Kerala High Court
Vijayasankar vs Union Of India (Uoi) on 18 August, 1995
Equivalent citations: II(1995)ACC613, 1996ACJ923
Author: K.T. Thomas
Bench: K.T. Thomas, K.S. Radhakrishnan
JUDGMENT K.T. Thomas, J.
1. The tragedy which visited a young bachelor in his twenties was so devastating that he turned into a paraplegic in a trice. He sustained an injury on his 'conus medullaris' (inner portion of spinal cord at the lumbar region) in a fall from a stationary train and he is afflicted with what the doctors in Apollo Hospital (Madras) described as 'meningocele'. He claimed compensation from the railway administration, but the Railway Claims Tribunal (for short 'the Claims Tribunal') dismissed his application on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to entertain it. This appeal is filed by him under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 (for short 'the Claims Tribunal Act').
2. The tragic journey of the appellant was on 26.7.1988. He boarded the train (Mangalore-Madras Mail) at Calicut with his destination as Pattambi. As he was alighting from the train when it reached Pattambi Railway Station, he slipped down from the train as there was a jolt or jerk and fell into the space beneath the platform and got jammed between. He was carried to the Government Hospital, Pattambi, and therefrom to different hospitals situated in Kerala and outside. He is now practically an immovable living person and seems to be so for the rest of his life. He claimed compensation from the respondent in a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/-.
3. Respondent admitted that appellant fell down from the train, but contended that there was no jerk to the train. His fall was attributed to his own negligence.
4. Appellant was examined on commission. A doctor, who had treated him, was examined as P.W. 2. A teacher, who witnessed the fall, was examined as P.W. 3. Respondent did not adduce any evidence. After closing the evidence, the Claims Tribunal heard arguments and passed the impugned order on 11.10.1991.
5. Claims Tribunal took the view that appellant's fall from the train was not due to any 'accident to a train' as envisaged in Section 124 of the Railways Act, 1989 (for short 'the Railways Act') and hence the Claims Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. In order to maintain an application under Section 125 of the Railways Act before the Claims Tribunal, the applicant should have sustained the injury in an 'accident to a train'. As per Section 123 of the Railways Act accident means "an accident of the nature described in Section 124 of the Railways Act. The said description is the following:
124. Extent of liability.-When in the course of working a railway, an accident occurs, being either a collision between trains of which one is a train carrying passengers or the derailment of or other accident to a train or any part of a train carrying passengers, then whether or not there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administration such as would entitle a passenger who has been injured or has suffered a loss to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the railway administration shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, be liable to pay compensation to such extent as may be prescribed and to that extent only for loss occasioned by the death of a passenger dying as a result of such accident, and for personal injury and loss, destruction, damage or deterioration of goods owned by the passenger and accompanying him in his compartment or on the train, sustained as a result of such accident.
In this case there was no collision between the trains, nor any derailment of a train. So the only limb of the section to which the appellant could possibly have clung then was 'or other accident to a train'. But with the pronouncement of the judgment in Union of India v. Sunil Kumar Ghosh 1984 ACJ 719 (SC), appellant could not come within the purview of the said part of the provision. Supreme Court considered the identical expression 'accident to a train' in Section 82-A of the Railways Act, 1890, which corresponds to the present Section 124 of the Railways Act. Relevant portion of the said judgment is the following:
But a jolt to the bogie which is detached from one train and attached to another cannot be termed as an accident. No shunting can take place without such a jerk or an impact at least when it is attached or annexed to a train by a shunting engine. If a passenger tumbles inside the compartment or tumbles out of the compartment when he is getting inside the compartment, or stepping out of the compartment, it cannot be said that an accident has occurred to the train or a part of the train. It is doubtless an accident 'to the passenger'. But not to the train. Otherwise, it will have to be held that every time a bogie is detached in the course of shunting operation and attached or annexed to a train in the course of the said operation the train meets with an accident. And if such an event or occurrence is to be ordinarily expected as a part of everyday life, it cannot be termed as an accident- accident to the train (or a part of it).
( Emphasis added) The above legal position as set by the Supreme Court leaves no room for doubt that the jerk which the appellant attributed as the cause of his fall is not an accident to the train. So the Claims Tribunal was right in declining to entertain the claim as per the law which stood then. Appellant could possibly have filed a regular civil suit for compensation in a civil court, as his remedy then was to resort to such a civil suit. But the appellant, instead of filing a civil suit, has chosen to file this appeal in challenge of the impugned order.
6. Misfortune of the appellant seems to have abated slightly when Parliament brought about amendments to the Railways Act recently through the Railways (Amendment) Act, 28 of 1994. One of the amendments is introduction of a new provision as Section 124-A. It reads as follows:
124-A. Compensation on account of untoward incidents.-When in the course of working a railway an untoward incident occurs, then whether or not there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administration such as would entitle a passenger who has been injured or the dependant of a passenger who has been killed to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the railway administration shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, be liable to pay compensation to such extent as may be prescribed and to that extent only for loss occasioned by the death of, or injury to, a passenger as a result of such untoward incident:
Provided that no compensation shall be payable under this section by the railway administration if the passenger dies or suffers injury due to-
(a) suicide or attempted suicide by him;
(b) self-inflicted injury;
(c) his own criminal act;
(d) any act committed by him in a state of intoxication or insanity;
(e) any natural cause or disease or medical or surgical treatment unless such treatment becomes necessary due to injury caused by the said untoward incident.
7. 'Untoward incident' has also been defined now. As per Section 123(c) of the Railways Act it includes "the accidental falling of any passenger from a train carrying passengers."
8. The Railways (Amendment) Act, 28 of 1994, came into force with effect from 1.8.1994 [vide Notification No. TG-II/ 1026/Rly. Adm./94 dated 15.7.1994, published in Gazette of India (Extra), Part-II]. It has come to the advantage of the appellant since the amended provisions have been given retrospective operation. This can be discerned from other provisions of the Claims Tribunal Act which too were amended along with the amendments in the Railways Act. We shall now show as to how the new changes were given retrospective operation.
9. Section 13 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act deals with jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal. Sub-section (1-A) has been added to it by the same Amendment Act. It reads thus:
(1-A). The Claims Tribunal shall also exercise, on and from the date of commencement of the provisions of Section 124-A of the Railways Act, 1989, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before that date by any civil court in respect of claims for compensation now payable by the railway administration under Section 124-A of the said Act or the rules made thereunder.
In this context it is profitable to refer to Section 24 of the Claims Tribunal Act also. As per that provision every suit pending before any court immediately before the appointed day or on the date of commencement of the provisions of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 "being a suit... the cause of action whereon it is based, is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after the appointed day or as the case may be, the date of commencement of the provisions of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal" shall stand transferred to the Claims Tribunal. When Section 13(1-A) is read along with Section 24 it is clear that Parliament has transplanted the civil court jurisdiction regarding all claims for compensation (relating to trains) with Claims Tribunals from 1.8.1994 onwards. Even cases which could be filed in civil courts before the date could be entertained only by the Claims Tribunal. Similarly, those cases which were in fact filed before civil courts prior to that date could only be dealt with by the Claims Tribunal after that date. It cannot, therefore, be contended that the Claims Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the present claim of the appellant.
10. Learned Counsel of the respondent pleaded that the case may be sent back to the Claims Tribunal for disposal of the claim afresh in view of conferment of the jurisdiction through the amended provisions. Of course, such a remit would enable the Claims Tribunal to pass an award for compensation in this case since the Claims Tribunal cannot reject it now. But otherwise what is the advantage of remitting the case to the Claims Tribunal, if such an award can be passed by the High Court in this appeal itself. We take note of the legal position that under Section 124-A the respondent cannot take up a contention that there was no negligence on the part of the railway administration. Section 23 of the Claims Tribunal Act provides appeal to the High Court from every order of the Claims Tribunal not being an interlocutory order. Being the appellate forum vested with the normal appellate powers, the High Court has coextensive powers with Claims Tribunal to dispose of the claims in an appeal preferred against the order of the Claims Tribunal. Appeal is only a continuation of the original proceedings and is, in fact, another stage in the same legal proceeding. Considering the pitiable condition of the appellant, we are persuaded to avert any further prolongation of this litigation. Therefore, we proceed to dispose of the claim in this appeal itself without remitting the case to the Claims Tribunal.
11. As per Rule 3 of Railways Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Compensation Rules', the amount of compensation payable in respect of death or injuries shall be as specified in the Schedule thereto. The Rule 3(2) says, however, that compensation for injuries not specified in the Schedule shall be Rs. 2,00,000/- if the Claims Tribunal is of the opinion that the injuries had deprived the person of all capacity to do any work.
12. Item No. 21 in Part II of the Schedule to the Compensation Rules is 'fracture of spine with paraplegia'. But the injuries sustained by the appellant are more devastating as could be seen from Exh. P-3 which is a summary report issued by Apollo Hospital, Madras. It shows that according to the diagnosis of the doctors, appellant had 'fracture L-2 with injury to conus medullaris' and his condition is pseudo meningocele. P.W. 2, doctor, who saw the appellant immediately after the accident, noted fractures of ribs on the right side of the chest, fracture of spine and injury to spinal cord. According to the doctor, "his spinal cord is completely damaged below the L-2 level and both lower limbs are totally paralysed." The doctor further said in the evidence that the appellant's condition is completely irrecoverable for life and further said the sexual function is impossible for him during life. We are, therefore, of the definite view that appellant's case would fall within the ambit of Rule 3(2) of the Compensation Rules. So the appellant is entitled to an award for Rs. 2,00,000/-. We are also persuaded to award interest on the said amount at least from 1.8.1994, the date when the Amendment Act came into force.
In the result, we pass an award in favour of the appellant in a sum of Rs. 2,24,000 (Rupees two lakh twenty-four thousand) only together with the interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on the sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- from 1.8.1994 till payment. This amount should be paid by the respondent. Out of the said awarded sum an amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- shall be put in fixed deposit with a nationalised bank for a period of five years initially and the monthly interest thereon shall be paid by that bank to the appellant every month either by money order or by any other convenient mode. The balance shall be paid to the appellant in cash.
Appeal is disposed of in the above terms.