Himachal Pradesh High Court
Decided On : 23 March vs Rampal Gautam & Others on 23 March, 2026
Author: Virender Singh
Bench: Virender Singh
2026:HHC:9059
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CMPMO No. : 381 of 2022
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Decided on : 23 March, 2026
rd
Praveen Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
Rampal Gautam & Others ...Respondents
of
Coram
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the petitioner
rt : Mr. Mohinder Verma, Advocate.
For the respondents : Ms. Devyani Sharma, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Anirudh Sharma, Advocate.
Virender Singh, Judge (Oral)
Petitioner Praveen Kumar has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, by filing the present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the judgment dated 16.07.2022, passed by learned District Judge Bilaspur (hereinafter referred to as the 'First appellate Court'), in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.4/14 of 2022.
2. By way of the judgment dated 16.07.2022, learned First Appellate Court has allowed the appeal preferred by the 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on - 25/03/2026 20:31:16 :::CIS2 2026:HHC:9059 respondent against the order dated 25.09.2019, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Bilaspur (hereinafter referred to as the .
'trial Court'), in CMA No.131/6 of 2019, in Civil Suit No.63/1 of 2019, titled as Praveen Kumar versus Ram Pal Gautam & Others.
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3. By way of order dated 25.09.2019, the leaned trial Court has restrained the respondents from causing any kind of rt interference over the suit land till final disposal of the main suit.
4. By way of order dated 16.07.2022, the appeal preferred by the respondents was allowed by the learned appellate Court and the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, has been dismissed.
5. Parties to the present petition, are hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned trial Court.
6. Brief facts, leading to filing of the present petition, before this Court, may be summed up, as under: 6.1. Plaintiff Praveen Kumar has filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction to restrain the defendants ::: Downloaded on - 25/03/2026 20:31:16 :::CIS 3 2026:HHC:9059 from interference in the peaceful ownership and possession of the plaintff in the suit land (Abadi Deh), comprised in .
Khewat /Khatoni No.515/719, Khasra No.607, measuring 39 00 Bighas situated in Village Thar (Panjgain), P.O. Panjgain, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P., as per Jamabandi, for of the year 201112.
6.2. The said relief has been sought on the ground that rt the house of the plaintiff, which was constructed by his father, is over a portion of Khasra No.607 and the defendants were having evil eye on the suit land and structure of the plaintiff and they are adamant to take forcible possession of the land after dismantling the house and cowshed.
7. When put to notice, the suit has been contested by the defendants by taking preliminary objections that the suit is bad for nonjoinder of necessary parties as the suit land is Abadi Deh and all the right holders/villagers are the necessary parties to adjudicate the matter; and the suit is not maintainable as Tatima has not been annexed with the plaint.
7.1. On merits, the suit has been contested on the ground that the defendant No.1, had purchased the share of ::: Downloaded on - 25/03/2026 20:31:16 :::CIS 4 2026:HHC:9059 Smt. Kunta Devi @ Kanta Devi on 11.04.2019, for a consideration of rupees one lac, in the presence of Pradhan, .
Gram Panchayat, Panjgain and Ward Member Shri Jaipal.
However, it is admitted that the suit land is Abadi Deh and without partition, according to the defendants, the plaintiff of cannot claim any specific right. They have also asserted that they are in possession over the suit land.
8. rt Along with the plaint, application, under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC has also been filed seeking ad interim exparte injunction restraining the defendantsrespondents from interference into the peaceful ownership and possession over the suit land. The said application has also been contested by the respondent.
9. Learned trial Court has allowed the application by holding that the suit land is Abadi Deh and whoever is a resident of the said village and is in possession of the land, he is owner of the land to the extent of his possession and restrained the defendants from causing any kind of interference over the suit land till final disposal of the main suit.
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10. The said order has been assailed by the defendants before the learned First Appellate Court. Learned First .
Appellate Court has allowed the appeal, by setting aside the order, passed by the learned trial Court, by dismissing the application, under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC.
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11. The said order has been assailed before this Court, mainly on the ground that the findings recorded by the rt learned First Appellate Court are illegal, wrong and not sustainable in the eyes of law.
12. The order has further been assailed on the ground that a nonspeaking order has been passed by the learned First Appellate Court and the documentary evidence has not been considered by the learned First Appellate Court.
Learned First Appellate Court has not given any reason, while reversing the findings, recorded by the learned trial Court.
13. Reasserting the fact that the suit land is Abadi Deh, it is the case of the defendants that the learned First Appellate Court has erred, while holding that no Tatima of the suit land has been annexed to depict the specific area, over the suit land. Reasserting the fact that there is no provision of ::: Downloaded on - 25/03/2026 20:31:16 :::CIS 6 2026:HHC:9059 preparation of Tatima with respect to the Abadi Deh land, the findings have been pleaded to be perverse findings.
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14. On the basis of the above facts, Mr. Mohinder Verma, Advocate, appearing for the plaintiff, has prayed that the petition may kindly be allowed by setting aside the order of passed by the learned First Appellate Court and order passed by the learned trial Court may kindly be restored.
15. rt The prayer, so made, by learned counsel for the petitioner has been opposed by Ms. Devyani Sharma, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Anirudh Sharma, Advocate, on the ground that the learned First Appellate Court has rightly concluded that the plaintiff has failed to show his physical possession over the specific portion of suit land, as such, he is not entitled to the interim injunction, during the pendency of the suit, by restraining the defendants from interference in his possession.
16. Heard.
17. Learned First Appellate Court, in the present case, has categorically held that the plaintiff is not entitled to interim injunction qua the suit land, as the same is Abadi Deh, ::: Downloaded on - 25/03/2026 20:31:16 :::CIS 7 2026:HHC:9059 measuring 3900 bighas. While allowing the appeal, the learned First Appellate Court has also held that in the absence .
of specific identification and location of possession of plaintiff over specific portion of the suit land, no effective interim injunction order can be passed in favour of the plaintiff.
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18. Perusal of the record shows that the suit land is Abadi Deh, measuring 3900 bighas. Even, as per the rt photographs annexed with the petition, as well as, from the pleadings, it cannot be held, at this stage, that the entire 39 bighas land is in possession of the plaintiff.
19. Although, in the plaint, the plaintiff has asserted the fact that he enjoyed the ownership and peaceful possession of the house constructed over the suit land, but, in the absence of any specification of the said house and even, by a rough site plan, no injunction can be granted in favour of the plaintiff.
20. Moreover, it is not the case of the plaintiff that he is seeking injunction, qua a specific portion of the suit land, as in the prayer clause, he has sought a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interference into the peaceful ownership and possession, in the ::: Downloaded on - 25/03/2026 20:31:16 :::CIS 8 2026:HHC:9059 suit land comprised in Khewat/Khatoni No.515/719, Khasra No.607, measuring 39 bighas, which is Abadi Deh.
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21. Admittedly, the said relief cannot be given to the plaintiff, as he is not the only right holder, in the entire Abadi Deh. A specific stand has been taken by the defendants that he of has purchased the share of Smt. Kunta Devi @ Kanta Devi wife of Ramanand Sharma, resident of Village and Post Office rt Panjgain, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur, vide sale deed dated 11.04.2019. In such situation, this Court is of the view that the approach adopted by learned First Appellate Court does not fall within the definition of 'perverse findings'.
22. Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Another Versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor & Another, (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206, has elaborately discussed the term 'perverse findings'. Relevant paragraphs 24 to 30 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: "24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others (2001) 1 SCC 501 this Court observed that the expression `perverse' ::: Downloaded on - 25/03/2026 20:31:16 :::CIS 9 2026:HHC:9059 means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.
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25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others AIR 1966 Cal. 31, the Court observed that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, the Court observed that this is not a case where it can of be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings.
rt
26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another AIR 1977 Kar. 58, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc.
27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition "Perverse - Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable."
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English - International Edition "Perverse - Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable."::: Downloaded on - 25/03/2026 20:31:16 :::CIS
10 2026:HHC:9059
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English 1998 Edition "Perverse - Law (of a verdict) against the .
weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law."
4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) "Perverse - Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or of petulant."
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition rt"Perverse - A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence."
28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P. (2003) 1 SCC 761, the Court observed thus:
"We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity."
29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others (1999) 2 SCC 10, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under:
"9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but ::: Downloaded on - 25/03/2026 20:31:16 :::CIS 11 2026:HHC:9059 if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny.
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10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there of is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the rtconclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with."
30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officercum Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed as under:
"7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court reappreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the factfinding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But ::: Downloaded on - 25/03/2026 20:31:16 :::CIS 12 2026:HHC:9059 what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility
- of the primary or perceptive facts .
themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, of the finding is rendered infirm in law."
23. When the findings, so recorded, do not fall within rt the definition of 'perverse findings', then, this Court, while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot interfere with the findings recorded by the learned First Appellate Court. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed.
24. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
( Virender Singh )
March 23, 2026( ps ) Judge
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