Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mazid Beg (Dead) Thr. Legal ... vs Shri Arvind Agrawal on 9 January, 2024
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GURPAL SINGH AHLUWALIA
ON THE 9th OF JANUARY, 2024
MISC. PETITION No. 583 of 2017
BETWEEN:-
MAZID BEG (DEAD) THR. LEGAL
REPRESENTATIVE AARKEY INVESTMENT PVT.
LTD. THR. ITS DIRECTOR MR. MANOJ GARG S/O.
SHRI J.P. GARG A/A 43 R/O. OFFICE AT - 16,
AMAR STAMBH PRESS COMPLEX ZONE-I M.P.
NAGAR BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI RAJESH PANCHOLI - ADVOCATE )
AND
1. SHRI ARVIND AGRAWAL S/O SHRI
RAMESHWAR PRASAD, AGED ABOUT 45
YEARS, R/O. 27-A SHANKAR NAGAR
RAIPUR (C.G.) (CHHATTISGARH)
2. DR. SUBHASH CHANADRA AGRAWAL S/O
SHRI RAMESHWAR PRASAD AGRAWAL,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS, R/O. 27-A
SHANKAR NAGAR RAIPUR (C.G.)
(CHHATTISGARH)
3. OMVATI GOYAL (DEAD) THRO. LRS.
PRAHALAD DASJI GOYAL S/O LATE
RAMNARAYAN GOYAL, AGED ABOUT 80
YEARS, 18 OMKAR BHAWAN SHYAMALA
HILLS BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
4. ASHOK GOYAL S/O PRAHALAD DASJI
GOYAL, AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS, 18
OMKAR BHAWAN SHYAMALA HILLS
BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
2
5. SMT. JYOTI GOYAL W/O ASHOK GOYAL 18
OMKAR BHAWAN SHYAMALA HILLS
BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
6. MOHD. NASEEM S/O MAZID BEG, AGED
ABOUT 43 YEARS, NEAR MASZID VILLAGE
AHMEDPUR KALA TAH. HUZUR BHOPAL
(MADHYA PRADESH)
7. COLLECTOR BHOPAL THE STATE OF
MADHYA PRADESH OFFICE OF
COLLECTOR OLD SECRETARY BUILDING
BAIRAGARH RAOD BHOPAL (MADHYA
PRADESH)
8. SMT. HAMEEDA BI W/O SHAHZAD KHAN,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, HOUSE NO. 53
VILLAGE AHMEDPUR KALA NAGAR
NIGAM WARD NO. 53 HOSHANGBAD ROAD
TAH. HUZUR, BHOPAL (MADHYA
PRADESH)
9. MOHD. RASHID BEG S/O LATE MAJID BEG,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, H.NO. 9 NIRUPAM
ESTATE OPPOSITE THANA BAG SEWANIA
HOSHANGAB ROAD TAH. HUZUR BHOPAL
(MADHYA PRADESH)
10. SMT. FAMIDA BI W/O MUNNAWAR D/O
LATE MAJID BEG, AGED ABOUT 45
YEARS, HOUSE NO. 53 VILLAGE
AHMEDPUR KALA NAGAR NIGAM WARD
NO. 53 HOSHANGBAD ROAD TAH. HUZUR
BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
11. SALEEM BEG S/O LATE MAJID BEG, AGED
ABOUT 44 YEARS, HOUSE NO. 53 VILLAGE
AHMEDPUR KALA NAGAR NIGAM WARD
NO. 53 HOSHANGBAD ROAD TAH. HUZUR
BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
12. SMT. FARIDA BI W/O TAHIR ALI, AGED
ABOUT 38 YEARS, NEAR ROYAL MARKET
BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
13. KU. SANJIDA BI D/O LATE MAJID BEG,
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, HOUSE NO. 53
VILLAGE AHMEDPUR KALA NAGAR
3
NIGAM WARD NO. 53 HOSHANGBAD
ROAD TAH. HUZUR BHOPAL (MADHYA
PRADESH)
14. MOHD. ARSHAD BEG S/O LATE MAJID
BEG, AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, HOUSE NO.
53 VILLAGE AHMEDPUR KALA NAGAR
NIGAM WARD NO. 53 HOSHANGBAD
ROAD TAH. HUZUR BHOPAL (MADHYA
PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(SHRI GAJENDRA PARASHAR - PANEL LAWYER FOR THE STATE AND SMT.
SANJNA SAHNI - ADVOCATE FOR CAVEATORS. )
This petition coming on for admission this day, the court passed
the following:
ORDER
1. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed seeking the following reliefs :-
(i) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate other writ, order or direction quashing the impugned order (Annexure-P/1) as bad in law and consequently allow the application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC of the petitioner.
(ii) Cost of instant petition may also kindly be awarded in favour of the petitioner.
(iii) Any other appropriate writ, order or direction which in the esteemed opinion of this Hon'ble Court is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, may also kindly be issued in favour of the petitioner in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience.
2. It is fairly conceded by counsel for the respondents that a similar question of law was raised in connected Miscellaneous Petition No.469/2017 by the petitioner Mazid Beg (dead) through Lrs; and this Court by a detailed order passed today has dismissed the said 4 miscellaneous petition and therefore, this petition may also be disposed of in the terms and conditions of the order passed in the said miscellaneous petition.
3. This Court by a separate order passed today in the case of Mazid Beg (dead) through Lrs. (supra), has held as under :-
ORDER
1. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed against order dated 23.09.2017 passed by 7th Additional District Judge, Bhopal in Civil Suit No.527-A/08, by which, an application filed by the petitioner under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC has been rejected.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that Nathe Khan was the original owner of the land in dispute. He was survived by his two children namely Shafat Bi (daughter) and Jalil Khan. It is the case of the original plaintiff Majid Beg that since Jalil Khan refused to give share to his sister, therefore, Majid Khan forcibly took possession of the entire property.
Since Jalil Khan was deprived of possession, therefore, he executed multiple sale deeds in favour of Deviprasad, Sureshchand, Mahesh, Yashveer and Baijnath. Mahesh in his turn executed a Will in favour of defendants no. 1 to 4 namely Subhashni, Abhinav, Manju and Anurag. In spite of all these transactions, Jalil Khan or purchasers could not obtain possession and accordingly, sale deed was executed in favour of Kamla Joshi - defendant no. 5. Since Kamla Joshi was also not in position to take possession, therefore, sale deed was executed in favour of Omwati Goyal - defendant no. 6.
3. It is submitted that in the meanwhile, Majid Khan died and accordingly, Aarkey Investment Pvt. Ltd. Through its Director Manoj Garg sought his impleadment as plaintiff. The said application was 5 rejected by the Trial Court. However, by the orders of the High Court, Aarkey Investment Pvt. Ltd., was impleaded as plaintiff in place of Majid Beg. It is submitted that the respondents had carried out an extensive amendment in the written statement and accordingly, the petitioner also filed an application for consequential amendment in the plaint which has been rejected.
4. Challenging the order passed by the court below it is submitted by counsel for the petitioner that since Aarkey Investment Pvt. Ltd; has substituted Majid Beg, therefore, certain amendments were required specifically in the light of exhaustive amendment carried out by the respondents in their written statement.
5. Per contra, it is submitted by counsel for the respondents that initially Majid Beg had filed a suit for declaration of title on the basis of adverse possession and now, by way of amendment, the petitioner has tried to withdraw his admission and has tried to develop a new case alleging that Shafat Bi had a share which could not have been sold by Jalil Khan, accordingly, supported the order passed by the Trial Court.
6. Considered the submissions made by counsel for the parties.
7. Before considering the subject matter of this case, this Court would like to consider nature of the suit which is going on between the parties.
8. Admittedly, Nathe Khan was the original owner who died sometime in the year 1948. He was survived by his two children namely Shafat Bi and Jalil Khan. Under the Muslim Law, daughter is also entitled for her share. It is not the case of either of the parties that the property which was jointly inherited by Shafat Bi and Jalil Khan was partitioned. However, it appears that Majid Beg had forcibly taken possession of the property in dispute 6 because Jalil Khan had refused to give share to his sister Shafat Bi. Accordingly, Jalil Khan executed multiple sale deed. Mahesh one of the purchasers executed a will in favour of defendants no. 1 to 4. Since, defendants no. 1 to 4 were not in possession of the property, therefore, they executed a will in favour of Kamla Joshi - defendant no. 5 who in her turn executed a sale deed in favour of defendant no.
6. Thus, it is clear that un-partitioned joint property is being sold by executing sale deeds in respect of specific pieces of land. It is well established principle of law that a co-sharer can alienate his share but cannot alienate specific piece of land and the purchaser by virtue of sale deed would step into the shoes of co-sharer and if wants a possession of the land then he has to file a suit for partition. Surprisingly, none of the parties have filed a suit for partition and they are fighting for the land.
9. Be that whatever it may be.
10. The original case of the petitioner was that he has perfected his title by way of adverse possession. It is submitted by counsel for the petitioner that where the plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration of his title on the strength of some right then he can take alternative plea of adverse possession also.
11. It is well established principle of law that a possession howsoever long would not become adverse unless and until title of the true owner is denied and true owner is ousted from his property. Long possession is not enough to sustain the plea of adverse possession.
12. The Supreme Court in the case of Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati and others, (2004) 10 SCC 65 has held that a person, though having no right to enter into possession of the property of someone else, does so and continues in possession setting up title in himself and adversely to the title of the owner, commences 7 prescribing title into himself and such prescription having continued for a period of 12 years, he acquires title not on his own but on account of the default or inaction on part of the real owner, which stretched over a period of 12 years results into extinguishing of the latter's title.
13. The Supreme Court in the case of Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah, (2019) 15 SCC 756 has held that mere long continuous possession is not enough to sustain the plea of adverse possession unless it is further proved that such possession was open, hostile, exclusive and with the assertion of ownership right over the property to the knowledge of its true owner.
14. The Supreme Court in the case of Sri Uttam Chand (D) Th Lrs . vs Nathu Ram (D) Thr. Lrs. , decided on 15 January, 2020 in Civil Appeal No.190/2020 has held as under :-
"14. As to whether the plaintiff can claim title on the basis of adverse possession, this Court in a judgment Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur [Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729 :
(2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 453] has held as under:
(SCC p. 777, para 60) "60. The adverse possession requires all the three classic requirements to co-exist at the same time, namely, nec vi i.e. adequate in continuity, nec clam i.e. adequate in publicity and nec precario i.e. adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his knowledge. Visible, notorious and peaceful so that if the owner does not take care to know notorious facts, knowledge is attributed to him on the basis that but for due diligence he would have known it. Adverse possession cannot be decreed on a title which is not pleaded. Animus possidendi under hostile colour of title is 8 required. Trespasser's long possession is not synonymous with adverse possession.
Trespasser's possession is construed to be on behalf of the owner, the casual user does not constitute adverse possession. The owner can take possession from a trespasser at any point in time. Possessor looks after the property, protects it and in case of agricultural property by and large the concept is that actual tiller should own the land who works by dint of his hard labour and makes the land cultivable. The legislature in various States confers rights based on possession."
15. The matter has been examined by a Constitution Bench in M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das [M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1] wherein, it has been held that a plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another, against whom the claimant asserts possession adverse to the title of the other. The Court held as under: (SCC pp. 703-706, paras 1142-1143 & 1147-1150) "1142. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another against whom the claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the other. Possession is adverse in the sense that it is contrary to the acknowledged title in the other person against whom it is claimed. Evidently, therefore, the plaintiffs in Suit 4 ought to be cognizant of the fact that any claim of adverse possession against the Hindus or the temple would amount to an acceptance of a title in the latter. Dr Dhavan has submitted that this plea is a subsidiary or alternate plea upon which it is not necessary 9 for the plaintiffs to stand in the event that their main plea on title is held to be established on evidence. It becomes then necessary to assess as to whether the claim of adverse possession has been established.
1143. A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous possession which meets the requirement of being nec vi nec claim and nec precario. To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence. Evidence, it is well settled, can only be adduced with reference to matters which are pleaded in a civil suit and in the absence of an adequate pleading, evidence by itself cannot supply the deficiency of a pleaded case. Reading Para 11(a), it becomes evident that beyond stating that the Muslims have been in long, exclusive and continuous possession beginning from the time when the Mosque was built and until it was desecrated, no factual basis has been furnished. This is not merely a matter of details or evidence. A plea of adverse possession seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner and the law is not readily accepting of such a case unless a clear and cogent basis has been made out in the pleadings and established in the evidence.
*** 1147. In Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar 10 Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038] , R.S. Sarkaria, J. speaking for a three- Judge Bench of this Court noted that the concept of possession is "polymorphous" embodying both a right (the right to enjoy) and a fact (the real intention). The learned Judge held: (SCC p. 278, para 13) '13. ... It is impossible to work out a completely logical and precise definition of "possession" uniformly applicable to all situations in the contexts of all statutes. Dias and Hughes in their book on Jurisprudence say that if a topic ever suffered from too much theorising it is that of "possession". Much of this difficulty and confusion is (as pointed out in Salmond's Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., 1966) caused by the fact that possession is not purely a legal concept. "Possession", implies a right and a fact; the right to enjoy annexed to the right of property and the fact of the real intention. It involves power of control and intent to control. (See Dias and Hughes, ibid.)' These observations were made in the context of possession in Section 29(b) of the Arms Act, 1959.
1148. In P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy [P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, 1957 SCR 195 : AIR 1957 SC 314] , Jagannadhadas, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench of this Court dwelt on the "classical requirement" of adverse possession: (AIR pp. 317-18, para 4) '4. Now, the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi nec clam nec precario. (See Secy. of State for India in Council v. Debendra Lal Khan [Secy. of State for India in Council v. Debendra Lal 11 Khan, 1933 SCC OnLine PC 65 : (1933-34) 61 IA 78] IA at p. 82.) The possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor.' The Court cited the following extract from U.N. Mitra's Tagore Law Lectures on the Law of Limitation and Prescription: (AIR p. 319, para 7) '7. ... "An adverse holding is an actual and exclusive appropriation of land commenced and continued under a claim of right, either under an openly avowed claim, or under a constructive claim (arising from the acts and circumstances attending the appropriation), to hold the land against him (sic) who was in possession. (Angell, Sections 390 and 398). It is the intention to claim adversely accompanied by such an invasion of the rights of the opposite party as gives him a cause of action which constitutes adverse possession." ' [ 6th Edn., Vol. I, Lecture VI, at p. 159] This Court held: (AIR p. 319, para 7) '7. ... Consonant with this principle the commencement of adverse possession, in favour of a person implies that the person is in actual possession, at the time, with a notorious hostile claim of exclusive title, to repel which, the true owner would then be in a position to maintain an action. It would follow that whatever may be the animus or intention of a person wanting to acquire title by adverse possession his adverse possession cannot commence until he obtains actual possession with the requisite animus.' 1149. In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Union of India [Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Union of 12 India, (2004) 10 SCC 779] , S. Rajendra Babu, J. speaking for a two-Judge Bench held that: (SCC p. 785, para 11) '11. ... Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and
(e) his possession was open and undisturbed.' The ingredients must be set up in the pleadings and proved in evidence. There can be no proof sans pleadings and pleadings without evidence will not establish a case in law.
1150. In Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam [Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam, (2007) 14 SCC 308] , this Court emphasised that mere possession of land would not ripen into a possessory title. The possessor must have animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. Moreover, he must continue in that capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act."
(emphasis in original)
16. In the present case, the defendants have not admitted the vesting of the suit property with the Managing Officer and the factum of its transfer in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants have denied 13 the title not only of the Managing Officer but also of the plaintiff. The plea of the defendants is one of continuous possession but there is no plea that such possession was hostile to the true owner of the suit property. The evidence of the defendants is that of continuous possession. Some of the receipts pertain to 1963 but possession since November 1963 till the filing of the suit will not ripe into title as the defendants never admitted the appellant-plaintiff to be the owner or that the land ever vested with the Managing Officer. In view of the judgments referred to above, we find that the findings recorded by the High Court that the defendants have perfected their title by adverse possession are not legally sustainable. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by the High Court is set aside and the suit is decreed. The appeal is allowed."
15. Furthermore, once the property is still joint and has not been partitioned then there is no question of any adverse possession.
16. It is submitted by counsel for the petitioner that a temporary injunction order has been issued in favour of the petitioner with a specific finding that the petitioner is the owner of the property in dispute.
17. Considered the said submission made by counsel for the petitioner.
18. It is well established principle of law that any findings recorded at the stage of temporary injunction has no bearing on the final outcome of the suit and the suit has to be finally decided on the basis of evidence which would come on record. A suit cannot be decided merely on the findings recorded at the stage of temporary injunction. Furthermore, it is well established principle of law that each and every co-sharer is deemed to be in joint possession of undivided property. The person setting up the defence of ouster has to prove that he 14 has hostile and open possession and repudiation to the rights of the petitioner.
19. The Supreme Court in the case of Govindammal vs R.Perumal Chettiar & Ors, reported in 2006 (11) SCC 600 has held as under :-
"11. In Vidya Devi v. Prem Prakash [(1995) 4 SCC 496] the question was whether the plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession was available to the co- bhumidhar or not. In that context, their Lordships held that when no period of limitation is fixed for filing a suit for partition by a co-bhumidhar against his other co-bhumidhars in respect of a joint holding, the question of the other co-bhumidhar acquiring his title to such holding by adverse possession for over 12 years can never arise. It was further observed that if that be so, such plea of perfection of title by adverse possession of a holding by a co-bhumidhar against his other co-bhumidhar as defence in the latter's suit for partition can be of no legal consequence.
12. In Mohd. Baqar v. Naim-un-Nisa Bibi [AIR 1956 SC 548] it was observed that under the law, possession of one co-sharer is possession of all co-sharers; it cannot be adverse to them, unless there is a denial of their right to their knowledge by the person in possession and exclusion and ouster following thereon for the statutory period. There can be no question of ouster, if there is participation in the profits to any degree.
13. In Md. Mohammad Ali v. Jagadish Kalita [(2004) 1 SCC 271] this Court examined a series of decisions on the question of adverse possession and after extracting the legal propositions from 15 various decisions, their Lordships concluded that long and continuous possession by itself, it is trite, would not constitute adverse possession. Even non-participation in the rent and profits of the land to a co-sharer does not amount to ouster so as to give title by prescription. A co-sharer, as is well settled, becomes a constructive trustee of other co-sharer and the right of a person or his predecessors-in-interest is deemed to have been protected by the trustees.
14. As against this, our attention was also invited to a decision in T.P.R. Palania Pillai v. Amjath Ibrahim Rowther [AIR 1942 Mad 622 : (1942) 2 MLJ 321 (FB)] . Their Lordships observed that in order to constitute adverse possession, the possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. Therefore, in cases of adverse possession also their Lordships have said that the possession should be for longer period and it is known to the competitor that it is held adverse to his knowledge. Their Lordships further held that in cases of usufructuary mortgage granted by one of several co-sharers, if a person remains in possession of the land and cultivates it for years, the requirement of continuity, publicity and extent for adverse possession are fully complied with. But that is not the case here.
15. In Nirmal Chandra Das v. Mohitosh Das [AIR 1936 Cal 106 : 40 CWN 777] their Lordships observed that in order to succeed on the ground of ouster, the person setting up ouster is bound to show that he did set up an adverse or independent title during the 16 period which was beyond the statutory period of 12 years. Their Lordships further observed that there can be no adverse possession by one co-sharer as against others until there is an ouster or exclusion; and the possession of a co-sharer becomes adverse to the other co-sharer from the moment there is ouster. Therefore, what is ouster and what is adverse to the interest of the claimant depends upon each case. In this case, a plea was raised that certain properties were (sic given on) usufructuary mortgage. But that was not in a manner to show that these properties are adverse to the interest of the plaintiff. It was only when 'B' schedule properties were sought to be sold and it came to the knowledge of the plaintiff that her stepsons were not interested in partition of the property and giving her share, she filed the suit in the year 1979. Therefore, for the first time in 1979 she came to know that adverse possession is being sought to be established and her interest in 'B' schedule properties is sought to be sold by her stepsons. But in any case, just because she gave a notice and she did not pursue the same, on that basis no adverse inference can be drawn and she cannot be ousted on that count by way of adverse possession."
20. Thus, it is clear that every co-sharer shall be deemed to be in constructive possession and unless and until ouster is proved, no injunction can be issued against the co-sharer.
21. Initially suit filed by the petitioner was on the basis of adverse possession and now by introducing an amendment he is seeking permission to withdraw the earlier admissions.
1722. It is the case of the petitioner that by way of consequential amendments, the petitioner has proposed amendment in the plaint. As per the provisions of CPC, the case has to be set up by the plaintiff and it is to be denied or admitted by the defendants. The amendment of pleadings cannot go on for indefinite period in the name of consequential amendment. If some amendments are made by the plaintiff in the plaint then the same can be denied by the defendants. However, there cannot be any consequential amendment in the plaint. Viewing from every angle, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out warranting interference in the impugned order.
23. Accordingly, impugned order dated 23.9.2017 passed by 7th Additional District Judge, Bhopal in Civil Suit No.527-A/08 is hereby affirmed. The petition fails and is hereby dismissed."
4. Accordingly, this petition is also dismissed in the terms and conditions of the order passed in the case of Mazid Beg (dead) through Lrs. (supra).
(G.S. AHLUWALIA) JUDGE JP JITENDRA KUMAR Digitally signed by JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, ou=PRINCIPAL BENCH INDORE, 2.5.4.20=a650f9cd964b96221568096ac01ab1bf019e0b76f6fc652f893c6324a2f64a 5a, postalCode=482001, st=Madhya Pradesh, PAROUHA serialNumber=627378D3EE51220F5E81130EECF5ABBEC55EBB6B78033E5FF10402 B19143AD99, cn=JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Date: 2024.01.11 22:15:23 -08'00'