Madras High Court
S.Shaik Ismail vs The Govt. Of Tamil Nadu on 11 March, 2021
Author: S.S.Sundar
Bench: S.S.Sundar
W.P.No 33335 of 2012
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 11.03.2021
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE Mr. JUSTICE S.S.SUNDAR
W.P. No. 33335 of 2012
1.S.Shaik Ismail
2.S.Basheer Ahamed
3.S.Rafeek Mohamed
4.S.Tajammal
5.S.Abdullah
6.Master Mohamed Asfaq
7.Sree Gokulam Chit & Finance Co.(P) Ltd.,
Rep. by its Executive Director, Mr. G.Baiju,
Corporate Office,
No.66, Arcot Road,
Chennai – 600 024. .. Petitioners
Vs
1.The Govt. of Tamil Nadu,
Rep. by its Secretary to Govt.,
Planning, Development and Special,
Initiatives Department,
Fort St. George, Secretariat,
Chennai – 600 009.
2.The District Collector,
Chennai.
3.The Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition),
Chennai Unit II,
Chennai Metro Rail Project,
Harini Towers, No.7, Conran Smith Road,
Gopalapuram, Chennai – 600 086.
http://www.judis.nic.in
1/19
W.P.No 33335 of 2012
4.The Chief Metro Rail Limited,
Having office at Koyambedu, Chennai. .. Respondents
(R4 suo-motu impleaded vide order dated 04.02.2021 in W.P. No.33335 of
2012 of 2019 in W.P. No.24893 if 2018)
Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying
to issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the 3rd respondent herein to forthwith
refer the dispute for enhanced compensation pursuant to the Award
No.15/2011-12 dated 08.02.2012 of the third respondent herein in respect of
the lands comprised in T.S. No.5/10 and 5/26 (new T.S. No.5/40 abd 5/43
respectively), Saligramam Division, Chennai to the competent Civil Court under
Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
For Petitioners : Ms. A.L.Ganthimathi
For Respondents 1-3 : Mr. M.Elumalai
Additional Government Pleader
4 : Mr. Jayesh B.Dolia
ORDER
This Writ Petition is filed for issuing Writ of Mandamus directing the third respondent, the Land Acquisition Officer, to refer the dispute for enhancement of compensation pursuant to the award of the third respondent dated 08.02.2012, in respect of the petitioner's lands comprised in T.S. No.5/10 and 5/26 (new T.S. No.5/40 and 5/43 respectively), Saligramam Division, http://www.judis.nic.in 2/19 W.P.No 33335 of 2012 Chennai, to the competent Civil Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
2. Brief facts that are necessary for the disposal of the Writ Petition are as follows:
The petitioners' lands originally comprised in S.No.168/2 measuring an extent of 15 grounds and 912 Sq.ft., were acquired by the Government by resorting to the provisions of Land Acquisition Act (Central 1894). It is not necessary to elaborate the details of the acquisition since this Court is concerned only with the later part of the acquisition. After issuing notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred as 'the Act'), and declaration under Section of 6 of the Act, it is admitted that the third respondent passed an award in Award No.15/2011-12. In the award, it is admitted that a sum of Rs.15,15,47,346/- was determined as compensation for the petitioners. It is the case of the petitioners that the petitioners neither accepted the compensation amount nor participated in the award proceeding since the petitioners challenged the acquisition proceeding by filing a Writ Petition in W.P. No.10891 of 2012. It is admitted that the said Writ Petition was dismissed by a learned single Judge of this Court by order dated 26.04.2012. However, the petitioners preferred an appeal in W.A. No.1214 of 2012 and the said appeal http://www.judis.nic.in 3/19 W.P.No 33335 of 2012 was also dismissed by this Court confirming the acquisition proceedings dated 02.08.2012 However, while disposing of the Writ Appeal, the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court made the following observation:
“ ...
We, therefore, without interfering with the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge, dispose of this writ appeal giving liberty to the appellants to claim higher compensation by taking recourse to Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. However, there shall be no order as to costs.”
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners have sought for reference under Section 18 of the Act by a communication dated 09.06.2012 even before the Writ Appeal was disposed of by order dated 02.08.2012. It is the specific case of the learned counsel for the petitioner that though the award was passed on 08.02.2012, the notice of the award was not communicated to the petitioners immediately after the award was passed. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners approached the third respondent as they did not receive a copy of award or notice under Section 12(2) of the Act. It is only pursuant to a representation of the petitioners dated 18.06.2012, the petitioners received a communication dated 04.06.2012, along with the copy of notice of the award under Section http://www.judis.nic.in 4/19 W.P.No 33335 of 2012 12(2) of the Act. From the communication dated 04.06.2012 it is seen that the notice of the award under Section 12(2) of the Act was sent on 14.02.2012. However, according to the petitioners, the communication of notice of award was only sent to them after a letter dated 04.06.2012. Therefore, by referring to Section 18 of the Act, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners will have an opportunity to file a petition seeking reference under Section 18 of the Act only after the communication of notice of award to the petitioner and that the respondents are under legal obligation to consider the representation filed by the petitioners on 09.06.2012 .
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners further submitted that this Court while disposing of the Writ Appeal by order dated 02.08.2012, granted liberty to the petitioners to approach the respondents under Section 18 of the Act for claiming higher compensation. Since the petitioners have already submitted that the representation under Section 18 of the Act on 09.06.2012, the counsel further contended that the petitioner's representation cannot be turned down merely by referring to the limitation prescribed under the Act. Learned counsel also relied upon a few judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the notice of award contemplated under Section 12(2) of the Act is not a mere communication or intimation about the crux or contents of the award http://www.judis.nic.in 5/19 W.P.No 33335 of 2012 but the full text of the award. Since the notice of the award in the present case is not the full award, learned counsel for the petitioners further stated that the respondents cannot cite limitation as the full text of the award was not communicated before the representation of the petitioner dated 09.06.2012, was submitted for enhancement of compensation.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raja Harish Chandra Singh Vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another, reported in 1961 AIR 1500. The paragraphs relied upon by the petitioner's counsel are extracted hereunder:
“...
Part III which deals with reference to Court and procedure thereon opens with s. 18. Section 18(1) provides that any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by him for determination of the Court, inter alia, whether the amount of compensation is adequate or not. It is under this provision that the appellant made an application from which the present appeal arises. Section 18(2) requires that the application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken. These grounds have been stated by the appellant in his application. The proviso to s. 18 deals with the question of limitation. It prescribes that every such application shall be made
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award; (b) in other cases within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under s. 12(2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award whichever shall first expire. The appellant's case falls under the latter part of el. (b) of the proviso. It has been held by the Allahabad High Court that since the application made by the appellant before respondent I was made beyond six months from the date of the award in question it was beyond time. The view taken by the High Court proceeds on the literal construction of the relevant clause. As we have already seen the award was http://www.judis.nic.in 6/19 W.P.No 33335 of 2012 signed and delivered in his office by respondent 1 on March 25, 1951 and the application by the appellant was made under s. 18 on February 24, 1953. It has been held that the effect of the relevant clause is that the application made by the appellant is plainly Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs The Deputy Land Acquisition ... on 30 March, 1961 beyond the six months permitted by the said clause and so respondent I was right in rejecting it as barred by time. The question which arises for our decision is whether this literal and mechanical way of construing the relevant clause is justified in A law. It is obvious that the effect of this construction is that if a person does not know about the making of the award and is himself not to blame for not knowing about the award his right to make an application under s. 18 may in many cases be rendered ineffective. If the effect of the relevant provision unambiguously is as held by the High Court the unfortunate consequence which may flow from it may not have a material or a decisive bearing. If, on the other hand, it is possible reasonably to construe the said provision so as to avoid such a consequence it would be legitimate for the Court to do so. We must therefore enquire whether the relevant provision is capable of the construction for which the appellant contends, and that naturally raises the question as to what is the meaning of the expression "the day of the Collector's award". In dealing with this question it is relevant to bear in mind the legal character of the award made by the Collector under s. 12. In a sense it is a decision of the Collector reached by him after holding an enquiry as prescribed by the Act. It is a decision, inter alia, in respect of the amount of compensation which should be paid to the person interested in the property acquired; but legally the award cannot be treated as a decision; it is in law an offer or tender of the compensation determined by the Collector to the owner of the property under acquisition. If the owner accepts the offer no further proceeding is required to be taken; the amount is paid and compensation proceedings are concluded. If, however, the owner does not accept the offer s. 18 gives him the statutory,, right of having the question determined by Court, and' it is the amount of compensation which the Court may determine that would bind both the owner and the Collector. In that case it is on the amount thus determined judicially that the acquisition proceedings would be concluded. It is because of this nature of the award that the award can be appropriately described as a tender or offer made by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property for his acceptance. In Ezra v. The Secretary of State (1). It has been held that "the meaning to be attached to the word "award" under s. 11 and its nature and effect must be arrived at not from the mere use of the same expression in both instances but from the examination of the provisions of the law relating to the Collector's proceedings culminating in the award. The considerations to which we have referred satisfy us that the Collector acts in the matter of the enquiry and the valuation of the land only as an agent of the Government and not as a judicial officer; and that consequently, although the Government is bound by his proceedings, the persons interested are not concluded by his finding http://www.judis.nic.in 7/19 W.P.No 33335 of 2012 regarding the value of the land or the compensation to be awarded." Then the High Court has added that such tender once made is binding on the Government and the Government cannot require that the value fixed by its own officer acting on its behalf should be open to question at its own instance before the Civil Court. The said case was taken before the Privy Council in Ezra v. Secretary of State for India (2 ), and their Lordships have expressly approved of the observations made by the High Court to which we have just referred. Therefore; if the award made by the Collector is in law no more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to, the owner of the property then the making of the award as properly understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned. That is the normal requirement under the contract law and its applicability to cases of award made under the Act cannot be reasonably excluded. Thus considered the date of the award cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office; it must involve the consideration of the question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If that be the true position then the literal and mechanical construction of the words "the date of the award"
occurring in the relevant section would not be appropriate.
There is yet another point which leads to the same conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation of the property sought to be acquired it is clear that the said decision ultimately affects the' rights of the owner of the property and in that sense, like all decisions which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the said decision should be communicated to the said party. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, 'is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. Thus considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If the award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it can be said to be made when pronounced. If the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced the award is said to be communicated to the said party even if the said party is not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Similarly if without notice of the date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced and a party is not present the award can be said to be made when it is communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair-play and natural justice the expression "the date of the award" used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively.
http://www.judis.nic.in 8/19 W.P.No 33335 of 2012 In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words "from the date of the Collector's award" used in the proviso to s. 18 in a literal or mechanical way. In this connection it is material to recall the fact that under s. 12(2) it is obligatory on the Collector to give immediate notice of the award to the persons interested a,, are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made. This requirement itself postulates the necessity of the communication of the award to the party concerned. The Legislature recognised that the making of the award under s. 11 followed by its filing under s. 12(1) would not meet the requirements of justice before bringing the award into force. It thought that the communication of the award to the party concerned was also necessary, and so by the use of the mandatory words an obligation is placed on the Collector to communicate the award immediately to the person concerned. It is significant that the section requires the Collector to give notice of the award immediately after making it. This provision lends support to the view which we have taken about the construction of the expression "from the date of the Collector's award" in the proviso to s. 18. It is because communication of the order is regarded by the Legislature as necessary that s. 12(2) has imposed an obligation on the Collector and if the relevant clause in the proviso is read in the light of this statutory requirement it tends to show that the literal and mechanical construction of the said clause would be wholly inappropriate. It would indeed be a very curious result that the failure of the Collector to discharge his obligation under s. 12(2) should directly tend to make ineffective the right of the party to make an application under s. 18, and this result could not possibly have been intended by the legislature.
It may now be convenient to refer to some judicial decisions bearing on this point. In Magdonald v. The Secretary of State, for India in Council (1) Rattigan and Shah Din, JJ. held that under the proviso to s. 18 until an award is announced or communicated to the parties concerned it cannot be said to be legally made.
...
so the question arose as to when the time would begin to run. The High Court held that the time can begin to run only from the date on which the decision is communicated to the parties. "If there was any decision at all in the sense of the Act", says the judgment, "it could not date earlier than the date of the communication of it to the parties; otherwise they might, be barred of their right, of appeal without any knowledge of the decision having been passed".
Adopting the same principle a, similar construction has been placed by the Madras High Court in K. V. E. Swaminathan alias Chidambaram Pillai v. Letchmanan Chettiar (1). On the limitation provisions contained in ss. 73(1) and 77(l) of the Indian Registration Act XVI of 1908. It was held that in a case http://www.judis.nic.in 9/19 W.P.No 33335 of 2012 where an order was not passed in the presence of the parties or after notice to them of the date when the order would be passed the expression "within thirty days after the making of the order" used in the said sections means within thirty days after the date on which the communication of the order reached the parties affected by it. These decisions show that where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order by reference to the making of the said order, the making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned. Therefore, we are satisfied that the High Court of Allahabad was in error in coming to the conclusion that the application made by the appellant in the present proceedings was barred under the proviso to s. 18 of the Act.” Though Section 18 of the Act states that the limitation should run from the date of award, the Hon'ble Supreme Court interpreted the provision to mean that the date of award should be the date on which the award was communicated to the party concerned. This does not help the petitioner's counsel to advance an argument that the service of award as contemplated under Section 18 of the Act should be the communication of the award with full text and not the notice under Section 12(2) of the Act.
6. The next judgment relied upon the learned counsel for the petitioners is the judgment in Mahadeo Bajirao Patil Vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in (2005) 7 SCC 440. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is extracted hereunder:
“15. The next ground on which the High Court held the application to be barred by limitation is that in any event the appellant had knowledge of the award being made on 8-12-1994, since he filed a copy of the award as annexure to the writ petition filed on 9-12-1994 and, therefore, should have http://www.judis.nic.in 10/19 W.P.No 33335 of 2012 filed the application under Section 18 of the Act within six weeks. The submission urged on behalf of the appellant relying upon the decision of this Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer that in the instant case even if it is assumed that the appellant had knowledge of the award at least on 8-12-1994, he could make an application within six months from the date of such knowledge, would have deserved serious consideration, but for the finding recorded by us earlier that the appellant had notice under Section 12(2) of the Act and, therefore, the period of limitation for filing the application under Section 18 was six weeks from the date of receipt of the notice and not six months from the date of knowledge of the award.” This judgment also deals with the question regarding the period of limitation for filing an application under Section 18 of the Act. However, it was only held that the period of limitation under Section 18 of the Act was six weeks from the date of receipt of notice and not six months from the date of knowledge of the award.
7. Again the learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhagawan Das and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2010) 3 SCC 545. The relevant paragraphs from the said judgment are extracted hereunder:
“...
28.The following position therefore emerges from the interpretation of the proviso to Section 18 of the Act:
i) If the award is made in the presence of the person interested (or his authorised representative), he has to make the application within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award itself.
ii) If the award is not made in the presence of the person interested (or his authorised representative), he has to make the application seeking reference within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2).
http://www.judis.nic.in 11/19 W.P.No 33335 of 2012
iii) If the person interested (or his representative) was not present when the award is made, and if he does not receive the notice under Section 12(2) from the Collector, he has to make the application within six months of the date on which he actually or constructively came to know about the contents of the award.
iv) If a person interested receives a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, after the expiry of six weeks from the date of receipt of such notice, he cannot claim the benefit of the provision for six months for making the application on the ground that the date of receipt of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act was the date of knowledge of the contents of the award.” The above judgment also does not support the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners.
8. Another judgment relied upon by the counsel for the petitioners is the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Premji Nathu Vs. State of Gujarat and Another reported in (2012) 5 SCC 250. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after relying upon the judgments has discussed and expressed its view in the following paragraphs:
“...
17. In State of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehan Begum, the principle laid down in Harish Chandra case was reiterated and it was held: (AIR P. 1607, para 5) “5. It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Harish Chandra casalis That the party affected by the award must know to actually or constructively, and the period of six months will run from the date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an aware been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. I the awards communicated to a party under Section 12(2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads t or not. Similarly when a party is present in court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, It must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award.
Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award http://www.judis.nic.in 12/19 W.P.No 33335 of 2012 must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award. (emphasis supplied)
18. In Bhagwan Das v. State of U.P. this Court interpreted Section 18 and laid down the following propositions: (SCC pp. 553-54, para 28) “(i) If the award is made in the presence of the person interested (or his authorised representative), he has to make the application within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award itself.
(ii) If the award is not made in the presence of the person interested (or his authorised representative), he has to make the application seeking reference within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2).
(iii) If the person interested (or his representative) was not present when the award is made, and if he does not receive the notice under Section 12(2) from the Collector, he has to make the application within six months of the date on which he actually or constructively came to know about the contents of the award.
(iv) If a person interested receives a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, after the expiry of six weeks from the date of receipt of such notice, he cannot claim the benefit of the provision for six months for making the application on the ground that the date of receipt of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act was the date of knowledge of the contents of the award
19. The Court in Bhagwan Dass then held: (SCC p. 554, paras 30-31) "30. When a person interested makes an application for reference seeking the benefit of six months' period from the date of knowledge the initial onus is on him to prove that he (or his representative) was not present when the award was made, that he did not receive any notice Page: 258 under Section 12(2) of the Act, and that he did not have the knowledge of the contents of the award during a period of six months prior to the filing the application for reference. This onus is discharged by asserting these facts on oath. He is not expected prove the negative. Once the initial onus is discharged by the daimant/person interested, It is for the Land Acquisition Collector to establish that the person interested was present either in person or through his representative when the award was made, or that he had received notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, or that he had knowledge of the contents of the award.
31. Actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the award can be established by the Collector by proving that the person Interested had received or drawn the compensation amount for the acquired land, or had attested the mahazar/panchnama/proceedings delivering possession of the acquired, and a pursuance of the acquisition, or had filed a case challenging the award or had acknowledged the making of the award in any document or in statement on osth or evidence. The person interested, not being in http://www.judis.nic.in 13/19 W.P.No 33335 of 2012 possession of the acquired land and the name of the State or its transferee being entered in the revenue municipal records coupled with delay, can also lead to an inference of constructive knowledge In the absence of any such evidence by the Collector, the claim of the person interested that he did not have knowledge arter will be accepted, unless there are compelling circumstances not to do so."
20. In the light of the above, it is to be seen whether the conclusion recorded by the Reference Court, which has been approved by the High Court that the application filed by the appellant was barred by time is iegally sustainable.
21. A careful reading of the averments contained in Para 2 of the application filed by the appellant under Section 18(1) shows that the notice issued by the Collector under Section 12(2) was served upon him on 22-2-1985. Thereafter, his advocate obtained certified copy of the award and filed application dated 8- 4-1985 for making reference to the Court. This implies that the copy of the award had not been sent to the appellant along with the notice and without that he could not have effectively made an application for seeking reference.
22. On behalf of the State Government, no evidence was produced before the Reference Court to show that the copy of the award was sent to the appellant along with the notice. Unfortunately, while deciding Issue 3, this aspect has been totally ignored by the Reference Court which mechanically concluded that the application filed on 8-4-1985 was beyond the time specified in Section 12(2)(b). The learned Single Judge of the High Court also committed serious error by approving the view taken by the Reference Court, albeit without considering the fact that the notice issued by the Collector under Section 12(2) was not accompanied by a copy of the award which was essential for effective exercise of right vested in the appellant to seek reference under Section 18(1).
9. This Court, on careful consideration of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Premji Nathu Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, has to accept the fact that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clarified the position to the effect that the the limitation under Section 18 of the Act does not start merely from the notice of the award but from the date on which the entire award was communicated to the petitioner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Mahadeorao Kubade Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2018) 8 SCC 266 considered the scope of Section 12 and 18 of the Act. Following the http://www.judis.nic.in 14/19 W.P.No 33335 of 2012 judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Premji Nathu's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
9. The main contention canvassed by the appellants, in these civil appeals. Is Whether an effective notice of the award was provided to the appellant herein.
As per the mandate of Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Ms Bansuri Swaraj, relies on the Judgment of Premji Nathu v. State of Gujarat, wherein this Court has observed as under: (SCC p. 258. Paras 20-22) “20. In the light of the above it is to be seen whether the conclusion recorded by the Reference Court, which has been approved by the High Court that the application filed by the appellant was barred by time is legally sustainable.
21. A careful reading of the averments contained in Para 2 of the application filed by the appellant under Section 18(1) shows that the notice issued by the Collector under Section 12(2) was served upon him on 22-2-1985. Thereafter, his advocate obtained certified copy of the award and filed application dated 8-4-1985 for making a reference to the Court. This implies that the copy of the award had not been sent to the appellant along with the notice and without that he could not have effectively made an application for seeking reference.
22. On behalf of the State Government, no evidence was produced before the Reference Court to show that the copy of the award was sent to the appellant along with the notice. Unfortunately, while deciding Issue 3, this aspect has been totally ignored by the Reference Court which mechanically concluded that the application filed on 8-4-1985 was beyond the time specified in Section 18(2)(b). The learned Single Judge of the High Court also committed serious error by approving the view taken by the Reference Court, albeit without considering the fact that the notice issued by the Collector under Section 12(2) was not accompanied by a copy of the award which was essential for effective exercise of right vested in the appellant to seek reference under Section 18(1). (emphasis supplied)
11. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Government, has not disputed the aforesaid proposition of law. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the aforesaid observations are squarely applicable to the present case as the notice dated 4-12-1987, was not accompanied with the award. In this case, there could not have been a valid notice of the award, by letter dated 4-12-1987. under sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act, until the appellant received a certified copy of the award, which he did on 3-2-1988. http://www.judis.nic.in 15/19 W.P.No 33335 of 2012 Therefore, the reference for enhancement was, accordingly, not barred by limitation 12. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we set aside the order of the High Court concerning the point of limitation and remand the matters back for fresh consideration on merits of the case, inter alia, as to the quantum of compensation. Taking into consideration, the long pendency, we request the High Court to dispose of the matter expeditiously.” In the above judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clarified that notice of award should be accompanied with the award It is categorically held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the Sub Section 2 of 12 of the Act will be satisfied only if the landowner gets a certified copy of the award and that the effective notice of award as prescribed under Section 12(2) of the Act should be the actual communication of the entire award and not mere notice regarding the passing of award.
10. Though this Court has not discussed other judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court on the interpretation of Section 12 and Section 18, going by the issues that were dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the last two judgments above referred to, this Court is able to see that the views of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Premji Nathu's case and Vijay Mahadeorao Kubade's case can be applied in the present case where it is not established that the entire copy of the award was communicated to the petitioners along with the notice of award. In this case the award was passed on 08.02.2012. It is stated that a copy of the award is not communicated to the petitioners and the petitioners have to http://www.judis.nic.in 16/19 W.P.No 33335 of 2012 approach the respondents for getting the notice of the award. The notice of award dated 14.02.2012 was communicated to the petitioner only along with the communication dated 04.06.2012.
11. Since this Court also has given liberty to the petitioner to pursue their remedy by seeking reference under Section 18 of the Act, this Court is of the view that the respondents cannot seriously object the petition filed by the petitioners under Section 18 of the Act being considered by referring to the limitation prescribed under Section 18 of the Act. Though the learned Additional Government Pleader seeks time to produce the files to show that the notice of award dated 14.02.2021 was communicated to the petitioner, this Court is of the view that the limitation prescribed under Section 18 of the Act starts only from the date of service of copy of award if the provisions are construed as per the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Premji Nathu Vs. State of Gujarat and Another reported in (2012) 5 SCC 250 and in Vijay Mahadeorao Kubade Vs. State of Maharashtra through the Collector reported in (2018) 8 SCC 266. The petition for reference under Section 18 of the Act filed by the petitioners on 09.06.2012 cannot be rejected on the ground of limitation. As a result the petitioners are entitled to the relief as prayed for. The respondents are directed to refer the dispute regarding quantum of compensation for the lands acquired from the petitioners forthwith under http://www.judis.nic.in 17/19 W.P.No 33335 of 2012 Section 18 of the Act.
12. The Writ Petition is allowed. No costs.
11.03.2021 Index: Yes Speaking order bkn To
1.The Secretary to Govt., Planning, Development and Special, Initiatives Department, Fort St. George, Secretariat, Chennai – 600 009.
2.The District Collector, Chennai.
3.The Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Chennai Unit II, Chennai Metro Rail Project, Harini Towers, No.7, Conran Smith Road, Gopalapuram, Chennai – 600 086.
4.The Chief Metro Rail Limited, Having office at Koyambedu, Chennai.
http://www.judis.nic.in 18/19 W.P.No 33335 of 2012 S.S.SUNDAR, J., bkn W.P. No. 33335 of 2012 11.03.2021 http://www.judis.nic.in 19/19