Jharkhand High Court
Niraj Kumar @ Niraj Srivastava @ Neeraj ... vs State Of Jharkhand on 19 March, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 807 of 2024
Niraj Kumar @ Niraj Srivastava @ Neeraj Srivastava, aged
about 34 years, Son of Rambrat Sharma, Resident of Near
Jatra Tanr, Bengali Tola, Lower Vidyapati Nagar, Kanke
Road, P.O.-Missirgonda, P.S.-Gonda, Dist.-Ranchi/
Jharkhand. ... ... ... Appellant
Versus
State of Jharkhand ... ..........Respondent
PRESENT
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
.....
For the Appellants : Mr. P.P.N. Roy, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Naveen Kumar Jaiswal, Advocate
Ms. Pragati Prasad, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mrs. Vandana Bharti, Spl. P.P.
.....
C.A.V. on 25.02.2025 Pronounced on 19.03.2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. The instant appeal has been filed under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 against the order dated 24.05.2024 passed by the learned A.J.C.-XVIII-cum- Spl. Judge, ATS, Ranchi in Misc. Criminal Application No.1543 of 2024 whereby and whereunder the prayer for regular bail of the appellant in connection with ATS Case No.01 of 2022, registered for the offence under Sections 386, 387, 420, 468, 471, 109, 34, 120B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 16, 17, 18, 20 and 21 of the UA(P) Act, 1967, has been rejected.
1 Prosecution case and Facts:
2. The brief facts of the prosecution case leading to this Criminal Appeal is that the Superintendent of Police, A.T.S. received a secret information on 15.01.2022 that one Aman Srivastava by changing places in association with his family members and associates is realizing extortion from businessmen and receiving the money through hawala and at that time huge amount is kept with one Sidharth Sahu who is about to send the amount to Aman Srivastava and Avik Srivastava through hawala. It was also informed that they were also preparing to extort money from some more persons and planning to commit some cognizable offence. They use social media app for communication.
3. Since there is terror of the said gang in the area, the police party without wasting time, prepared for conducting raid and for that teams were constituted for raiding. The different teams raided at different places connected with Aman Srivastava and his associates and one Sanjay Karmakar was apprehended from the house of Prince Raj and from his possession one loaded revolver and 6 cartridges were recovered. He had produced license obtained from Jammu and Kashmir State, to this respect one FIR has been lodged under Arms Act.
4. The police party under the command of senior officials raided the house of one Siddarth Sahu and from the almirah 2 of his house Rs.28,88,000/-has been recovered. On interrogation, he had disclosed that this money is belonging to Aman Srivastava gang obtained through extortion and on being directed by them one Pintu had given this money to him. Which he had to give to one Sunil.
5. He further disclosed that he is relative of Aman Srivastava and after the death of his father he is running the gang with the help of his other family members. They used to collect money from different areas. The recovered money was seized in accordance with law.
6. On 16.01.2022 search was conducted of the house of one Binod Kumar Pandey from where Rs. 5,42,000/- was recovered. He had disclosed that the money was belonging to Aman Srivastava and he was going to send the same through hawala in the accounts of Aman and Avik. Hence, the FIR being ATS (Ranchi) Case No. 01 of 2022 dated 17.01.2022 has been lodged against 12 named accused persons for the alleged for offence Under Sections 386/ 387/109/34/120 B/ 201 of the Indian Penal Code, for offence under Sections 20/ 21 of UA (P) Act, 1967 for taking appropriate legal action.
7. After institution of said FIR the police took up the investigation and submitted charge-sheet against the appellant for offence under Sections 386/ 387/420/468/471/ 109/34/120 B/201 of the Indian Penal 3 Code, for offence under Sections 16/17/18/20/ 21 of UA (P) Act, 1967.
8. Accordingly, the accused/petitioner had preferred anticipatory bail being A.B.P. No. 1188/2022 but the same has been rejected by special court and thereafter the petitioner has also filed a Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 1429/2022 before this Court which has been dismissed as withdrawn on 23.01.2023.
9. Thereafter the accused/appellant has been arrested on 15.04.2023.
10. Consequently, the above-named appellant had preferred the regular bail application vide Misc. Cr. Application No. 1543 of 2024 before the Spl. Judge, ATS, Ranchi for regular bail but the same has been rejected vide order dated 24.05.2024 against which the present appeal has been filed. Submission of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant
11. The following grounds have been taken on behalf of the appellant: -
(i) No case is made out against the appellant even if the entire prosecution version will be taken in entirety to be accepted.
(ii) The Learned Court has failed to appreciate that the case was only supported by highly interested official witnesses and none of the independent witnesses have supported the case.4
(iii) The learned court ought to have appreciated that the entire allegation leveled in the FIR is misconceived and based on the confession of the co-accused.
(iv) The learned court has failed to appreciate that nothing was recovered from the possession of this appellant and the appellant was implicated in this case only on the basis of the confession of the co-accused and the same bears no evidentiary value in the eye of law.
(v) The learned court ought to have appreciated that admittedly the appellant was not present at the place of seizure at the time of alleged search and moreover, he has nothing to do with the alleged recovered fire arms and money.
(vi) Save and except the confession of the co-accused before the police, there is no material against this appellant and even during investigation no material has been collected against this appellant.
(vii) The learned court has failed to appreciate that this appellant was in no way connected with the other co-accused and there is nothing on record to show that he was member of the alleged gang of Aman Srivastava.
(viii) The allegation upon this petitioner is that he used to transfer the collected money in the account of gang members through hawala and by using banking channels but to this effect there is no evidence, the 5 entire allegation is hypothetical and based only on the imaginations of the I.O. of the case.
(ix) The case of the present appellant is identically placed to that of the case of the co-accused, namely, Avik Srivastava appellant in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 667 of 2022 who has been directed to be released on bail by the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court dated 26.09.2022.
(x) The appellant is languishing in judicial custody since 15.04.2023 and altogether 62 witnesses are to be examined and as per the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713 and in the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813, the personal liberty of the individual has paramount importance, hence, taking into consideration the period of custody, it is a fit case where the appellant deserves to be released from judicial custody.
(xi) No ingredient of the offence said to be committed under the UA(P) Act is being attracted if the entire case diary will be taken into consideration.
(xii) Learned counsel for the appellant, on the aforesaid premise, has submitted that the learned court ought to have considered that aspect of the matter, while 6 considering the prayer for regular bail, but having not been considered, therefore, the impugned orders need to be interfered with.
Submission of the Learned Counsel for the Respondent State :
12. While on the other hand, Mrs. Vandana Bharti, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the State has vehemently opposed the prayer to interfere with the impugned order by taking following grounds :-
(i) The case of the appellant is not identical to that of the Avik Srivastava and the said order cannot be said to be in any aid to the present appellant, reason being that at the time when the Coordinate Bench had passed the order on 26.09.2022, up to that date the chargesheet was not submitted against the said Avik Srivastava under the Penal offence of the UA(P) Act, i.e., Sections 16, 17 and 18 thereof.
(ii) The Coordinate Bench, in the aforesaid pretext, has passed order as under paragraph 11 thereof that in absence of any imputation either under Section 17, 17 or 18 of the UA(P) Act, no case can be said to be found under Section 21 of the UA(P) Act.
(iii) It has been submitted that herein, in the present case, chargesheet has already been submitted 7 against the present appellant under Sections 16, 17 and 18 in addition to Section 21 of the UA(P) Act. Hence, the fact of the present case, after submission of chargesheet on the date of consideration of the prayer for bail, is quite different to that of the case of Avik Srivastava. However, it has been submitted that subsequently the chargesheet has also been submitted against the said Avik Srivastava under Sections 16, 17 and 18 of the UA(P) Act.
(iv) The material has been surfaced in course of investigation as would be evident from the various paragraphs of the case diary even in the affidavits filed on behalf of the State which contains the statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. of extortion of money which is for the purpose of utilizing in the terrorist activities.
(v) In response to the argument of the appellant that no case of penal offence said to be attracted under the UA(P) Act is made out, it has also been argued by the learned State counsel that the money was trailed by depositing in the name of the fake company running in the name and style of ASMEngicom, which is the money collected through extortion by the gang being run in the name and style of Aman 8 Srivastava gang to which the present appellant is the active member.
(vi) By responding to the argument on the issue of custody, it has been submitted that the question of applicability of Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be disputed but the balance is to be maintained in maintaining law and order situation and if the present appellant is found to be active member of Aman Srivastava gang, then merely because he remained in custody and 62 witnesses are to be examined, that cannot be a ground to release him on bail.
(vii) The judgments upon which reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant, i.e., Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb (supra) and in the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
(viii) Further the proviso as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of UA(P) Act put a complete embargo against release of the accused persons, if prima facie case is made out and allegation against the appellant is serious in nature.
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(ix) In this case there is prima facie case made out against the appellant and chargesheet has been submitted in which cognizance has been taken hence, seeing the seriousness of the crime it is not fit case to enlarge the appellant on bail.
(x) Learned State counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is, therefore, not a fit case where the interference is to be shown with the impugned order.
Analysis
13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the case diary and the finding recorded by the learned court in the impugned order.
14. This Court, before proceeding to examine as to whether the appellant has been able to make out a prima facie case for enlarging him on bail, deems it fit and proper to discuss some settled proposition of law and the relevant provisions of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as Act, 1967).
15. The main objective of the Act 1967 is to make powers available for dealing with activities directed against the integrity and sovereignty of India. As per Preamble, Act 1967 has been enacted to provide for the more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities of individuals and associations and dealing with terrorist activities and for matters 10 connected therewith. Therefore, the aim and object of enactment of UAPA is also to provide for more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities.
16. To achieve the said object and purpose of effective prevention of certain unlawful activities the Parliament in its wisdom has provided that where an association is declared unlawful by a notification issued under Section 3, a person, who is and continues to be a member of such association shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years, and shall also be liable to fine.
17. Clause (m) of Section 2 of the 1967 Act defines "terrorist organization". It is defined as an organization listed in the First Schedule. CPI (Maoist) has been listed at Item no. 34 in the First Schedule. Chapters III onwards of the 1967 Act incorporate various offences. Chapter IV has the title "punishment for terrorist act". Clause (k) of Section 2 provides that "terrorist act" has the meaning assigned to it under Section 15 and the terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the treaties specified in the Second Schedule.
18. Further section 10(a)(i) of Act 1967 provides that where an association is declared unlawful by a notification issued under Section 3 which has become effective under sub- section (3) of that Section, a person, who is continues to be a member of such association shall be punishable with 11 imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine therefore, so long as Section 10(a)(i) stands a person who is or continues to be a member of such association shall be liable to be punished.
19. As per mandate of section 13 of the Act 1967 who takes part in or commits, or advocates, abets, advises or incites the commission of, any unlawful activity, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
20. The "terrorist act" has been defined under Section 2(k) has the meaning assigned to it in Section 15. Section 15 contains the activities which will be treated to be a "terrorist act". Section 15 reads as under :
"15. Terrorist act.--4(1) Whoever does any act with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security, economic security, or sovereignty of India or with intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country,--
(a) by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisonous or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological radioactive, nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or by any other means of whatever nature to cause or likely to cause--
(i) death of, or injuries to, any person or persons; or
(ii) loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property; or
(iii) disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community in India or in any foreign country; or 12 (iiia) damage to, the monetary stability of India by way of production or smuggling or circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or of any other material; or]
(iv) damage or destruction of any property in India or in a foreign country used or intended to be used for the defence of India or in connection with any other purposes of the Government of India, any State Government or any of their agencies; or
(b) overawes by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force or attempts to do so or causes death of any public functionary or attempts to cause death of any public functionary; or
(c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any person and threatens to kill or injure such person or does any other act in order to compel the Government of India, any State Government or the Government of a foreign country or an international or inter-governmental organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act; or commits a terrorist act. [Explanation.--For the purpose of this sub-section,--
(a) "public functionary" means the constitutional authorities or any other functionary notified in the Official Gazette by the Central Government as public functionary;
(b) "high quality counterfeit Indian currency" means the counterfeit currency as may be declared after examination by an authorised or notified forensic authority that such currency imitates or compromises with the key security features as specified in the Third Schedule.] (2) The terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the treaties specified in the Second Schedule.
21. As per the provision of Section 15, whoever has acted with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security, economic security, or sovereignty of India 13 or with intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country would be covered under the definition of "terrorist act". This provision, therefore, stipulates that any activity with an intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror will come under the fold of terrorist act if done to threaten the unity, integrity, security, sovereignty of India or economic security, which has been inserted by way of Act 3 of 2013 with effect from 01.02.2013.
22. Section 17 provides punishment for raising funds for terrorist act which reads as under :
"17. Punishment for raising funds for terrorist act.--Whoever, in India or in a foreign country, directly or indirectly, raises or provides funds or collects funds, whether from a legitimate or illegitimate source, from any person or persons or attempts to provide to, or raises or collects funds for any person or persons, knowing that such funds are likely to be used, in full or in part by such person or persons or by a terrorist organisation or by a terrorist gang or by an individual terrorist to commit a terrorist act, notwithstanding whether such funds were actually used or not for commission of such act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.--For the purpose of this section,--
(a) participating, organising or directing in any of the acts stated therein shall constitute an offence;
(b) raising funds shall include raising or collecting or providing funds through production or smuggling or circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian currency;
and 14
(c) raising or collecting or providing funds, in any manner for the benefit of, or, to an individual terrorist, terrorist gang or terrorist organisation for the purpose not specifically covered under section 15 shall also be construed as an offence.
23. It is evident from the contents of Section 17 of the Act, 1967 that whoever, in India or in a foreign country, directly or indirectly, raises or provides funds or collects funds, whether from a legitimate or illegitimate source, from any person or persons or attempts to provide to, or raises or collects funds for any person or persons, knowing that such funds are likely to be used, in full or in part by such person or persons or by a terrorist organisation or by a terrorist gang or by an individual terrorist to commit a terrorist act, notwithstanding whether such funds were actually used or not for commission of such act, the same would be covered under the aforesaid provision. Meaning thereby, raising of funds directly or indirectly to commit a terrorist act by a terrorist organization or by terrorist gang or by an individual terrorist, irrespective of the fact whether this was actually used for commission of such act, would be punishable under Section 17.
24. Sub-section (c) of Section 17 of the Act, 1967 enlarges the scope of the terrorist act since the same provides that any act for the benefit of an individual terrorist, terrorist gang or terrorist organisation even if not specifically covered under Section 15 shall also be construed as an offence. 15
25. Section 22(A) of the Act, 1967 stipulates about the provision for commission of offence by companies which reads as under :
"22A. Offences by companies.--(1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person (including promoters of the company) who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person (including promoters) liable to any punishment provided in this Act, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised reasonable care to prevent the commission of such offence. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any promoter, director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such promoter, director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section,--
(a) "company" means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
(b) "director", in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm."
26. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person (including promoters of the 16 company) who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Meaning thereby, the main ingredient for attracting the aforesaid provision will be in the case when the offence has been committed by a company and in those circumstances, whoever is connected with the affairs of the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence.
27. At this juncture it will be purposeful to discuss the core of Section 43(d)(5) of the Act 1967 which mandates that the person shall not be released on bail if the court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations made are prima facie true apart from the other offences the appellant is accused of committing offences under Sections 17, 18 and 21 of the UA(P) Act, 1967.
28. The requirement as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, 1967 in the matter of grant of regular bail fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] wherein at paragraph 23 it has been held by interpreting the expression "prima facie true"
as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the Act, 1967 which 17 would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigation agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the First Information Report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It has further been observed that it must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. The degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is "prima facie true", as compared to the opinion of the accused "not guilty" of such offence as required under the other special enactments. For ready reference, paragraph 23 of the aforesaid judgment is required to be quoted herein which reads hereunder as :-
"23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the duty of the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or otherwise. Our attention was invited to the decisions of this Court, which has had an occasion to deal with similar special provisions in TADA and MCOCA. The principle underlying those decisions may have some bearing while considering the prayer for bail in relation to the offences under the 1967 Act as well. Notably, under the special enactments such as TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is required to record its opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is 18 "not guilty" of the alleged offence. There is a degree of difference between the satisfaction to be recorded by the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is "not guilty" of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for the purposes of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable 11 grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is "prima facie"
true. By its very nature, the expression "prima facie true" would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the first information report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is "prima facie true", as compared to the opinion of the accused "not guilty" of such offence as required under the other special enactments. In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge application or framing of charges in relation to offences under the 1967 Act...."
29. It is, thus, evident from the proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (Supra) that it is the bounden duty of the Court to apply its mind to examine the entire materials on record for the purpose of satisfying itself, whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused or not.
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30. Further It is settled proposition of law that at the stage of granting or non-granting of the bail, the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise and the elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage.
31. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court by setting out propounding the law in the same case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra), has observed that the elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage and the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise. For ready reference paragraph 24 and 25 of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted herein under:-
"24. A priori, the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this stage--of giving reasons for grant or non- grant of bail--is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage. The Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.
25. From the analysis of the impugned judgment, it appears to us that the High Court has ventured into an area of examining the merits and demerits of the evidence. For, it noted that the evidence in the form of 20 statements of witnesses under Section 161 are not admissible. Further, the documents pressed into service by the investigating agency were not admissible in evidence. It also noted that it was unlikely that the document had been recovered from the residence of Ghulam Mohammad Bhatt till 16-8-2017 (para 61 of the impugned judgment). Similarly, the approach of the High Court in completely discarding the statements of the protected witnesses recorded under Section 164 CrPC, on the specious ground that the same was kept in a sealed cover and was not even perused by the Designated Court and also because reference to such statements having been recorded was not found in the charge-sheet already filed against the respondent is, in our opinion, in complete disregard of the duty of the Court to record its opinion that the accusation made against the accused concerned is prima facie true or otherwise. That opinion must be reached by the Court not only in reference to the accusation in the FIR but also in reference to the contents of the case diary and including the charge-sheet (report under Section 173 Cr.P.C.) and other material gathered by the investigating agency during investigation."
32. It is, thus, evident that the exercise to be undertaken by the court at this stage of granting bail of giving reasons for grant or non-grant of bail that is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage. Rather, the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.
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33. Further it is the duty of the Court to record its opinion that the accusation made against the accused concerned is prima facie true or otherwise and such opinion must be reached by the Court not only in reference to the accusation in the FIR but also in reference to the contents of the case diary and including the charge-sheet (report under Section 173 CrPC) and other material gathered by the investigating agency during investigation. Reference in this regard may be taken from the Judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2005) 5 SCC 294. For ready reference the following paragraph of the aforesaid Judgment is being quoted herein under:-
"46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. However, while dealing with a special statute like MCOCA having regard to the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Act, the court may have to probe into the matter deeper so as to enable it to arrive at a finding that the materials collected against the accused during the investigation may not justify a judgment of conviction. The findings recorded by the court while granting or refusing bail undoubtedly would be tentative in nature, which may not have any bearing on the merit of the case and the trial court would, thus, be free to decide the case on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial, without in any manner being prejudiced thereby."
34. The hon'ble Apex Court in a very recent judgment rendered in Gurwinder Singh Vs State of Punjab and 22 Another reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 109 while taking in to consideration of the judgment as rendered in the National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) and Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb (supra) has observed that, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail and lays down that if the Court, 'on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure', is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond.
35. The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that the conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase - 'bail is the rule, jail is the exception' - unless circumstances justify otherwise - does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP Act and the 'exercise' of the general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope.
36. In the aforesaid context it has further been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task on hand and in dealing with 23 bail applications under UAP Act, the courts are merely examining if there is justification to reject bail and the 'justifications' must be searched from the case diary and the final report submitted before the Special Court.
37. In the aforesaid background the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the test for rejection of bail is quite plain and Bail must be rejected as a 'rule', if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It has further been observed that it is only if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied - that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in accordance with the 'tripod test' (flight risk, influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence).
38. For ready reference following paragraphs of the aforesaid Judgment are being quoted herein under:
"27. A bare reading of Sub-section (5) of Section 43D shows that apart from the fact that Sub-section (5) bars a Special Court from releasing an accused on bail without affording the Public Prosecutor an opportunity of being heard on the application seeking release of an accused on bail, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail. It lays down that if the Court, 'on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure', is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence 24 or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond. It is interesting to note that there is no analogous provision traceable in any other statute to the one found in Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act. In that sense, the language of bail limitation adopted therein remains unique to the UAP Act.
28. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase - 'bail is the rule, jail is the exception' - unless circumstances justify otherwise - does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP Act. The 'exercise' of the general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope. The form of the words used in proviso to Section 43D (5)- 'shall not be released' in contrast with the form of the words as found in Section 437(1) CrPC - 'may be released' - suggests the intention of the Legislature to make bail, the exception and jail, the rule.
29. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task on hand. In dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the courts are merely examining if there is justification to reject bail. The 'justifications' must be searched from the case diary and the final report submitted before the Special Court. The legislature has prescribed a low, 'prima facie' standard, as a measure of the degree of satisfaction, to be recorded by Court when scrutinising the justifications [materials on record]. This standard can be contrasted with the standard of 'strong suspicion', which is used by Courts while hearing applications for 'discharge--"
39. In this background, the test for rejection of bail is quite plain. Bail must be rejected as a 'rule', if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the final report or Case 25 Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It is only if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in accordance with the 'tripod test' (flight risk, influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence). This position is made clear by Sub-section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on granting of bail specified in Sub-section (5), are in addition to the restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grant of bail.
40. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment after textual reading of Section 43 D(5) UAP Act, has formulated the guideline which was summarized in the form of a twin- prong test. For ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted herein under:
"31. On a textual reading of Section 43 D(5) UAP Act, the inquiry that a bail court must undertake while deciding bail applications under the UAP Act can be summarised in the form of a twin-prong test:
1) Whether the test for rejection of the bail is satisfied?
1.1 Examine if, prima facie, the alleged 'accusations' make out an offence under Chapter IV or VI of the UAP Act 1.2 Such examination should be limited to case diary and final report submitted under Section 173 CrPC;
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2) Whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail in light of the general principles relating to grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC ('tripod test')?"
41. Further, it is settled proposition of law that at the stage of granting or non-granting of the bail, the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise and the elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage.
42. Further, it is the duty of the Court to record its opinion that the accusation made against the accused concerned is prima facie true or otherwise and such opinion must be reached by the Court not only in reference to the accusation in the FIR but also in reference to the contents of the charge-sheet and other material gathered by the investigating agency during investigation.
43. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid position of law and the factual aspect as has been gathered against the appellant is proceeding to examine as to whether the accusation against the appellants is prima facie true as compared to the opinion of accused not guilty by taking into consideration the material collected in course of investigation.
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44. Counter affidavit has been filed by the respondent state. It is evident from the counter affidavit that the appellant has been charge-sheeted accused of the instant case.
45. It is evident from record that instant matter relates to a multidimensional organised crime by gang of Aman Srivastava, and initially matter was instituted under sections 386/387/420/468/471/109/120B/34/201 of Indian Penal Code but later on during course of investigation evidences have come which suggested that accused must be tried for relevant sections of Unlawful Activity prevention act in addition to Indian penal code.
46. As per paragraph 22 and 23 of the supplementary case diary the accused/appellant was apprehended by ATS on 15.04.2023 at 00.05 during search some mobile phones, documents and a blue colour Grand Vitara car was seized and seizure list was prepared.
47. After arrest his confessional statement was recorded in which he admitted that he was engaged by Avik Srivastava/co-accused for management of his money obtained by means of extortion and levy and in greed of money he joined company of Avik Srivastava and thereafter he remained in contact with Avik Srivastava.
48. He further disclosed that in order to invest money obtained by all these illegal means, Avik Srivastava has opened a company at 205 Gulmohar Apartment, Namkum 28 in the name of ASM Engicom whose account is with IndusInd Bank from which account a sum of rupees 30-32 Lakhs were transferred to the account of accused/petitioner in the year 2019-20 which was obtained from extortion. He further confessed that he has invested these money in contract work and a lot more which would be evident from para 25 of supplementary case dairy.
49. Further as per para 82 of Supplementary Case Diary, one Rahul Kumar Sharma was noticed under section 160 of CrPC who appeared and disclosed that he is brother of accused/Appellant and account at Bank of India, Central bank, HDFC Bank are on his name, He use to give entire amount to accused/ appellant whatever money received in that account.
50. Further during course of investigation, it has come that one company Arnav Enterprises whose owner is Anita Kumari is wife of accused/ petitioner and said company is also governed by accused/ petitioner also received money from ASM Engicon which would be evident from para 96 of Supplementary Case Diary.
51. From the CDR it is evident that the appellant was in regular connection with the co-accused Manjari Srivastava (sister of Aman Srivastava) who manages the hawala system for the gang. Her involvement has been established in case 29 of co-accused Siddharth Sahu from where a cash amount of Rs.28,88,000/- was recovered.
52. From record it is evident that the appellant has been charge sheeted in the instant case vide charge sheet No. 10/2024, dated 04/08/24, u/s 386, 387, 420, 468, 471, 109, 120B, 34, 201 IPC and u/s 16, 17, 18 20, 21 UAP Act.
53. It has come during investigation that co-accused Vinod Kumar Pandey has confessed that the appellant Niraj Srivastava is a contractor and invests money of Aman Srivastava and Avik Srivastava in contract jobs. Further co- accused Sandip Prasad has also confessed that the appellant was given Rs 4-5 lakhs extortion amount by the gang of Aman Srivastava for investment in contract jobs and he further disclosed that the present appellant manages ASN Engicom company and invests the extortion money collected by Avik Srivastava in the same. The aforesaid fact has been substantiated by the verification of bank account of Niraj Kumar whereby it transpired that there have been huge transactions with ASM Engicom.
54. Thus, during investigation, it transpired that the extortion money collected by Aman Srivastava was used to be deposited in the account of ASM Engicom, a company of Avik Srivastava and the appellant has received huge money through the cheques issued by this company. Thus, on the basis of evidences collected it has come that companies have 30 been established by the accused/appellant mainly for the purpose to justify money obtained by illegal means.
55. Further it is also evident from perusal of the confessional statement of Sandeep Prasad who is one of the active members of the Aman Srivastav gang, wherein it has been stated that the appellant used to invest the extorted/levy amount into construction business and further he has confessed that he himself had given 4-5 lacs cash amount of the extorted money to the appellant.
56. Thus, during the investigation by the Anti-terrorist squad, statements made by the co-accused, witnesses, confession statements, analysis of financial transaction in the bank account of the appellant, technical analysis of the seized mobile phones of the arrested accused in the case, chargesheet has been submitted against this appellant for offences 386/387/420/468/471/109/120(B)/34/201 u/s of Indian penal code and 16/17/18/20/21 of Unlawful Activities (prevention) Act, 1967.
57. Thus, it appears that there is sufficient prima facie evidence which indicate the complicity of the appellant to an organized crime syndicate and that suggest that the appellant was facilitating the alleged crime for which A.T.S. P.S. Case no. 01/2022 was registered.
58. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken the ground of custody of the appellant as he has been languishing in 31 the custody since 15.04.2023 and has also taken the aid of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb (supra) and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) .
59. It has been contended by taking aid of the aforesaid judgments that in the instant case there is no probability in near future that trial will be concluded, hence, taking into consideration the period of custody, and probable delay in trial, it is a fit case where the appellant deserves to be released from judicial custody.
60. While, on the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has seriously disputed the aforesaid fact apart from the merit that the present appellant is having a close association with the Aman Srivastava Gang.
61. The contention has been made that the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant i.e. the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb (Supra), is not fit to be accepted, reason being that in the said case, the Hon'ble Apex Court taking in to consideration the huge number of witnesses i.e. 276, put a pin-pointed question therein for reducing the number of witnesses by the investigating agency and when the same has been shown to be not possible then the Hon'ble Apex Court, by taking into consideration the period of custody and there is no 32 likelihood of conclusion of the trial in near future, has not interfered in the order granting bail to the respondent- accused.
62. But here in the instant case, the appellant is closed associate by giving direct aid to the Aman Srivastava Gang and the charge sheeted witnesses are only 62 in numbers.
63. Considering the above facts and circumstance and after going through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, case diary, and other documentary evidence it is evident that there is direct and serious allegation against the appellant that in nexus with the member of Aman Srivastava Gang.
64. So far as the argument regarding reliance having been placed upon the judgment of Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb (Supra) is concerned, this Court is of the view that in the facts and circumstances the aforesaid judgment will not be applicable herein since in the said case altogether 276 charge-sheeted witnesses were to be examined and on the pin-pointed question by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the investigating agency has submitted that there is no question of reducing the number of charge-sheeted witnesses and in view thereof and considering the period of custody, i.e., more than 5 and half years and also taking into consideration the spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution of India the Hon'ble 33 Apex Court has not interfered in the order by which the bail was granted to respondent-accused.
65. While, the fact of the instant case is that there are only 62 witnesses approximately as per the charge-sheet which is very much less in comparison to 276 witnesses of aforesaid case.
66. So far as the factual aspects of the Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) is concerned that on 9-2-2020 at about 9.30 a.m., on the basis of some secret information, the appellant herein was apprehended by Mumbai Police of the DCB CID Unit VIII from a bus-stop at Terminal II Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj International Airport, Andheri. The search of the person of the appellant was undertaken. The appellant had a bag with him and from the bag 1193 numbers of counterfeit Indian currency notes of the denomination of Rs 2000 were recovered. The counterfeit notes were seized and the appellant herein was arrested. The first information report was registered at Sahar Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 489-B, 489-C, 120-B read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860.
67. Accordingly, the said appellant was apprehended and was in custody past four years. While hearing the prayer for bail the Hon'ble Apex Court has taken into consideration the fact that the appellant is in jail as an 34 undertrial prisoner past four years; and till date trial court has not been able to even proceed to frame charge; and further the prosecution intends to examine not less than eighty witnesses.
68. Accordingly, while referring mandate of Section 19 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, the Hon'ble Apex Court has enlarged the said appellant on bail.
69. However, in the instant case there is 62 witnesses and appellant is in custody since 15.04.2023. Further, there is no quarrel about the settled position of law that Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides for protecting the fundamental right of liberty but that is to be assessed by carving out the balance in enforcing the law and order.
70. Further, in the instant case it has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the state on instruction that in course of trial, the number of charge-sheeted witnesses may also be reduced depending upon the situation and trial may be concluded in shortest time period.
71. This Court considering the aforesaid distinguishing fact in the present case by taking into consideration the active involvement of the appellant with the banned organization and further taking in to gravity of the offence, is of the view that the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb (Supra) and 35 Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra is not fit to be applied herein.
72. So far the issue of parity is concerned, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that other co-accused Avik Srivastava upon whom there is almost similar allegation has been directed to be released on bail by the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 26.09.2022 passed in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 667 of 2022, therefore, on the ground of parity also, the present appellant deserves to be enlarged on bail.
73. Per contra the learned counsel for the state as regards parity with the case of accused Avik Srivastava, has submitted that so many incriminating materials have not been considered in his case. The only consideration was with respect to charge sheeted sections in the chargesheet and with respect to transaction / transfer of money said to be falling under offence of extortion. There was no consideration with respect to statements of witnesses u/s 164 CrPC who have disclosed about extortion as well as of levy collection through the activities of bombing, firing and murder at various places.
74. In the aforesaid context it needs to refer herein that the issue of parity has been dealt by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tarun Kumar vs. Assistant Director 36 Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486 wherein it has held as under:
"18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr. Luthra to grant bail to the appellant on the ground that the other co- accused who were similarly situated as the appellant, have been granted bail, also cannot be accepted. It may be noted that parity is not the law. While applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus upon the role attached to the accused whose application is under consideration."
75. It is further settled connotation of law that Court cannot exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances before granting bail and by only simply saying that another accused has been granted bail is not sufficient to determine whether a case for grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramesh Bhavan Rathod vs. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6 SCC 230 wherein it has been held as under:
"25. We are constrained to observe that the orders passed by the High Court granting bail fail to pass muster under the law. They are oblivious to, and innocent of, the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and to the severity of the punishment in the event of conviction. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527], this Court has held that while applying the principle of parity, the High Court cannot exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances before granting bail. This Court observed : (SCC p. 515, para 17) 37 "17. Coming to the case at hand, it is found that when a stand was taken that the second respondent was a history-sheeter, it was imperative on the part of the High Court to scrutinise every aspect and not capriciously record that the second respondent is entitled to be admitted to bail on the ground of parity. It can be stated with absolute certitude that it was not a case of parity and, therefore, the impugned order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 16031] clearly exposes the non-application of mind. That apart, as a matter of fact it has been brought on record that the second respondent has been charge-sheeted in respect of number of other heinous offences. The High Court has failed to take note of the same. Therefore, the order has to pave the path of extinction, for its approval by this Court would tantamount to travesty of justice, and accordingly we set it aside."
26. Another aspect of the case which needs emphasis is the manner in which the High Court has applied the principle of parity. By its two orders both dated 21-12- 2020 [Pravinbhai Hirabhai Koli v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2986] , [Khetabhai Parbatbhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2988] , the High Court granted bail to Pravin Koli (A-10) and Kheta Parbat Koli (A-15). Parity was sought with Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13) to whom bail was granted on 22-10-2020 [Siddhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2985] on the ground (as the High Court recorded) that he was "assigned similar role of armed with stick (sic)". Again, bail was granted to Vanraj Koli (A16) on the ground that he was armed with a wooden stick and on the ground that Pravin (A-10), Kheta (A-15) and Sidhdhrajsinh (A-13) who were armed with sticks had been granted bail. The High Court has evidently misunderstood the central aspect of what is meant by parity. Parity while granting bail must focus upon the role of the accused. Merely observing that another accused who was granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a 38 case for the grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. In deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in relation to the incident and to the victims is of utmost importance. The High Court has proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which again cannot pass muster under the law."
76. It is evident from the proposition laid down in the said cases that the factual aspect governing the case of the culpability said to be committed by one or the other, if found to be exactly the same and having taken into consideration by the concerned Court, then only the principle of parity will be applicable.
77. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled legal position and in the order to determine the applicability of issue of parity this Court has gone through order dated 26.09.2022 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Criminal Appeal(DB) No. 667 of 2022 by which the co-accused Avik Srivastava has been enlarged on bail by the Co-ordinate Bench and while enlarging the co-accused Avik Srivastava on bail the Court has taken in to consideration the charge- sheeted under Sections 16 or 17 of the UAP Act has not been submitted against the said appellant, for ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid order is being quoted as under:
"11. As we have noted above, a "Terrorist Act" has been defined in Section 15 of UAP Act and the penal provision for being involved in a Terrorist Act is Section 16 of UAP Act. Section 17 of UAP Act is also a corollary to Section 15 of the said Act as it encompasses punishment for raising funds for a Terrorist Act. The 39 appellant, however, has not been charge-sheeted under Sections 16 or 17 of the UAP Act. Similar is the situation when the offence charged is under section 21 of the Act. Therefore, for laying down a foundation to attract Sections 20 and 21 of the UAP Act, Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Act will have to act as a base for the same. Therefore, leaving aside Sections 20 and 21 of the UAP Act, the primary offence against the appellant is conspiracy, abetment and acting in furtherance of a common intention with respect to extortion. The appellant has been shown to be the Director of M/s A.S.N. Engicom, through which the extortion money was channelized. Mrs. Priya Shrestha has drawn the attention of the Court to the various amounts transferred to the account of M/s A.S.N. Engicom as well as other suspicious transactions. Such transaction/ transfer of money would at best attract an offence for extortion 6 and not an offence under sections 20 and 21 of UAP Act.
78. Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid order that Co- ordinate Bench while taking note that the appellant, has not been charge-sheeted under Sections 16 or 17 of the UAP Act for laying down a foundation to attract Sections 20 and 21 of the UAP Act, Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Act will have to act as a base for the same and accordingly quashed and set aside the order dated 11.3.2022, passed in Misc. Cr. Application No. 205 of 2022 arising out of ATS Case No. 1/2022 by learned A.J.C. XVIII cum Special Judge, ATS, Ranchi and consequently direct that the appellant be released on bail.
79. However, in course of argument, learned counsel appearing for the State has submitted that the charge has also been filed under Section 16 and 17 of the UA(P) Act even with respect to the co-accused Avik Srivastava.
80. But the aforesaid finding of the co-ordinate bench will not be applicable herein reason being that as per the 40 counter affidavit charge-sheet has been submitted against the appellant for offence under Sections 386/ 387/420/468/471/ 109/34/120 B/201 of the Indian Penal Code, for offence under Sections 16/17/18/20/ 21 of UA (P) Act, 1967.
81. On the basis of discussion made hereinabove and by applying the proposition laid down for the purpose of applicability of principle of parity, in the light of the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench in the case of co-accused Avik Srivastava is of the view that the principle of parity will not be applicable herein.
82. Further contention has been raised that charge-sheet against the petitioner has already been filed and, thus, investigation is complete and therefore, no purpose would be served in keeping the petitioner in judicial custody.
83. In the aforesaid context it is settled position of law that the mere fact that investigation is complete does not necessarily confer a right on the accused/petitioner to be released on bail.
84. In the context of aforesaid contention, it would be relevant to note here that in the instant case mere filing of the charge-sheet does not cause material change in circumstances.
85. Further, it is settled proposition of law that the filing of charge-sheet is not a circumstance that tilts the scales in 41 favour of the accused for grant of bail and needless to say, filing of the charge-sheet does not in any manner lessen the allegations made by the prosecution.
86. At this juncture it would be apposite to refer the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Virupakshappa Gouda v. State of Karnataka, (2017) 5 SCC 406 wherein at paragraph-12 the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed which reads as under:
"12. On a perusal of the order passed by the learned trial Judge, we find that he has been swayed by the factum that when a charge-sheet is filed it amounts to change of circumstance. Needless to say, filing of the charge-sheet does not in any manner lessen the allegations made by the prosecution. On the contrary, filing of the charge-sheet establishes that after due investigation the investigating agency, having found materials, has placed the charge-sheet for trial of the accused persons."
87. Thus, this Court, after taking note of the settled legal proposition, is of view that the aforesaid contention is not tenable in the eye of law.
88. Accordingly, this Court, on the basis of the facts as referred hereinabove and coming to the provision of Section 43D(5) of the Act, 1967 as also the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) and Gurwinder Singh Vs State of Punjab and Another(supra) is of the view that it cannot be said that the allegation levelled against the appellants is prima facie untrue.
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89. In view of the foregoing discussions, we find no illegality in the impugned order dated 24.05.2024 passed in Misc. Cr. Application No.1543 of 2024 by AJC-XVIII-cum-Spl. Judge, ATS, Ranchi rejecting the bail petition of the appellant, as such order impugned requires no interference by this Court.
90. In the result, we find no merit in instant appeal, hence, the same is dismissed.
91. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, also stands dismissed.
92. It is made clear that any observation made herein will not prejudice the case of the appellant in course of trial and view as expressed by this Court is only limited to the instant appeal.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) I agree.
(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi Dated, the 19th March, 2025.
Birendra / A.F.R. 43