Allahabad High Court
Smt. Hasan Jahan vs State Of U.P. & 3 Others on 19 January, 2018
Bench: Sudhir Agarwal, Shashi Kant
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR Court No. - 34 Case :- WRIT - C No. - 30635 of 2015 Petitioner :- Smt. Hasan Jahan Respondent :- State Of U.P. & 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- K.P. Singh,W.A. Siddiqui Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,P.K. Singh,Upendra Singh Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal,J.
Hon'ble Shashi Kant,J.
1. Heard Sri S.K.Tyagi, Advocate, holding brief of Sri W.A.Siddiqui, learned counsel for petitioner and learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for respondents.
2. Petitioner, claiming benefit of Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the "Repeal Act, 1999"), has filed present writ petition stating that "actual physical possession" of land in dispute was not taken till enactment of Act, 1999, therefore, proceedings initiated under Section 6(1) of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1976") have abated and now petitioner cannot be dispossessed from land in dispute which is still in their possession.
3. The case set up by petitioner is that she and her sister Smt. Rashidan are co-owner of 1/2 share of Plot No. 410-A, area 242.82 Sq.Meter, 410-B area 490.41 Sq.Meter and plot No.271 area 5220 Sq. Meter situated in village Dhakka, Tehsil and District Moradabad including residential house area 44.58 Sq. Meter. The aforesaid land initially belong to petitioner's father Habibullah (now deceased). Proceedings under Act, 1976 were initiated in respect to aforesaid property and vide order dated 29.12.1977, 1241.71 Sq.Meter land was declared surplus. It is said that Act, 1976 has been repealed by Repeal Act, 1999 and it is provided under Sections 3 and 4 thereof that if possession of land declared surplus under Act, 1976 is not taken by the authorities and have been continuing with land owner, the ceiling proceedings shall abate and after Repeal Act, 1999, the land therefore, will remain with land owner.
4. Assailing that land in question is still in possession of petitioner and it was never taken by Competent Authority, present writ petition has been filed seeking mandamus commanding respondents not to interfere in peaceful possession of petitioner in respect of plot No.271 area 1241.71 Sq.Meter, situated in Village Dhakka, Tehsil & district Moradabad, which has been succeeded by petitioner and her sister after death of their father.
5. A counter affidavit has been filed by Respondents-1, 2 and 3 which has been sworn by Sri Surendra Prakash Gupta, Assistant Engineer, Urban Land Ceiling, Moradabad stating that return in Form No.330 was filed by Sri Habibullah son of Bashir resident of Village Dhakka, Moradabad under Section 6 of Act, 1976 and it was registered as Case No.735/330. Land owner had total land of 3241.71 Sq.Meter hence, after leaving permitted ceiling area of 2000 Sq.Meter, rest 1241.71 Sq.Meter was declared surplus and a draft statement under Section 8(3) of Act, 1976 was forwarded to Sri Habibullah by registered letter dated 19.11.1977. It was received by him on 20.11.1977. Thereafter, he did not file any objection. On 29.12.1977, after expiry of period prescribed for filing objection, order under Section 8(4) of Act, 1976 was passed declaring 1241.71 Sq.Meter land surplus. Draft statement under Section 9 of Act, 1976 was issued on 29.01.1979 served on Sri Habibullah on 30.01.1979. Notification under Section 10(1) was published in Gazette dated 17.02.1979 and under Section 10(3), it was published on 21.12.1985. Notice under Section 10(5) was issued on 28.02.1986 which was served upon Sri Habibullah on 07.03.1986. Thereafter, possession was taken by Tehsildar Moradabad on 19.03.1986 in presence of witness Maan Singh son of Sri Khoobi. Sri Habibullah filed revision, which was rejected vide order dated 04.05.1988. The surplus land, which was taken in possession by Competent Authority, was handed over to Moradabad Development Authority on 04.01.2002.
6. It is said that land in question is in possession of Moradabad Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as "M.D.A.") since 2002 and therefore, entire writ petition is founded on false and incorrect statement and deserves to be dismissed.
7. A counter affidavit on behalf of respondent no.4 M.D.A. has also been filed wherein basic facts, as stated in the counter affidavit of respondents 1 to 3 have been reiterated and it is also said that after taking possession of land in dispute, M.D.A. has started development activities thereon and it is in de facto and actual possession of M.D.A. It is said that M.D.A. is developing "Samajwadi Awasiya Yojna" a State Sponsored Residential Scheme, wherein disputed land is part of the said scheme. A total 16216.05 Sq.Meter land was transfer by State Government to M.D.A. wherein aforesaid scheme has been launched. 352 affordable houses/flates have to be constructed for which tenders have been invited. A copy of report with regard to possession has been filed as Annexure 6 to the writ petition wherein it is stated that on the disputed land and others possession whereof was transferred to M.D.A., it has already constructed a boundary wall. The total 3400 Meter boundary are to be constructed out of which 2550 meter wall has been constructed and payment of Rs.95.02 lacks has also been made.
8. In para 10 of the counter affidavit also it is said "The entire area for the proposed residential scheme has been developed & surrounded by a boundary wall and about Rs.95.02 Lakhs have already been spent in the process of development."
9. In reply to para 10 of the counter affidavit of respondent no.4, petitioner, in para 10 of the rejoinder affidavit, said as under :
"That the contents of paragraphs no. 10 of the counter affidavit are matter of record, thus needs no reply, it is however submitted here that the land in question is still in actual physical possession of the petitioner. It is also relevant to state here that in regard to the land in question no any compensation has been given or taken by the petitioner till date."
10. It is, thus, evident that fact stated by respondent no.4 that on the disputed land, boundary wall has already been constructed and it is in possession of M.D.A. there is no clear denial except of bare assertion that actual physical possession is that of petitioner. We therefore, have no reason to disbelieve stand taken by respondent no.4 that possession is that of M.D.A. and there exist a boundary wall on the disputed land besides some other land.
11. It is in these facts and circumstances, we find that petitioner has concealed the actual fact with regard to de facto possession of M.D.A. over land in dispute and existence of boundary wall thereon. It is also not stated anywhere that if petitioner or her father had continued in possession over land in dispute, at what point of time M.D.A. dispossessed them and got possession. This shows falsity of stand taken by petitioner and, therefore, it cannot be said that proceedings stand abated after enactment of Repeal Act 1999.
12. Learned counsel for petitioner then contended that there is no valid document or notice under Section 10(5) or 10(6) to show that possession was taken, of land in dispute, validly, hence it cannot be presumed that "actual physical possession" was taken by respondents and, therefore, Repeal Act, 1999 would stand attracted and petitioners are entitled to keep land in dispute with them and for restoration of possession. In this regard he has placed reliance on Supreme Court's decision in State of U.P. Vs. Hari Ram (supra).
13. We have gone through the judgment in State of U.P. Vs. Hari Ram (supra). From facts as noticed in judgment, it transpires that Hari Ram filed a statement on 28.09.1976 giving details of vacant land, he was holding in excess of ceiling limit, as provided under Act, 1976 as provided under Section 6. Competent Authority surveyed the land and a draft statement under Section 8(3) was served upon Hari Ram on 13.05.1981. Competent Authority then passed order on 29.06.1981 under Section 8(4) of Act, 1976 declaring 52,513.30 sq. meters land surplus. Notification under Section 10(1) was published on 12.06.1982 and then notification under Section 10(3) vesting land in State was issued on 22.11.1997 declaring that land shall be deemed to have vested in State from 12.06.1982. Competent Authority vide letter dated 10.06.1999 informed Settlement Officer (Consolidation) that surplus land declared by notification dated 22.11.1997 stood vested in Government. On 19.06.1999 Prescribed Authority issued notice under Section 10(5) directing Hari Ram to handover possession of land declared surplus to authorized person. Hari Ram filed appeal before District Judge, Varanasi being Appeal No. 29 of 1999 under Section 33 of Act, 1976 contending that before passing order under Section 8(4) no notice under Section 8(3) was served upon him. Appeal was allowed by District Judge, Varanasi vide judgment dated 14.12.1999 and order dated 29.06.1981 passed by Competent Authority under Section 8(4) was set aside. Matter was taken to this Court by State of U.P. in Writ Petition No. 47369 of 2000 which was dismissed and thereafter matter was taken in Supreme Court. Argument advanced on behalf of State of U.P. before Supreme Court was that sub-section (3) of Section 10 does not envisage taking physical and de facto possession of surplus land and expression "deemed acquisition" and "deemed vesting" would cover not only "de jure possession" but also "de facto possession". It was sought to argue that this deeming fiction is sufficient compliance of requirement of possession under Section 3(1)(a) of Repeal Act, 1999 and would dispel otherwise claim set up by land owner. It is in this backdrop matter was examined by a Bench of Two Judges of Supreme Court. It observed that expression "deemed to have been acquired" used as a deeming fiction under sub-section (3) of Section 10 can only mean acquisition of title or acquisition of interest because till that time land may be either in ownership of the person who hold that vacant land or possess such land as owner or as tenant or as mortgagee and so on as defined under Section 2(1) of Act, 1976. Word 'vested' has not been defined in Act so also the word 'absolutely'. What is "vested absolutely" is only the land which is deemed to have been acquired and nothing more. Vest/vested, may or may not include "transfer of possession" meaning of which depends on the context in which it has been placed and interpretation of various other related provisions. In para 29 and 30 of judgment, Court said:
"29. What is deemed "vesting absolutely" is that "what is deemed to have acquired". In our view, there must be express words of utmost clarity to persuade a court to hold that the legislature intended to divest possession also, since the owners or holders of the vacant land is pitted against a statutory hypothesis. Possession, there is an adage "nine points of law" In Beedall v. Maitland (1881) 17 Ch. D. p.183 Sir Edward Fry, while speaking of a Statute which makes a forcible entry an indictable offence, stated as follows:
"this statute creates one of the great differences which exist in our law between the being in possession and the being out of possession of land, and which gave rise to the old saying that possession is nine points of the law. The effect of the statute is this, that when a man is in possession, he may use force to keep out a trespasser; but if a trespasser has gained possession, the rightful owner cannot use force to put him out, but must appeal to the law for assistance."
30. Vacant land, it may be noted, is not actually acquired but deemed to have been acquired, in that deeming things to be what they are not. Acquisition, therefore, does not take possession unless there is an indication to the contrary. It is trite law that in construing a deeming provision, it is necessary to bear in mind the legislative purpose. The purpose of the Act is to impose ceiling on vacant land, for the acquisition of land in excess of the ceiling limit thereby to regulate construction on such lands, to prevent concentration of urban lands in hands of few persons, so as to bring about equitable distribution. For achieving that object, various procedures have to be followed for acquisition and vesting. When we look at those words in the above setting and the provisions to follow such as sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10, the words ''acquired' and ''vested' have different meaning and content. Under Section 10(3), what is vested is de jure possession not de facto, for more reasons than one because we are testing the expression on a statutory hypothesis and such an hypothesis can be carried only to the extent necessary to achieve the legislative intent." (emphasis added)
14. Court then restricted meaning of word "vesting" under Section 10(3) by holding that "vesting" means "vesting of title absolutely" and not "possession" though nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily surrendering or delivering possession. For the purpose of Section 10(3) of Act, 1976, Court said, that word "vested" takes in every interest in the property including de jure possession and, not de facto but it is always open to a person to voluntarily surrender and deliver possession, under Section 10(3) of Act, 1976. Court then examined Section 10(5) stating that it talks of peaceful possession and 10(6) talks of forceful possession. Discussion in this regard in paras 34, 35, 36 and 37 read as under:
"Peaceful dispossession
34. Sub-section (5) of Section 10, for the first time, speaks of "possession" which says where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10, the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person, who may be in possession of it to surrender or transfer possession to the State Government or to any other person, duly authorized by the State Government.
35. If de facto possession has already passed on to the State Government by the two deeming provisions under sub-section (3) to Section 10, there is no necessity of using the expression "where any land is vested" under sub- section (5) to Section 10. Surrendering or transfer of possession under sub-section (3) to Section 10 can be voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as provided under Section 11 of the Act early. Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under sub-section (5) to Section 10 to surrender or deliver possession. Subsection (5) of Section 10 visualizes a situation of surrendering and delivering possession, peacefully while sub-section (6) of Section 10 contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession.
Forceful dispossession
36. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Sub-section (6) to Section 10 again speaks of "possession" which says, if any person refuses or fails to comply with the order made under sub- section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land to be given to the State Government and for that purpose, force - as may be necessary - can be used. Sub-section (6), therefore, contemplates a situation of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order under sub- section (5), in the event of which the competent authority may take possession by use of force. Forcible dispossession of the land, therefore, is being resorted only in a situation which falls under sub-section (6) and not under sub-section (5) to Section 10. Sub-sections (5) and (6), therefore, take care of both the situations, i.e. taking possession by giving notice that is "peaceful dispossession" and on failure to surrender or give delivery of possession under Section 10(5), than "forceful dispossession" under sub-section (6) of Section 10.
37. Requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 is mandatory. Though the word ''may' has been used therein, the word ''may' in both the sub-sections has to be understood as "shall" because a court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of non-issue of notice under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of Section 11 is that it might result the land holder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word ''may' has to be read as ''shall'." (emphasis added)
15. Court also refers to the procedure prescribed in U.P. Urban Land Ceiling (Taking of Possession payment of amount and Allied Matters) Directions, 1983 (Directions issued by the State Government under Section 35 of Act, 1976) and said in para 39, as under:
"39. Above-mentioned directives make it clear that sub-section (3) takes in only de jure possession and not de facto possession, therefore, if the land owner is not surrendering possession voluntarily under sub-section (3) of Section 10, or surrendering or delivering possession after notice, under Section 10(5) or dispossession by use of force, it cannot be said that the State Government has taken possession of the vacant land." (emphasis added)
16. Then coming to Repeal Act, 1999 Court held that mere vesting of land under Section 10(3) would not confer any right upon State Government to have "de facto possession" of vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18.03.1999. It further says that, "State has to establish that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under sub-section (5) of Section 10 or forceful dispossession under sub-section (6) of Section 10. On failure to establish any of those situations, the land owner or holder can claim the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act." Having said so Court held that since State Government failed to establish any of the above situation, hence Hari Ram was entitled for benefit under Section 3 of Repeal Act, 1999. Thus judgment in State of U.P. Vs. Hari Ram (supra) shows that there was no possession whatsoever taken before 18.03.1999, from the stage beyond Section 10(3). Even notice under Section 10(5) was issued on 10.06.1999, i.e., after cut off date of Repeal Act, 1999. That be so, it was held that Hari Ram was entitled for benefit under Section 3 of Repeal Act, 1999.
17. Now we come to another set of judgments. Another situation arose where after notification under Section 10(3), no notice under Section 10(5) was issued but surplus land was actually taken in possession by Competent Authority and land owner was dispossessed before prescribed date, i.e., date of adoption of Repeal Act, 1999. Now the question is, "whether defect of notice or non service of notice under Section 10(5) or 10(6) would result in extending benefit of Section 3 of Repeal Act, 1999 to the land owner who was actually dispossessed or actual physical possession was taken by Competent Authority before coming into operation of Repeal Act, 1999 in the concerned State".
18. This aspect was examined by another two Judges Bench in State of Assam Vs. Bhasker Jyoti Sarma and others, 2015(5) SCC 321. It was claimed by State that possession of surplus land was taken on 07.12.1991 vide certificate of handing over/ taking over prepared by Revenue Authorities which also has endorsement of the person handing over possession. From the judgment it is evident that original land owner, Bhabadeb Sarma, never raised any dispute regarding possession till his death on 03.10.1997. In the context of Section 3 of Repeal Act, 1999, Court said that aforesaid provision postulates that vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of Section 10 is subject to condition that possession thereof has been taken over by Competent Authority or by State Government or any person duly authorised by State Government. It also held that expression "possession" used in Section 3 means "actual physical possession" of surplus land and not just possession that goes with vesting of excess land in terms of Section 10(3) of the Act, 1976. Court then examined the question, if possession actually taken without notice under Section 10(5) or 10(6), will it not amount to a possession taken by State for the purpose of benefit to land owner under Section 3 of Repeal Act, 1999. Court observed that in ordinary course "actual physical possession" can be taken from the person in occupation only after notice under Section 10(5) is issued to him to surrender such possession to State Government, or Authorized Officer or Competent Authority. Need for using force to dispossess a person in possession should ordinarily arise only if the person concerned refuses to cooperate and surrender or deliver possession of land in question and that is the rationale behind Section 10(5) and 10(6) of Act, 1976. Having said so, Court said, that what would be position if for any reason Competent Authority or Government or Authorized Officer resorts to forcible dispossession of erstwhile owner even without exploring possibility of a voluntary surrender or delivery of such possession on demand. If a person is dispossessed without any notice under Section 10(5), he could have made a grievance based on Section 10(5), and seeks restoration of possession to him, no matter he could have upon such restoration be liable to be evicted under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, 1976 upon his failure to deliver or surrender such possession. However, in reality, unless there was something that was inherently wrong so as to attract the process of taking over such possession, as the identity of land or boundaries thereof or any other similar nature going to root of the matter, requiring an adjudication, a person, who had lost his land by reason of same being declared surplus under Section 10(3), would not consider it worthwhile to agitate violation of Section 10(5) for he can well understand that even when Court may uphold his contention that procedure ought to be followed as prescribed, it may still be not enough for him to retain land for the authorities could the very next day, dispossess him from the same by simply serving a notice under Section 10(5). Court said in this backdrop, "It would, in that view, be an academic exercise for any owner or person in possession to find fault with his dispossession on the ground that no notice under Section 10(5) had been served upon him."
19. Court then examined this very argument from another angle and in para 16 said:
"16. The issue can be viewed from another angle also. Assuming that a person in possession could make a grievance, no matter without much gain in the ultimate analysis, the question is whether such grievance could be made long after the alleged violation of Section 10(5). If actual physical possession was taken over from the erstwhile land owner on 7th December, 1991 as is alleged in the present case any grievance based on Section 10(5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession. If the owner did not do so, forcible taking over of possession would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. In any such situation the owner or the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act. Any other view would, in our opinion, give a licence to a litigant to make a grievance not because he has suffered any real prejudice that needs to be redressed but only because the fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal Act tempted him to raise the issue regarding his dispossession being in violation of the prescribed procedure." (emphasis added)
20. Thereafter Court distinguished the judgment in State of U.P. Vs. Hari Ram (supra) on the ground that question, whether a dispossession in breach of Section 10(5) would vitiate the very act of dispossession was not an issue in that case. If owner of land has been dispossessed, as a matter of fact, such dispossession without notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not vitiate or obliterate the act of taking possession for the purposes of Section 3 of Repeal Act, 1999. This is the law laid down by Supreme Court in State of Assam Vs. Bhasker Jyoti Sarma (supra). It would be useful to reproduce observations of Court in para 17 of judgment as under:
"17. .....the fact that such dispossession was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not vitiate or obliterate the act of taking possession for the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That is because Bhabadeb Sarma-erstwhile owner had not made any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at any stage during his lifetime implying thereby that he had waived his right to do so." (emphasis added)
21. Court further observed that for the purpose of Section 3 of Repeal Act, 1999, it is the de facto dispossession which is relevant and not any other thing. If a person has been dispossessed and land has already vested under Section 10(3) of Act, 1976, Section 3 of Repeal Act, 1999 will not help erstwhile land owner so as to claim any benefit under Repeal Act, 1999.
22. Another matter came up before Court in State of U.P. and others Vs. Surendra Pratap and others, AIR 2016 SC 2712. Therein also again question of possession was examined by Court and in para 8 and 9 of judgment, it said as under:
"8. We have heard Mr. Irshad Ahmad, learned Additional Advocate General for the State in support of the appeal and Mr. Aarohi Bhalla, learned Advocate for respondent Nos.1 and 2. The record indicates that notification u/s 10(3) of the Act was published in the official gazette on 29.04.1986 and an appropriate notice u/s 10(5) of the Act was issued by the Competent Authority on 31.03.1993. These aspects of the matter are not disputed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 but in their submission, despite such notice u/s 10(5) of the Act, the possession was never taken over. The factum about taking over the possession finds clear mention in the possession certificate dated 20.08.1994. Further, the objections preferred by respondent Nos.1 and 2 were dismissed vide order dated 30.06.1995 which order also records the fact that possession of the land already stood taken over. In the premises, all requisite actions contemplated under the Act were taken in accordance with law well before the enactment of the Repeal Act and the surplus vacant land stood vested with the State Government of which the possession was also taken over. The Writ Petition preferred in the year 2005, therefore, had no stateable claim and the High Court was completely in error in accepting the submissions advanced on behalf of respondent Nos.1 and 2.
9. Moreover, in Civil Appeal Nos. 369-370 of 2016 (State of U.P. and Ors. v. Adarsh Seva Sahakari Ltd.) decided on 19.01.2016, this Court has observed that after the vesting of the surplus land with the State Government u/s 10(5) of the Act, if any transfer of the property in question is effected, such transfer would be void ab initio and the transferee would not be entitled to challenge the alleged inaction on part of the State Government or the Competent Authority in not taking possession in compliance with the provisions u/s 10(5) of the Act." (emphasis added)
23. Possession if taken, even if there is some defect with regard to notice under Section 10(5) or 10(6) of Act, 1976 would not attract Section 3 of Repeal Act, 1999 is the view taken by Division Bench of this Court in Shiv Ram Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2015(5) AWC 4918 and Polu and others Vs. State of U.P. and another (Writ Petition No. 20035 of 2013), decided on 03.11.2016. In Shiv Ram Singh (supra) we find that original record produced before Division Bench also shows compliance of directions of 1983 and this is evident from para 10 of judgment which reads as under:
"10. In the present case, the learned Chief Standing Counsel has produced the original file for the perusal of the Court. The material before the Court indicates that the Directions of 1983 were duly observed. Direction 3(2) envisages that an order in Form ULC-II has to be sent to each land holder as prescribed under Section 10(5) and the date of issue and service of the order is to be entered in Column 8 of Form ULC-I. This procedure has been complied and we may only note that a copy of the original ULC-II register has been produced for the perusal of the Court. Similarly, direction 3(3) contemplates that on possession of the excess vacant land being taken in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of Section 10, entries will be made in a register in Form ULC-III. The original Form ULC-III has similarly been produced before the Court. Entries have been made in compliance with direction 3 both in ULC-II and ULC-III registers. In the present case, it is also clear from the record that on 14 February 1992, a communication was addressed by the Competent Authority to the Tehsildar drawing attention to an earlier letter dated 25 February 1987 and requesting that possession of the land be taken over. A copy of the letter dated 25 February 1987 forms part of the original record which was produced by the learned Chief Standing Counsel. On 25 June 1993, possession of the land was taken over. The possession receipt has been duly executed by the Naib Tehsildar and by the Kanoongo. In this view of the matter, we are unable to accept the contention of the petitioner that possession of the land was not taken over prior to the date of the Repeal Act."
24. Court after having recorded finding that possession in fact was taken prior to 18.03.1999, denied benefit of Section 3 of Repeal Act, 1999.
25. We are also informed that Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 29550 of 2015 (Shiv Ram Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others) against judgment in Shiv Ram Singh (supra) was dismissed by Supreme Court on 26.10.2015.
26. Thus the submission that dispossession of petitioner, not valid, hence he must be deemed in actual physical possession cannot be accepted and stands rejected in view of above exposition of law.
27. In view of above discussion, we find no merit in this writ petition. Dismissed accordingly.
28. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
Order Date :- 19.01.2018 Monika/KA