Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Depot Manager, Apsrtc, Karimnagar vs Gurrapu Anjamma on 6 July, 1999
Equivalent citations: I(2000)ACC648, 2001ACJ1885, 1999(6)ALD101, 1999(5)ALT684
JUDGMENT
1. This appeal is filed questioning the order passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Warangal in WC No.127 of 1992 dated 6-3-1995, in which he awarded a sum of Rs.82,545/- to the wife of the deceased.
2. Brief facts of the case are as follows:
Deceased G. Megha Raju was working as a Conductor in the appellant-Corporation, who received personal injuries during the course of his employment resulting in his death. The deceased who was on duty in bus No.AAZ 6567 on his return journey on enroute Arenda to Karimnagar on 3-1-1993, due to bad road conditions, developed chest pain and he was thereafter admitted into a Government Hospital at Peddapally by detaining the bus service at Peddapally and he expired soon after his admission into the hospital for treatment on 3-1-1993. It is further stated that the death was occurred while on duty during the course of the employment in the appellant-corporation. He was not paid any compensation. His wife moved the authority under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 for payment of compensation which was resisted by the appellant Corporation. It was admitted that while the bus was on enroute from Arenda to Karimnagar on 3-1-1993, the deceased got chest pain and he was admitted into a Government Hospital at Peddapally where he died. But the allegation that he received personal injury due to the accident arising under the course of his employment was denied and he got chest paid due to his personal ill-health and not because of any accident caused to the bus conductor. It is also stated that the deceased will not come under the definition of Section 2(1)(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act since post held by him is not shown in any category of Schedule II of the Workmen's Compensation Act and therefore the appellant-Corporation is not liable to pay any compensation. The Commissioner, however, held that the deceased conductor was a 'workman' within the meaning of Section 2(1)(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act and he further held that the deceased-conductor developed the chest pain while he was on duty of strain leading to his hospitalisation. He accordingly held that the workman/deceased-conductor died due to personal injuries he received in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The Commissioner therefore ordered a compensation of Rs.82,380/- along with a sum of Rs.165/-totalling to Rs.82,545/- payable by the appellant-Corporation and the same was directed to be deposited with 6% interest from the date of accident till the date of deposit.
3. Being aggrieved by the same, the present appeal is preferred by the appellant-Corporation. The appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law:
"(a)Whether the death of an employee during the duty hours, though not due to any accident or other occupational hazard would entitle the legal representatives for a compensation under the Act.
(b) Whether the deceased conductor can be construed as a workman as per the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as the post held by the deceased is not shown in Schedule-II and the case is not covered by Section 2(1) (n) of the W.C. Act."
4. Firstly, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the deceased-conductor though died while he was conducting the bus but the death was not due to any accident and hence, the Corporation is not liable to pay any compensation; and in any event the conductor is not a workman 35 per the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 (for short 'the Act'). Hence, it is argued, the Commissioner has no jurisdiction to award any compensation. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents contended that admittedly the deceased-conductor was conducting the bus and due to strain of work accelerated to chest pain, and once casual connection between the employment and death is established, it can be held that the conductor died during the course of his employment and that the death need not be resultant of an accident. In support of his contentions, learned Counsel for the respondents relied upon the following decisions:
1. Thengackal Estate v. Reethammal, LLJ 1996 (II) 511;
2. National Insurance Company Ltd v.
3. United India Insurance Company Limited v. Yasodara Amma and another, LLJ 1990 (1) 387;
4. Abdul Sallar Rehmanbhai v. Julekhabi Rahiman Daryawardi and others, 1989 LLR 289;
5. United India Insurance v. C. S. Gopalakrishnan and another, LLJ 1989 (II) 30; and
6. Zubeda Bano and others v. S.R.T.C. ami others, LLJ 1991 (1) 66.
5. In Reethammal's case (supra) the Division Bench of Kerala High Court held thus:
"Understanding the expression 'accident' as an 'unlocked for mishap' or as an 'untoward event' which is not expected or designed, we feel that in the state of health which Ramayya was having at the relevant time, the employment as a gardener has at least accelerated his death or that his death was due not only to the disease but the disease couple with the employment and as such the death of Rantayya has arisen out of his employment. We find sufficient support in taking the above view in the lucid explosition of law made by Chagla, CJ, in Laxmibai Atmaram v. Chairman and Trustees, Bombay Port Trust, 1954-I-LLJ-614 which reads thus at page 616:
"... But, if the employment is a contributory cause or if the employment has accelerated the death, or if it could be said that the death was due not only to the disease but the disease coupled with the employment, then the employer would be liable and it could be said that the death arose out of the employment of the deceased."
We have no doubt in our mind that the work Ramayya was doing at the time when he suffered chest pain has been a contributory cause of the death if not the sole cause....."
6. In Balawwa's case (supra) the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court held as follows:
"With regard to the first point, it is no doubt true that a claim for compensation for the death of an employe could be made under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Workmen's Compensaton Act only if the death of that employee has occurred due to an injury sustained by accident out of and in the course of his employment. By a series of Judicial pronouncements it is now well settled that the word 'accident' should be taken to mean a mishap or untoward event, not expected or designed; that if a person suffered heart attack and dies, it necessarily means that there has been an injury to the heart and that, that event being a mishap not expected or designed, is an accident and that, if a workman suffers heart attack out of and in the course of his employment, then the employer is liable to pay compensation under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (See: 1. M/s, Mackinon Mackenzie and Co (P) Ltd v. Rita Fernanda, 1969-II LLJ 812; Devshi Bhanji Khona v. Mary Burno, 1985-II-LLJ 70 (Kerala); United India Insurance Company Ltd v. Yashodhara Amma, 1990-I-LLJ 387 (Kerala); Zubeda liana v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, 1991-I-LLJ-66 (Bombay)." (Para 10)
7. In Yashodhara Amma's case (supra) in which a driver while driving the vehicle developed heart attack and later on died and in those circumstances, the Division Bench of Kerala High Court held as follows:
"From what we have quoted above, it is clear that the 'accident' found in subsection (1) of Section 3 has to be understood as meaning a mishap or untoward event not expected or designed. Certainly, in this case, the mishap-the untoward event happened in the course of the employment of the deceased at Perambra. As we said early, the symptoms of heart attack were seen and the deceased was taken to the hospital and finally he succumbed to death.
Counsel submitted that these circumstances will not be sufficient to say that there was a personal injury which is one of the necessary desiderata of Section 3(1) of the Act. We do not agree. An almost similar case was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Executive Engineer v. Janaki, 1978 KLT 897, Narayana Pillai, J., speaking for the Division Bench, observed thus:
"The principles applicable to cases of the instant type are by now well established. Compensation can be awarded only if the accident arose in the course of and out of the employment of the workman and those conditions refer to the time when the accident happened and the casual connection between the employment and the death. If the workman actually got ill in the course of and on account of the employment and he died as a result of it then there is no scope for a controversy at all."
6. Here, in this case, there is no scope for a controversy that the workman actually got ill in the course of his employment. Of course, his illness was not an external injury, but it was a serious injury to the heart. The strenuous driving of the vehicle from ICozhikode to Perambra accelerated his illness and that resulted in the death of the claimant's husband. We feel that the object of the section is to give protection to the helpless dependents of such workers and taking a pragmatic and meaningful construction of the section, we fell that the Commissioner has rightly applied the decision reported in Executive Engineer v. Janaki (supra). The decision rendered by the Commissioner is proper and legal. We see no error of law involved in this appeal. This appeal deserves to be dismissed and we do so. No order as to costs."
8. In Abdul Sattar Rehmanbahi's case (supra) in which a Conductor died due to heart attack while he was sleeping in the bus. The Division Bench of Bombay High Court held that if any employee while on duty dies of heart attack, the employer will be liable for payment of compensation to his dependant. It is immaterial as to whether the employee was actually performing his duties or not.
9. The Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Gopalakrishnan's case (supra) after considering a case where the deceased bus conductor died of heart attack while sleeping the vehicle after strenuous work, bus crew had to sleep in the vehicle at the halting place where no shelter was provided either for the bus or for the crew and the bus conductor died of heart attack, held thus: (Para 9) "Though it is necessary that there should be a casual connection between the employment and the death in the unexpected way in order to bring the accident within Section 3, it is not necessary that it should be established that the workman died as a result of exceptional strain or some exceptional work that he did on the date in question. If the nature of the work and the hours of work caused great strain to the employee and that strain caused the unexpected death, it can be said that the workman died as a result of an accident which has arisen in the course of his employment."
After discussing various case laws in Para 17 of its judgment, it was further held thus:
"... But, considering the circumstances proved in the case, it is only natural and probable to infer that the workman was put to great strain and stress in discharging his duties. From the evidence discussed by the Commissioner, it is clear that the workman was asked to do work for more hours than what he was statutorily bound to do."
10. The case of Zubeda Bano (supra) was of a death of the bus driver of a State Transport Corporation by heart attack and collapsed while changing destination name board. While discussing the scope of Section. 3, the Bombay High Court observed:
"Under the circumstances, disagreeing with the view taken by the Commissioner, we hold that the death of deceased Abdul Aziz arose 'out of and during the course of his employment' as contemplated under Section 3 of the Act and hence, the death was compensable by the employer-MSRTC."
11. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the conductor who was on duty on enroute Arenda to Karimnagar developed chest pain and the bus was stopped at Peddapally and he was admitted into a Government Hospital at Peddappaly where he died due to heart attack. It is also admitted that duty hours of the deceased conductor was from 5-05 a.m. to 12-45 p.m. and the deceased died at about 11-45 a.m. As per Ex.Pl the deceased died due to cardiac infraction while he was on duty. In view of the law laid down by various High Courts cited supra, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that due to strain and hard working conditions with which the deceased was working since morning 5.05 a.m. he developed chest pain, the employment is a contributory cause, and accelerated injury to the heart and he died due to heart attack which arose out of and in the course of employment. Therefore, the first contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is answered accordingly.
12. With regard to the second contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the conductor is not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(1)(n) of the Act, it is relevant to extract the same as under: (prior to 15-9-1995) "(n) "workman" means any person (other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business) who is-
(i) a railway servant as defined in Section 3 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, not permanently employed in any administrative district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II.
Schedule II: List of persons who subject to the provisions of Section 2(l)(n) are included in the definition of workman.
The following persons are workmen within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (n) and subject to the provisions of that Section, that is to say any person who is-
(i) employed, otherwise than in a clerical capacity or on a railway, in connection with the operation or maintenance of a lift or a vehicle propelled by steam or other mechanical power or by electricity or in connection with the loading or unloading of any such vehicle; or....."
Admittedly, in the present case conductor's duties consisted mainly of issuing tickets, collecting fares, writing SRs and looking after the convenience of the passangers and their luggage. He has also to do all that was prescribed in the Motor Vehicles Rules and is person connected with the operation or maintenance of a mechanically propelled vehicle. In view of the nature of the job for which he is employed and also the vehicle propelled by mechanical power will have a wider meaning to cover conductor who is connected with the motor vehicle. As the conductor is a person connected with the motor vehicle, without hesitation. I can hold that he is also a workman within the meaning of Section 2(1)(n) of the Act. lam also fortified with my view from the judgment of Madras High Court in Pollachi Transport Limited v. Arumuga Kounder, AIR 1938 Mad. 485. In view of the same, the contention of the appellant that the conductor cannot be treated as workman is devoid of merits and the same cannot be accepted.
13. In view of my conclusions, it follows that the deceased died due to heart attack which arose out of and in the course of employment and he is also workman within the meaning of Section 2(1)(n) of the Act. There are no merits in the appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. As the entire compensation has been deposited by the appellant-Corporation and certificate to that effect is also produced, the respondent-claimant is entitled to withdraw the entire amount together with accrued interest as per the order of the Court-below. No Costs.