall be substituted."
15. There was some inconsistency in the Hindi version of the language of Section 210 inasmuch as the words used in sub-Section (1) where "dksbZ vihy ugha gqbZ" as against the language in the English version which was "in which no appeal lies". The aforesaid inconsistency was removed by making suitable amendment in the Hindi version of Section 210 of the principal Act by providing as follows :-
"19. In Section 210 of the principal Act, in the Hindi version, in sub-section (1) for the words "dksbZ vihy ugha gqbZ" the words "dksbZ vihy ugha gks ldrh" shall be substituted."
16. The provisions contained under Section 24 and Section 210 consequent to the amendments made as per the terms of the U.P. Act No. 7 of 2019 now stand as under :-
"24. Disputes regarding boundaries.─ (1) The Sub-Divisional Officer may, on his own motion or on an application made in this behalf by a person interested, decide, by summary inquiry, any dispute regarding boundaries on the basis of existing survey map or, where the same is not possible in accordance with the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953, on the basis of such maps.
(2) If in the course of an inquiry into a dispute under sub-section (1), the Sub-Divisional Offices is unable to satisfy himself as to which party is in possession or if it is shown that possession has been obtained by wrongful dispossession of the lawful occupant, the Sub-Divisional Officer shall─
(a) in the first case, ascertain by summary inquiry who is the person best entitled to the property, and shall put such person in possession;
(b) in the second case, put the person so dispossessed in possession, and for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary and shall then fix the boundary accordingly.
(3) Every proceeding under this section shall, as far as possible, be concluded by the Sub-Divisional Officer within three months from the date of the application.
(4) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer may prefer an appeal before the Commissioner within 30 days of the date of such order. The order of the Commissioner shall, subject to the provisions of Section 210, be final."
"210 Power to call for the records.―The Board or the Commissioner may call for the record of any suit or proceeding decided by any sub-ordinate revenue court in which no appeal lies, for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed in such suit or proceeding; and if such subordinate court appears to have―
(a) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or
(b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or
(c) acted in the exercise of such jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity;
the Board, or the Commissioner, as the case may be, may pass such order in the case as it or he thinks fit.
(2) If an application under this section has been moved by any person either to the Board or to the Commissioner, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.
Explanation.- For the removal of doubt it is, hereby, declared that when an application under this section has been moved either to the Board or to the Commissioner, the application shall not be permitted to be withdrawn for the purpose of filing the application against the same order to the other of them.
(3) No application under this section shall be entertained after the expiry of a period of sixty days from the date of the order sought to be revised or from the date of commencement of this Code, whichever is later."
17. Learned counsel for the petitioner has made his submissions as under :-
17.1 As per the unamended provisions, sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the Code provided the remedy of an appeal against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer passed under Section 24 and the order passed in appeal by the Commissioner was to be final. The remedy of revision under Section 210 of the Code was available only in a case in which no appeal lies, and therefore since sub-section (4) of Section 24 provided for an appeal, there was to be no further remedy of a revision available thereagainst under Section 210 of the Code.
17.2. Consequent to the amendment made to sub-section (4) of Section 24 as per the U.P. Act No. 7 of 2019, the finality attached to the order of the Commissioner continues subject to the provisions of Section 210 of the Code. The order of the Commissioner under sub-section (4) of Section 24 has been made subject to the provisions of Section 210 of the Code and as per terms of Section 210 the remedy of revision being available only in a case where no appeal lies, the order passed by the Commissioner under sub-section (4) of Section 24 would not be amenable to a further remedy of revision under Section 210 of the Code.
18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has sought to refer to the corresponding provisions with regard to settlement of boundary disputes under Section 41 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 (now repealed) and the provisions with regard to the remedy of revision under Section 219 of the aforesaid Act to contend that even under the earlier statutory provisions, the order passed under Section 41 relating to a boundary dispute was subject to an appeal under Section 210 and the remedy of revision under Section 219 was not available thereafter. To support his submissions, reliance has been placed upon the judgment in the case of Vijay Kumar and others Vs. State of U.P. and others4
19. Controverting the aforesaid submissions, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State respondents has submitted as under :-
19.1 Even under the unamended provisions, the finality attached to the order passed by the Commissioner in an appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 24 could not be held to restrict the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the Board under Section 210; the order of the Commissioner which was held to be final only meant that there was no further right of an appeal against such an order.
19.2 The amending Act of 2019 has made the order of the Commissioner subject to the provisions of Section 210, which clearly goes to show that the finality attached to the order of the Commissioner passed in appeal has been made subject to the exercise of the revisional powers by the Board under Section 210.
19.3 The amending Act of 2019 has clarified the position by providing in explicit terms that the order of the Commissioner passed in an appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 24, is final, subject to the revisional powers to be exercised by the Board under Section 210.
19.4 The restriction contained under Section 210 providing for the remedy of a revision only in a case "in which no appeal lies" would not be attracted since the question under consideration is with regard to the availability of the remedy of a revision against the order passed in appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 24 against which no further appeal lies. In this regard attention is drawn to the Third Schedule of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 to point out that in respect of proceedings relating to disputes regarding boundaries under Section 24, the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer is subject to an appeal before the Commissioner and there is no provision with regard to a further appeal. It is therefore contended that since no appeal lies against the appellate order of the Commissioner under sub-section (4) of Section 24, the remedy of revision under Section 210 would not be barred.
19.5 The decision in the case of Vijay Kumar and others (supra), sought to be relied upon by the petitioner, has been rendered in the context of the provisions under the U.P. Land Revenue Act 1901 (now repealed). The scheme of the statutory provisions under the U.P. Revenue Code 2006, consequent to the amendments made in the year 2019, being entirely different the aforesaid decision would not be applicable in the facts of the present case.
20. Learned Additional Advocate General has further placed reliance on the settled principle of statutory construction that even in a case where there appears to be some inconsistency between two statutory provisions, the principle of harmonious construction would have to be applied so as to avoid a head on clash and the provisions of one section of a statute cannot be read in a manner so as to render the provisions under the other section as otiose. It is also contended that the provisions under Section 210 pertaining to the revisional powers of the Board are of a general nature and the same cannot be held to override the provisions under Section 24 (4) which are of a special nature and relate specifically to the subject matter relating to boundary disputes. To support the aforesaid submissions, reliance is placed upon the decisions in Krishan Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan and others5, Sultana Begum Vs. Prem Chand Jain6, Jagdish Singh Vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi and others7, Anwar Hasan Khan Vs. Mohd. Shafi and others8, British Airways Plc. Vs. Union of India and others9, D.R.Yadav and another Vs. R.K.Singh and another10, Suresh Nanda Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation11, Gujrat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Essar Power Ltd.12 and Sanjay Ramdas Patil Vs. Sanjay and others13.
21. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, the provisions contained under sub-section (4) of Section 24, as they stood prior to the amendment brought about by the U.P. Act No. 7 of 2019 and post the amendment, would have to be considered in juxtaposition, as follows :-
Pre-amendment Post-amendment Section 24 (4).─Any person aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer may prefer an appeal before the Commissioner within 30 days of the date of such order. The order of the Commissioner shall be final.
Section 24 (4).─Any person aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer may prefer an appeal before the Commissioner within 30 days of the date of such order. The order of the Commissioner shall subject to the provisions of Section 210 be final.
22. Under the pre-amended provision the order of the Commissioner passed in an appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 24, against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer under sub-section (1) of Section 24, was to be final. The amending Act of 2019 has made the finality attached to the order of the Commissioner under sub-section (4) subject to the provisions of Section 210.
23. Section 210, as it stands after the amendment brought about by the U.P. Act No. 4 of 2016, empowers the Board or the Commissioner to call for the record of any suit or proceedings decided by any subordinate revenue court "in which no appeal lies" for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed in such suit or proceedings.
24. The Board or the Commissioner, may pass such order in the case as it thinks fit, if the subordinate court appears to have─
(a) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or
(b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or
(c) acted in the exercise of such jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
25. It would therefore be seen that under Section 210, the Board or the Commissioner, may exercise the power to call for the record of any suit or proceedings decided by any subordinate revenue court, under the following conditions :-
(i) where no appeal lies; and
(ii) the subordinate court appears to have─
(a) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or
(b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or
(c) acted in the exercise of such jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
The Board or the Commissioner, as the case may be, may thereafter pass such order in the case as it or he thinks fit.
26. A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions at first blush would suggest that the remedy of a revision under Section 210 being available in a case where no appeal lies, the order passed by the Commissioner under sub-section (4) of Section 24 would not be revisable before the Board under Section 210.
27. The aforesaid proposition, though seemingly attractive, would have to be examined in the context of the amendment made to sub-section (4) of Section 24 by the amending Act of 2019 in terms of which the finality attached to the order of the Commissioner passed in the appeal has been made subject to the provisions of Section 210.
28. The provisions contained under sub-section (4) of Section 24, as they stand post the amendment of the year 2019, whereby the finality attached to the order passed by the Commissioner in appeal has been made subject to the provisions of Section 210, has to be read together with the apparently conflicting provisions under Section 210 which contains an interdict that the revisional powers thereunder are to be exercised where no appeal lies.
29. It is a settled principle of statutory construction that the provisions of a statute are to be read in a way that renders them compatible and not contradictory.
30. The applicability of the principle of harmonious construction came up for consideration in Krishan Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan and others5, in the context of some apparent conflict between two provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and referring to an earlier decision in Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore,14 it was observed as follows :-
"11. It is settled principle of interpretation that where there appears to be inconsistency in two sections of the same Act, the principle of harmonious construction should be followed in avoiding a head on clash. It should not be lightly assumed that what the Parliament has given with one hand, it took away with the other. The provisions of one section of statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to reconcile the same. In Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255, 268, this Court observed: (AIR p. 268) "The rule of construction is well settled that when there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is what is known as the rule of harmonious construction."
The essence of harmonious construction is to give effect to both the provisions..."
31. The principle of harmonious construction as a basic rule of interpretation again fell for consideration in Sultana Begum Vs. Prem Chand Jain6 and it was held that the rule of interpretation requires that while interpreting two inconsistent, or, obviously repugnant provisions of an Act, the courts should make an effort to so interpret the provisions as to harmonise them so that the purpose of the Act may be given effect to and both the provisions may be allowed to operate without rendering either of them otiose. The observations made in the judgment are being extracted below :-
"10...That being so, the rule of interpretation requires that while interpreting two inconsistent, or, obviously repugnant provisions of an Act, the courts should make an effort to so interpret the provisions as to harmonise them so that the purpose of the Act may be given effect to and both the provisions may be allowed to operate without rendering either of them otiose.."
32. The observations made by Lord Davy in Canada Sugar Refining Co. vs. R.15 which was referred to in this regard are as follows :-
"12. In Canada Sugar Refining Co. v. R., Lord Davy observed:
"Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject-matter."
33. In the aforesaid decision in the case of Sultana Begum (supra) the earlier decisions in M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa16, Gammon India Ltd. v. Union of India,17 Mysore SRTC v. Mirja Khasim Ali Beg,18 V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy,19 Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand,20 CIT v. National Taj Traders,21 Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of W.B.22 and J.K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P.23 were referred and the principles were summarized as follows :-
"14. This rule of construction which is also spoken of as "ex visceribus actus" helps in avoiding any inconsistency either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute.
15. On a conspectus of the case-law indicated above, the following principles are clearly discernible:
(1) It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the Act and to construe the provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other in such a manner as to harmonise them.
(2) The provisions of one section of a statute cannot be used to defeat the other provisions unless the court, in spite of its efforts, finds it impossible to effect reconciliation between them.
(3) It has to be borne in mind by all the courts all the time that when there are two conflicting provisions in an Act, which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is the essence of the rule of "harmonious construction".
(4) The courts have also to keep in mind that an interpretation which reduces one of the provisions as a "dead letter" or "useless lumber" is not harmonious construction.
(5) To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it otiose."
34. The principle of applicability of a harmonious construction in the context of construing conflicting statutory provisions was emphasized in the case of Jagdish Singh vs. Lt. Governor Delhi7 and it was stated thus :-
"It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute or the statutory rule that efforts should be made in construing the different provisions, so that, each provision will have its play and in the event of any conflict a harmonious construction should be given. Further a statute or a rule made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision so as to make the rule consistent and any construction which would bring any inconsistency or repugnancy between one provision and the other should be avoided. One rule cannot be used to defeat another rule in the same rules unless it is impossible to effect harmonisation between them. The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions, and therefore, this Court has held in several cases that a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "dead letter" is not a harmonious construction as one part is being destroyed and consequently court should avoid such a construction."
35. The basic rule of applying the principles of harmonious construction in a manner so as to give effect to all the provisions so as to ensure their consistency with the object sought to be achieved was reiterated in the case of Anwar Hasan Khan Vs. Mohd. Shafi and others8 and referring to the earlier decisions in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama24 and also the observations of Justice Holmes in Towne Vs. Eisner25 and Learned Hand J. in Lenigh Valley Coal Co. Vs. Yensavage26, it was observed as follows :-
"8. It is settled that for interpreting a particular provision of an Act, the import and effect of the meaning of the words and phrases used in the statute have to be gathered from the text, the nature of the subject-matter and the purpose and intention of the statute. It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort should be made in construing its provisions by avoiding a conflict and adopting a harmonious construction. The statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved. The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "dead letter" is not harmonious construction. With respect to law relating to interpretation of statutes this Court in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, (1990) 1 SCC 277 held: (SCC p. 284, para 16) "16. The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. This intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of enactment in question. That does not mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its nature or purpose. A statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation. ''Words are certainly not crystals, transparent and unchanged' as Mr Justice Holmes has wisely and properly warned. (Towne v. Eisner [245 US 418, 425 (1918)] ) Learned Hand, J., was equally emphatic when he said: ''Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them.' (Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage [218 FR 547, 553] ).".
36. A similar view with regard to applying the principles of harmonious construction so as to give effect to all the provisions and to make them workable was taken in British Airways Plc. Vs. Union of India and others9 and it was stated thus :-
"8. While interpreting a statute the court should try to sustain its validity and give such meaning to the provisions which advance the object sought to be achieved by the enactment. The court cannot approach the enactment with a view to pick holes or to search for defects of drafting which make its working impossible. It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort should be made in construing the different provisions so that each provision will have its play and in the event of any conflict a harmonious construction should be given. The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect shall be given to all the provisions and for that any provision of the statute should be construed with reference to the other provisions so as to make it workable. A particular provision cannot be picked up and interpreted to defeat another provision made in that behalf under the statute. It is the duty of the court to make such construction of a statute which shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. While interpreting a statute the courts are required to keep in mind the consequences which are likely to flow upon the intended interpretation."
37. The principle of harmonizing various provisions of the Act and the legislative intent was reiterated in the decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers,27 in the context of considering a question with regard to liability to pay interest under certain provisions of the Income Tax Act and referring to Broom's Legal Maxims (10th Edn.), p.361, Craies on Statutes (7th Edn.), p. 95 and Maxwell on Statutes (11th Edn.) p.221 and the earlier decisions in Whitney v. IRC28, CIT v. S. Teja Singh29, Gursahai Saigal v. CIT30, Salmon v. Duncombe31, Curtis v. Stovin,32 S. Teja Singh case, Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries,33 Pye v. Minister for Lands for NSW,34 Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India,35 R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka36 and Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain,6 it was observed as follows :-
"14. A construction which reduces the statute to a futility has to be avoided. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat i.e. a liberal construction should be put upon written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect the intention of the parties. [See Broom's Legal Maxims (10th Edn.), p. 361, Craies on Statutes (7th Edn.), p. 95 and Maxwell on Statutes (11th Edn.), p. 221.]
15. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable. (See Whitney v. IRC, 1926 AC 37 referred to in CIT v. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352 and Gursahai Saigal v. CIT,AIR 1963 SC 1062.
16. The courts will have to reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. (See Salmon v. Duncombe, (1886) 11 AC 627, Curtis v. Stovin (1889) 22 QBD 513 referred to in S. Teja Singh case AIR 1959 SC 352.
17. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility, and should rather accept the bolder construction, based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. (See Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries (1940) 3 All ER 549 referred to in Pye v. Minister for Lands for NSW (1954) 3 All ER 514. The principles indicated in the said cases were reiterated by this Court in Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India,1992 Supp (1) SCC 594
18. The statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.
19. The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with other parts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. (See R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka (1992) 1 SCC 335. Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute. It is the duty of the court to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the same Act. (See Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain (1997) 1 SCC 373 .
20. Whenever it is possible to do so, it must be done to construe the provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. It should not be lightly assumed that Parliament had given with one hand what it took away with the other.
21. The provisions of one section of the statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. Thus a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "useless lumber" or "dead letter" is not a harmonised construction. To harmonise is not to destroy."
38. The principle of harmonizing the laws has been elucidated in the legal treatise "Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Henry Campbell Black,"37 by stating that statutes should be so construed so as to give effect to all of their clauses and provisions and each statute should receive such a construction as will harmonize it with the pre-existing body of law.
39. Reverting to the controversy at hand, the order of the Commissioner under sub-section (4) of Section 24, as per unamended provisions, was to be final. This finality attached to the order of the Commissioner was in the sense that there was no provision of a further appeal against the said order. A question would arise as to whether such finality could be held to restrict the revisional jurisdiction conferred upon higher courts.
40. A Full Bench of this Court in Shah Chaturbhuj Vs. Mauji Ram38, had the occasion to interpret a similar provision "the decision of the revenue court shall be final" occurring in Section 5 of the U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act, 1934, and it was held that the provision with regard to finality of the decision of the revenue court only meant that that there was no further right of appeal against such an order. The observations made in this regard are as follows :-
"In our judgment the provision in Clause (2) of Section 5 that "the decision of the Appellate Court shall be final" means no more than this that the order passed by the Appellate Court cannot be made the subject of a second appeal....The provision about the finality of the decision of the Appellate Court contained in Clause (2), Section 5 cannot therefore warrant the inference that the Legislature intended in any way to limit or control the revisional jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Section 115, Civil P.C."
41. A similar situation arose in the case of Smt. Krishna Devi Vs. Board of Revenue39, wherein the question of maintainability of a revision before the Board under Section 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 195040, against an order passed by the Assistant Collector exercising powers under Rule 115-N (3) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952, in view of the finality attached to the said order, was subject matter of consideration. Following the Full Bench decision in the case of Shah Chaturbhuj Vs. Mauji Ram (supra) it was held that the finality mentioned under sub-rule (3) of Rule 115-N cannot whittle down the revisional power conferred upon the Board by Section 233 of the Act, 1950. It was stated thus :-
"11. It is true that Rule 115-N (3) provides that the decision of the Assistant Collector shall be final. It is well-settled that such finality does not restrict the revisional jurisdiction conferred upon higher courts. In the case of Shah Chaturbhuj v. Mauji Ram, 1938 A.W.R. 437 a Full Bench of this Court interpreted the phrase "the decision of revenue court shall be final" occurring in Section 5 of the U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act, 1934, as not depriving the higher courts of revisional powers under Section 115 of the C.P.C. The Full Bench held that the finality mentioned in the provision only meant that there was no right of appeal vesting in the litigants against such an order. In our opinion, this Full Bench decision equally applies to Section 333. The finality mentioned by sub-Rule (3) of Rule 115-N cannot whittle down the amplitude of the revisional power conferred upon the Board of Revenue by section 333 of the Z.A. and L.R. Act."
42. The "Revenue Court" as defined under Section 4 (16) of the Code means all or any of the following authorities, that is to say, the Board and all members thereof, Commissioners, Additional Commissioners, Collectors, Additional Collectors, Assistant Collectors, Settlement Officers, Assistant Settlement Officers, Record Officers, Assistant Record Officers, Tahsildar and Naib-Tahsildar. The term "Revenue Officer" has been defined under Section 4 (17) of the Code to mean the Commissioner, an Additional Commissioner, the Collector, an Additional Collector, the Sub-Divisional Officer and Assistant Collector, Settlement Officer, an Assistant Settlement Officer, Record Officer, an Assistant Record Officer, the Tahsildar, Tahsildar (Judicial), the Naib-Tahsildar or the Revenue Inspector.
43. A conjoint reading of the definitions of the aforesaid terms "Revenue Court" and "Revenue Officer" would indicate that some persons who act as Revenue Courts also act as Revenue Officers ─ where a Revenue Officer deals with judicial matters in revenue, he acts as a Revenue Court, which is under the control and supervision of the Board of Revenue; on the other hand, where a Revenue Officer deals with non-judicial matters in revenue, he acts under the control and supervision of the State Government. The functions of the Revenue Officer regarding the land revenue administration may be classified as judicial and non-judicial depending on the nature of the functions being discharged.
44. Section 234 (1) (v) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 (now repealed) empowered the State Government to define the matters or proceedings which were deemed to be judicial or non-judicial. In terms of the aforestated provision, para 911 of the Revenue Manual, provided for certain matters to be deemed to be judicial. This included cases relating to settlement of boundary disputes under Sections 41 and 51 of the Land Revenue Act, 1901.
45. The Board of Revenue constituted under Section 7 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, as per Section 8 thereof, is to be the chief controlling authority in all matters relating to disposal of cases, appeals or revisions. The revisional jurisdiction of the Board is provided for by Section 210 of the Code, and in terms thereof it is empowered to exercise revisional jurisdiction by calling for the record of any suit or proceedings decided by any subordinate court, in which no appeal lies, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed in such suit or proceedings, provided the conditions laid down under clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (1) of the section are satisfied. The language of the section is one of wide amplitude and embraces within its fold all cases decided by courts subordinate to the court.
46. Section 210 whereunder the Board is empowered to call for the records of any suit or proceedings "decided" by any "subordinate revenue court", indicates the legislative intent that a revision would lie against judicial adjudications of suits and proceedings; administrative proceedings conducted by those very authorities being not within the purview of Section 210. The Sub-Divisional Officer, acting under sub-section (1) of Section 24, is empowered to "decide" any "dispute" regarding boundaries, and the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer is subject to an appeal under sub-section (4) before the Commissioner; the order of the Commissioner thereafter is to be final. The provisions contained sub-section (1) and sub-section (4) of Section 24 leave no room for doubt that the Sub-Divisional Officer and also the Commissioner exercising powers thereunder, discharge judicial functions.
47. The Sub-Divisional Officer while deciding the dispute regarding boundaries in exercise of powers under sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Code, which corresponds to Section 41 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act (repealed), acts as a "Revenue Court". The Commissioner while deciding an appeal under sub-section (4) against an order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, also acts as a "Revenue Court", and as such would be a court subordinate to the Board of Revenue and subject to its revisional jurisdiction.
48. The mere fact that there is no further appeal against the order passed by the Commissioner in an appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 24 would not be held to create a bar in invocation of the revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue under section 210 of the Code. The jurisdiction conferred on the Board under Section 210 to revise the orders passed by the subordinate revenue courts would not be dependent on a motion being made by a party to the case inasmuch as the section confers power upon the Board to exercise revisional jurisdiction independent of any such motion having been made. The fact that a right of appeal is not given to the party concerned would therefore not be held to affect the jurisdiction vested in the Board under Section 210.
49. The provision under sub-section (4) of Section 24, as it existed, prior to the amending Act of 2019, that "the order of the Commissioner shall be final" would therefore be held to mean no more than that the order passed in appeal under sub-section (4) would not be subject to any second appeal. The provision with regard to finality attached to the order of the Commissioner under sub-section (4) would not in any manner be held to limit or control the revisional jurisdiction conferred upon the Board under Section 210.
50. In terms of the amendment made to sub-section (4) of Section 24 by the U.P. Act No. 7 of 2019, the finality attached to the order passed by the Commissioner in appeal has been made subject to the provisions of Section 210, and as per terms of Section 210, the power of the Board to call for the record of any subordinate court would be exercisable in case where no appeal lies.
51. The order of the Commissioner passed in exercise of powers under sub-section (4) of Section 24 is an order in appeal against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer passed under sub-section (1) of Section 24, and this order is not subject to any second appeal under the Code. This is further clear from a reading of the Third Schedule of the Code wherein in respect of the provisions contained under Section 24 relating to disputes regarding boundary and boundary marks the court of original jurisdiction has been specified in column 3 as the court of Sub-Divisional Officer and the court of first appeal is mentioned in column 4 as the court of Commissioner; further column 5 pertaining to the second appeal is left blank. This goes to show that the order passed by the Commissioner in appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 24 against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer acting as a court of original jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 24, has a finality attached to it inasmuch as there is no provision of a second appeal against the said order.
52. By virtue of the amendment made to sub-section (4) of Section 24 in terms of U.P. Act No. 7 of 2019 the finality attached to the order of the Commissioner in appeal, has now been made subject to Section 210. There being no provision under the Code for a second appeal against the order of the Commissioner passed under sub-section (4) of Section 24, it can be said that against the order of the Commissioner in appeal, no further appeal lies, and therefore the necessary condition for invocation of the powers of the Board under Section 210 for calling the records and exercising revisional powers against the order passed by the Commissioner in appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 24, stands fulfilled.
53. A rule of construction, spoken of as, ex visceribus actus, helps in avoiding any inconsistency either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute. It essentially means that every part of a statute must be construed within its four corners and no provision should be interpreted in isolation.
54. Craies on Statute Law41 has explained the rule of ex visceribus actus by stating as follows :-
"...there is a general rule of construction applicable to all statutes alike, which is spoken of as construction ex visceribus actus― within the four corners of the Act. "The office of a good expositor of an Act of Parliament," said Coke in the Lincoln College Case42, "is to make construction on all parts together, and not of one part only by itself―Nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere potest antequam totum iterum atque iterum perlegerit." And again he says : It is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute to construe one part of a statute by another part of the same statute, for that best expresseth the meaning of the makers.... and this exposition is ex visceribus actus."
55. The finality attached to the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 24, having been made subject to Section 210, by virtue of the amending Act of 2019, it would be presumed that the legislature was conscious of the existing provisions of Section 210 whereunder in order to invoke revisional powers of the Board the necessary condition is "where no appeal lies".
56. In this regard it may be noted that there is a general presumption that the legislature is aware of the existing law when it passes a legislation seeking to amend the earlier law. The legislature would therefore also be presumed not to intend to create any confusion in the law by creating a provision which is in conflict with the existing law.
57. The principle to be followed with regard to interpretation of an amending Act in the context of a pre-existing law was subject mater of consideration in Caesar Griffin's43 case, wherein it was observed as follows :-
"...Of two constructions, either of which is warranted by the words of an amendment of a public act, that is to be preferred which best harmonizes the amendment with the general terms and spirit of the act amended. This principle forbids a construction of the amendment, not clearly required by its terms, which will bring it into conflict or disaccord with the other provisions of the constitution."
58. In this regard, reference may be had to the legal treatise "The Written Laws and Their Interpretation" by Joel Prentiss Bishop44 wherein it has been stated as follows :-
"...A new statutory provision, cast into a body of written and unwritten laws, is not altogether unlike a drop of coloring matter to a pail of water. Not so fully, yet to a considerable extent, it changes the hue of the whole body; and how far and where it works the change can be seen only by him who comprehends the relations of the parts, and discerns how each particle acts upon and governs and is governed by the others....Every statute operates to modify or confirm something in the law which existed before. No statute is written, so to speak, upon a blank in the institutions of society. No such blank exists or can exist...In every case, it is a thread of woof woven into a warp which before existed. It is never to be contemplated as a thing alone, but always as a part of a harmonious whole."
59. In construing a statute there is a general presumption against inconsistency. The mind of the legislature is presumed to be consistent and in a case of any apparent ambiguity, such a construction is to be adopted as would make all the provisions of the statute consistent with each other and with the pre-existing body of law.
60. It would also be presumed that the legislature does not intend to be inconsistent with itself and that it does not intend to make unnecessary changes in the existing laws. Hence in case of any doubt, a statute is to be so construed as to be consistent with itself throughout its extent so as to harmonize with the other laws and be in consonance with the legislative purpose, provisions and scheme of the enactment. Interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi modus, that is, to interpret and in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws is the best mode of interpretation.
61. The presumption against inconsistency would lead to an inference that the legislature while bringing about the amendment to the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 24 did not intend to create a conflict with the pre-existing provisions of Section 210, and it would be necessary to construe the two provisions harmoniously so as to make them workable.
62. Construing the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 24 and Section 210 in the aforesaid manner and by applying the principle of harmonious construction the apparent conflict between the two provisions would be reconciled and the provisions of the two sections can be read in a manner so as to give full effect to both the provisions without rendering either of them redundant or otiose.
63. It would therefore follow as a necessary consequence that the order passed by the Commissioner in appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 24, which is final in the sense that there is no further appeal thereagainst, would be subject to the revisional powers of the Board to be exercised under Section 210.
64. As regards the decision in the case of Vijay Kumar and others (supra), sought to be relied upon on behalf of the petitioner, it may only be noted that the aforestated decision, was rendered in the context of the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act 1901, (now repealed). The statutory scheme under the U.P. Revenue Code, being entirely different, particularly consequent to the amendments made in the year 2019 whereby the order passed in an appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 24 has been made subject to the provisions of Section 210, the aforesaid decision would have no applicability in the facts of the present case.
65. Having come to the aforesaid conclusion, the objection raised on behalf of the State respondents with regard to the availability of a statutory remedy against the order passed by the Commissioner in an appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the Code, is sustained.
66. The writ petition is not entertained for the reason of existence of an alternative statutory remedy.
67. The petition stands dismissed leaving it open to the petitioner to take recourse to the statutory alternative remedy.
Order Date :- 12.5.2022 Pratima (Dr.Y.K.Srivastava,J.)