Chattisgarh High Court
Smt Jasmine Raj Singh vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 7 April, 2026
1
2026:CGHC:16604
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
SYED
ROSHAN
ZAMIR WPS No. 2882 of 2026
ALI
1. Smt Jasmine Raj Singh W/o Late P.R. Singh Aged About 53
Digitally signed
by SYED
ROSHAN Years R/o Mohta Colony, Patpar, Bhatapara, Tehsil
ZAMIR ALI
Bhatapara, Distt. Balodabazar Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh.
Date:
2026.04.10
17:27:39
+0530
... Petitioner
versus
1. State of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, School
Education Department Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya
Raipur, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2. The Director Public Instruction Department, Directorate,
Indrawati Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Atal Nagar, Dist Raipur (CG)
3. The Joint Director Education Division, Raipur, Distt. Raipur
(CG)
4. District Education Officer Balodabazar, Distt. Balodabazar
Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh.
... Respondents
For Petitioner : Ms. Hamida Siddiqui, Advocate For Respondents : Mr. Vivek Verma, Govt. Advocate S.B.: Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge Order On Board 07/04/2026
1. Petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking following reliefs:-
"10.1.That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash/ set aside the order dated 12.03.2026 passed by 2 respondent no.3 in the interest of justice (Annexure P-
1).
10.2. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent department to allow the petitioner to work on the post.
10.3. That, this Hon'ble Court further pleased to grant such other relief (s) as may be deemed fit and proper in the interest of justice and fair play."
2. At the outset, learned counsel for petitioner submits that though ground of jurisdiction of the authority is raised, however, she is not pressing the same in view of earlier decisions of this Court on that point.
3. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that while being posted as Head Master in Government Middle School Matadevalaay Bhatapara, she made certain complaints before respondent No.3 against some teachers/staff of the school who were not regularly appearing in the school and were not performing duty properly. In stead of taking action on complaints of petitioner, respondent No.3 has taken action against the petitioner and placed her under suspension vide order impugned on the ground that in an inquiry conducted by a team of three members committee, she has been found guilty of committing misconduct as defined under Rule 3 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 (for short 'the Rules of 1965'). Reasons assigned in the suspension order is that petitioner is arbitrarily deputing and removing 3 sanitation workers/sweepers; misbehaving with staff posted in school and making false complaint against them. She submits that the suspension order of petitioner has been issued in utter violation of principles of natural justice because prior to issuance of suspension order, any show-cause notice or opportunity of explaining and defending the misconduct alleged against petitioner has not been afforded to her.
4. She further submits that the order of suspension nowhere mentions that the same has been issued either in a contemplated disciplinary enquiry or in a pending enquiry against petitioner and therefore, the order of suspension is vitiated in law. Unless there is a disciplinary enquiry contemplated or pending, the petitioner could not have been suspended. Hence, she prays that the order of suspension be quashed/set aside.
5. Learned State Counsel opposing the submissions made by learned counsel for petitioner, raises a preliminary objection that impugned suspension order passed under Rule 9 (1) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short 'the Rules of 1966') is an appealable order under Rule 23 of the Rules of 1966. Thus, petitioner is having an alternate efficacious remedy of filing appeal against her suspension order. He further submits that, as the petitioner is not assailing suspension order on the 4 question of jurisdiction of respondent No.3, petitioner is required to assail the order of suspension by filing an appeal in terms of Rule 23 of the Rules of 1966 before the appellate authority. He further submits that even otherwise, the order of suspension is not an order of punishment, therefore, present petition is not entertainable on the ground of availability of alternate efficacious remedy of appeal.
6. At this stage, learned counsel for petitioner submits that this Court can interfere in the impugned order despite availability of alternative remedy as there is no material available against the petitioner for ordering her suspension and therefore, impugned order on face of it is illegal.
7. Heard learned counsel for respective parties and perused the documents annexed along with writ petition.
8. Pleadings and submissions made by learned counsel for petitioner reveal that petitioner has filed this petition seeking quashment of order of suspension. From perusal of suspension order, Annexure P-1, it is appearing that petitioner has been placed under suspension under Rule 9 (1) of the Rules of 1966 on account of irregularities committed by her alleging that it comes under the category of misconduct under Rule 3 of the Rules of 1965. Before placing the petitioner under suspension, an enquiry was also conducted and based on the opinion expressed by the Committee which conducted 5 enquiry, the petitioner has been placed under suspension by the order impugned.
9. Rule 23 of the Rules of 1966 provides remedy of appeal to a government servant against all or any of the orders mentioned therein. Rule 23 (ii) of the Rules of 1966 provides that subject to the provisions of Rule 22 of the Rules, 1966, a Government servant may prefer an appeal against an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under Rule 9 of the Rules, 1966. Thus, there exists a statutory remedy against the order of suspension passed against government servant. In case at hand, the petitioner was placed under suspension under Rule 9 (1) of the Rules, 1966 and petitioner had not availed the statutory remedy of appeal which is provided under Rule 23 of the Rules of 1966 and directly filed present writ petition.
10. True it is that High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain petition filed even if the party is having alternate remedy available, but only in exceptional circumstances. In case of Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Association of India and Others, reported in (2011) 14 SCC 337, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referring to its several judgments has laid down that, rule of self-imposed restraint in entertaining writ petition when alternate remedy is available needs to be followed by the 6 High Court and so, when there is statutory forum for redressal of the grievance, writ petition should not be entertained. Relevant para of said decision is reproduced herein below:-
"11.We have considered the respective arguments/submissions. There cannot be any dispute that the power of the High Courts to issue directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition under Article 226 of the Constitution is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by parliamentary legislation - L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261. However, it is one thing to say that in exercise of the power vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can entertain a writ petition against any order passed by or action taken by the State and/or its agency/instrumentality or any public authority or order passed by a quasi- judicial body/authority, and it is an altogether different thing to say that each and every petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution must be entertained by the High Court as a matter of course ignoring the fact that the aggrieved person has an effective alternative remedy. Rather, it is settled law that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation."
(Emphasis supplied) 7
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai & ors reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 dealing with issue of maintainability of writ petition in view of availability of alternate remedy has held that alternative remedy not to operate as a bar in atleast three contingencies; (i) where writ petition has been filed for enforcement of any of fundamental rights; (ii) where there has been a violation of principle of natural justice; and (iii) where the order or proceeding is absolutely without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.
12. In case of Harbans Lal Sahina Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & ors reported in (2003) 2 SCC 107 (Para-7);
"7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice or, (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act and is challenged [Sess Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks Mumbai and orders, (1998) 8 SCC 11]. The present case attracts applicability of first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners' dealership, which is their bread and butter came to 8 be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings."
13. In case of Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax & others vs. Commercial Steel Limited, reported in (2021) SCC Online SC 884, referring to its earlier decision in case of Whirlpool Corporation vs Registrar of Trademarks, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus;-
"11.The respondent had a statutory remedy under section 107. Instead of availing of the remedy, the respondent instituted a petition under Article 226. The existence of an alternate remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. But a writ petition can be entertained in exceptional circumstances where there is: (i) a breach of fundamental rights;(ii) a violation of the principles of natural justice; (iii) an excess of jurisdiction; or (iv) a challenge to the vires of the statues or delegated legislation."
14. In case at hand, the order of suspension is challenged mainly on the ground that suspension order is passed without issuing any show cause notice or opportunity of hearing. Purpose of placing an employee under suspension is mainly to keep him/her away from the mischief range. The purpose is also to complete the proceedings unhindered. Suspension is an interim measure in aid of disciplinary proceedings so that the delinquent may not gain custody or control of papers or take any advantage of her position. Thus, the order of suspension 9 cannot be treated as an order of punishment under service jurisprudence and being so, no show-cause notice or opportunity of hearing is required to be granted prior to issuance of suspension order. Hence, contention of learned counsel for petitioner that a show cause notice ought to have been issued, has no merit.
15. That apart, during course of arguments, learned counsel for petitioner could not able to convince this Court to treat this writ petition to be an exceptional case for exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to by- pass alternate remedy available to her.
16. For the foregoing discussion and considering that petitioner is having efficacious alternate remedy under the Rules of 1966, I am not inclined to entertain this writ petition and accordingly it is dismissed. However, petitioner will be at liberty to avail alternate remedy available to her under the Rules of 1966.
Sd/-
(Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge roshan/-