Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench
Shamshada Akhter vs Aijaz Parvaiz Shah on 16 August, 2021
Bench: Ali Mohammad Magrey, Sanjay Dhar
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
LPA no.80/2020, CrlM no. 343/2020
&
LPA no.84/2021 with CM no.4348/2021
Reserved on: 03.08.2021
Pronounced on: 16.08.2021
Shamshada Akhter
... Appellant
Through: Mr. Hakim Suhail Ishtiaq, Advocate.
v.
Aijaz Parvaiz Shah
...Respondent
Through: Mr. Shafqat Nazir, Advocate.
AND Parvez Ahmad Fafoo ...Appellant Through: Mr. Hakim Suhail Ishtiaq, Advocate.
v.
Imtiyaz Ahmad Tak ...Respondent Through: Mr. Shafqat Nazir, Advocate.
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ali Mohammad Magrey, Judge. Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Dhar, Judge.
(JUDGMENT) Per Magrey, J:
1. These two Letters Patent Appeals (LPAs) have been filed by the appellants against the orders passed by two different learned Single Judges of this Court in petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now applicable in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir) / 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1933 (now repealed).
The two provisions are in pari materia to each other.
2. The question arising for determination in both these LPAs is about their maintainability under Clause 12 of the J&K Letters Patent of 1943. Therefore, the two LPAs were taken up and heard together on the said Page 2 of 14 LPA No. 80/2020, CrlM No. 343/2020 & LPA No. 84/2021 with CM No. 4348/2021 question of law, and are being dealt with by this common order. First, the brief narration of factual matrix of the two cases is given hereunder.
LPA no.80/2020:
3. The appellant on 26.02.2019 filed a complaint under the J&K Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2010 (the Act), alleging therein that her husband, respondent herein, had subjected her to domestic violence. She sought compensation, damages and prohibition against committing acts of domestic violence and harassment, as well as maintenance to the tune of Rs.40,000/- per month. The appellant is working as a Bank Manager and the respondent has retired from Government service. Obviously, they are quite aged. They are issueless.
4. The trial Magistrate, namely, the Special Mobile Magistrate, Passenger Tax & Electricity (PT&E), Srinagar, by order dated 29.04.2019, without going into the merits of the matter, on finding that the parties were quite aged, inasmuch as the husband had even retired, directed the parties to accommodate each other in a cordial and friendly manner in the house where they were residing before the dispute. The Magistrate further ordered the appellant to provide a two room accommodation to the respondent-husband, who had to undertake to live peacefully in the house without causing any cruelty - physical or mental - to the appellant.
5. The appellant filed a statutory appeal under Section 29 of the Act on 06.05.2019. The Appellate Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Srinagar, found the appeal lacking merit and, therefore, disposed of the same by order dated 24.02.2020.
6. The appellant, thereafter, filed a petition under Section 482 Cr. P. C., being CRM(M) no.58/2020, on 28.02.2020, seeking quashing of orders dated 29.04.2019 and 24.02.2020, respectively, passed by the trial Magistrate and the Appellate Court. That petition was dismissed by order dated 03.03.2020 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, finding it to be without any merit. The instant LPA has been filed under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent challenging the aforesaid order dated 03.03.2020 passed Page 3 of 14 LPA No. 80/2020, CrlM No. 343/2020 & LPA No. 84/2021 with CM No. 4348/2021 by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid petition under Section 482 Cr. P. C. LPA no.84/2020:
7. In this case, the respondent in the LPA filed a complaint on 09.05.2017 against the appellant under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act before the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class (Sub- Judge), Bijbehara, Anantnag. The trial Magistrate issued process against the appellant. The appellant on 22.09.2017 filed a petition, bearing no.226/2017, under Section 561-A Cr. P. C., seeking quashing of the aforesaid complaint. The learned Single Judge by order dated 18.03.2021 dismissed the petition as being without merit. The petitioner in the said petition has challenged the order of the learned Single Judge by filing the present LPA.
8. On 06.07.2021 when this LPA was first taken up by the Division Bench for consideration, the Court observed and directed, inter alia, as under:
"To our mind, a Letters' Patent Appeal against such order passed in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not maintainable.
Since the counsel for the appellant is not available, in the interest of justice, we direct it to be listed on 13 th July, 2021, on which date he will satisfy about the maintainability of the appeal."
9. It may be observed here that in LPA no.80/2020, notice to show cause as to why the appeal be not admitted for hearing was issued on 09.09.2020. Thereafter, on 13.07.2021, the Division Bench headed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice passed an order to the following effect:
"On the joint request of the parties, put up on 3 rd August, 2021 to enable them to address on maintainability of Letters' Patent against an order passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr. P. C. It will be open for other learned members of the Bar to address on the issue, if they so desire.Page 4 of 14
LPA No. 80/2020, CrlM No. 343/2020 & LPA No. 84/2021 with CM No. 4348/2021 The Registry may circulate a notice to this effect to the Bar."
Pursuant to the above Court direction, the Registry issued a notice dated 19.07.2021 for information of the members of the Bar in this regard. However, none, except the learned counsel representing the parties, appeared before the Court.
10. We heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the matter.
11. The objection to the maintainability of these LPAs is taken on the ground that the inherent powers exercised by the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. are supervisory in nature, and that in terms of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent applicable to the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, intra- Court appeal against an order passed by a learned Single Judge in exercise of power of superintendence of the Court is not available and, therefore, these LPAs are not maintainable. Taking the Court through Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, the learned counsel submitted that by the plain language of the Clause in question, appeal against such an order is excluded. The learned counsel sought to derive support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana, AIR 2017 SC 1535.
12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the power exercisable by the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. is not supervisory, but the provision saves the inherent powers of the Court, and that inherent powers are not the same as powers of superintendence. In this connection, the Court was taken through Article 227 of the Constitution of India in an attempt to put across as to what is the scope and nature of the powers of superintendence and supervision. The learned counsel further submitted that the judgment in Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana (supra) is neither attracted, nor relevant, for there is a marked difference and distinction in the language and contours of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent (1865) applicable to Punjab High Court and Clause 12 of the Letters Patent applicable to the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, inasmuch as the clause/portion of the sentence '...or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction...)', occurring in Clause 10 of the Letters Patent applicable to Page 5 of 14 LPA No. 80/2020, CrlM No. 343/2020 & LPA No. 84/2021 with CM No. 4348/2021 Punjab High Court, is not there in Clause 12 of the Letters Patent applicable to the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir.
13. At the very outset, we may observe that the learned counsel for the appellant is right in saying that there is a marked difference in the contents of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent applicable to the Punjab High Court and Clause 12 of the Letters Patent applicable to the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana (supra) is not attracted. However, with a view to determining the question whether these LPAs under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent would lie, apart from examining the pertinent substantive law, some relevant historicity concerning the High Court and the powers granted to it would need to be gone into.
14. Chapter XXIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, corresponding to Chapter XXXI under Part-VII of the Code of Criminal Procedure Svt. 1989 (1933 A.D.) (now repealed), deals with appeals. Section 372 Cr. P. C. under the said Chapter of the Code reads as under:
"372. No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided.- No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force.
Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court."
The word 'victim' occurring in the proviso to Section 372, quoted above, in terms of clause (wa) inserted in Section 2 of the Code, is defined to mean 'a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression includes his or her guardian or legal heir.
15. In the instant case, we are concerned with the orders passed by the learned Single Judges of this Court in exercise of their powers under Section Page 6 of 14 LPA No. 80/2020, CrlM No. 343/2020 & LPA No. 84/2021 with CM No. 4348/2021 482/561-A Cr. P. C.; therefore, the proviso to Section 372 Cr. P. C. is not applicable. Even otherwise, neither the respondent in the first LPA, nor the appellant in the second LPA were charged. Resultantly, the main provision of the Section only is attracted.
16. Section 372 Cr. P. C., thus, provides that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court, except as provided for by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force. So, in terms of the Section, no appeal lies against any judgment or order of a Criminal Court, except as provided by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force. There is no dispute that the High Court is a Criminal Court. It is to be borne in mind that the provision of law uses the words 'judgment' or 'order'. Essentially, the two words, viz. 'judgment' and 'order' are used in the provision quite distinctly. Let it be examined as to what appeals are provided for by the Code.
17. Section 373 Cr. P. C. provides for an appeal from orders requiring security or refusal to accept or reject surety for keeping peace or good behaviour. Section 374 Cr. P. C. provides appeals from convictions. It says that any person convicted on a trial held by a High Court in its extra ordinary original criminal jurisdiction may appeal to the Supreme Court, and that any person convicted on trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or on a trial held by any other Court in which a sentence of imprisonment for more than seven years has been passed against him or against any other person convicted at the same trial, may appeal to the High Court. Section 377 Cr. P. C. provides for the appeal by the State Government against sentence, Section 378 Cr. P. C. provides for appeal in case of acquittal, Section 379 Cr. P. C. provides for appeal against conviction by the High Court in certain cases, and Section 380 Cr. P. C. provides for Special right of appeal in certain cases when more persons than one are convicted in one trial.
18. Obviously, from a reading of the relevant provisions of the Code, it is seen that no appeal is provided by the Code against an order made by the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. Page 7 of 14 LPA No. 80/2020, CrlM No. 343/2020 & LPA No. 84/2021 with CM No. 4348/2021
19. Now, let us proceed to examine whether there is any appeal provided for against an order passed or made by the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. by any other law for the time being in force. It is reiterated here that the case of the appellants is that appeal is provided under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.
20. Clause 12 of the Letters Patent applicable to the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, insofar as relevant herein, is extracted hereunder:
"12. And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of judicature from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court and that notwithstanding anything herein before provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of 'one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of 'any Division Court, consistent with the provisions of the civil procedure code......"
Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, it is, thus, seen, provides that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of judicature from the judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court. The provision, as is axiomatic from a portion thereof within parenthesis, makes a distinction between judgments and orders. In the relevant part of the Clause, insofar as it says '...an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of judicature from the judgment...', the word used is 'judgment'; the word order is not mentioned therein. It be seen that Section 482 Cr. P. C. makes the use of the word 'orders', not judgment. There is a separate Chapter, viz. Chapter XXVII in the Code which deals with the subject of 'judgment'. Section 353 thereunder provides for the manner the judgment is to be pronounced and signed. Section 354 thereunder provides for the language and contents of judgment. It reads thus:
Page 8 of 14LPA No. 80/2020, CrlM No. 343/2020 & LPA No. 84/2021 with CM No. 4348/2021 "354. Language and contents of judgment.--(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code, every judgment referred to in Section 353.--
(a) shall be written in the language of the Court;
(b) shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision;
(c) shall specify the offence (if any) of which, and the section of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or other law under which, the accused is convicted and the punishment to which he is sentenced;
(d) if it be a judgment of acquittal, shall state the offence of which the accused is acquitted and direct that he be set at liberty.
(2) When the conviction is under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and it is doubtful under which of two sections, or under which of two parts of the same section of that Code the offence falls, the Court shall distinctly express the same and pass judgment in the alternative.
(3) When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such sentence.
(4) When the conviction is for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of one year or more, but the Court imposes a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than three months, it shall record its reasons for awarding such sentence, unless the sentence is one of imprisonment till the rising of the Court or unless the case was tried summarily under the provisions of this Code.
(5) When any person is sentenced to death, the sentence shall direct that he be hanged by the neck till he is dead.
(6) Every order under Section 117 or sub-section (2) of Section 138 and every final order made under Section 125, Section 145 or Section 147 shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision."Page 9 of 14
LPA No. 80/2020, CrlM No. 343/2020 & LPA No. 84/2021 with CM No. 4348/2021
21. Ordinarily, judgment is a formal intimation of the decision and declaration of the mind of the Court at the time of pronouncement. However, from a plain reading of Section 354 Cr. P. C., it becomes axiomatic that judgment in context of the Code has a connotation of its own, which is that a judgment is the determination of guilt, or otherwise, of an accused and in the event of such guilt being established, also includes the process of sentencing the accused [see Yakub Abdul Razak Menon v State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1].
22. In any case, whereas Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, as seen above, mentions the word 'judgement', which is, obviously, used in distinction to 'order', Section 482 Cr. P. C. uses the word 'order', not 'judgment'. So, it becomes clear and we are convinced that Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, in context of the Criminal Procedure Code, does not provide for an appeal to the High Court against an order, which includes an order made by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
23. As mentioned earlier, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the orders under Section 482 Cr. P. C are made by the High Court in exercise of the supervisory powers and, therefore, in terms of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent no appeal lies to the High Court against such orders. In this connection, the learned counsel cited the judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Kulwinder Singh v State of Punjab, MANU/PH/0222/2007, wherein it is observed that the power under Section 482 Cr. P. C. is to be exercised ex-debito justitiae.
24. As seen above, Clause 12 of the Letters Patent applicable to the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir excludes certain judgments and orders mentioned therein within parenthesis, viz., a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court, and an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence. The specific case of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the orders under Section 482 Cr. P. C. are made in exercise of the Page 10 of 14 LPA No. 80/2020, CrlM No. 343/2020 & LPA No. 84/2021 with CM No. 4348/2021 power of superintendence, and, therefore, on that count, no appeal under Clause 12 lies against the same.
25. It is settled law that Section 482 Cr. P. C. saves the inherent powers of the High Court and that, in fact, is the lead carried by the Section. Can these inherent powers of the Court be equated with, or have been akin to, the powers of superintendence of the Court? This would need to be examined in context of, and in reference to, the historicity of the Court and the powers granted to it at the time of its establishment.
26. The High Court of Judicature Jammu and Kashmir was established by Order No.1 of 1928 dated 26.03.1928 by the Ruler of the erstwhile State from 15th Baisakh Svt. 1985. Clause 1 of this order provided for establishment of the High Court of Judicature, Clause 2 thereof mentioned the Title of the Court, Clause 3 provided for oath of office, Clause 4 provided for seal of the Court, Clause 5 provided for Writs etc., Clause 6 related to the original jurisdiction of the Court. It provided as under:
"6. Original jurisdiction
(a) The High Court of Judicature shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any original proceeding, or any suit of which the value is not less than Rs.10,000 and notwithstanding anything contained in Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Samvat year 1977, every such suit or proceeding shall be instituted in the High Court of Judicature.
Provided that nothing in this Clause shall affect the provisions of Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Samvat year 1977, in respect of a suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before a court subordinate to it to try or dispose of the same.
(b) The High Court of Judicature shall be deemed for the purposes of all enactments, for the time being in force, to be the highest Civil Court of appeal and revision.
(c) The High Court of Judicature shall be the highest court of criminal appeal.
(d) The High Court of Judicature shall be empowered to hear and decide such revenue appeals as may be specified by Page 11 of 14 LPA No. 80/2020, CrlM No. 343/2020 & LPA No. 84/2021 with CM No. 4348/2021 general or special orders of His Highness in the (that) behalf and shall be deemed to be the highest court of revenue."
Clause 7 related to the jurisdiction of Judges of the Court. It provided as under:
"7. Jurisdiction by Judges of the Court
(a) Except as otherwise provided by any enactment for the time being in force, and subject to any rules made under this order, with the sanction of His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur, the jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature may be exercised by a Single Judge of the Court or by a bench of two or more Judges of the Court.
(b) Revenue appeals and revisions shall first be heard by the Revenue Commissioner [one of the Judges of the Court having revenue experience and styled as such under Clause 1] sitting alone and appeals against his decisions shall lie to a bench consisting of two other Judges of the Court.
(c) Subject to the provision of clauses (b) above, the Chief Justice shall determine which Judge in each case shall sit alone, and which Judge of the Court shall constitute a bench."
Clause 8 provided for appeals from civil jurisdiction, Clause 9 provided for Rule of decision when Judges differ, Clause 10 for power to refer question to a full bench or a bench, Clause 11 provided for superintendence and control of subordinate courts. It read as under:
"11. Superintendence and control of subordinate courts
(a) Subject to such rules and regulations as His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur may be pleased to frame in this behalf, the general superintendence and control over all courts, shall be vested in, and they shall be subordinate to, the High Court of Judicature.
(b) The Chief Justice or a Judge of the High Court of Judicature appointed by him, shall from time to time visit and inspect the proceedings of the courts subordinate to the High Court of Judicature and shall give such directions in matters not provided for by law as may be necessary to secure the due administration of Justice."
(Underlining supplied) Page 12 of 14 LPA No. 80/2020, CrlM No. 343/2020 & LPA No. 84/2021 with CM No. 4348/2021 Clause 12 provided for Ministerial Officers, Clause 13 provided for appointments and powers of subordinate Judicial Officers, Clause 14 for place of sitting, Clause 15 provided for Special Commissions and Circuit, Clause 16 provided for requisitions by the Ruler, Clause 17 provided for confirmation of sentences, Clause 18 for power to make rules, Clause 19 for admission of Advocates, Clause 20 for contempt, Clause 21 for pending cases, Clause 22 provided for consequential changes in the existing laws, regulations or encasements to bring them into conformity with the provisions of the said order and Clause 23 related to Royal Prerogative, clause (a) whereunder provided for saving the inherent powers and prerogative of the Ruler and clause (b) provided as under:
"(b) Except as provided by this order, there shall be no appeal or revision against the decree and orders of the High Court of Judicature for Jammu and Kashmir State".
27. From a perusal of the aforesaid Order, establishing the High Court of Judicature Jammu and Kashmir, among other things, it is seen that Clause 11 thereof vested the powers of superintendence in the High Court and, in exercise of such powers of superintendence, the Chief Justice and the Judges of the High Court were ordained to inspect the proceedings of the courts subordinate to the High Court and give such directions in matters not provided for by law as might be necessary to secure the due administration of Justice. It is further seen that in terms of clause (b) under Clause 23, Royal Prerogative, it was categorically said that there shall be no appeal or revision against the decrees and orders of the High Court, except as provided by the Order. It, therefore, follows that there was no appeal provided against the orders containing the directions as might be given by the Chief Justice or a Judge of the High Court in exercise of the powers of superintendence.
28. It is reiterated here that the aforesaid Order, establishing the High Court and containing the aforesaid provisions, was issued on 26.03.1928. Thereafter, the Ruler of the erstwhile State, promulgate Notification No.43- L/1989 dated 04.01.1933 / 26th Poh, 1989, consolidating and amending the laws relating to Criminal Procedure in the erstwhile State vide Act No.XXIII of 1989, titled as the Code of Criminal Procedure, Svt. 1989 (1933 A. D.).
Page 13 of 14LPA No. 80/2020, CrlM No. 343/2020 & LPA No. 84/2021 with CM No. 4348/2021 Section 561-A thereof saved the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
29. On comparison of the powers and their object under Section 561-A Cr. P. C., corresponding to Section 482 Cr. P. C. now applicable to the Union Territory, with what was provided in Clause 11 of the Order No. 01 of 1928, quoted hereinabove, under which the High Court was created, it is seen that the same are apparently akin to each other. It is reiterated that in terms of Clause 11 of the 1928 Order, the High Court, in exercise of the powers of superintendence vested in it, could give directions to the subordinate courts with a view to securing the administration of justice, and, in terms of Section 561-A Cr. P. C., the powers of the High Court (to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice) appear to have been saved.
30. It is again reiterated that in Order dated 26.03.1928 there was no appeal provided against any directions made or given by the High Court in exercise of the powers of superintendence vested in it thereunder. Subsequent thereto, on 28.08.1943, the then Ruler of the State granted Letters Patent to the High Court. The order was saved by virtue of Sections 102 and 157(3) of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir (now repealed) and stands saved by Section 77 of the Jammu & Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019 [Act No.34 of 2019]. Clause 12 thereof has been already extracted hereinabove. From a perusal of the said Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, it is seen that yet again there is no appeal provided for against an order passed or made by the High Court in exercise of the powers of superintendence. Clause 12 of the Letters Patent has been already extracted hereinabove. However, for facility of convenience, the relevant portions of it are again extracted below:
"12. And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature from the judgment (...not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the Page 14 of 14 LPA No. 80/2020, CrlM No. 343/2020 & LPA No. 84/2021 with CM No. 4348/2021 power of superintendence) of one Judge of the said High Court..."
We are of the opinion and have come to the conclusion that the powers of superintendence vested in the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir have been and are akin to the inherent powers saved under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1933, which corresponds to Section 482 Cr. P. C. now applicable in the Union Territory and, consequently, there has been and is no appeal provided for against orders passed by a Single Judge of the Court in exercise of such powers under Section 482 Cr. P. C. before the Court. Resultantly, no LPA lies against the orders passed by a Judge of the Court in exercise of the powers under Section 482 Cr. P. C.
31. We are however making it clear that the above decision and conclusion is based on the subject of the Letters Patent Appeals qua the orders passed by Subordinate Criminal Courts and in case any other issue, which is not raised in these appeals for consideration, that is left open and will be decided in appropriate cases.
32. In light of the above, these LPAs are held to be not maintainable and are dismissed as such together with the connected CM(s)/CrlM(s).
(Sanjay Dhar) (Ali Mohammad Magrey),
Judge Judge
Srinagar,
16.08.2021
"Mohammad Yasin Dar"
I. Whether the Judgment is reportable? Yes/No.
II. Whether the Judgment is speaking? Yes/No.
MOHAMMAD YASIN DAR
2021.08.16 10:41
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document