Karnataka High Court
Smt. Muniyamma vs The State Of Karnataka on 3 April, 2025
Author: K.Somashekar
Bench: K.Somashekar
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 R
C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006,
WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 &
WA NO. 1811 OF 2006
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 3RD DAY OF APRIL, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K.SOMASHEKAR
AND
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
WRIT APPEAL NO.1329 OF 2006 (LA-BDA)
C/W
WRIT APPEAL NO.1330 OF 2006 (LA-BDA)
WRIT APPEAL NO.1789 OF 2006 (LA-BDA)
WRIT APPEAL NO.1811 OF 2006 (LA-BDA)
IN WA NO.1329 OF 2006
BETWEEN:
1. HULLURAIAH
AGED ABOUT 82 YEARS,
S/O LATE KEMPAGUDDAIAH,
SINCE DEAD BY LRs
H. CHANDRANNA,
S/O LATE HULLURAIAH,
AGED 53 YEARS,
R/O 79, 22ND CROSS ROAD,
GOVINDARAJ NAGAR,
VIJAYNAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 040.
2. SMT. B.J.SHARDA,
W/O RAJANNA
AGE 47 YEARS,
NO.54, F - II, SAPTAGIRI ENCLAVE,
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006
C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006,
WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 &
WA NO. 1811 OF 2006
2ND MAIN ROAD, PRASHANTH NAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 079.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. D.L.N. RAO, SENIOR COUNSEL AND
SRI. C.M. NAGABUSHANA AND P.V. CHANDRASHEKAR,
SRI. VENKATESH P. DALWAI, ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, M.S. BUILDING,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
K.P. WEST EXTN.,
BANGALORE - 560 020.
REPT., BY ITS COMMISSIONER.
3. THE SPECIAL ADDITIONAL,
LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
K.P. WEST EXTN.,
BANGALORE - 560 020.
4. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
(REVENUE)
BANGALORE DISTRICT,
K.G. ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 009.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. HARISHA A.S., AGA FOR R-1 & R-4, SRI. G.S.
KANNUR, SENIOR COUNSEL AND SRI. K. KRISHNA, ADV. FOR
R-2 & R-3)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE
THE ORDER DATED 06.06.2006, PASSED IN W.P.NO.1984/2004
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006
C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006,
WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 &
WA NO. 1811 OF 2006
(LA-BDA) BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS HON'BLE
COURT AND THEREBY ALLOW THE WRIT PETITION, AS PRAYED
FOR.
IN WA NO.1330 OF 2006
BETWEEN:
SMT. MUNIYAMMA
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS,
W/O LATE MUNIYAPPA,
RESIDING AT MALLATHAHALLY,
YESHWANTHAPURA HOBLI,
BENGALURU - 560 056.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. D.L.N. RAO, SENIOR COUNSEL APPEARING ON
BEHALF OF SRI. C.M. NAGABUSHANA & P.V. CHANDRASHEKAR,
ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN,
DEVELOPMENT,
M.S.BUILDINGS,
BENGALURU-560 001.
2. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
K.P.WEST EXTN.,
BANGALORE - 560 020,
REPTD., BY ITS COMMISSIONER;
3. THE SPECIAL ADDITIONAL,
LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
K.P. WEST EXTN.,
BANGALORE - 560 020;
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI HARISH A.S., AGA FOR R-1, SRI. G.S. KANNUR,
SENIOR COUNSEL AND SRI B.VACHAN, ADV. FOR R-2 & R-3)
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006
C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006,
WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 &
WA NO. 1811 OF 2006
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE
THE ORDER DATED 06.06.2006, PASSED IN W.P.NO.1985/2004
(LA-BDA) BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS HON'BLE
COURT AND THEREBY ALLOW THE WRIT PETITION, AS PRAYED
FOR.
IN WA NO.1789 OF 2006
BETWEEN:
1. SMT. K.RADHAMMA,
W/O SRI. H. RAMACHANDRAIAH,
SINCE DEAD BY L.Rs.,
1a. H.RAMACHANDRAIAH
H/O. DECEASED K.RADHAMMA,
AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS,
1b. R. RAJU,
S/O. LATE K.RADHAMMA,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
1c. R. RAGHUNATH,
S/O. LATE K.RADHAMMA,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
1d. SMT. R. ROOPA,
D/O. LATE K.RADHAMMA,
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
1e. R. JAYAPRAKASH,
S/O. LATE K. RADHAMMA,
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
ALL ARE RESIDING AT
NO.184/82, 1ST MAIN ROAD,
2ND PHASE, RAJAJINAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 010.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. D.L.N. RAO, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. LAXMIKANTH, ADVOCATE)
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006
C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006,
WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 &
WA NO. 1811 OF 2006
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT,
M.S.BUILDINGS,
DR. B.R.AMBEDKAR VEEDH,
BENGALURU-560 001.
2. THE COMMISSIONER,
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD,
BENGALURU - 560 020.
3. M/S. KARNATAKA RURAL INFRAUSTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT LIMITED,
REP. BY MANAGING DIRECTOR,
GATE NO.14, CHINNASWAMY STADIUM,
RAJBHAVAN ROAD, BENGALURU - 560 001.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI HARISH A.S., AGA FOR R-1, SRI G.S. KANNUR,
SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI K. KRISHNA, ADV. FOR R-2,
SRI GURURAJ JOSHI, ADV. FOR R-3)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE
THE ORDER DATED 06.06.2006, PASSED BY THE LEARNED
SINGLE JUDGE IN W.P.NO.3566/2004.
IN WA NO.1811 OF 2006
BETWEEN:
1. NARASAHANUMAIAH,
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS L.Rs.
SRI HANUMANARASAIAH
AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006
C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006,
WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 &
WA NO. 1811 OF 2006
2. SRI. KEMPAIAH,
S/O BASAHANUMAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
BOTH ARE RESIDING AT MUDDANAPALYA,
GIDADAKONENAHALLI,
YESHWANTHAPURA HOBLI,
BANGALORE - 560 091.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. UDAY HOLLA, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. B.
ROOPESH - ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT,
M.S.BUILDINGS,
DR. B.R.AMBEDKAR VEEDH,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2. THE COMMISSIONER,
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD,
BENGALURU - 560 020.
3. THE ADDITIONAL LAND ACQUISISION OFFICER,
T.CHOWDAIAH ROAD,
BENGALURU - 560 020.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI HARISH A.S., AGA FOR R-1 AND 3, SRI G.S.
KANNUR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI K. KRISHNA, ADV.
FOR R-2)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE
THE ORDER DATED 06.06.2006, PASSED BY THE LEARNED
SINGLE JUDGE IN W.P.NO.6622/2004 AND OTHER CONNECTED
WRIT PETITIONS.
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006
C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006,
WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 &
WA NO. 1811 OF 2006
THESE WRIT APPEALS, HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED ON 28.02.2025 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, K. SOMASHEKAR J., PRONOUNCED
THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K.SOMASHEKAR
AND
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K. SOMASHEKAR) All these appeals originate from a common order dated 06.06.2006 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court challenging the land acquisition proceedings carried out by the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) for the formation of Further Extension of Sir M. Visveswaraya Layout in Bangalore. As the lands of appellants in all these appeals have been acquired by the BDA for the common cause for formation of 'Further Extension of Sir M. Visveswaraya Layout', all these appeals are taken up for hearing together and are disposed of by this common judgment.
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006
2. Heard the learned counsel Shri C.M. Nagabhushana representing the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 1329/2006 (arising out of W.P. No. 1984/2004). Further, we have heard Shri Harisha A.S., learned AGA representing Respondent Nos.1 and 4 and the learned counsel Shri K. Krishna representing Respondent Nos.2 and 3 / BDA. The disputed land in respect of this appeal pertains to Survey No. 67, with an extent of 3.11 acres.
3. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Shri D.L.N. Rao who represents the learned counsel Shri C.M. Nagabhushana and Shri P.V. Chandrashekar who are on record for the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 1330/2006 (arising out of W.P. No. 1985/2004). We have also heard the learned AGA Shri Harisha A.S. representing R1, and the learned counsel Shri B. Vachan for R2 and R3. The land in dispute in respect of the present appeal is Survey No. 42, measuring 2 acres.
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006
4. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Shri D.L.N Rao representing the learned counsel Shri Lakshmikanth and Shri B. Roopesh for appellants in Writ Appeal No. 1789/2006 (arising out of W.P. No. 3566/2004). We have also heard the learned AGA Shri Harisha A.S. for R1, the learned counsel Shri K. Krishna for R2, and the learned counsel Shri Gururaj Joshi for R3. The disputed land in respect of the present appeal pertains to Survey No. 79, with an extent of 21 guntas.
5. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Shri Udaya Holla representing the learned counsel Shri B. Roopesh for appellant in Writ Appeal No.1811/2006 (arising out of W.P. No. 6622/2004). Further, we have heard the learned AGA Shri Harish A.S., for R1 and R3, and the learned counsel Shri K. Krishna for R2. The land in dispute in respect of this appeal is Survey No. 30/03, measuring an extent of 1.22 acres.
6. The facts of the cases in a nutshell, are as under:
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 On January 17, 2003, the BDA resolved to develop a residential layout encompassing lands situated in Herohalli, Gidadakonenahalli, and Mallathahalli villages of Yeshwanthpur Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk. Pursuant to this decision, a preliminary notification under Section 17(1) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976, was issued on April 8, 2003, and published in the Karnataka Gazette on April 9, 2003. The notification proposed the acquisition of 773 acres and 18 guntas of land, including approximately 159 acres and 11 guntas belonging to the State Government. After receiving objections from affected landowners, the BDA considered the representations and, through a resolution passed on June 28, 2003, decided to drop 263 acres and 18 guntas from acquisition due to factors such as existing buildings, recognized nurseries, and Government schemes. The final notification under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act was subsequently issued on September 9, 2003, and Gazetted
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 on September 10, 2003, confirming the acquisition of 510 acres.
7. Aggrieved by the acquisition, several landowners and stakeholders filed writ petitions before a learned Single Judge of this Court, contending that the exclusion of certain lands from acquisition was arbitrary and discriminatory. Some petitioners argued that their lands had been fully developed or converted for non-agricultural purposes, while others challenged the procedural irregularities in the acquisition process. They also contended that the acquisition violated their rights under Articles 14, 21, and 300-A of the Constitution of India. By its judgment dated June 6, 2006, the learned Single Judge upheld the acquisition proceedings, dismissing most of the writ petitions, while allowing limited relief in respect of Survey No. 106/2 in Mallathahalli. The Court further granted petitioners the liberty to approach the BDA with proof that their lands were similarly placed to those exempted from acquisition.
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006
8. The appellants in these writ appeals raise specific grievances regarding the acquisition process. In respect of W.A.No.1329/2006, the original appellant namely Hullaraiah, an agriculturist by lineage, had lost his land measuring 3 acres 32 guntas in Veerapura Village, Magadi Taluk, due to a prior acquisition for the Manchanbele Dam project. He was rehabilitated with land measuring 3 acres 11 guntas in Survey No. 67 of Harohalli Village, Bangalore North Taluk. However, the said land was subsequently included in the present acquisition by issuing a Preliminary Notification dated 08.04.2003 and a final notification dated 09.09.2003. The appellant contended that Government land cannot be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and that vast extents of land were excluded for extraneous reasons, thereby violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
9. In W.A.No.1330/2006, the appellant Smt. Muniyamma, a Scheduled Caste widow, had challenged the acquisition of land measuring 2 acres of Sy.No.42 of
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 Mallathahalli granted to her late husband as part of a Government scheme for depressed classes. The respondent / BDA had issued a preliminary notification which was published in the Karnataka Gazette on 09.04.2003 and a final notification which was published in the Karnataka Gazette on 10.09.2003. She argued that the land had been fully developed with residential constructions and that a prior acquisition attempt in 1987 had been abandoned due to the same reasons.
10. In W.A.No.1789/2006, the appellant Smt. Radhamma, a devotee of Muneshwara, had purchased land measuring 21 guntas in Survey No. 79 of Mallathahalli Village and developed it with residential structures and a temple. The respondent / BDA had issued a preliminary notification dated 23.04.2003 and a final notification which was published in the Karnataka Gazette on 10.09.2003. Despite her objections, the authorities failed to recognize her ownership in the final notification, and she alleged selective exemption of influential
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 individuals' lands, thereby violating her fundamental rights.
11. In W.A.No.1811/2006, appellants being agriculturists by lineage, had lost their land measuring 1 acre 22 guntas of Survey No. 30/03 of Gidadakonenahally village due to present acquisition by issuing a Preliminary Notification dated 08.04.2003 and a final notification dated 09.09.2003. The appellants contended that though their lands were gramathana lands and they were assured by the officials that their land would not be acquired, the same has been acquired though vast extents of land were excluded for extraneous reasons, thereby violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
12. In all these cases, the appellants assert that the acquisition process suffered from procedural irregularities, arbitrary exclusions, and failure to consider the individual circumstances of the landowners. Hence, the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 1329/2004 had preferred W.P. No.
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 1984/2004; similarly, the appellant in W.A.No.1330/2006 had preferred W.P.No.1985/2004; the appellant in W.A.No.1789/2006 had preferred W.P.No.3566/2004 and the appellants in W.A.No.1811/2006 had preferred W.P.No.6622/2004 before a learned Single Judge of this Court challenging the acquisition proceedings. The learned Single Judge had clubbed all those petitions and by its common order dated 06.06.2006 in W.P.No.16133/2004 and batch, has proceeded to reject the petitions filed by the appellants and has upheld the acquisition proceedings. It is the said order which is under challenge in all these appeals.
13. The learned counsel for Appellants have challenged the acquisition of lands by the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) for the formation of the Further Extension of Sir M. Visveswaraya Layout on multiple legal grounds, arguing that the acquisition process is arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of constitutional and statutory provisions. They assert that
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 the learned Single Judge failed to properly appreciate the legal and factual aspects of their claims and, therefore, seek intervention by this Court.
14. The learned counsel for appellant in respect of W.A.No.1329/2006, contend that the State does not acquire its own land, as upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar & Another (AIR 2003 SC 942). The Court in that case held that land already vested in the State is beyond the purview of the Land Acquisition Act and that it is futile and legally impermissible to exercise eminent domain over Government-owned land. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads thus:
"36. To sum up, the State is not a "person interested" as defined in Section 3(b) of the Act. It is not a party to the proceedings before the Collector in the sense, which the expression "parties to the litigation" carries. The Collector holds the proceedings and makes an award as a representative of the State Government. Land
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 or an interest in land pre-owned by the State cannot be the subject-matter of acquisition by the State. The question of deciding the ownership of the State or holding of any interest by the State Government in proceedings before the Collector cannot arise in the proceedings before the Collector [as defined in Section 3(c) of the Actl. If it was government land there was no question of initiating the proceedings for acquisition at all. The Government would not acquire the land, which already vests in it. A dispute as to the pre-existing right or interest of the State Government in the property sought to be acquired is not a dispute capable of being adjudicated upon or referred to the civil court for determination either under Section 18 or Section 30 of the Act. The reference made by the Collector to the court was wholly without jurisdiction and the civil court ought to have refused to entertain the reference and ought to have rejected the same. All the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act beginning from the reference and adjudication thereon by the civil court suffer from lack of inherent jurisdiction
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 and are therefore a nullity liable to be declared so.''
15. It is the further contention of appellants that the BDA's attempt to acquire Government lands, including lands granted to individuals under Government rehabilitation schemes, is contrary to this established legal principle. They further contend that Section 27 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976, provides that if the BDA requires Government land, it must request a formal transfer from the State, rather than acquiring it under eminent domain. The failure to adhere to this statutory requirement, renders the acquisition ultra vires and illegal.
16. The learned counsel for appellants further argue that the acquisition process was discriminatory, violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In support of this contention, they have relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B.E.M.L. Employees House Building Cooperative Society Ltd. v. State of
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 Karnataka and Others (AIR 2004 SC 5054), where the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that statutory discretion must be exercised fairly and reasonably, without arbitrary exclusions or inclusions. The relevant extract of the case law is given below:
"7. It was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that whatever be the recommendations of the Land Acquisition Officer in his report under Section 5A, they were merely recommendations and the State Government was not bound to accept them.
The State Government had wide discretion to accept or reject the said. report under Section 5A of the Act and take independent decision to continue or discontinue the acquisition proceedings in respect of any particular land proposed to be acquired. Wide, the discretion may be; but, not wild: All exercise of statutory discretion must be based on reasonable grounds and cannot lapse into arbitrariness or caprice which is anathema to the Rule of Law envisaged in Article 14 of the Constitution. The facts placed on record do not indicate that the case of the
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 fifth Respondent was similar, if not identical, to that of the other land owners, whose lands were dropped from the acquisition proceedings.
Neither the appellant, nor the State Government has been able to show us any rational distinction between the case of the fifth Respondent and the cases of the other land owners, whose lands were excluded from the acquisition. When this is so. it appears to us that the vice of hostile discrimination infects and vitiates the decision taken by the State Government to continue with the acquisition against the fifth Respondent's land. "
17. The learned counsel for appellants further submits that similarly placed lands were arbitrarily omitted from the final acquisition notification while the lands of the appellants were retained. In WA 1789/2006, for instance, the appellant's land in Survey No. 79 of Mallathahalli Village was acquired while adjacent lands within the same survey number were excluded from acquisition, without any justification. Hence, it is contention of the appellants
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 that hostile discrimination of this nature renders the entire acquisition process unconstitutional.
18. Additionally, the learned counsel for the Appellants have relied on a judgment in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai & Ors. (AIR 2005 SCW 4796), where the Supreme Court has held that Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act confers a valuable right akin to a fundamental right and that any acquisition must be preceded by a fair hearing with due application of mind. The relevant extract is given below:
"5. The main question which fell for its consideration before the High Court was whether the objections raised by the Appellant objecting to the acquisition of land on various grounds have been considered by the Government.
6. It is not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuable right in favour of a person whose lands are sought to be acquired. Having regard to the provisions contained in
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 Article 300A of the Constitution of India, the State in exercise of its power of 'eminent domain' may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid.
7. Indisputably, the definition of public purpose is of wide amplitude and takes within its sweep the acquisition of land for a corporation owned or controlled by the State, as envisaged under Sub-clause (iv) of Clause (f) of Section 3 of the Act. But the same would not mean that the State is the sole judge therefore and no judicial review shall lie. [See Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar and Others vs. State of Gujarat and Another (AIR 1995 SC 142) .
8. The conclusiveness contained in Section 6 of the Act indisputably is attached to a need as also the purpose and in this regard ordinarily, the jurisdiction of the court is limited but it is equally true that when an opportunity of being heard has expressly been conferred by a statute, the same must scrupulously be complied with. For the said purpose, Sections 4, 5-A and 6 of
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 the Act must be read conjointly. The court in a case, where there has been total non-compliance or substantial non-compliance of the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act, cannot fold its hands and refuse to grant a relief to the writ petitioner. Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act renders a declaration to be a conclusive evidence. But when the decision making process itself is in question, the power of judicial review can be exercised by the court in the event the order impugned suffers from well- known principles, viz., illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. Moreover, when a statutory authority exercises such enormous power it must be done in a fair and reasonable manner.
9. It is trite that hearing given to a person must be an effective one and not a mere formality. Formation of opinion as regard the public purpose as also suitability thereof must be preceded by application of mind as regard consideration of relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. The State in its decision making process must not commit any misdirection in law. It is also not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuable important right and
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300A of the Constitution of India has been held to be akin to a fundamental right.
28. Although assignment of reasons is the part of principles of natural justice, necessity thereof may be taken away by a statute either expressly or by necessary implication. A declaration contained in a notification issued under Section 6 of the Act need not contain any reason but such a notification must precede the decision of the appropriate Government. When a decision is required to be taken after giving an opportunity of hearing to a person who may suffer civil or evil consequences by reason thereof, the same would mean an effective hearing.
29. The Act is an expropriatory legislation. This Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. Vs. Vishnu Prasad Sharma and Ors. [1966 (3) SCR 557] observed that in such a case the provisions of the statute should be strictly construed as it deprives a person of his land without consent. [See also Khub Chand and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors., 1967 (1( SCR
- 25 -
WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 120 and Collector of Central Excise, Ahmedabad vs. Orient Fabrics (P) Ltd. (2004) 1 SCC 597].
There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that in a case of this nature due application of mind on the part of the statutory authority was imperative''
19. In the present cases, the respective learned counsel for appellants argued that their objections were summarily ignored, and no reasons were recorded for rejecting their claims. They contend that the learned Single Judge, failed to appreciate that procedural fairness is not a mere formality but a substantive right, and non- compliance with Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, vitiates the entire acquisition process.
20. The learned counsel for appellants also challenge the unjustified acquisition of developed lands, arguing that land already converted for non-agricultural use or developed with residential buildings, should not have been acquired. In this regard, they have relied on a judgment
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy & Ors. v. Bangalore Development Authority & Ors. (2010 7 SCC 129), where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that once land is fully developed and built upon, its acquisition should be reconsidered unless indispensable for public purpose. They argue that in the present case, many of the acquired lands were already built upon or under residential use, yet the BDA proceeded with their acquisition while similarly placed properties were excluded. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads thus:
"The Supreme Court upheld the validity of land acquisition for the formation of Arkavathi Layout by the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA), ruling that the acquisition process complied with the statutory requirements under the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976, and the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court clarified that acquisition does not automatically lapse due to delays in implementation or procedural lapses, and landowners cannot claim
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 illegality merely because the land was not immediately utilized for its intended purpose. It emphasized that landowners are entitled to fair compensation and directed the BDA to ensure transparency and adequate rehabilitation for affected persons, particularly farmers. Addressing concerns of arbitrariness, the Court held that selective exclusion of land from acquisition without valid justification could violate Article 14 of the Constitution, but non- exclusion alone does not render the acquisition illegal unless proven discriminatory. Furthermore, it reaffirmed that acquisition for planned urban development constitutes a valid "public purpose," and once land is lawfully acquired for such a purpose, it cannot be challenged merely on the ground of non- utilization within a specific time frame"
21. In WA 1330/2006, the appellant, a Scheduled Caste widow, contends that her land was granted to her late husband under a Government scheme for the upliftment of oppressed classes. Despite this, the BDA proceeded with the acquisition, disregarding the fact that
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 the land was previously excluded from acquisition in 1987 due to having acquired a full-fledged developed land. It is the contention of the learned counsel that resurrecting acquisition proceedings for the same land after decades, without any change in circumstances, constitutes colorable exercise of power and is contrary to constitutional principles of fairness and justice.
22. It is the further contention of the appellants that the State cannot grant land on one hand and take it away on the other, as this would be inconsistent with the doctrine of legitimate expectation and constitutional protections under Article 21. In support of their contention, they have relied on a judgment in the case of Hari Ram v. State of Haryana (2010 AIR SCW 1726), where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that once the Government grants land under a specific scheme, it must honor its commitments and cannot subsequently acquire the same land arbitrarily. The relevant case extract is given below:
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 "7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at quite some length on various dates E The principal grievance raised by the appellants is that they have been discriminated by the State Government in not releasing their land although land of similarly situated persons in identical facts and circumstances has been released. On the other hand, Mr. Govind Goel, learned counsel for the respondents justified the action of the State Government and submitted that by an elaborate and speaking order, the State Govemment has rejected the appellants prayer of release of their land from acquisition and there is no infirmity in the said order. Mr. Govind Goel, learned counsel contended that plea regarding discrimination is fallacious as release of land of few owners after the impugned judgment cannot provide permissible basis for advancing the plea of discrimination, especially in the absence of any legal right for release. In this regard, he relied upon decisions of this Court in the case of Secretary Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain & Others', Jalandhar Improvement Trust 'v. Sampuran Singh', Union' of India and Another v.
- 30 -
WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 International Trading Co. and Another, Ved Prakash and Others v. Ministry of Industry, Lucknowand Another', Anand Buttons Lid. v. State of Haryana and Others', and Vishal Properties (P) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others®. He also referred to decisions of this Court in Sube Singh and Others v. State of Haryana and Others' and Jagdish Chand & Anr. v. State of Haryana and Anr.3."
23. Additionally, the learned counsel for appellants highlight that vast portions of land were dropped from acquisition for extraneous considerations, with no rational basis for these exclusions. In this regard, they rely on a judgment in the case of V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer (2012 (12) SCC 133), where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that acquisition proceedings cannot be conducted selectively to favor a particular group of landowners. They argue that the BDA's pick-and-choose approach violates constitutional and
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 statutory safeguards. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads thus:
"25. Land once vested in the Government-- whether can be divested :
It is a settled legal proposition, that once the land is vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested and proceedings under the Act would not lapse, even if an award is not made within the statutorily stipulated period. [Vide Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar [(1995) 6 SCC 31] , U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. [(1996) 3 SCC 124 : AIR 1996 SC 1170], Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman [(1996) 6 SCC 424] , M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of T.N. [(2000) 4 SCC 322] and Govt. of A.P. v.
Syed Akbar [(2005) 1 SCC 558 : AIR 2005 SC 492] .]
26. The said land, once acquired, cannot be restored to the tenure-holders/persons interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for which it was so acquired, or for any other purpose either. The proceedings cannot be
- 32 -
WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 withdrawn/abandoned under the provisions of Section 48 of the Act, or under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, once the possession of the land has been taken and the land vests in the State, free from all encumbrances. (Vide State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma [AIR 1966 SC 1593] , Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma [(1970) 2 SCC 149 : AIR 1970 SC 1576] , Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P. [(1993) 4 SCC 369 : AIR 1993 SC 2517] , Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan [(1993) 2 SCC 84] and Dedicated Freight Corridor Corpn. of India v. Subodh Singh [(2011) 11 SCC 100 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 604] .)
27. The meaning of the word "vesting" has been considered by this Court time and again. In Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust [AIR 1957 SC 344] this Court held that the meaning of the word "vesting" varies as per the context of the statute, under which the property vests. So far as the vesting under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act is concerned, the Court held as under : (AIR p. 353, para 19)
- 33 -
WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 "19. ... In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17 the property acquired becomes the property of the Government without any condition or limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration."
28. In Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra [(1976) 1 SCC 800 : AIR 1977 SC 448] in a similar situation, this Court held as under : (SCC p. 802, para 5) "5. ... once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in ... declaration."
29. Similarly, in State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai [(1997) 5 SCC 432 : AIR 1997 SC 2703] this Court held as under : (SCC p. 433, para 4)
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 "4. ... It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution."
30. In Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar [(2005) 1 SCC 558 : AIR 2005 SC 492] , this Court considered this very issue and held that, once the land has vested in the State, it can neither be divested, by virtue of Section 48 of the Act, nor can it be reconveyed to the persons interested/tenure-holders, and that therefore, the question of restitution of possession to the tenure-holder, does not arise.
31. In view of the above, the law can be crystallised to mean, that once the land is acquired and it vests in the State, free from all encumbrances, it is not the concern of the
- 35 -
WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 landowner, whether the land is being used for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other purpose. He becomes persona non grata once the land vests in the State. He has a right to only receive compensation for the same, unless the acquisition proceeding is itself challenged. The State neither has the requisite power to reconvey the land to the person interested nor can such person claim any right of restitution on any ground, whatsoever, unless there is some statutory amendment to this effect."
24. The learned counsel for appellants also challenge the economic motivations behind the acquisition, arguing that the BDA is acting as a real estate developer rather than a statutory planning authority. They point out that despite the pendency of the acquisition process, the BDA advertised site allotments and collected deposits from the public, indicating that its primary objective was revenue generation rather than genuine public purpose. This, they argue, is an abuse of statutory powers and is contrary to
- 36 -
WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 the principles laid down in the case of Nandkihor Babulal Agrawal v. State of Maharashtra (Civil Appeal No. 7634/2023). The relevant portion of the said judgment reads thus:
"10. It is not in dispute dispute that the acquisition has attained finality and the land stands vested in the State/Municipal corporation free from all encumbrances. There is indisputably no provision under the MRTP Act enabling the State Government to release the acquired land.
11. In our considered view, the High Court would be extremely circumspect to issue a mandamus in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, directing to release a lawfully acquired land only on the premise that such land has not been utilized for the public purpose for which it was acquired. There is no gainsaying that once the land vests in the State or its authorities, the public purpose' of its acquisition can be changed at a later stage. All that is required is that such land should be utilized for public purposes only. In fact, there cannot be a time limit within which
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 the authorities are expected to utilize the acquired land. The Municipalities or such other agencies are expected to have long-term plans for regulated development of urban areas and for that purpose, certain pockets of land are required to be kept vacant as reserve pool to cater the future needs."
25. In view of all these reasons, the respective learned counsel for the appellants seek to set aside the order dated 06.06.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge and to thereby to quash the impugned acquisition notifications.
26. Per contra, it is contended by the learned counsel for the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) and the State of Karnataka, that the acquisition process was conducted in strict compliance with legal requirements, and that the appellants' claims of discrimination and procedural irregularities are unfounded.
27. The respondents have argued that the entire acquisition process was carried out as per the Bangalore
- 38 -
WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 Development Authority Act, 1976, and that the due process was followed. They submit that the preliminary notification was issued on 08.04.2003, and after considering objections, the final notification was issued on 09.09.2003. Learned counsel for respondents contend that the appellants' objections were considered, but were found to be without merit, as the acquisition was essential for the planned urban development of Bangalore.
28. In support of the said contention, the respondents have relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandigarh Administration v. Jagjit Singh (AIR 1995 SC 705), stating that merely because some lands were excluded from acquisition, does not create a legal right for others to demand similar treatment. They contend that each exclusion was made based on objective factors, and there was no arbitrary discrimination. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads thus:
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 "8. We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be called one, on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law and indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many such instances, we think it necessary to deal with such pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extra-
ordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose.
- 40 -
WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal / unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again. The illegal / unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law - indeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law - but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the court is not condoning the earlier illegal act / order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination.
Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners' case is similar to the other persons' case. But then
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 why examine another person's case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the Court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the Court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person's case, which other person is not before the case nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course -- barring exceptional situations would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well- accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world. (What is the position in the case of orders passed by authorities in exercise of their quasi-judicial power, we express no opinion. That can be dealt with when a proper case arises.)"
29. The respondents further argue that land once vested in the State cannot be divested, relying on the judgment in the case of V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer (2012 (12) SCC 133). They assert that possession of the acquired lands has already been taken, civic amenities have been developed, and thousands of sites have been allotted to the public. They contend that reversing the acquisition would disrupt urban planning and public welfare. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads thus:
"25. Land once vested in the Government--whether can be divested :
It is a settled legal proposition, that once the land is vested in the State, free from all
- 43 -
WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 encumbrances, it cannot be divested and proceedings under the Act would not lapse, even if an award is not made within the statutorily stipulated period. [Vide Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar [(1995) 6 SCC 31] , U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. [(1996) 3 SCC 124 : AIR 1996 SC 1170] , Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman [(1996) 6 SCC 424] , M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of T.N. [(2000) 4 SCC 322] and Govt. of A.P. v.
Syed Akbar [(2005) 1 SCC 558 : AIR 2005 SC 492] .]
26. The said land, once acquired, cannot be restored to the tenure-holders/persons interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for which it was so acquired, or for any other purpose either. The proceedings cannot be withdrawn/abandoned under the provisions of Section 48 of the Act, or under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, once the possession of the land has been taken and the land vests in the State, free from all encumbrances. (Vide State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma [AIR 1966 SC 1593] , Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma [(1970) 2 SCC 149 : AIR 1970 SC 1576] ,
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P. [(1993) 4 SCC 369 : AIR 1993 SC 2517] , Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan [(1993) 2 SCC 84] and Dedicated Freight Corridor Corpn. of India v. Subodh Singh [(2011) 11 SCC 100 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 604] .)
27. The meaning of the word "vesting" has been considered by this Court time and again. In Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust [AIR 1957 SC 344] this Court held that the meaning of the word "vesting" varies as per the context of the statute, under which the property vests. So far as the vesting under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act is concerned, the Court held as under : (AIR p. 353, para 19) "19. ... In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17 the property acquired becomes the property of the Government without any condition or limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration."
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006
28. In Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra [(1976) 1 SCC 800 : AIR 1977 SC 448] in a similar situation, this Court held as under : (SCC p. 802, para 5) "5. ... once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in ... declaration."
29. Similarly, in State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai [(1997) 5 SCC 432 : AIR 1997 SC 2703] this Court held as under : (SCC p. 433, para 4) "4. ... It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should
- 46 -
WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution."
30. In Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar [(2005) 1 SCC 558 : AIR 2005 SC 492] , this Court considered this very issue and held that, once the land has vested in the State, it can neither be divested, by virtue of Section 48 of the Act, nor can it be reconveyed to the persons interested/tenure-holders, and that therefore, the question of restitution of possession to the tenure-holder, does not arise.
31. In view of the above, the law can be crystallised to mean, that once the land is acquired and it vests in the State, free from all encumbrances, it is not the concern of the landowner, whether the land is being used for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other purpose. He becomes persona non grata once the land vests in the State. He has a right to only receive compensation for the same, unless the acquisition proceeding is itself challenged. The State neither has the requisite
- 47 -
WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 power to reconvey the land to the person interested nor can such person claim any right of restitution on any ground, whatsoever, unless there is some statutory amendment to this effect."
30. The learned counsel for respondents also submit that once land is acquired, its non-utilization for a specific period does not invalidate the acquisition, which view is supported by a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra (1976 1 SCC 800). They argue that landowners cannot challenge the acquisition merely because the land has not been immediately used for its intended purpose. The relevant portion of the said judgment is extracted thus:
"5. ... once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring
- 48 -
WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in ... declaration."
31. For all the above reasons, the learned counsel for respondents pray that the writ appeals be dismissed, upholding the findings of the learned Single Judge and affirming the legality of the acquisition process.
32. In the context of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for appellants as well as the learned counsel for respondents, it is relevant to state that the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) Act, 1976 ("BDA Act"), grants the BDA the power to acquire lands for planned development in the Bangalore Metropolitan Area. Sections 15 to 19 of the BDA Act sets out the procedure that the BDA must follow to conceive a development scheme, invite objections, and secure Government approval. Once a scheme is approved, land may be acquired either by agreement under Section 35 or by compulsory acquisition under Section 36, which adopts the procedures of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (LA Act). In
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 current practice, the overall acquisition process is also subject to the overarching principles and enhanced safeguards introduced by the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act), to the extent applicable.
33. Under Section 17(1) of the BDA Act, the BDA first prepares and passes a resolution proposing a development scheme. In the present case, such a resolution was passed on January 17, 2003, identifying land in Herohalli, Gidadakonenahalli, and Mallathahalli villages for the Further Extension of Sir M. Visveswaraya Layout. Pursuant to this resolution, a preliminary notification was issued (SLAO/79/2003-2004) on April 8, 2003, and published in the Karnataka Gazette on April 9, 2003, as required by law. This notification clearly stated the extent of the land proposed for acquisition to be 773 acres 18 guntas (including 159 acres 11 guntas of Government land)--and
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 informed landowners that objections or claims could be filed by them.
34. After issuing the preliminary notification, the BDA is mandated to invite and consider objections from landowners and other stakeholders under Section 18 of the BDA Act. The requirement for an inquiry, akin to that under Section 5-A of the LA Act, was effectively satisfied, wherein the BDA published and served notices to affected persons, allowing them a reasonable opportunity to submit objections. The record shows that the BDA received multiple objections concerning existing structures, nurseries, and other developments. In the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, (AIR 2005 SCW 4796), the emphasis is on fair hearings and meaningful consideration of objections, the BDA held hearings to evaluate these submissions. As a direct consequence, 263 acres and 18 guntas were excluded from the acquisition scope due to valid concerns. This demonstrates that the statutory
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 discretion was exercised transparently and judiciously, reflecting adherence to Article 14 of the Constitution.
35. Once the objections were reviewed and decided upon, and the scheme was sanctioned by the State Government, the BDA issued a final declaration under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act on September 9, 2003, published on September 10, 2003 (Aa Ee/749/Bem Bhu Swa/2003). This final declaration concluded that approximately 510 acres of land were required for a public purpose--namely, the expansion and planned development of Sir M. Visveswaraya Layout. In line with the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B.E.M.L. Employees House Building Cooperative Society Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (AIR 2004 SC 5054), statutory discretion must be exercised fairly and reasonably. The BDA provided clear justifications for which parcels were included or excluded, thus negating allegations of arbitrariness.
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006
36. A related issue arose concerning Government land acquisition, with reliance on Sharada Devi v. State of Bihar (AIR 2003 SC 942) to argue that Government land cannot be acquired. However, Section 37 of the BDA Act specifically allows the transfer of Government land to the BDA for developmental purposes. Therefore, even though the LA Act does not typically apply in the same manner to Government-owned parcels, the BDA Act's own provisions lawfully allow the inclusion of Government land in the acquisition process. The BDA thus acted within its legislative mandate.
37. The learned counsel for appellants had claimed that the selective exclusion of land was arbitrary and thereby violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The BDA, however, presented legitimate reasons for excluding certain parcels--such as existing buildings, nurseries, or land already dedicated to Government schemes--while retaining the parcels essential to the layout. As reiterated in the case of B.E.M.L. Employees House Building
- 53 -
WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 Cooperative Society Case. (Supra), statutory authorities are free to exercise their discretion to exclude land where it furthers the public interest or is necessitated by practical considerations. Detailed records of the BDA's deliberations confirm that the BDA's use of discretion was neither capricious nor discriminatory, thereby meeting the constitutional requirement of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
38. Additionally, the learned counsel for appellants argued that their objections were disregarded, thereby violating the fair hearing principles associated with Section 5-A of the LA Act. However, the BDA's records reflect multiple hearings for objections, some of which were upheld (leading to exclusion of the concerned parcel), while others were overruled for stated reasons. In the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court made it clear that a fair hearing is mandatory, and in this instance, the BDA's notices,
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 hearings, and consideration of each objection indicate full compliance with that standard.
39. It was further argued that once land is developed or put to a specific use, it should not be subject to acquisition. Yet, the Supreme Court in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy v. BDA (2010 7 SCC 129), clarified that the acquisition of developed land is valid if a public purpose remains evident. In this case, the BDA's objective of facilitating planned urban expansion, providing housing, and ensuring civic amenities in a rapidly growing area satisfies such a public purpose.
40. An additional concern related to a Scheduled Caste widow (in WA 1330/2006), whose land had been granted under a rehabilitation scheme. Courts have indeed emphasized the need to protect vulnerable individuals, but the Supreme Court has time and again held that Government grants do not confer absolute immunity from acquisition as State has the power of "eminent domain"
- 55 -
WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 and reserves the power to acquire the land for public purpose with reasonable compensation. In this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Property Owners Association and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors ([2024] 11 SCR 1), has held thus:
"203. ................... The power to acquire private resources, in certain situations, continues to be traceable to other provisions in the Constitution, including the sovereign power of eminent domain. Acquisition of property, for instance, is a Concurrent list subject in Entry 42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule. Further, where a legislation falls within the ambit of Article 39(b), the law is only protected against a challenge Under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Even if a law is in furtherance of Article 39(b) and protected by Article 31C, it is susceptible to a challenge to its constitutionality under other provisions of the Constitution, including Article 300-A. Similarly, a law which falls outside the ambit of Article 39(b), may still be valid. All other benefits and protections
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 granted by the Constitution under inter alia Articles 31A and 31B continue to be applicable to such a law. With this in mind, we turn to determining the correctness of the above interpretation of Article 39(b), i.e. that all private property is covered within the ambit of Article 39(b)."
41. A larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chameli Singh and Ors. vs. State of U.P. and Ors.,(AIR 1996 SC 1051), has held thus:
"18. In every acquisition by its very compulsory nature for public purpose, the owner may be deprived of the land, the means of his livelihood. The State exercises its power of eminent domain for public purpose and acquires the land. So long as the exercise of the power is for public purpose, the individual's right of an owner must yield place to the larger public purpose. For compulsory nature of acquisition, Sub-section (2) of Section 23 provides payment of solatium to the owner who declines to voluntarily part with the possession of land. Acquisition in accordance with the procedure is a
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 valid exercise of the power. It would not, therefore, amount to deprivation of right to livelihood. Section 23(1) provides compensation for the acquired land at the prices prevailing as on the date of publishing Section 4(1) notification, to be quantified at later stages of proceedings. For dispensation or dislocation interest is payable under Sections 23(1-A) as additional amount and interest under Sections 31 and 28 of the Act to recompensate the loss of right to enjoyment of the property from the date of notification under Section 23(1-A) and from the date of possession till compensation is deposited. It would thus be clear that the plea of deprivation of right to livelihood under Article 21 is unsustainable."
42. Hence, although the circumstances warrant empathy, the BDA's acquisition cannot be deemed illegal solely because the land was previously granted under a welfare or rehabilitation scheme.
43. Be that as it may, the final acquisition award is made and possession taken, the land vests absolutely in
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 the State or the relevant acquiring authority, as established in the case of V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer (2012 (12) SCC 133). Such vesting is irrevocable, preventing the original owner from seeking reconveyance, especially after public funds have been invested in development. In the present dispute, since the BDA has already taken possession and started civic works, the question of reverting ownership does not arise.
44. Finally, the learned counsel for appellants alleged that the BDA was functioning more like a private real estate developer. However, in the case of Nandkishor Babulal Agrawal v. State of Maharashtra (Civil Appeal No. 7634/2023), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that once land is validly acquired for a public purpose, its eventual use--such as for layout formation, residential plot creation, or related infrastructure--cannot be undermined so long as the underlying intent serves the public interest. In this context, the BDA's statutory function is precisely to
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 plan and develop sites in growing urban regions, a recognized public purpose.
45. In conclusion, from the resolution under Section 17 of the BDA Act through the preliminary notification, the consideration of objections, and culminating in the final declaration under Section 19, the BDA adhered meticulously to the statutorily prescribed steps. It served due notice of acquisition to affected persons, conducted hearings to consider their objections, documented its reasons for excluding specific parcels, secured the requisite Governmental sanction, and validly took possession of the lands. No evidence has been produced indicating bad faith, malice, or patent illegality in either the selection or exclusion of land. The Hon'ble Supreme Court precedents--ranging from Bondu Ramaswamy to B.E.M.L. Employees House Building Cooperative Society (supra), clearly hold that courts should not interfere with acquisition proceedings that are validly executed for a demonstrated public purpose.
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 Consequently, we do not find any illegality or irregularity in the acquisition proceedings and the BDA's acquisition stands on solid legal ground, reflecting both procedural regularity and substantive legitimacy.
46. Accordingly, we proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
a) All these writ appeals namely,
i) W.A.No.1329/2006, ii) W.A.No.1330/2006,
iii) W.A.No.1789/2006 and iv) W.A.No.1811/2006, filed by the respective appellants are dismissed.
b) Consequently, i) the order dated 06.06.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.1984/2004,
ii) the order dated 06.06.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.1985/2004, iii) the order dated 06.06.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.3566/2004, and iv) the order dated 06.06.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.6622/2004,
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WA NO. 1329 OF 2006 C/W WA NO. 1330 OF 2006, WA NO. 1789 OF 2006 & WA NO. 1811 OF 2006 are hereby upheld. As a result, the acquisition proceedings are also upheld.
iii) Pending applications if any, stand disposed of as a consequence.
Before parting with this judgment, this Court places on record its deep appreciation for the able research and assistance rendered by its Research Assistants, namely Mr.Pranav.K.B , Ms. Sushmithaa Roshini R and Mr. Mohammed Sulaiman.
SD/-
(K.SOMASHEKAR) JUDGE SD/-
(VENKATESH NAIK T) JUDGE KS