Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Ramesh Kumar Choudhary vs Rsrtc & Ors on 19 February, 2018
Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7189 / 2017
Abid Mohammad S/o Late Sh. Mohammad Sharif, Aged About 30
Years, R/o Near Eidgaah Gauradi Chacha, Tehsil Degana, District
Nagaur, Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Through the
Chairman & Managing Director, Parivahan Marg, Choumu House,
Jaipur (Rajasthan)
2. The Dy. Chief Manager & Appellate Authority, RSRTC, Parivahan
Marg, Choumu House, Jaipur (Rajasthan).
3. Chief Manager, RSRTC Deedwana Depot, District-Nagaur.
----Respondents
Connected With
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6933 / 2016
Shravan Kumar
----Petitioner
Versus
Rajasthan State Road Transport & Ors.
----Respondent
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14010 / 2016
Ramesh Kumar Choudhary S/o Hari Ram Choudhary, Aged About
37 Years, R/o Ramsar Ka Kua, Parvatsar, Barmer, Rajasthan
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Through the
Chairman & Managing Director, Parivahan Marg, Choumu House,
Jaipur (raj.)
2. The Executive Engineer (transport), RSRTC, Parivahan Marg,
Choumu House, Jaipur (raj.)
3. Chief Manager, RSRTC Jalor Depot, Jalor, Rajasthan
----Respondents
(2 of 17)
[ CW-7189/2017]
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14011 / 2016
Hari Ram S/o Pancha Ram, Aged About 34 Years, R/o Village &
Post-barabhadvi, Tehsil-bargora, District-jalore, Rajasthan
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Through the
Chairman & Managing Director, Parivahan Marg, Choumu House,
Jaipur (rajasthan)
2. The Executive Director (transport), Rajasthan State Road
Transport Corporation, Parivahan Marg, Choumu House, Jaipur
(rajasthan)
3. Chief Manager, RSRTC Jalor Depot, Jslor, Rajasthan
----Respondents
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3223 / 2017
Dinesh Rajpurohit S/o Sh. Poonam Singh, Aged About 24 Years,
R/o Village & Post- Sankhwas, Tehsil and District- Nagaur,
Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Through the
Chairman & Managing Director, Parivahan Marg, Choumu House,
Jaipur (Rajasthan)
2. The Dy. Chief Manager & Appellate Authority, RSRTC, Parivahan
Marg, Choumu House, Jaipur (Rajasthan).
3. Chief Manager, RSRTC Nagaur Depot, Nagaur.
4. Chief Manager, RSRTC Ajaymeru Depot, Ajaymeru.
----Respondents
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5485 / 2017
Tarachand S/o Ramsahay Yadav, Aged About 28 Years, Village and
Post Murayakala, Tehsil- Ramgarh, District- Alwar, (at Present
Working At Depot Sardarsehar).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Through the
Chairman & Managing Director, Parivahan Marg, Choumu House,
Jaipur (Rajasthan)
2. The Executive Director (Transport), RSRTC, Parivahan Marg,
(3 of 17)
[ CW-7189/2017]
Choumu House, Jaipur (Rajasthan)
3. The Dy. General Manager (Accounts) & Authorised Appellate
Officer, RSRTC, Parivahan Marg, Choumu House, Jaipur.
4. Chief Manager, RSRTC Sardarsehar Depot, Churu, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
_____________________________________________________
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Avinash Acharya
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Harish Purohit
Mr. Navdeep Dadhich &
Mr. Suniel Purohit
_____________________________________________________
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
Order 19/02/2018
1. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in sum and substance, for the following reliefs:- (prayer clause of SBCWP No.6933/2016) "a) allow the above writ petition of the petitioner.
b) Quash and set aside the impugned termination order dated 17.12.2014 (Annex.2) and impugned order dated 17.12.2015 (Annex.5);
c) Quash and set aside the impugned order no.592 dated 8.10.2014 (Annex.3);
d) Direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service and grant all consequential benefits as if he was never ordered to be terminated from his service;
e) Any other appropriate writ, order or direction which this Hon`ble Court may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner.
(4 of 17) [ CW-7189/2017]
f) Writ petition filed by the petitioner may kindly be allowed with costs."
2. The petitioners were appointed as Conductor and while they were continuing their services with Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (RSRTC) on probation, their services were terminated by stigmatic order on the allegation that they did not collect fare lawfully from the passengers. It was argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondents without conducting proper enquiry under the Rules penalized them and terminated services of the petitioners, which is arbitrary, illegal and colourable exercise of power.
3. Since the matters involve common questions of facts and law and thus, all the writ petitions are being decided together by this single order. For the sake of brevity, the dates of the respective orders terminating the petitioners' probationary services is mentioned below :-
1. SBCWP No.6933/2016Shrawan Kumar
- termination order dtd.17.12.2014 (Annex.2) 2. SBCWP No.7189/2017 Abid Mohammad
- termination order dtd.5.11.2014 (Annex.3) 3. SBCWP No.14010/2016 Ramesh Kumar Choudhary
- Termination order order dtd.20.1.2015 (Annex.4) 4. SBCWP No.14011/2016 Hari Ram
- Termination order order dtd.27.1.2015 (Annex.2) 5. SBCWP No.5485/2017 Tarachand
- Termination order order dtd.01.12.2014 (Annex.3) (5 of 17) [ CW-7189/2017] 6. SBCWP No.3223/2017 Dinesh Rajpurohit
- Termination order order dtd.25.11.2014 (Annex.4) To substantiate his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the precedent law laid down by Hon`ble Apex Court in the case of State Bank of India & Ors. Vs. Palak Modi & Anr., reported in (2013) 3 SCC 607; the relevant portion whereof reads as under :
"44. The proposition laid down in none of the five judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Appellants is of any assistance to their cause, which were decided on their own facts. We may also add that the abstract proposition laid down in paragraph 29 of the judgment in Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences (supra) is not only contrary to the Constitution Bench judgment in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (supra), but large number of other judgments -
State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra (supra), Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha (supra) and Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India (supra) to which reference has been made by us and to which attention of the two- Judge Bench does not appear to have been drawn. Therefore, the said proposition must be read as confined to the facts of that case and cannot be relied upon for taking the view that a simple order of termination of service can never be declared as punitive even though it may be founded on serious allegation of misconduct or misdemeanor on the part of the employee.
46. In the result, the appeals are dismissed. The Appellants shall reinstate the private Respondents within 15 days of the production of copy of this judgment before Respondent No. 3 and give them all consequential benefits like pay, allowances, etc. within next one month. However, it is made clear that this judgment shall not preclude the competent authority from taking fresh decision in the matter of (6 of 17) [ CW-7189/2017] confirmation of the private Respondents after giving them effective opportunity of hearing against the allegation of use of unfair means in the test held on 27.2.2011."
Counsel for the petitioners also relied upon judgment of this Court in Rajendra Kumar Vs. The Chairman, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors., reported in 2008(4) WLC page 359; relevant portion whereof reads as follows :-
"12. Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in V.P. Ahunja's case (supra) that a probationer like a temporary servant is also entitled to certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily or punitively without complying with the principles of natural justice. In this case also, admittedly no enquiry whatsoever has been conducted in respect of the alleged charges which are mentioned in the impugned orders, therefore, the order passed by the Chief Manager, Hanumangarh is totally illegal, unconstitutional and against the principles of law.
13. In the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra), Hon'ble the Apex Court has held that if order is punitive in nature and cast stigma, then enquiry is necessary before terminating the services of an employee. The relevant portions of the said judgment in paras 21, 26 and 31 are as follows:
21. If findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as "founded" on the allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was not held, no findings were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to enquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay (7 of 17) [ CW-7189/2017] in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstances, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid.
... ... ...
26 . There is, however, considerable difficulty in finding out whether in a given case where the order of termination is not a simple order of termination, the words used in the order can be said to contain a "stigma". The other issue in the case before us is whether even if the words used in the order of termination are innocuous, the court can go into the words used or language employed in other orders or proceedings referred to by the employer in the order of termination.
... ... ...
Thus, it depends on the fact and circumstances of each case and the language or words employed in the order of termination of the probationer to judge whether the words employed amount to a stigma or not."
Counsel for the petitioners further relied upon judgment of this Court in Hanuwant Singh Vs. RSRTC & Ors., (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9242/2014, decided on 13.8.2015), relevant portion of the judgment aforesaid reads as follows :
"Heard and considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. The proposition of law as expounded in the catena of judgments cited at the bar clearly postulates that if the order of a probationary employee's termination is punitive and stigmatic and where the allegation of misconduct constitutes the foundation of the action taken, then the ultimate decision taken by the competent authority can be nullified on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice. It was further held that in such cases, the Court can lift the veil for examining whether, in the garb of termination simplisitor, the (8 of 17) [ CW-7189/2017] employer had in fact punished the employee for misconduct. Considering the material available on record in its entirety and upon examining the impugned orders on the touchstone of the principles enunciated in the above judgments, this Court is in total agreement with the arguments advanced by the petitioners' counsel that the impugned orders were founded on allegations of misconduct and cannot be termed as orders of termination simplisitor.
In the background of the above discussion, the orders under challenge cannot be sustained and are liable to be quashed.
Consequently, the writ petitions deserve acceptance and are hereby allowed. The impugned orders dated 27.11.2014, 28.11.2014 and 2.12.2014, whereby the respective petitioners' probationary services were terminated, are hereby quashed and set aside. However, the respondents are given liberty to pass a fresh order in the matter if so warranted, after following the principles of natural justice and the procedure established by law.
Stay petitions are disposed of.
No order as to costs.
A copy of this order be placed in each file."
The purport of the judgment so rendered as per learned counsel for the petitioners is that the decision taken by the competent court can be nullified on the ground of violation of principles of natural justices. Learned counsel for the petitioners also stated that the court can lift the veil for examining whether in the garb of termination simplicitor, the employer had in fact punished the employee for misconduct.
"Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the following judgments in support of the contention that termination of the services of a probationary employee for punitive reasons cannot be ordered without holding a mandatory inquiry as per the service Rules and Regulations and is a mandatory pre-requisite as per Article 311 of the Constitution of India:-
1. Chandra Prakash Shahi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
(9 of 17) [ CW-7189/2017] AIR 2000 SC 1706
2. Ramraj Gurjar Vs. RSRTC & Ors.
2008 WLC (Raj.) UC 485
3. Rajendra Kumar Vs. The Chairman, RSRTC & Ors. 2008(4) WLC 359
4. Ashique Ali Vs. RSRTC Jaipur & Anr.
2009(2) RLW (Raj.) 1162
5. State Bank of India & Ors. Vs. Palak Modi & Anr. (2013)3 SCC 607
4. Learned counsel for the respondents have justified impugned order of termination on the ground that the parameters of principles of natural justice were fully complied with. Counsel for the respondents, though, stated that no regular enquiry was conducted but the petitioners were called for hearing in person and were given ample opportunity to submit their stand in person.
Further the petitioners were given opportunity to bring any material witness or document for putting up their defence.
Learned counsel for the respondents also averred that no doubt the order being stigmatic but the impugned order(s) have been passed after giving proper opportunity of hearing and after adhering to the parameters of principles of natural justice.
Counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mathew P. Thomas Vs. Kerala State Civil Supply Corporation Ltd & Ors., reported in (2003) 3 SCC
263. The relevant portion whereof reads as follows :
"10. Paras 1 to 3 of the show-cause notice reflect about the unsatisfactory performance of the duty of the appellant. Paras 4 and 5 of the show-cause notice were not taken into consideration in passing the order of termination of services as is evident from the termination (10 of 17) [ CW-7189/2017] order although reference is made to the show-cause notice. the last para of the show-cause notice also indicates that he action was proposed in terms of Clause 2 of the order of appointment, namely, terminating the services during probationary period. The order of termination of services refers to relevant clause in the order of appointment and explanation given by the appellant to the show-cause notice. The last paragraph of the said order shows that his explanation was found unsatisfactory. The appellant had wrongfully recommended acceptance of bad stock not once but several times; as such it was held that his services have been unsatisfactory. Hence, the order of termination was passed. From this order of termination, it is clear that the respondents did not rely on paras 4 and 5 of the show-cause notice. The Division Bench in the impugned judgment, after perusal of the files observed that the appointing authority had abandoned those charges and concentrated only on the lapses committed by the appellant in wrongfully recommending acceptance of bad stock. We have no good reason to differ with this finding recorded by the Division Bench after perusal of the relevant files and records. Even otherwise, paras 4 and 5 of the show-cause notice stand withdrawn as per the direction given by the High Court. This being the position, no prejudice is caused to the appellant to complain that High Court has exceeded its power to judicial review when such a deletion of paras 4 and 5 from the show-cause notice is to the benefit and advantage of the appellant. This also protects the appellant from any adverse affect when he seeks employment elsewhere and prospective employer may not have any ground to take adverse view of the alleged misconduct contained in paras 4 and 5 of the show-cause notice.
11. An order of termination simplicitor passed during the period of probation has been generating undying debate. The recent two decisions of this Court in Deepti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National center for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Ors. and Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences and Anr. after survey of most of the earlier (11 of 17) [ CW-7189/2017] decisions touching the question observed as to when an order of termination can be treated as simplicitor and when it can be treated as punitive and when a stigma is said to be attached to an employee discharged during period of probation. The learned counsel on either side referred to and relied on these decisions either in support of their respective contentions or to distinguish them for the purpose of application of the principles stated therein to the facts of the present case. In the case of Deepti Prakash Banerjee (supra), after referring to various decisions indicated as to when a simple order of termination is to be treated as "founded" on the allegations of misconduct and when complaints could be only as motive for passing such a simple order of termination. In para 21 of the said judgment a distinction is explained, thus: (SCC pp. 71-72) "21. If findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as "founded" on the allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was not held, no findings were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to enquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstances, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid."
From long line of decisions it appears to us whether an order of termination is simplicitor or punitive has ultimately to be decided having due regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Many a times the distinction between the foundation and motive in relation to an order of termination either is thin or overlapping. It may be difficult either to categorize or classify strictly orders of termination simplicitor falling in one or the other category, based on misconduct as (12 of 17) [ CW-7189/2017] foundation for passing the order of termination simplicitor or on motive on the ground of unsuitability to continue in service. If the form and language of the so called order of termination simplicitor of a probationer clearly indicate that it is punitive in nature or/and it is stigmatic there may not be any need to go into the details of the background and surrounding circumstances in testing whether the order of termination is simplicitor or punitive. In cases where the services of a probationer are terminated by an order of termination simplicitor and the language and form of it do not show that either it is punitive or stigmatic on the face of it but in some cases there may be a background and attending circumstances to show that misconduct was the real basis and design to terminate the services of a probationer. In other words, the facade of the termination order may be simplicitor but the real face behind it is to get rid of services of a probationer on the basis of misconduct. In such cases it becomes necessary to travel beyond the order of termination simplicitor to find out what in reality is the background and what weighed with the employer to terminate the services of a probationer. In that process is also becomes necessary to find out whether efforts were made to find out the suitability of the person to continue in service or he is in reality removed from service on the foundation of his misconduct.
12 . In the present case, even on earlier occasions when the appellant failed to perform his duties properly during probation period he was warned to improve and continued in the service. If he was to be removed from service on the allegations of misconduct at that time itself the respondents could have removed him from service. This is also a circumstance to indicate that his order of termination was simplicitor. Therefore, having regard to the particular facts and circumstances and in view of what is stated above we have no good reason to disagree with the impugned order.
13. Thus, looking from every angle, we decline to interfere with the impugned order particularly having regard to the facts and (13 of 17) [ CW-7189/2017] circumstances of the case, which are available on record. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. No costs."
Counsel for the respondent further relies on Dipti Prakash Banerjee Vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta. Counsel for the respondents has also relied upon the judgment of Dev Kishan Vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur & Ors., passed by this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.13418/2015, decided on 15.12.2017, which is reproduced as under :-
"1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred with the following prayers:
"(a) the order dated 12.12.2014 (Annexure-2), terminating the services of the petitioner and the order dated 19.10.2015 (Annexure-5) dismissing the appeal of the petitioner may kindly be quashed and set aside and the appeal of the petitioner may kindly be allowed and accepted and the respondents may kindly be directed to reinstate back the petitioner in serviced continuously with all consequential benefits.
(b) the respondent may kindly be directed to permit the petitioner to continue his duties at Sirohi Depot as Conductor.
(c) Any other appropriate order or direction, which this Hon'ble Court deem just and proper be passed in favour of the petitioner.
(d) Costs of this writ petition may kindly be allowed to the petitioner."
2. The brief facts of this case, as noticed by this Court, are that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Conductor on (14 of 17) [ CW-7189/2017] probation vide order dated 09.11.2011, in pursuance whereof, the petitioner joined the duty with effect from 15.11.2011. It was alleged that while the petitioner was discharging his duties on the said post, he was carrying nine passengers without issuing tickets to them on 03.04.2014 on vehicle No.1182 at Ramdeora-Sirohi Route.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has shown from the record that the petitioner was not in a position to collect fare from these nine passengers, who were in fact misbehaving with him and were not paying the fare.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also stated that the inspecting authority did not check the cash in the bag and did not take the evidence of other passengers.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further reiterated that the respondents did not make any BCR, and the BCR prepared subsequently did not carry the signatures of the driver or any independent witness.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner also stated that the relevant documents, pertaining to the defence of the petitioner were not given to him and the petitioner has been saddled with the termination order, which is stigmatic. Learned counsel for the petitioner also reiterated that the evidence of Shri Pankaj Kumar Bansal, who was the complainant, was also taken in absence of the petitioner.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further pointed out that the termination is a serious punishment and before passing an order to that effect, the petitioner ought to have been heard, whereas from a bare perusal of the impugned orders, it is clear that the petitioner has not been heard before passing the same.
8. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment rendered by this Hon'ble Court at Principal Seat, Jodhpur in Ayub Khan Vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. (S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.9243/2014 decided on 13.08.2015) as well as the judgment rendered by this Hon'ble Court at Jaipur Bench in Hemant Vyas Vs. Rajasthan State (15 of 17) [ CW-7189/2017] Road Transport Corporation & Ors., reported in 2015(4) WLC (Raj.)
204.
9. Learned counsel for the respondents however, stated that both the impugned orders have been passed after due application of mind by the competent authorities and the mere fact that in two years' probation period, the petitioner has been levelled with sixteen separate charges on different dates for carrying the passengers without ticket, is relevant.
10. Learned counsel for the respondents further pointed out that in case of probation, it was the right and prerogative of the respondents to bring the services of the petitioners to an end, without any enquiry. But since a stigmatic conclusion was drawn against the petitioner, therefore, a proper enquiry was conducted.
11. Learned counsel for the respondents in reference of the aforecited judgments submits that these judgments only prescribe for parameters of principles of natural justice, which require adherence for passing stigmatic order and in this case, such opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner, in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
12. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties as well as perusing the record of the case alongwith the precedent law cited at the Bar, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioner, in his short tenure of probation starting from his appointment on 09.11.2011 to the date of his termination from service i.e. 12.12.2014, has been saddled with sixteen cases pertaining to carrying passengers without ticket on different dates.
13. On a bare perusal of the record as well as the impugned orders, it seems that the said orders have been passed after assigning proper reasons and affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, which of course was required, in light of the fact that the order was stigmatic.
14. After adhering to the necessary parameters and giving full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, as per the principles of natural (16 of 17) [ CW-7189/2017] justice, the impugned orders have been passed, whereby the services of the petitioner, which were on probation, have been brought to an end, in light of his continuously committing delinquency, and that too, on sixteen different dates. Thus, on a bare perusal of the record, this Court is not inclined to make any interference. The precedent law relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner also do not render any help to the petitioner, as he was given proper opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned orders.
15. Consequently, the present writ petition is dismissed."
5. Counsel for the respondents thus pointed out that the basic parameters of natural justice have strictly been adhered to and, therefore, even if the termination order(s) is stigmatic, then also impugned order(s) can be sustained.
6. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, perusing record of case and taking into consideration precedent laws, this Court finds that the impugned order(s) have been passed after giving proper opportunity of hearing to petitioners to call for any witness or document in their defence. The parameters of natural justice have sufficiently been adhered. Though, the order is stigmatic, such order has been passed after giving complete details of charges levelled and the reasons why such charges were levelled and found to be proved. Admittedly, a person on probation could have been terminated by termination simiplicitor but if the order is stigmatic, then the natural course left to the respondents was to conduct enquiry and give proper opportunity of hearing, which has been given before passing the impugned orders. Admittedly, the petitioners who were on probation and (17 of 17) [ CW-7189/2017] have committed such deliquency would not call for any protection from this Court. The precedent law cited by counsel for the petitioner only requires the respondents to adhere to the parameters of principles of natural justice and to give sufficient opportunity of hearing before passing order of termination, which in fact, has been given in the present case. The precedent law cited by counsel for the respondents is applicable. Since while passing the order of termination simplicitor the respondents have taken all due care and caution to give proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and its only after examining record and considering each and every aspect of the matter and after giving proper notice and examining reply received from petitioners termination order(s) have been passed.
7. In view of the observations made hereinabove, no interference is called for. The writ petitions are dismissed.
(DR. PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI)J. Sanjay