M/S.Ntpc Limited vs State Of Kerala on 4 December, 2013

[Cites 16, Cited by 0]

Kerala High Court

M/S.Ntpc Limited vs State Of Kerala on 4 December, 2013

This Writ Appeal raises a substantial question of law for consideration, i.e., whether a land once acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the benefit of a requisitioning body can be again made subject of acquisition for the benefit of another requisitioning body? The Writ Appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 4.12.2013 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P(C).No.15583 of 2013 by which judgment, the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner/appellant has been dismissed. Facts giving rise to the Writ Appeal are:

2. The appellant, NTPC Limited is one of the leading Public Sector Undertaking of the Government of India, the largest power producer in the country. The State of Kerala WA.1936/13 2 for establishing thermal power station at Kayamkulam, acquired land for the NTPC Limited during the peroid 1989-1993. The appellant's case is that State had acquired land to the extent of 108.02 hectares for establishing thermal power station at Kayamkulam, whereas according to the State of Kerala the total extent of land acquired for the appellant was 447.74 hectares.

Out of the land acquired by the State of Kerala, more than 164.80.70 hectares of land has been kept unutilised. The Government of Kerala has decided to start new Medical Colleges in various districts, including the District of Alleppey. Necessary funds were also provided in the 2011- 2012 Budget. A meeting was convened by the Chief Minister of the State on 6.12.2011, in which Chairman and Managing Director and other officers of the NTPC Limited were present. The State of Kerala, for establishing a Medical College at Alleppey, required land to an extent of 25 acres. In the meeting the NTPC Limited expressed its willingness to part with 25 acres of land which had been WA.1936/13 3 earlier acquired for them by the Government of Kerala. The State of Kerala thereafter ordered administrative sanction for establishment of new Medical College at Haripad in Alleppey district in Public-Private Partnership. The District Collector was directed to approach the appellant for 25 acres of land free of cost. The District Collector convened a meeting on 17.4.2012. The revenue officers were directed to inspect two sites. Two available plots were indicated by the appellant. One plot was a wet land, which was 4 k.m away from the National Highway. The second plot of 25 acres was a dry land, which was beside the National Highway. The District Collector communicated to the General Manager, NTPC Limited informing that on inspection, the dry land, which falls on western side of NH-47, is suitable for setting up of a Medical College. It was stated that the land is under possession of NTPC Limited, Kayamkulam, which was acquired for NTPC Limited and laying unutilised. Urgent steps for transferring the land was required by the District WA.1936/13 4 Collector. The said letter was issued by the District Collector on 14.5.2012. The NTPC Limited by letter dated 7.5.2012 communicated that the dry land measuring 25 acres, which was one of the two available plots indicated in the meeting dated 17.4.2012, is required by the NTPC Limited, since it has future plans for utilising the land for constructing an integrated township along with the Stage- II expansion. The NTPC Limited further stated that the Board of Directors of the NTPC Limited and the Government of India have to accord administrative sanction for transfer of the land. The District Collector thereafter sought sanction of the State Government for acquisition of land to the extent of 10.53.40 hectares in possession of NTPC Limited situated at Kayamkulam for the purpose of establishment of new Medical College at Haripad in Alleppey district. The Government accorded sanction vide order dated 31.5.2013 for acquisition of land to an extent of 10.53.40 hectares comprised in various survey numbers of Chingoli Village in Alleppey district WA.1936/13 5 under the possession of NTPC Limited for establishment of a Medical College at Haripad. The appellant, thereafter, immediately filed W.P(C).No.15583 of 2013 challenging the decision of the State Government dated 31.5.2013 granting administrative sanction to proceed with the acquisition. The following prayers had been made by the petitioner in the Writ Petition:

"(a) Call for the records leading to Ext.P1 and issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the same.

(b) To direct the respondents not to proceed with Ext.P1 so as to set up any Medical College in the premises of the petitioner.

(c) To stay all further proceedings pursuant to Ext.P1 pending disposal of the Writ Petition.

(d) Grant such other appropriate reliefs to the petitioner as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice."

WA.1936/13 6

3. In the Writ Petition a counter affidavit was filed by the District Collector, reply of which was also filed by the petitioner. The learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties, by judgment dated 4.12.2013, dismissed the Writ Petition, against which the Writ Appeal has been filed.

4. This Writ Appeal was admitted on 20.12.2013 and the following order was passed:

"We make it clear, while we are not inclined to grant stay of the judgment as such pendency of the Writ Petition will not stand in the way of the appellant objecting under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act and moreover, the authority taking a decision in the matter in accordance with law."

5. In the Writ Appeal an order dated 17.6.2014 was passed directing the appellant to make all efforts to identify alternative plot/plots measuring 25 acres for starting medical college as proposed by the Government. The appellant filed an affidavit dated 24.7.2014 and proposed an alternative plot and brought on record WA.1936/13 7 minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors held on 11.7.2014 proposing 25 acres of land in re-survey No.331 situated in Aarattupuzha Village at current market rate of land. An affidavit dated 31.7.2014 was also filed by the third respondent stating that the proposed land as mentioned in the affidavit dated 24.7.2014 is not feasible for construction of new Medical College. It was stated that the site was inspected on 26.7.2014 and it was found that it is a water logged area with 3 to 5 metres depth from three sides. The Writ Appeal thereafter has been heard and is being decided finally.

6. We have heard Sri.R.D.Shenoy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and Sri.K.P.Dandapani, learned Advocate General appearing for the State.

7. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the land, which is sought to be acquired by the State Government, is the land, which was earlier acquired by the State Government and given to the appellant for a public purpose, i.e., for establishing a WA.1936/13 8 thermal power plant. It is submitted that the public purpose, for which the land was given to the appellant has not yet been fully accomplished, hence the State has no authority or jurisdiction to again initiate proceedings for acquisition of a part of the land, which was earlier acquired by the State for the appellant. He submitted that the purpose, for which the land was acquired by the State and given to the appellant is still subsisting. Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be applied to a land, which has already been acquired for a public purpose, which is still subsisting. He further submitted that the appellant never consented to transfer the dry land as identified by the respondent.

8. The learned Advocate General, refuting the submission of learned counsel for the appellant, contended that there is no statutory prohibition in acquiring a land for a public purpose, which land had earlier been acquired for a public purpose. He submitted that the public purpose keeps on changing and the State WA.1936/13 9 is the best judge to decide as to for which public purpose which land is to be acquired. For the appellant the State had acquired land measuring 447.74 hectares, out of which, 164.80.70 hectares are still unutilised, although more than two decades have elapsed. The State has only requested for 25 acres of land, which was identified and is still unutilised. It is submitted that although earlier in the meeting held with the Chief Minister, the appellant had agreed to transfer an extent of 25 acres of land, but subsequently, they have refused to transfer the land as was prayed by the State and the State was left with no alternative but to proceed to acquire the land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Construction of the Medical College at Alleppey is a public purpose of great importance and acquisition of land is urgently needed for purpose of establishing a Medical College with regard to which administrative sanction has already been granted.

9. From the submission of learned counsel for the parties and the pleadings on record, the main issue which WA.1936/13 10 arise for consideration is as to whether the land, which was once acquired by the State for the appellant for a public purpose of establishing a thermal power plant, can again be acquired by the State for another public purpose, namely, for establishing a Medical College. The submission, which has been pressed by learned counsel for the appellant is that when the public purpose for which the land was earlier acquired during the period 1989-1993 is still subsisting, there is no jurisdiction to proceed further for acquisition of the same land.

10. It is necessary to look into the statutory scheme before we proceed to enter into the rival submissions. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had been enacted to amend the law for acquisition of land for public purposes and for Companies. The power of "Eminent domain" exists in every sovereign State. "Eminent domain" has been defined by P.Ramanatha Aiyar in the Law Lexicon 3rd Edition in the following words:

WA.1936/13 11

"Eminent domain. The inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property, especially land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking.

The right of the State or the sovereign to its or his own property is absolute while that of the subject or citizen to his property is only paramount. The citizen holds his property subject always to the right of the sovereign to take it for a public purpose. This right is called "eminent domain".

See Lewis on Eminent Domain; Mills on Eminent Domain; Randolph on Eminent Domain).

It is the right of the state or of those to whom the power has been lawfully delegated to condemn private property for public use and to appropriate the ownership and possession of such property for such use, upon paying the owner a due compensation to be ascertained according to law. OTHER DEFINITIONS OF THE TERM. " The sovereign power vested in the State to take private property for the public use, providing first a just compensation therefore." "A superior right to apply private property to public use" 1 Redfield WA.1936/13 12 Railw, S.63. "A superior right inherent in society, and exercised by the Sovereign power, or upon delegation from it, whereby the subject-matter of rights of property may be taken from the owner and appropriated for the general welfare." Abbot. L. Dict. "The right belonging to society, or to the Sovereign, or disposing in cases of necessarily, and for the public safety, of all the wealth contained in the State, is called the Eminent domain" (Jones v. Walker, 13 Fed Cas No.7, 507) "The right of every government to appropriate, otherwise than by taxation and its police authority, private property for public use." (Dillon Mun. Corp) "The right to resume the possession of private property for the public use." (Blood-good v. Mohawk, etc. R.Co. 31 Am Dec.313). "The ultimate right of the Sovereign power to appropriate not only the public property but the private property of all citizens within the territorial Sovereignty, to public purpose." (Ame Cyc) "Eminent domain is in the nature of a compulsory purchase of the property of the citizen for the purpose of applying to the public use." Mills Em. Dom. Sect.1.

The right of the State to reassert its domain over any portion of the soil of the State on account of public exigency and for the public good; the power to take private property for public use. WA.1936/13 13 The right of power of the government to take private property for public use on making just compensation therefor. The power of a Sovereign State to take or to authorise the taking of any property within its jurisdiction for public use without the owner's consent."

11. The Apex Court in Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. District Collector, Ranga Reddy District [(2008)9 SCC 552] had occasion to elaborate and explain the concept of "eminent domain". The following is laid down by the Apex Court in paragraphs 43, 45 and 47 of the judgment:

"43. "Eminent domain" may be defined as the right or power of a sovereign State to take private property for public use without the owner's consent upon the payment of just compensation. It means nothing more or less than an inherent political right, founded on a common necessity and interest of appropriating the property of individual members of the community to the great necessities and common good of the whole society. It embraces all cases where, by the authority of the State and for the public good, the property of an individual is taken without his consent to be devoted to some particular use, by the State itself, by a corporation, public or private, or by a private citizen for the welfare of the public (American WA.1936/13 14 Jurisprudence, 2d, Vol. 26, pp. 638-39, Para 1; Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 29, p. 776, Para 1; Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 14, pp. 468-70).

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45. The term "eminent domain" is said to have originated by Grotius, legal scholar of the seventeenth century. He believed that the State possessed the power to take or destroy property for the benefit of the social unit, but he believed that when the State so acted, it was obligated to compensate the injured property owner for his losses. In his well-known work De Jure, Belli et Pacis, the learned author proclaimed:

"The property of subject is under the eminent domain of the State, so that the State or he who acts for it may use, alienate and even destroy such property, not only in the case of extreme necessity, in which even private persons have a right over the property of the other, but for the ends of public utility, to which ends those who founded civil society must be supposed to have intended the private ends should give way."

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47. The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific grant. It is inherent and exists in every sovereign State without any recognition thereof in the Constitution or in any statute. It is founded on the law of necessity. The power is inalienable. No legislature can bind itself or its successors not to exercise this power when public necessity demands it. Nor can it be abridged or restricted by agreement or contract." WA.1936/13 15

12. Section 3(f) of the Land Acquisition Act defines "public purpose", which is an inclusive definition. There is no dispute that the land, which was acquired by the State for the appellant was also for a public purpose and the proceedings, which has now been initiated by administrative sanction dated 31.5.2013 for acquisition of land for construction of a Medical College is also a public purpose. Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act provides for publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 provides as follows:

"4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon.- (1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any pubic purpose or for a company a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be WA.1936/13 16 given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the notification)."

13. By Kerala State Amendment Act 25 of 1985, in sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, after the words "any locality", the words "in the State of Kerala or within the jurisdiction of the Collector, as the case may be" have been inserted. Thus, the State Government can publish preliminary notification for a land situated anywhere in the State of Kerala within the jurisdiction of the Collector, which is likely to be needed for any public purpose. The use of the word 'land' in sub- section (1) of Section 4 is of a very wide import. Section 3

(a) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 defines "land", which is to the following effect:

"3. Definitions.- In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context,-

(a) the expression "land" includes benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth;"

WA.1936/13 17

14. Publication of preliminary notification can be issued by the Government for a land, which is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose. To accept the submission of learned counsel for the appellant, the land, which has once been acquired for a public purpose and the public purpose is still subsisting, cannot be again acquired under Section 4 is to read a statutory prohibition under Section 4, which cannot be found on a plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 4. The State's right to take away the property is an integral part of the State sovereignty. The word 'public purpose' as defined in Section 3(1) is not static. The public purpose for which a land is to be acquired keeps on changing looking to the needs of a particular time. The Apex Court in various judgments, from time to time, has laid down that land acquired for one public purpose can be utilised for another public purpose. Reference is made to the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Maharashtrea v. Mahadeo Deoman Rai alias Kalal land others [(1990)3 SCC WA.1936/13 18 579]. Following was laid down in paragraph 6 of the judgment:

"6. Besides, the question as to whether a particular scheme framed in exercise of statutory provisions is in the public interest or not has to be determined according to the need of the time and a final decision for all times to come cannot be taken. A particular scheme may serve the public purpose at a given point of time but due to change of circumstances it may become essential to modify or substitute it by another scheme. The requirements of the community do not remain static; they indeed, go on varying with the evolving process of social life. Accordingly, there must be creative response from the public authority, and the public scheme must be varied to meet the changing needs of the public. At the best for the respondent, it can be assumed that in 1967 when the resolution in his favour was passed, the acquisition of the land was not so urgently essential so as to call for his dispossession. But for that reason it cannot be held that the plots became immune from being utilised for any other public purpose for ever. The State or a body like the Municipal Council entrusted with a public duty to look after the requirements of the community has to assess the situation from time to time and take necessary decision periodically. We, therefore, hold that the Resolution dated February 13, 1967 was not binding on WA.1936/13 19 the Municipal Council so as to disable it to take a different decision later."

(underlined by us)

15. Again in Government of A.P and another v. Syed Akbar [(2005)1 SCC 558] the Apex Court has laid down in paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 as follows:

"12. In the case Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra claim of the petitioner for restitution of the possession of the land acquired pursuant to the resolution of the State Government was rejected. In para 2, this Court observed thus: (SCC p.

406) "2. ... We do not think that this Court would be justified in making direction for restitution of the land to the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way back and vested in the Municipality free from all encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose would be utilised for any other public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original public purpose.

It is not intended that any land which remained unutilised, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the notification. Under these circumstances, the High Court was well justified in refusing to grant relief in both the writ petitions."

13. Yet in another recent decision, this Court in Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh WA.1936/13 20 referring to the case of Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil and other cases held that: (SCC p. 340, para 12) "12. If the land was not used for the purpose for which it was acquired, it was open to the State Government to take action but that did not confer any right on the respondents to ask for restitution of the land."

Paras 10 and 11 of the said judgment read thus:

(SCC p. 340) "10. In Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v.

State of Maharashtra it is stated that the acquired land remaining unutilised was not intended to be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of notification.

11. Yet again in C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of T.N. it is held that acquired land having vested in the State and the compensation having been paid to the claimant, he was not entitled to restitution of possession on the ground that either original public purpose had ceased to be in operation or the land could not be used for other purpose."

14. From the position of law made clear in the aforementioned decisions, it follows that (1) under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the land acquired vests in the Government absolutely free from WA.1936/13 21 all encumbrances; (2) the land acquired for a public purpose could be utilised for any other public purpose; and (3) the acquired land which is vested in the Government free from all encumbrances cannot be reassigned or reconveyed to the original owner merely on the basis of an executive order."

(underlined by us)

16. Section 14 of the General Clauses act provides that where by any Central Act, any power is conferred, then unless a different intention appears that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. Section 14(1) of the General Clauses Act is quoted below:

"14. Powers conferred to be exercisable from time to time.- (1) Where, by any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any power is conferred, then unless a different intention appears that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires."

17. Section 14 thus clarifies that power given under the Central Act can be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. The mere fact that once acquisition WA.1936/13 22 proceedings were undertaken for acquisition of land for the appellant for establishing a thermal power project, it cannot be said that power to acquire land by the State of Kerala had exhausted and the said power cannot be exercised again by the State of Kerala with regard to same land. The interpretation, which is sought to be put by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant runs contrary to the legislative scheme delineated by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 read with Section 14 of General Clauses Act. When the power of acquiring a land can be exercised "from time to time as occasion requires". To read fetter in that power as submitted by learned counsel for the appellant is to do violence with the provisions of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

18. In this context, a reference to the judgment of the Apex Court in Daulat Singh Surana and others v. First Land Acquisition Collector and others [(2007)1 SCC 641] is pertinent. In the above case the land was earlier requisitioned by the Government of West Bengal in WA.1936/13 23 the year 1943 and thereafter the property was used by the Government. The Government continued in possession of the property, when the notification dated 13.12.1994 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and declaration dated 23.3.1993 were issued; the acquisition was challenged before the High Court. One of the grounds taken was that the State itself was in possession of the property under a requisition order issued by the Government and in spite of an order passed in a Writ Petition directing the Government to hand over possession to the owners of the land, possession was never handed over to the owners. The Division Bench of the Calcautta High Court held that it was absolutely irrelevant that the Government was in possession of the land at the time of publication of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was observed that examination should remain confined only to the question of existence of public purpose. Against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court, land owners WA.1936/13 24 approached the Apex Court and the Apex Court dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment of the Calcutta High Court. The following was laid down by the Apex Court in paragraphs 30, 31 and 33:

"30. The Division Bench carefully examined the pleadings, documents and the judgments cited at the Bar. The Court came to a categorical finding that for the purpose of examining the validity of a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the question of possession of land is absolutely irrelevant; the examination should remain confined only to the question of existence of public purpose. The Division Bench drew support for the aforesaid view from Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli. The Division Bench also observed that neither had the appellant seriously contended that behind the proposed acquisition, the public purpose was absolutely absent; nor did the learned Single Judge arrive at the conclusion that the proposed acquisition was not for a notified public purpose. WA.1936/13 25

31. The Government of West Bengal was empowered to take steps for acquisition of any land in any locality, if the same was needed for public purpose under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. According to the Division Bench, in absence of any bar, the Government was fully empowered to publish a notification under Section 4 in respect of a piece of land which is already in the government's possession. The Division Bench observed that the order dated 18-8-1993 passed by the learned Single Judge was in ignorance of both the aforementioned statutory provisions and the binding Division Bench judgment.

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33. The High Court was correct and justified in holding that while examining the validity of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the question of possession of land was absolutely irrelevant."

19. In the above judgment, the Apex Court has laid down that the land, which is in possession of the Government can be proceeded with for acquisition and WA.1936/13 26 the mere fact that the Government was in possession of the land does not restrict the Government's power to proceed with the acquisition. In the above case the Apex Court has also reiterated that the power of compulsory acquisition is described by the term "eminent domain". It is useful to quote paragraphs 53, 54 and 59 of the judgment in Daulat Singh Surana's case (supra).

"53. The power of compulsory acquisition is described by the term "eminent domain".

This term seems to have been originated in 1525 by Hugo Grotius, who wrote of this power in his work De Jure Belli et Pacis as follows:

"The property of subjects is under the eminent domain of the State, so that the State or he who acts for it may use and even alienate and destroy such property, not only in the case of extreme necessity, in which even private persons have a right over the property of others, but for ends of public utility, to which ends those who founded civil society must be supposed to have intended that private ends should give way. But it is to be added that when this is done the State is WA.1936/13 27 bound to make good the loss to those who lose their property."

54. The Court observed that the requirement of public purpose is implicit in compulsory acquisition of property by the State or, what is called, the exercise of its power of "eminent domain".

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59. In Somavanti v. State of Punjab the Court observed that public purpose must include an object in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned. Public purpose is bound to change with the times and the prevailing conditions in a given area and, therefore, it would not be a practical proposition even to attempt an extensive definition of it. It is because of this that the legislature has left it to the Government to say what is a public purpose and also to declare the need of a given land for a public purpose."

WA.1936/13 28 The Apex Court in the above judgment has also emphasised that public purpose is bound to change with the times and prevailing condition in a given area.

20. When there is no prohibition and Government can proceed to acquire a land which was in its possession under a requisition order, we see no reason as to why the Government cannot proceed for acquisition of a land, which is in possession of a public undertaking of the Central Government, although the land was handed over to the public undertaking after acquisition during the period 1989-1993.

21. It is further relevant to note that land to the extent of 164.80.70 hectares is remaining unutilised as on date. The appellant had also agreed for transferring 25 acres of land on its market value as was communicated to the Government. With regard to transfer of land, the appellant offered to transfer a wet land, 4 k.m away from National Highway, whereas the District Collector has identified a dry land adjoining to the National Highway in WA.1936/13 29 which it was proposed to construct a Medical College. The learned Advocate General has submitted that in view of the interim order passed in the Writ Appeal as noted above, no further steps were taken. He submits that there is still an opportunity to the appellant to raise his objections as per the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894/Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

22. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that there is no prohibition in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 from acquiring a piece of land, which had earlier undergone land acquisition proceedings and is in possession of a Central Government undertaking. We, thus, do not find any substance in the submissions raised by learned counsel for the appellant.

23. In the Writ Petition the appellant/petitioner only challenged the administrative sanction given by the State Government on 21.5.2013 for acquiring 10.53.40 hectares WA.1936/13 30 of land situated in Chingoli Village. We do not find any error in the said administrative sanction, which warrants interference by this Court exercising the writ jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge did not commit any error in dismissing the Writ Petition. We observe that the dismissal of the Writ Petition shall not preclude the appellant from raising such objections or taking such step as are permissible in the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the District Collector.

Subject to the above observations, the Writ Appeal is dismissed.

Parties will bear their costs.

ASHOK BHUSHAN ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE, JUDGE vgs

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