Gujarat High Court
Kuldip N Sharma, Ips (Retd) vs State Of Gujarat on 25 February, 2022
Author: N.V.Anjaria
Bench: N.V.Anjaria, Samir J. Dave
C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15370 of 2021
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N.V.ANJARIA
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SAMIR J. DAVE
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed Yes
to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? Yes
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy No
of the judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question No
of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
of India or any order made thereunder ?
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KULDIP N SHARMA, IPS (RETD)
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT
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Appearance:
MR I.H.SYED, SENIOR ADVOCATE with MR VISHRUT BHANDARI(11297)
for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
for the Respondent(s) No. 4,5
ADVANCE COPY SERVED TO GOVERNMENT PLEADER/PP for the
Respondent(s) No. 1
MS. MANISHA LAVKUMAR, GP with MS AISHWARYA GUPTA, AGP for the
Respondent(s) No. 2,3
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N.V.ANJARIA
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SAMIR J. DAVE
Date :25/02/2022
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N.V.ANJARIA) The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench by its order dated 11.8.2021 rejected the Miscellaneous Application Page 1 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022 C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022 No.198 of 2021 of the petitioner, thereby refusing to condone the delay of seven years, eight months and twenty-seven days in filing the Original Application No.173 of 2021, consequentially the Original Application also stood dismissed.
1.1 It is the aforesaid order dated 11.8.2021 of the Tribunal which is prayed to be set aside in the present petition. The petitioner has further prayed to set aside the memorandum of charge dated 15.9.2012. Also prayed is to set aside order dated 30.7.2020 whereby respondent No.4 was appointed as Inquiry Officer. The petitioner has next prayed to direct the respondents to release all the retiral dues, gratuity and other consequential benefits which the petitioner is entitled to receive upon attaining the age of superannuation.
2. In the Original Application before the Tribunal, the petitioner wanted a direction against the respondents to produce all documents, files and correspondence between the Home Department and State Government leading to issuance of memorandum of charge dated 15.9.2012 as well as order dated 30.4.2020. It was prayed to declare the said memorandum of charge, issued by the Principal Secretary, Home Department to be without authority in law. It was next prayed to set aside the aforementioned memorandum of charge and the order, further to command the respondents to release the retirement benefits.
2.1 Since there was a delay of 2826 days in filing the Original Application, the question of condonation of delay was required to be considered first by the Tribunal.
3. Noticing the facts in the background, the petitioner happens to be an Officer of Indian Police Service. He was issued show-cause notice and thereafter charge-sheet dated 15.9.2012 by respondent Page 2 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022 C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022 No.3. Looking briefly at the charges levelled against the petitioner, it was stated that when the petitioner was transferred and appointed as Managing Director, Gujarat Sheep and Wool Development Corporation in November, 2009, he retained the services of four police personnel called orderlies, named in the charge-sheet, who were posted under the petitioner when the petitioner was Superintendent of Police, Ahmedabad (Rural) and Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad city. The petitioner took those personnel with him to take them under him to get work done from them even while working as Managing Director. It was stated that the post of the Managing Director was a civilian post and it was not permissible to take work from the orderlies from the police department. It was stated that by taking work from the police personnel at his Ahmedabad residence, provisions of Gujarat Manual, Part-III were breached by the petitioner.
3.1 It was the further charge that the petitioner continued to have the services of those orderlies even when he was transferred to New Delhi and that at the residence of New Delhi on 23.6.2011, one of the orderlies fell down and when taken to hospital privately, he was declared 'brought dead'. For such acts of commissions and omissions three charges were levelled as per the above details stating that the conduct of the petitioner was unbecoming of senior member of Indian Police Service in violation of All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968. It appears that in the departmental inquiry initiated, seven inquiry officers declined to work as Inquiry Officers and on 30.7.2020, a retired IAS Officer was appointed as Inquiry officer, who has been conducting inquiry against the petitioner.
3.2 While the challenge pertained to the question of condonation of delay, in course of the hearing learned senior advocate Mr.I.H.Syed with learned advocate Mr.Vishrut Bhandari proceeded to argue on the aspect of legality of the memorandum of charge Page 3 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022 C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022 and the departmental inquiry to raise a spree of contentions on that score. Learned senior advocate submitted that the inquiry initiated against the petitioner suffered from basic infirmities in as much as memorandum of charge was issued without approval of the to be competent authority, who was to be the Chief Minister. It was submitted that pursuant to the charge-sheet dated 15.9.2012, as many as six Inquiry Officers were changed. It was then submitted with reference to Rule 8 (25) of All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969 that Inquiry authority was required to conclude the inquiry and submit the report within six months, with extension permissible for further six months and that the delay vitiated the departmental inquiry.
3.2.1 Learned advocate tried to elaborate the submissions, further relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. B.V.Gopinath [(2014) 1 SCC 351], on the aspect necessity of obtaining permission of the competent authority before issuing the memorandum of charge. Also sought to be raised on another decision of the Apex Court in Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited Vs. Ananta Saha and Others [(2011) 5 SCC 142] for the proposition that if initial action is not in consonance with law, the subsequent proceedings would not sanctify the same.
3.2.2 As learned senior advocate for the petitioner increasingly adverted to raise issues on the legality of the inquiry proceedings, we had to remind him that what was under
consideration in the present petition was the question of condonation of delay and whether sufficient cause was made out to condone delay of 2826 days in approaching the Central Administrative Tribunal.
4. For seeking to explain the passage of time and resultant Page 4 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022 C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022 delay of more than seven years, learned senior advocate for the petitioner highlighted several facts which were pleaded before the Tribunal in his application to condone the delay. It was submitted that petitioner wanted to challenge the memorandum of charge in question on the ground of lack of authority to issue the same, however he reeled under impression throughout that the power and authority must have been delegated by the competent authority. The petitioner stated that he initially had filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal the Original Application No.491 of 2020 challenging the order dated 30.7.2020 appointing the Inquiry Officer and that the Tribunal was requested to keep the inquiry proceedings in abeyance in view of the pandemic situation. It was stated that the said proceedings came to be disposed of by order dated 11.1.2021 as the respondents assured that the principles of natural justice would be complied with.
4.1 It was further stated that the petitioner had filed Special Civil Application No.1648 of 2008 before this Court. It was further averred in the delay condonation application that as per the legal advice, the petitioner filed another Original Application No.117 of 2021 before the Tribunal in which the very memorandum of charge dated 15.9.2012 was challenged. It was stated that in view of the pandemic times, the hearing was adjourned. It was further stated that in both the proceedings of Original Application Nos.490 of 2020 and 117 of 2021, the petitioner did not raise ground about the approval of the competent authority in issuing the charge-sheet since he remained under impression that the powers must have been delegated.
4.1.1 It was then averred that the petitioner realized for raising the said ground, when in case of another IPS Officer one Mr.Yadav, order dated 2.1.2019 came to be passed by Central Administrative Tribunal in his Original Application No.274 of 2015 Page 5 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022 C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022 and on the ground that the approval was not obtained under Rule 8 of All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 for issuing the departmental charge memorandum, the charge charge-sheet was quashed by the Tribunal. According to the petitioner, he knew about the order in said another matter in May, 2021 and at that time conceived idea to raise the ground of non-approval by competent authority.
4.1.2 It was then averred that Original Application No.117 of 2021 was filed in hurry as Inquiry Officer had been proceeding with inquiry and again based on a legal advice, the said Original Application No.117 of 2021 was withdrawn by the petitioner with a liberty to file another before the Tribunal incorporating the left out legal contentions. At this juncture the instant Original Application No.173 of 2021 and delay application therein came to be presented before the Tribunal. It was stated that the Inquiry Officer had been proceeding with the inquiry therefore representation was made pointing out the illegality in issuing the charge sheet. It was with such pleadings and averments that the petitioner sought to explain the passage of time of more than seven years of 2826 days in approaching the Tribunal.
4.1.3 Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted to assail the impugned order of not condoning the delay and consequentially not entertaining the main application, inter alia that after the charge-sheet dated 15.9.2012, as many as six Inquiry Officers were changed and the seventh Inquiry Officer was appointed to conduct the inquiry. He submitted that the petitioner was not at fault for passage of time before he could challenge the memorandum of charge. Learned advocate for the petitioner extensively referred to the past proceedings and the averments made in the Miscellaneous Application narrating the passage of time, to submit that for bona fide reason the time was consumed before lodging the challenge Page 6 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022 C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022 and no delay was attributable to the conduct of the petitioner.
4.2 Before the Tribunal, the respondents filed affidavit-in-reply to oppose the condonation of delay. Learned Government Pleader Ms.Manisha Shah with learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms.Aishwarya Gupta reiterated the submissions raised before the Tribunal and further highlighted the facts and events to submit on that basis that the petitioner whiled away the time at every stage and remained lethargic in his conduct. It was stated that the show- cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 20.10.2011 for his acts of commissions and omissions while he was working as Managing Director in Gujarat Sheep and Wool Development Corporation. Against the said show-cause notice, it was stated, the petitioner preferred appeal under Rule 16 of All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, which was not entertained by the Government.
4.2.1 It was submitted that after several officers refused to work as Inquiry Officer in case of the petitioner, one Dr. Arvind Kumar (Rtd.) came to be appointed on 30.7.2020 before whom, however, the proceedings were not undertaken during the period between August, 2020 and September, 2020 due to pandemic relating lock down. Learned Government Pleader mentioned several dates on which the Inquiry Officer has requested the petitioner to remain present in the hearing, however the request were rejected by the petitioner, who did not remain present on the ground of pandemic despite assurance to him that Covid related precautionary measures would be taken in the inquiry process.
4.2.2 It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that Original Application No.491 of 2020 was filed on 2.12.2020 praying for suspension of inquiry till the pandemic was over, which application was dismissed by the Tribunal on 11.1.2021, that the Page 7 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022 C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022 said order was challenged before this Court in Special Civil Application No.1648 of 2021 and during the pendency of said petition, despite being asked to remain present, the petitioner did not attend the inquiry proceedings.
4.2.3 Filing of yet another Original Application No.117 of 2021 on 15.2.2021 was referred to by learned Government Pleader which was withdrawn on 8.6.2021. The present Miscellaneous Civil Application No.191 of 2021 and Original Application No.173 of 2021 came to be filed by the petitioner thereafter on 9.6.2021, submitted learned Government Pleader. It was submitted, not only the petitioner had not produced the memorandum of Original Application Nos.491 of 2020 or Original Application No.117 of 2021 but also in neither of them, the petitioner raised ground about the approval of the competent authority which he has now been canvassing to justify the challenge to the memorandum of charge and seeking to explain the delay.
4.2.4 While opposing the petition and prayer to condone the delay, learned Government Pleader relied on decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar [(1995) 4 SCC 683] to submit about the effect of latched and delay when a litigant seeks relief. Another decision of the Apex Court in the Swadeshi Cotton Mills Company Limited Vs. Government of U.P [(1975) 4 SCC 378] which was also in the context of latches, stating the principle that ignorance of law is no excuse. Yet another decision in Prabhakar Vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department [(2015) 15 SCC 1] as also in New Okha Industrial Development Authority Vs. Hari Kishan [(2017) 3 SCC 583] on the doctrine of delay and latches in approaching the Court of law.
4.3 The Tribunal considered the conduct of the petitioner in filing Page 8 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022 C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022 the repeated Original Applications and Writ Petition calling in question directly or indirectly, on one ground or another, the very memorandum of charge prior to the petitioner presenting Original Application No.173 of 2021 and delay condonation therein. It was observed by the Tribunal that until Special Civil Application No.1648 of 2021 and application for was withdrawn on 14.6.2021 on the ground that the petitioner had filed substantial application before the Tribunal, no application for condonation of delay was filed by the petitioner.
4.3.1 For not accepting the explanation for passage of long time, the Tribunal rightly observed in paragraph No.9.1 of its order thus, "...it is beyond comprehension that the applicant who was a senior IPS officer and who retired as Director General, Bureau of Police Research and Development, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi and who must have issued a large number of charge memorandum in his official capacity and must have dealt with numerous such inquiries, was oblivious about the position of law regarding condonation of delay. Not only this, the applicant has previously appeared before the CAT, Principal Bench, New Delhi, as well as this Tribunal, which clearly indicates that he is well versed with the provisions of Law."
4.3.2 The Tribunal recorded the following reasons in paragraph No.14, "The record reveals that the applicant has approached this Tribunal after a long gap of more than seven years while challenging the departmental charge memorandum dated 15.9.2012. The reasons put forth by the applicant is that he came to know only in May 2021 about the order passed by the Tribunal in the 2019 in the case of another IPS officer wherein it was held That the for taking disciplinary action against an Page 9 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022 C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022 IPS officer under All India Service (D&A) Rules, 1969, it was necessary on the part of disciplinary authority to follow the said Rules 1969 as also the instructions contained in the State resolutions issued in the year 1998. It is difficult to consider the information received by the applicant in May 2021 as a valid reason to condone the delay from the date of notification instituting the inquiry ie, 2012."
4.4 In Digambar (supra), relied on by learned Government Pleader, while expressing on the question of latches and undue delay by the person seeking relief under the writ jurisdiction, it was observed that the party who conducted itself without any plausible cause in delayed manned could not be entitled to discretionary relief. It was stated by the Supreme Court that entitlement of a person, be it against the State or anybody else, even if it is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessary depend upon unblamedworthy conduct.
4.4.1 In the Swadesi Cotton Mills Company Limited (supra) the facts before the Supreme Court was that the petitioner filed Writ petition in 1956 challenging the validity of an assessment made on it in the year 1949 and prayed for refund of the tax collected from it. The long delay was explained by the petitioner stating that it came to know about the correct legal position after a particular decision in Modi Food Products Limited case. The Supreme Court held that, "every individual is deemed to know the law of the land... Ignorance of law is not an excuse for not taking appropriate steps within limitation."
5. For approaching the Central Administrative Tribunal to seek relief, limitation is prescribed in Section 21 of the Central Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, Page 10 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022 C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022 "21. Limitation.--
(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,--
(a) in a case where a final order such as is men- tioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made;
(b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1), where--
(a) the grievance in respect of which an applica- tion is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the juris- diction, powers and authority of the Tribunal be- comes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and
(b) no proceedings for the redressal of such griev- ance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be en- tertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tri- bunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period."
Page 11 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022 5.1 The statute making authority has liberally provided the period of limitation for filing application under this provision. In cases falling under Section (1)(a), one year period is contemplated from the date on which the final order is made. The cases falling under clause (b) would attract six months. Under Sub section (3), it is provided that notwithstanding contained in Sub section (1) or Sub section (2), the Tribunal may admit the application after the period specified in clauses upon the applicant making out sufficient cause. It was contended that in view of this provision, the petitioner was required to challenge the memorandum of charge within one year from the date of issuance.
5.2 In State of Karnataka and Others Vs. S.M.Kotrayya and Others [(1996) 6 SCC 267], the Supreme Court explained the section thus, "A reading of the said section would indicate that sub- section (1) of Section 21 provides for limitation for redressal of the grievances in clauses (a) and (b) and specifies the period of one year. Sub-section (2) amplifies the limitation of one year in respect of grievances covered under clauses (a) and (b) and an outer limit of six months in respect of grievances covered by sub- section (2) is provided. Sub-section (3) postulates that notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1) or sub-section (2), if the applicants satisfy the Tribunal that they had sufficient cause for not making the applications within such period enumerated in sub-sections (1) and (2) from the date of application, the Tribunal has been given power to condone the delay, on satisfying itself that the applicants have satisfactorily explained the delay in filing the applications for redressal of their grievances.
5.2.1 It was further observed, "When sub- section (2) has given power for making applications within one year of the Page 12 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022 C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022 grievances covered under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) and within the outer limit of six months in respect of the grievances covered under sub-section (2), there is no need for the applicant to give any explanation to the delay having occured during that period. They are entitled, as a matter of right, to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court for redressal of their grievance. If the applications come to be filed beyond that period, then the need to give satisfactory explanation for the delay caused till date of filing of the application must be given and then the question of satisfaction of the Tribunal in that behalf would arise. Sub-section (3) starts with a non obstante clause which rubs out the effect of sub-section (2) of Section 21 and the need thereby arises to give satisfactory explanation for the delay which occasioned after the expiry of the period prescribed in sub-sections (1) and (2) thereof."
5.3 In Basawaraj & Another Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81, the Supreme Court highlighted that the Statute of Limitation is founded on public policy, its aim is to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 24 (266) quoted the Supreme Court three reasons which provided to the existence of laws of limitation namely that the long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, secondly the defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim and thirdly, the persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.
5.3.1 The principles of laws of limitation were succinctly stated thus, "15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient Page 13 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022 C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022 cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
5.3.2 It was observed that even if the law of limitation operates harshly affecting a particular party it has to be applied with all rigor. About the sufficient cause the Court stated, "11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide: Madanlal v. Shyamlal, AIR 2002 SC 100; [(2002) 1 SCC 535 :
AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1201.); [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201].
5.4 In Pundlik Jalam Patil Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project & Another, [(2018) 17 SCC 448], following was observed by the Supreme Court, "The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes Page 14 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022 C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022 described as `statutes of peace'. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression.
The object for fixing timelimit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.".
(Para 19)
6. It is to be recollected that in the present case the delay is of more than seven years comprising of 2826 days. For condoning the delay of this extent, the petitioner was required to establish with cogent facts the sufficient cause showing that he was diligent in pursuing his rights before the Tribunal.
6.1 As back as in the year 1962, in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coal Fields Limited, [(1962) 2 SCR 762], the Supreme Court stated that though the discretion is available to the Court, the word 'sufficient cause' even while receiving, a liberal construction has to be applied when neither negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the party applying.
7. Sufficient cause is not something pleaded cleverly. Nor the sufficient cause can be made out, out of bundle of some reasons picked up from here and there. The sufficient cause needed to be satisfied for condoning delay in approaching court of law is also not an assemblage of good excuses. It cannot be made out by telling a story of events which may be related or connected to some legal proceedings. When improbable facts are pleaded to explain the Page 15 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022 C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022 passage of time, they became antithesis to sufficient cause known to law. The conduct of litigant because of which the delay may have occurred, becomes decisive in judging the bona fides of the reasons advanced.
7.1 As the averments of the petitioner in delay condonation application and the case put forward go to show, he filed series of proceedings before the Tribunal seeking to challenge the same memorandum of charge. The last one in which delay occurred was Original Application No.173 of 2021, which according to the petitioner was filed to make good the lacuna of taking legal contention. It was the case that the aspect that the memorandum of charge was issued without approval of competent authority came to his knowledge in the month of May, 2021. In none of the earlier proceedings before the Tribunal, the petitioner took the said ground to challenge the memorandum of charge and later he came out with excuse that he knew about the same from decision in case of another officer to seek to file the fresh proceedings before the Tribunal.
7.2 The petitioner who held high official position could not be countenanced for his conduct of filing proceedings before the Tribunal one after the another, not pursuing the reason for one reason or the another, on the spacious ground that the contention about the non-approval of the competent authority while issuing memorandum of charge was required to be taken, which necessitated the filing of application and that the same was delayed for good reason. The say of the petitioner that he realized about the need to raise such contention in May, 2021 from decision of the Tribunal in case of another IPS Officer and therefore after withdrawing the then pending proceedings of Original Application, the another one was filed raising the contention, was entirely uninspiring. It would be eminently right to take a view that such an Page 16 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022 C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022 explanation to justify the delay was no more than an excuse from the petitioner.
8. It would not be out of place to mention at this stage the factual aspects submitted by learned Government Pleader with regard to the status of the proceedings of departmental inquiry against the petitioner. In the departmental inquiry which was conducted against the petitioner, Presiding Officer submitted his statement to the Inquiry Officer on 4.10.2021. The closing brief, copies of the proceedings and the witness statements have been sent to the petitioner giving him the time to file the reply and the defence statement. On 20.8.2021 Inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 18.11.2021 to the State. The said report of the Inquiry Officer has been forwarded to the petitioner on 21.11.2021. Against that the petitioner has submitted his written representation under Rule 9(2) of the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules on 8.12.2021. It may be stated that the petitioner, in his said written representation dated 8.12.2021, has raised and reiterated all the contentions in respect of the alleged infirmities and illegalities in the charge-sheet and the inquiry which were sought to be raised in the present proceedings. The petitioner is not precluded from raising all the contentions in the inquiry to be considered in accordance with law.
8.1 It goes without saying that this Court has not gone into or expressed anything on merits of the inquiry.
9. Whiling away seven years was unfathomable conduct on part of the petitioner. The dictum that ignorance of law is no excuse holds true in the facts of the case of the petitioner when he seeks to justify his delay putting forth the above grounds. The petitioner could not have been oblivious to the need to approach the Tribunal within limitation period of one year contemplated under Section 21 Page 17 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022 C/SCA/15370/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 25/02/2022 of the Central Administrative Tribunals Act.
10. The facts and the reasons furnished by the petitioner only showed the supine lethargy of the petitioner. His conduct was of whiling away the time. It was a conduct far from diligence. Sufficient cause was hardly made out to condone the delay of more than seven years.
11. The challenge to the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal in this petition fails. The petition is dismissed. Notice is discharged. No order as to costs.
(N.V.ANJARIA, J) (SAMIR J. DAVE,J) Manshi Page 18 of 18 Downloaded on : Sun Apr 24 14:19:47 IST 2022