Karnataka High Court
Sri Munimada @ Munimadappa S/O Late ... vs The Special Deputy Comissioner on 12 December, 2018
Author: G.Narendar
Bench: G.Narendar
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 12TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2018
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE G.NARENDAR
WRIT PETITION Nos.17706/2010
c/w
17705/2010, 26019/2010 AND 27733/2011 (SCST)
W.P.No.17706/2010
BETWEEN
SRI MUNIMADA @ MUNIMADAPPA
S/O LATE VENKATA
SINCE DECEASED REPTD BY HIS LR'S
SRI. GUPALAPPA
S/O LATE MUNIMADA @ MUNIMADAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS
R/A BALLUR VILLAGE,
ATTIBELE HOBALI,
ANEKAL TQ., BANGALORE DISTRICT. ... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. V.LAKSHMINARAYANA, SENIOR ADV. FOR
SRI. R SWAMYNATHAN, ADV.)
AND
1. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMISSIONER,
BANGALORE URBAN DISTRICT,
BANGALORE.
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
BANGALORE URBAN DISTRICT.
3. SRI. ALLELLAPPA
S/O LATE CHOODAPPA,
DASANAPURA VILLAGE,
ATTIBELE HOBLI,
ANEKAL TALUK.
2
4. SRI. NARAYANA REDDY
S/O LATE CHIKKANAGI REDDY,
NO.170, TVS ROAD,
BALLUR VILLAGE,
ATTIBELE HOBALI,
ANEKAL TALUK. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. SAVITHRAMMA, HCGP FOR R1 AND R2,
SRI. R.V.SRINIVASA REDDY, ADV. FOR C/R3 AND R4)
THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO CALL FOR THE
ENTIRE RECORDS RELATING TO THE ORDER PASSED BY
THE LEARNED ASST. COMMISSIONER ON 8.9.08 VIDE ANN-B
& ORDER & ORDER PASSED BY THE LEARNED SPECIAL
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BOTH ON 19.4.10, RESPECTIVELY
MARKED AS ANN-E & F & SET ASIDE THE SMAE AS ILLEGAL,
ARBITRARY & DEVOID OF MERITS.
W.P.No.17705/2010
BETWEEN
SRI RAMA
S/O LATE BALLURA @ BALLURAPPA,
SINCE DECEASED REPTD BY HIS LR'S
SRI. NARAYANAPPA,
S/O LATE VATTAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
R/A BALLUR VILLAGE,
ATTIBELE HOBALI,
ANEKAL TQ., BANGALORE DISTRICT. ... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. R SWAMYNATHAN, ADV.)
AND
1. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMISSIONER,
BANGALORE URBAN DISTRICT,
BANGALORE.
3
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
BANGALORE URBAN DISTRICT.
3. SRI. ALLELLAPPA
MAJOR,
S/O LATE CHOODAPPA,
DASANAPURA VILLAGE,
ATTIBELE HOBLI,
ANEKAL TALUK.
4. SRI. R RAJU
S/O LATE RANGADHAMAIAH,
AGED 44 YEARS,
NO.12/1, SURVEYOR STREET,
BASAVANAGUDI,
BANGALORE-560004. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. SAVITHRAMMA, HCGP FOR R1 AND R2,
SRI. R.V.SRINIVASA REDDY, ADV. FOR C/R3 AND R4,
SRI. V.LAKSHMINARAYANA ASSTS., FOR R3 AND R4)
THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO CALL FOR THE
ENTIRE RECORDS RELATING TO THE ORDER PASSED BY
THE LEARNED ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER ON 22.9.2008
VIDE ANNEXURE-B AND ORDERS PASSED BY THE LEARNED
SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISIONER BOTH ON 19.4.2010
RESPECTIVELY MARKED AS ANNEXURES-E & F AND SET
ASIDE THE SAME AS ILLEGAL, ARBITRARY AND DEVOID OF
MERITS ETC.
W.P.No.26019/2010
BETWEEN
SRI MUNIYA @ MUNIYAPPA
S/O LATE CHIKKA
SINCE DECEASED REPTD BY HIS LR'S
1. SRI. M VENKATESH
S/O LATE MADANAGIRIYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS
2. SMT. MANJULA
4
D/O LATE MADANAGIRIYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS
3. SMT. SHYLAJA
D/O LATE MADANAGIRIYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 24 YEARS
ALL ARE R/AT BALLUR VILLAGE,
ATTIBELE HOBALI, ANEKAL TALUK,
BANGALORE DISTRICT. ... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. R.SWAMINATHAN, ADV.)
AND
1. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMISSIONER,
BANGALORE URBAN DISTRICT,
BANGALORE.
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
BANGALORE URBAN DISTRICT,
BANGALORE.
3. SRI. A VENKATA REDDY
S/O CHANGA REDDY
AGED: MAJOR
R/A NO. 326/20, 24TH CROSS
6TH BLOCK, JAYANAGAR,
BANGALORE-560082. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. SAVITHRAMMA, HCGP FOR R1 AND R2,
SRI. G.D.ASWATHANARAYANA, ADV. FOR C/R3)
THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO CALL FOR THE
ENTIRE RECORDS RELATING TO THE ORDER PASSED BY
THE LEARNED ASST. COMMISSIONER ON 6.1.09, VIDE ANN-B
& ORDER PASSED BY THE LEARNED SPECIAL DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER BOTH ON 4.8.10, RESPECTIVELY MARKED
AS ANN-E & SET ASIDE THE SAME AS ILLEGAL, ARBITRARY &
DEVIOD OF MERITS ETC.
5
W.P.No.27733/2011
BETWEEN
SRI. BUDDIGA
S/O BALLURA @ BALLURAPPA
SINCE DECEASED REPTD. BY HIS LR'S
SRI. NARAYANAPPA
S/O LATE BATTAPPA
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
R/AT BALLUR VILLAGE,
ATTIBELE HOBLI,
ANEKAL TALUK,
BANGALORE DISTRICT. ... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. R SWAMYNATHAN, ADV.)
AND
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS SECRETARY,
REVENUE DEPARTMENT,
M.S.BUILDINGS, VIDHANA VEEDHI,
BANGALORE-560001.
2. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMISSIONER,
BANGALORE URBAN DISTRICT,
BANGALORE.
3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
BANGALORE URBAN DISTRICT,
BANGALORE.
4. SRI J K SHARMA
S/O J P SHARMA,
AGED: MAJOR,
R/AT NO.A-1, 102,
PACHIM VIHAR, NEW DELHI-63,
AND PRESENTLY R/AT NO.243,
ATTIBELE, MATTIKERE,
JVS MAIN ROAD, PROPRITOR,
CHETAK LOGISTIC LIMITED,
6
NEAR SWAMY NURSERY,
BALLUR VILLAGE,
ATTIBELE HOBLI,
ANEKAL TALUK. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. SAVITHRAMMA, HCGP FOR R1 TO R3,
SRI. LAKSHMINARAYANA ASSTS., FOR R4)
THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO CALL FOR THE
ENTIRE RECORDS RELATING TO THE ORDER BEARING
NO.K.SC.ST 115/06-07 PASSED BY THE LEARNED ASST.
COMMISSIONER ON 19.9.08, VIDE ANN-B & SET ASIDE THE
ORDER PASSED BY THE LEARNED SPECIAL DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER, ON 25.3.11 MARKED AS ANN-C THE SAME
AS ILLEGAL, ARBITRARY & DEVOID OF MERITS ETC.
THESE WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS AND THEREAFTER POSTED FOR
'FURTHER HEARING' THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:
ORDER
All these petitions are taken up for final disposal as the grantees are all the beneficiaries during the year 1940 and the petitions could be disposed of on common point.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondents.
7 Facts in W.P.No.17706/20103. The petitioner is an unsuccessful applicant before respondent Nos.1 and 2 and being aggrieved by the orders dated 08.09.2008 and 19.04.2010 produced as Annexures-E and F is before this Court praying to call for records of the orders passed vide Annexures-E and F and set aside the same as illegal, arbitrary and devoid of merits.
4. The case of the petitioner is that old Sy.No.182 (New Sy.No.239) situated at Belur village, Attibele Hobli, Anekal Taluk, Bengaluru District was declared as Surplus lands in the year 1940. That the then Government distributed the said lands for Free of Cost to the landless people of the oppressed class. That 2 acres of land was granted in favour of one Munimada @ Munimadappa by way of Dharakasth Basis Free of Cost on 16.01.1940 and on permanent non-alienation condition was imposed.
Pursuant to the grant, name of the grantee came to be mutated in the revenue records. That the petitioner, the grand son of the original grantee is the sole survivor. That the grantee sold 1 acre out of the said 2 acres to one 8 A.V.Chandraiah under a registered sale deed dated 16.06.1955 and the remaining 1 acre was sold in favour of one C.Krishnappa under the registered sale deed dated 28.09.1974.
5. It is the case of the petitioner that the alienation is contrary to the conditions imposed and being breach of conditions, the same are rendered null and void as being violative of the provisions of Section 4 of the PTCL Act.
6. That the petitioner instituted the proceedings before respondent No.2 in the year 2006 by invoking the provisions of Section 5 and sought for resumption of the land as the sale was violative of provisions of the Act.
7. It is contended that respondent No.2 by order dated 08.09.2008 considering the case of the parties, in case No.K.SC.ST.20/2007-08 was pleased to set aside the sale deeds rendered between 1955 and 1974 and declare them as null and void. Being aggrieved by the order of respondent No.2, respondent Nos.3 and 4 preferred an appeal before respondent No.1 in case bearing No.SC.ST.(A) 116/2008-09 and case bearing No.SC.ST.(A) 9 120/2008-09. That respondent No.1 after holding an enquiry was pleased to set aside the order passed by respondent No.2.
Facts in W.P.No.17705/20108. The petitioner was granted land on 31.01.1940.
That the sale was executed on 26.11.1965. Thereafter, multiple sale deeds have been executed. The appeal before the Assistant Commissioner was preferred in the year 2006 under Section 5 of the PTCL Act. The appeal was registered as case bearing No.KSC/ST(A):102/2006-2007 and the same came to be allowed by order dated 22.09.2010 vide Annexure-B to the petition.
9. The respondent Nos.3 and 4 preferred an appeal before respondent No.1 in case bearing No.SC.ST.(A) 169/2008-09 and case bearing No.SC.ST.(A) 141/2008-09.
Respondent No.1 by order dated 19.04.2010 was pleased to set aside the order of respondent No.2 passed vide order dated 22.09.2008.
1010. Admittedly, the application under Section 5 of the Act was preferred after the passage of more than four decades.
Facts in W.P.No.26019/201011. The petitioner was granted land on 31.01.1940.
That the sale was executed on 04.12.1963. Thereafter, multiple sale deeds have been executed. The appeal before the Assistant Commissioner was preferred in the year 2009 under Section 5 of the PTCL Act. The appeal was registered as case bearing No.K.SC.ST.(A) 16/2007-2008 and the same came to be allowed by order dated 06.01.2009 vide Annexure-B to the petition.
12. The respondent No.3 preferred an appeal before respondent No.1 in case bearing No.SC.ST.(A) 218/2008-
09. The respondent No.1 by order dated 04.04.2010, was pleased to set aside the order of respondent No.2 passed vide order dated 06.07.2009.
1113. Admittedly, the application under Section 5 of the Act was preferred after the passage of more than four decades.
Facts in W.P.No.27733/201114. The petitioner was granted land on 31.01.1940.
That the sale was executed on 01.11.1954. Thereafter, multiple sale deeds have been executed. The appeal before the Assistant Commissioner was preferred in the year 2008 under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act. The appeal was registered as case bearing No.K.SC/ST.16/2007-2008 and the same came to be allowed by order dated 19.09.2008 vide Annexure-B to the petition.
15. The respondent No.4 preferred an appeal before respondent No.2 in case bearing No.KSC.ST.Appeal.No.113/2008-09. The respondent No.2 by order dated 25.03.2011, was pleased to set aside the order of respondent No.3 passed vide order dated 19.09.2008.
1216. Admittedly, the application under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act was preferred after the passage of more than four decades.
17. It is contended that the impugned orders passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner is contrary to the mandate of the PTCL Act and the law laid down by this Court.
18. Though other contentions are raised, this Court does not dwelve into the correctness or the legality of the contentions in view of the fact that in similar circumstances, this Court placing reliance on the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court on the point as to suo moto act or action initiated on the application of the party is within a reasonable time and as to whether the application by the petitioner is vitiated by delay and laches, has been pleased to order several writ petitions.
19. This Court in similar circumstances while disposing WP No.30614/2015 vide order dated 4.6.2018 has been pleased to hold as follows:
13"5. Learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the ruling of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi Vs. State of Karnataka and Another reported in 2018(1) Kar. L.R.5 (SC) wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to hold as hereunder:
"8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Dy.
Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No.3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers which were 14 sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1st January, 1939 to 31st December, 1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R.Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. Order accordingly."
6. By the said ruling, the Hon'ble Apex Court has settled the law, in respect of inordinate and gross delay in invoking the statutory provisions or exercising powers 15 vested by the statute. After examining the issue and following its earlier ruling rendered in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr.Lrs.& Ors. reported in 2017(6) SCC 459 wherein it has been reiterated that in respect of a statute that does not provide for a period of limitation to exercise the power, then the statutory provisions must be invoked within a reasonable time.
7. Learned HCGP would also place on record the Judgment rendered by this Court in WP No.6051/2008(SC/ST) C/w.WP No.1951/2016(SC/ST) disposed of by order dated 20.2.2018 whereby, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, placing reliance on the ruling of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Nekkanti Ram Lakshmi's case referred supra was pleased to dismiss the writ petitions preferred by the legal heirs of the original grantee.
8. In the instant case, the provisions of Section 5 are invoked after passage of more than 30 years. And by no stretch of imagination can it be considered as a reasonable period. The law in this regard 16 has been well settled and is squarely applicable to the facts of the case.
9. The contention on behalf of the petitioner merits consideration. The counsel for respondent would submit that the decision reported in the case cited supra cannot be looked into in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Manchegowda vs. State of Karnataka reported in (1984) 3 SCC 301. That in the case of Manchegowda, the law is settled by a Division Bench of three Judges whereas, the cited ruling is rendered by a Division Bench of two Judges. This contention requires to be rejected in the light of the fact that, the Hon'ble Apex Court was not seized with the issue regarding delay in invoking the provisions of the Act while disposing of Manchegowda's case. Thus, the Apex Court has not considered the issue with regard to unreasonable delay in invoking the provisions of the statute as the said ruling came to be rendered in a short span after coming into force of the enactment.
10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Manchegowda's case referred supra in fact 17 visualized the present conundrum by holding that any negligence and delay on the part of the authorities, entitled to take action to avoid such transfers through appropriate legal process for resumption of such grant may be further impediments in the matter of avoiding such transfers and resumption of possession of the granted lands. The relevant paragraph is extracted hereunder for quick reference.
"12. In pursuance of this policy, the Legislature is undoubtedly competent to pass an enactment providing that transfers of such granted lands will be void and not merely voidable for properly safeguarding and protecting the interests of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for whose benefit only these lands had been granted. Even in the absence of any such statutory provisions, the transfer of granted lands in contravention of the terms of the grant or in breach of any law, rule or regulation covering such grant will clearly be voidable and the resumption of such granted lands after avoiding the voidable transfers in accordance with law will be permitted. Avoidance of such voidable transfers and resumption of the granted lands through process of law is bound 18 to take time. Any negligence and delay on the part of the authorities entitled to take action to avoid such transfers through appropriate legal process for resumption of such grant may be further impediments in the matter of avoiding such transfers and resumption of possession of the granted lands. Prolonged legal proceedings will undoubtedly be prejudicial to the interests of the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for whose benefit the granted lands are intended to be resumed. As transfers of granted lands in contravention of the terms of the grant or any law, regulation or rule governing such grants can be legally avoided and possession of such lands can be recovered through process of law, it must be held that the Legislature for the purpose of avoiding delay and harassment of protracted litigation and in furthering its object of speedy restoration of these granted lands to the members of the weaker communities is perfectly competent to make suitable provision for resumption of such granted lands by stipulating in the enactment that transfers of such lands in contravention of the terms of the grant or any regulation, rule or law regulating such grant will be void and providing a suitable procedure 19 consistent with the principles of natural justice for achieving this purpose without recourse to prolonged litigation in court in the larger interests of benefiting the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes."
(underlining by this Court)
11. The Hon'ble Apex Court has been prophetic in rendering the said ruling by observing that, in statues where no limitation is provided, the Authorities and the State must act consciously and if the process of invoking the provisions of statute is delayed and is initiated after a long lapse of time, the delay by itself would act as an impediment. The action on the application filed by the third respondent after more than 30 years cannot by any standards or parameters be construed as being made within a reasonable period and hence, cannot be sustained. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent is liable to be rejected.
12. It is relevant to state the principle enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the exercise of power vested in an authority should be exercised in a reasonable manner 20 and more importantly even a reasonable time more so, when time is not stipulated under the statute is not a principle of recent origins and the Hon'ble Apex Court way back in 1983 itself has enunciated the principle in the case of Mansaram vs. S.P.Pathak and others reported in 1984(1) SCC 125 where the issue involved was one of eviction of a tenant and the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that where the time limit for taking action for eviction is not stipulated in the statute, the eviction after an unreasonable long lapse of time on the ground of initial occupation of the premises being unlawful is not sustainable. In para.12 the Hon'ble Apex Court has held thus:
"12. What is stated hereinbefore is sufficient to quash and set aside the order of the House Allotment Officer. However, there is one more aspect of the matter which we cannot overlook.
The appellant entered the premises in 1954. There have been numerous proceedings between him and the late Basantrai Sharma who let out the premises to the appellant but no one ever raised the question whether the appellant had entered the premises in contravention of clause 22(2). Till Basantrai Sharma died, no one 21 raised the controversy about the entry of the appellant in the premises as being unauthorised or in contravention of clause 22. Basantrai Sharma in his life time tried to obtain possession of the premises from the appellant alleging grounds available to him under the Rent Control Order other than unauthorized entry. This would permit an inference that Basantrai Sharma accepted the appellant as his tenant and his tenancy did not suffer from any infirmity. After Basantrai Sharma died, his successor-in-interest one Smt. Usha Rani N. Sharma did not raise any controversy about the occupation of the premises by the appellant. One Mr. S.P. Pathak, a total stranger has come forward to complain about the unauthorised entry of the appellant in the premises. The unauthorised entry according to the appellant was in the year 1954. Appellant retired in 1967. Basantrai Sharma was alive in 1967. If appellant came into the premises because he was holding an office of profit, obviously Basantrai Sharma would not miss the opportunity to evict the appellant because he was otherwise also trying to do the same thing. Rent was accepted without question from the appellant by Basantrai Sharma till his death and thereafter. Could he be at this distance of time, 22 thrown out on the ground that his initial entry was unauthorized. To slightly differently formulate the proposition, could the initial unauthorized entry, if there be any, permit a House Allotment Officer, 22 years after the entry, to evict the appellant on the short ground that he entered the premises in contravention of clause 22(2) ? Undoubtedly, power is conferred on the Collector to see that the provisions of the Rent Control Order which disclosed a public policy are effectively implemented and if the Collector therefore, comes across information that there is a contravention, he is clothed with adequate power to set right the contravention by ejecting anyone who comes into the premises in contravention of the provisions. But when the power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. Exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, no limitation is prescribed in this behalf but one would stand aghast that a landlord to some extent in pari delicto could turn the tables against the person who was in possession for 22 years as a tenant. In such a situation, even though the House Allotment Officer was to reach an 23 affirmative conclusion that the initial entry 22 years back was an unauthorised entry and that failure to vacate premises till 9 years after retirement was not proper, yet it was not obligatory upon him to pass a peremptory order of eviction in the manner in which he has done. In such a situation, it would be open to him not to evict the appellant. In this connection, we may refer to Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of U.P. wherein one Ram Agyan Singh who came into possession of premises without an order of allotment in his favour as required by sec. 7(2) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, was permitted to retain the premises by treating his occupation lawful and this court declined to interfere with that order. No doubt it must be confessed that sec. 7A conferred power on the District Magistrate to take action against unauthorised occupation in contravention of the provisions of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, but there was a proviso to the section which enabled the District Magistrate not to evict a person found to be in unauthorized occupation, if the District Magistrate was satisfied that there has been undue delay or otherwise it is inexpedient to do so. There is no such proviso to clause 28 which confers power on the 24 Collector to take necessary action for the purpose of securing compliance with the Rent Control Order. But as stated earlier, where power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and the reasonable exercise of power inheres its exercise within a reasonable time. This is too well established to need buttressing by a precedent. However, one is readily available in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha & Ors. In that case Commissioner exercised suo motu revisional jurisdiction under sec. 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code which did not prescribe any period of limitation for exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The Commissioner exercised revisional jurisdiction one year after the Collector made the order which was sought to be revised. The High Court set aside the order of the Commissioner. In the appeal by State of Gujarat, this Court declined to interfere holding inter alia that the revisional power in the absence of prescribed period of limitation must be exercised within a reasonable time and period of one year was held to be too late. This aspect must be present to the mind of House Allotment Officer before just rushing in on an unproved technical contravention brought to his notice contrived by the successor-in-interest of the 25 deceased landlord, and evicting the appellant 22 years after his entry and 9 years after his retirement on the short ground that his entry in the year 1954 was in contravention of clause 22(2)."
13. The above decision has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its subsequent judgment in the case of Santhoshkumar Shivgonda Patil & others vs. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale and others reported in (2009) 9 SCC 352 wherein at para.10 referring to the ruling in the case of State of Punjab vs. Bhatinda District Co-op Milk Producers Union Ltd., held that where the statute does not prescribe the time limit, same has to be exercised within a reasonable time be it suo motu or otherwise. It was pleased to hold that the reasonable period under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code could be three years subject to exceptional circumstances and categorically held that the exercise of revisional power after lapse of 17 years can by no stretch of imagination be construed as being within a reasonable time. The observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in para.10,11 and 12 is reproduced below.
26'10. Recently, in the case of State of Punjab and Others v.
Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers Union Ltd. while dealing with the power of revision under Section 21 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, it has been held: (SCC p.367, paras 17-19) "17. A bare reading of Section 21 of the Act would reveal that although no period of limitation has been prescribed therefore, the same would not mean that the suo motu power can be exercised at any time.
18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors.
19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordinarily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years. The view of the High Court, thus, cannot be said to be unreasonable. Reasonable period, keeping in view the discussions made hereinbefore, must be found out from the statutory scheme. As indicated hereinbefore, maximum period of limitation provided for in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act is five years."
2711. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribed the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercises at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is playing that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein.
12. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which the power of revision may be exercised would be 3 years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstance of the case assuming that the order of the Tahsildar passed on 30.03.1976 is flawd and legally not correct.'
20. In the instant petitions, the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, which was relied upon by this Court squarely applies to the instant cases.
2821. There is no dispute with regard to the grant of the land which is in the year 1940 and invoking the provisions of the PTCL Act was preferred after the passage of more than 50 years.
22. In that view of the matter, the order of the Assistant Commissioner directing resumption of the land stands vitiated. In that view of the matter, the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the Assistant Commissioner does not call for interference.
Accordingly, the petitions are rejected.
Sd/-
JUDGE VM CT-HR