Jharkhand High Court
Mrs. Daisy Prasad vs The Delhi Public School on 29 August, 2025
Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
[2025:JHHC:26149]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
A.C. (S.B.) No. 05 of 2020
Mrs. Daisy Prasad, aged about 57 years, wife of Late
Ravindra Prasad, resident of Flat No. 104, Aradhana
Apartment, Opposite Loreto Convent, North Office
Para, Doranda, P.O. and P.S. Doranda, Town &
District Ranchi - 834002 (Jharkhand).
..... ... Appellant
Versus
1. The Delhi Public School, Ranchi, having its office
at SAIL Township, Doranda, P.O. and P.S. Doranda,
District Ranchi.
2. Dr. Ram Singh, Principal, Delhi Public School,
Ranchi, P.O. and P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi.
3. Mr. J.C. Mohapatra, G.M. (P & A) & I/C,
Research & Development Centre for Iron and Steel
(RDCIS), P.O. & P.S. Doranda, Ranchi - 834002.
4. Mr. K.J. Chauhan, DGM & I/C (F&A), Research
& Development Centre for Iron and Steel (RDCIS),
P.O. & P.S. Doranda, Ranchi 834002.
5. Mr. Manas Rath, DGM & I/C (Adin), Research &
Development Centre for Iron and Steel (RDCIS),
P.O. & P.S. Doranda, Ranchi 834002.
6. Mr. D. Kishore, GM (Mech., Elec., PC & A, C &
IT), Centre of Engineering and Technology, RDCIS
Lab Building, 4th Floor, P.O. and P.S. Doranda,
District Ranchi-834002.
..... ... Respondents.
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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate.
: Mr. Mayank Deep, Advocate.
: Mr. Gaurav Raj, Advocate.
For the Resp. Nos. 1 & 2 : Mr. Ajit Kumar, Sr. Advocate.
: Mr. Nipun Bakshi, Advocate.
For the Resp. Nos. 3 to 6 : Mr. Sushant Kumar, Advocate.
------
21/ 29.08.2025 This appeal has been assigned by Hon'ble the Chief Justice -1- [2025:JHHC:26149] to this Court, that's is how, this appeal has been listed before this Bench.
2. Heard Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (DPS School) and Mr. Sushant Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 3 to 6 (Managing Committee).
3. This appeal has been filed under Section 15 of the Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act, 2005 for setting aside the order dated 26.02.2020, passed by the learned Jharkhand Education Tribunal, Ranchi, in Case No. 06 of 2017 (JET), whereby, the application filed by the appellant has been dismissed by the said Tribunal.
4. Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the appellant was working as a Teacher in Delhi Public School, SAIL Township, Ranchi as an untrained teacher with effect from 22.02.1990. He submits that she was again appointed as Post-Graduate Teacher (English) after she obtained B.Ed. degree in the year 1992 on 25.09.2012 in the same school. He further submits that the appellant herein has tendered her resignation to the Principal on 23.09.2016 and on 24.09.2016, the Principal, Delhi Public School, Ranchi, issued and communicated a letter to the appellant stating therein that her resignation has been accepted by the competent authority of the school. He submits that the appellant herein sent a text message to the Principal of the school on 29.09.2016 saying that the principal has refused to meet the appellant on 24.09.2016. He then submits that on 30.09.2016, the appellant herein sent another letter to the Principal confirming that she had resigned and had requested that whenever the 7th pay commission recommendations for pay enhancement are implemented, any arrears of pay should be released and paid for the period she was in service. He submits that the appellant has received all the retiral benefits on 08.11.2016. He further submits -2- [2025:JHHC:26149] that on 14.12.2016, the appellant after two and half months, further submitted a letter of withdrawal of resignation and demanded reinstatement in service. He submits that the demand of withdrawal was further followed by the appellant by way of filing another letter on 05.01.2017 by the appellant. He also submits that the learned tribunal without appreciating the documents in the right prospective has dismissed the petition of the appellant, as such, the same is not in accordance with law.
5. According to him, in light of Rule-29(1) of the Affiliation Bye-Laws of Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), three months notice is necessary of acceptance of resignation, which has not been done. He further submits that the Principal is not the competent authority to accept the resignation and the competent authority is the Managing Committee of the school to accept the resignation, which has not been done and that is in violation of Rule-29(1) of the said Bye Laws and service condition of employee is para materia condition of the said Bye Laws. In these backgrounds, he submits that since the resignation letter was not accepted by the Managing Committee, the withdrawal of the resignation was fit to be allowed, however, that has been wrongly not done. He submits that cooling period of three months notice in terms of the said Bye Laws is also violated. He further submits that the law is well settled that before acceptance of resignation, the withdrawal can be made and to buttress his argument, he relied in the case of Secy. Technical Education U.P. & Ors. Versus Lalit Mohan Upadhyay & Anr., reported in (2007) 4 SCC 492 and he has placed reliance on para-19 of the said judgment, which is quoted hereinbelow:-
"19. There cannot be any quarrel on the settled principle of law that an employee is entitled to withdraw his resignation before its acceptance by the competent authority. We have gone through the decisions of this Court -3- [2025:JHHC:26149] in M/s J. K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Company Ltd., Kanpur v. State of U. P. & Ors. [AIR 1990 SC 1808] and Union of India & Ors. v. Gopal Chandra Misra & Ors. [(1978) 2 SCC 301] relied upon by the learned senior counsel for respondent No.1. He contended that before terminating the services of the respondent No.1 on the basis of the complaint of the girl student and subsequent inquiry reports of the Inquiry Officers, it was obligatory upon the Authority to hold regular departmental inquiry for the alleged misconduct and then to proceed against respondent No. 1 in accordance with relevant Rules. We are afraid to accept this submission. Admittedly, Shri L. M. Upadhyay was on probation and the Authority was empowered to judge his fitness for work or suitability to the post of teacher at the time of acceptance of his resignation. In our view, the services of Shri L.M. Upadhyay during probation period could have been terminated by the Authority, but the Principal and the Board of Governors had adopted a reasonable and fair mode of accepting his pending letter of resignation instead of terminating his services for unsuitability."
6. Placing reliance on the above judgment, he submits that before the acceptance by the competent authority, the said withdrawal was made and in view of that the learned tribunal has wrongly dismissed the petition filed by the appellant.
7. Learned counsel submits that the appellant has also sought information under the RTI Act from the Managing Committee and the information was provided by the competent authority that no such record is available with the Managing Committee. He further refers to Rule-29 of the said Bye-Laws and he submits that the acceptance of -4- [2025:JHHC:26149] resignation was the Rule by the Managing Committee, which has not been done in view of that the learned tribunal without appreciating all these facts has passed the order, as such, the same is not in accordance with law. On the same line, he relied in the case of Mala Tandon Thukral Versus Director of Education & Ors. reported in MANU/DE/0199/2010 and he refers to paras-12, 16 and 17 of the said judgment, which reads as under:-
"12. In the present day world of cut throat competition and growing unemployment it is not an easy task to secure a job. The W.P.(C) No. 7356/2008 pg. 10 petitioner no doubt was a regular employee appointed on the post of a primary teacher and it has to be borne in mind that nobody would ordinarily choose to resign from his/her job unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. As per the petitioner she was suffering from depression and when she consulted her family members, she immediately reviewed her decision and sought withdrawal of resignation but shockingly within just 24 hours the school authorities sought the approval of the resignation through circulation by the Managing Committee. This court is not finding any fault if in certain cases there is a requirement of any resolution to be passed by the Managing Committee by circulation but in any case the issue of resignation of the petitioner was not one such matter which required such an urgent attention of the members of the Managing Committee. Moreover, the members of the Managing Committee were required to append their signatures on the resolution already circulated and therefore also it cannot be inferred that the members of the Managing Committee took any independent and conscious decision on -5- [2025:JHHC:26149] the resolution sent by the school authorities. In all such cases, it is the moral duty of the W.P.(C) No. 7356/2008 pg. 11 Members of the Managing Committee, either to call the concerned employee to have his/her views behind tendering the resignation or through some other process so as to feel satisfied that the decision taken by the employee is voluntary and independent and not under any force, duress, coercion or because of some depression or unstable state of mind.
16. According to Wharton's Law Lexicon (15th Edition, page 1502) the word "resignation" has been derived from the maxim: Resionatio est juris proprii spontanea refutatio which means resignation is a spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right and in relation to an office, it connotes the act of giving up or relinquishing the office. Under the common law the resignation is not complete until it is accepted by the proper authority and before such acceptance an employee can change his mind and withdraw the resignation but once the resignation is accepted the contract comes to an end and the relationship of master and W.P.(C) No. 7356/2008 pg. 14 servant stands snapped. At the same time ,it has been held by the Apex court in Moti Ram vs. Param Dev (1993)2SCC725 that in the general juristic sense, in order to constitute a complete and operative resignation there must be the intention to give up or relinquish the office and the concomitant act of its relinquishment. It also held that:
"In cases where the act of relinquishment is of a bilateral character, the communication of the intention to relinquish, by itself, would not -6- [2025:JHHC:26149] be sufficient to result in relinquishment of the office and some action is required to be taken on such communication of the intention to relinquish, e.g., acceptance of the said request to relinquish the office, and in such a case the relinquishment does not become effective or operative till such action is taken. As to whether the act of relinquishment of an office is unilateral or bilateral in character would depend upon the nature of the office and conditions governing it."
17. Hence applying the same to the present case, the bilateral act of resignation required two conditions to be fulfilled:
(i) tendering of the resignation of the petitioner and acceptance by the respondent no.4 school; and
(ii) approval by the Directorate of Education within a period of thirty days The second condition being not fulfilled in the case, the W.P.(C) No. 7356/2008 pg. 15 resignation cannot be said to be operative."
On the same line, he further relied in the case of Gurunanak Higher Secondary School, Ranchi & Anr. Versus Subroto Chatteree, passed in A.C. (S.B.) No. 03 of 2007 by the co-ordinate bench of this court.
8. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that the case of the appellant is fully covered in light of the above judgments.
9. On these grounds, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that this appeal may kindly be allowed.
10. Per contra, Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (DPS School) at the outset submits that now the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation on 22.04.2023. He submits that after tendering the resignation, the appellant herein was working in Shree Gurunanak Public School, -7- [2025:JHHC:26149] Ramgarh Cantt, Ramgarh and in view of that it appears that the she was gainfully employed, as such, the petitioner is not entitled to be reinstated. By way of referring the resignation letter of the appellant, he submits that the said resignation was voluntarily and even she has stated that she will not give three months notice and she will pay the amount later on. By the letter dated 24.09.2016, she has asked to reimburse the leave encashment. He further submits that no dues certificate was issued by the school on 24.09.2016 itself, contained at Page-98 and 99 of the appeal. She was paid gratuity, leave encashment and thereafter she has demanded experience certificate from the school and the school has been pleased to issue the experience certificate to the appellant on 27.09.2016. She has accepted all the retiral dues on 30.09.2016 in writing and she has further requested with regard to intimation about the 7th pay commission and the withdrawal of resignation in writing was made 14.12.2016.
11. Learned senior counsel further submits that on 23.09.2016 itself the daughter of the appellant has sent a message on WhatsApp that her mother is suffering from jaundice and she has already resigned and formalities will be done in course of time. In this background, he submits that the appellant has accepted all the retiral dues and even she was gainfully employed, as such, the appellant is not entitled for anything. He submits that in light of the Bye Laws, there is no necessity of acceptance of the resignation letter by the Managing Committee. He further submits that the tendered resignation was voluntary one and in the aforesaid background, there was no need of acceptance of the same by the Managing Committee.
12. On the ground of acceptance of resignation is not necessary, he relied in the case of Om Dutta Sharma Versus State of Jharkhand reported in 2016 SCC OnLine Jhar 1744, particularly para-4(x) and 4(xiv), which is as under:-
"4(x) Thus, once the appellant is accepting an amount of full and final settlement -8- [2025:JHHC:26149] including for gratuity, the conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court, Jamshedpur in his order dated 10th December, 2003 is absolutely not tenable at law. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition bearing W.P.(C) No. 2888 of 2004 vide order dated 22nd June, 2010 which was preferred by the respondent- Management.
xiv) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manubhai Chhaganbhai Thakore vs. Union Bank of India and 2 others, as reported in (2008) (2) LLJ, 226 (Guj), especially at paragraph no. 11 thereof, has held as under; "11. As far as the issue involved in the Letters Patent Appeal is concerned, the appellant has filed the petition before the learned single Judge of this Court challenging the action of relieving the petitioner from service pursuant to acceptance of this resignation and requiring the respondent Bank to treat him as having continued in service. The appellant by his letter dated December 11,2001 submitted his resignation on the ground of health and requested for settlement of his dues. When the appellant has submitted his resignation he was not reported on his duty on account of ill health. After submitting his resignation on December 11, 2001, the appellant, by his letter dated December 26, 2001 requested for accepting the resignation with immediate effect and released him from the service immediately, since he was not keeping good health. The appellant has deliberately not produced the copy of the letter dated December 26, 2001 and his suppressed this -9- [2025:JHHC:26149] fact. On the contrary he has suggested in the petition that the resignation was to come into effect after three months from the date of submission of his resignation, which again is factually incorrect. The letter of resignation dated December 11, 2001 did not specific any date from which the appellant wanted to leave the service. The appellant being award staff, notice period required is one month and not 3 months as suggested by the appellant.
The appellant having resigned by his letter dated December 11, 2001, requested the bank to accept resignation immediately and release him as per the letter dated December 26, 2001. Acting on the request of the appellant the respondent Bank accepted his resignation and communicated acceptance of resignation as per the letter dated January 5, 2002. The notice period of 30 days would have expired on January 10, 2002, whereas the appellant was relieved on January 9, 2002 pursuant to the memorandum dated January 5, 2002 accepting his resignation. There was no withdrawal of resignation before January 10, 2002. As per the request of the appellant, the resignation was accepted with immediate effect vide memorandum dated January 5, 2002 and balance notice period was waived. It is only after the appellant was communicated acceptance of his resignation and was relieved from his services, he purported to seek withdrawal of his resignation by communication dated January 31, 2002. The respondent Bank is, therefore, justified in taking the stand that it was not open for the appellant to request for withdrawal of resignation after the same was accepted and -10- [2025:JHHC:26149] communicated to him. The reliance was rightly placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of North Zone Cultural Centre and Another V. Vedpathi Dindeshkumar, 2003-II-LLJ-839 (SC) and P.Lal v. Union of India and Another, 2003-II- LLJ164 (SC), wherein it is held that the resignation becomes effective from the date of acceptance and the same cannot be withdrawn after it is accepted. Even noncommunication of acceptance does not make the resignation inoperative. After the appellant was communicated the acceptance of his resignation and he was relieved from the service, the appellant has accepted his retirement dues without any demur or protest. The appellant was communicated acceptance of resignation with immediate effect as per letter dated January 5, 2002 of the Bank. The appellant applied for payment of P.F. And gratuity admissible to him. A gross amount of Rs. 4,23,497.34 ps. was admissible and payable to the appellant towards his P.F. Gratuity and other legal dues. However, there were different loans outstanding and payable by the appellant such as clean loan, P.F. Loan, advance against LFC, credit society loan, salary advance, personal loan, house repairing loan etc. The total amount recoverable from the appellant was Rs.4,05,311.34 ps. After adjusting the outstanding loan, balance amount has been paid to the appellant which he has accepted without any demur or protest. We are, therefore, of the view that the appellant has voluntarily submitted his resignation and his resignation having been accepted and communicated was not entitled to withdrawn -11- [2025:JHHC:26149] the same subsequently. Moreover, he having accepted the legal dues unconditionally even after his letter dated January 31, 2002 purporting to withdraw his resignation, cannot now challenge the action of the Bank of acceptance of his resignation and seek directions that he be continued in service of the respondent Bank."
(emphasis supplied)
13. He further submits that ex-post facto approval of resignation is also the Rule, in light of the judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Anirudh Kumar Pandey Versus Management of Modern Public School & Ors., reported in 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12051, where in paras-14 and 16, it has been held as follows:-
"14. The issue before us is as to whether in view of the Rule 114A of Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, the resignation letter of the appellant can be said to have been accepted on 12.09.2000 when it was duly accepted by the Managing Committee or on 15.11.2000 when the approval was accorded by DOE. It is a settled proposition of law that once a letter of resignation is accepted, it cannot be withdrawn and the withdrawal of resignation is permissible only before its acceptance. Rule 114A of Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, deals with the LPA 620/2017 Page 13 resignation by an employee of a recogonised private school. The relevant provision is produced as under:-
"Rule 114A. Resignation- The resignation submitted by an employee of a recognized private school shall be accepted within a period of thirty days from the date of the receipt of the resignation by the managing committee with the approval of the -12- [2025:JHHC:26149] Director.
Provided that if no approval is received within 30 days, then such approval would be deemed to have been received after the expiry of the said period."
16. It is clear that the language used in Rule 114A of Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, is "with the approval of Director." The Rule does not require that the resignation has to be accepted by the Managing Committee "with the prior approval" nor does it require that the Managing Committee should accept it "with the permission" of DoE. It simply states that the approval of the Director has to be sought. The approval therefore has to be post acceptance of resignation letter. The act of the Managing Committee holds good till the DoE disapprove their action and if it is not so disapproved and the approval is granted, then the act of the Managing Committee hold good from the date of its decision itself. This interpretation of the Rule is further ratified by the deeming provision contained in the Proviso of the said Rule, which clearly states that if no communication is LPA 620/2017 Page 16 received from DoE, the approval shall be deemed to have been accorded. Consequently, it is the decision of the Managing Committee which is final and approval can be accorded ex post facto."
15. Relying on the above two judgments, he submits that the case of the school is fully covered and in view of that there is no merit in this appeal. He further submits that it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Committee of Management Dayanand Arya Kanta Degree College and Ors. Versus Director of Higher Education, reported in (1998) 4 SCC 104, particularly in paras-3 and 4, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
-13-[2025:JHHC:26149] "3. There is no dispute to the fact that Smt.Manju Saraswat tendered resignation voluntarily and till today she had not withdrawn such resignation. There is also no dispute to the fact that the relevant time when the Managing Committee had accepted the said resignation, the said Managing Committee was in office both de facto and de jure by virtue of the interim order passed by the High Court in the writ proceeding in favour of the Managing Committee. In the aforesaid circumstances, the footing that the authorised controller had accepted the resignation tend by Smt. Manju Saraswat because the authorised controller was not in office at the relevant time when the voluntary resignation was accepted by the Managing Committee which was lawfully discharging the duties and functions of the Managing Committee. So far as the question of according approval by the Vice-Chancellor of the University is concerned, it may be pointed out that such approval is not contemplated under sub-section 3 of Section 35 of the Uttar Pradesh University Act, 1973 in the case of voluntary resignation by teacher. The said sub-section applies when decision to terminate the service of teacher whether by way of punishment or otherwise is taken by the management. If a teacher voluntarily tenders resignation and by that process withdraws from the service on own record, the question of termination of service does not arise. In this connection, reference may made to the decision of this Court in J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd.
Vs. State of U.P. (1990 (44) SCC 27). It has been held in the said decision that if an -14- [2025:JHHC:26149] employee voluntarily tenders resignation, it becomes an act of the employee who chooses to voluntarily give up job. Therefore, such situation will be covered by the expression voluntary retirement within the meaning of clause I of Section 2 (a) of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It has also been indicated in the said decision that if the resignation is not voluntarily but it is tendered on account of coersion, such resignation cannot be held to be voluntary act of the employee expressly deciding to withdraw from service.
4. We have already indicated that such is not the case in this appeal. Therefore, there was no occasion approval on a decision of the management to terminate the service of the concerned teacher. Since the Managing Committee which was lawfully in office at the relevant point of time and had accepted the voluntary resignation, the relationship of master and servant between the college authorities and Dr. Manju Saraswat had come to and end. Hence, there is on question of her continuance in the service in the said college. Mr. Vijay Bahugana, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent Dr. Manju Saraswat, has submitted that although such voluntary resignation was tendered by Dr. Manju Saraswat and the same had not been withdrawn by her, on account of some misconception, the fact remains that she had thereafter continued in service for long for which she had also been paid. Mr. Bahugana has submitted that the new Management has taken charge of the said college and it will be only appropriate if such Committee considers the case of Smt.Manju Saraswat sympathetically. It is not -15- [2025:JHHC:26149] necessary for this Court to make any observation on such submission of Mr. Bahugana. It will be open to the concerned Managing Committee to consider the representation, if made by Dr. Manju Saraswat, on its merit. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside without, however, any order as to costs."
16. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that the approval is not required in case of voluntary resignation.
17. Learned senior counsel further submits that the facts herein are very clear that this appellant has kept mum and after a substantial period, she has tried to withdraw her resignation and in view of that the principle of sub-silento come into play and to buttress his argument, he relied in the case of Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank Versus Neelam, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 91, where in paras-18 to 20, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:-
"18. It is trite that the courts and tribunals having plenary jurisdiction have discretionary power to grant an appropriate relief to the parties. The aim and object of the Industrial Disputes Act may be to impart social justice to the workman but the same by itself would not mean that irrespective of his conduct a workman would automatically be entitled to relief. The procedural laws like estoppel, waiver and acquiescence are equally applicable to the industrial proceedings. A person in certain situation may even be held to be bound by the doctrine of Acceptance Sub silentio. The Respondent herein did not raise any industrial dispute questioning the termination of her services within a reasonable time. She even accepted an alternative employment and has been continuing therein from 10.8.1988. In her -16- [2025:JHHC:26149] replication filed before the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court while traversing the plea raised by the Appellant herein that she is gainfully employed in HUDA with effect from 10.8.1988 and her services had been regularized therein, it was averred :
"6. The applicant workman had already given replication to the A.L.C. cum Conciliation Officer, stating therein that she was engaged by HUDA from 10.8.1988 as Clerk-cum-Typist on daily wage basis. The applicant workman has the right to come to the service of the management and she is interested to join them."
19. She, therefore, did not deny or dispute that she had been regularly employed or her services had been regularized. She merely exercised her right to join the service of the Appellant.
20. It is true that the Respondent had filed a writ petition within a period of three years but indisputably the same was filed only after the other workmen obtained same relief from the Labour Court in a reference made in that behalf by the State. Evidently in the writ petition she was not in a position to establish her legal right so as to obtain a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the Appellant herein to reinstate her in service. She was advised to withdraw the writ petition presumably because she would not have obtained any relief in the said proceeding. Even the High Court could have dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay or could have otherwise refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. The conduct of the Appellant in approaching the Labour Court after more than seven years had, therefore, -17- [2025:JHHC:26149] been considered to be a relevant factor by the Labour Court for refusing to grant any relief to her. Such a consideration on the part of the Labour Court cannot be said to be an irrelevant one. The Labour Court in the aforementioned situation cannot be said to have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction injudiciously, arbitrarily and capriciously warranting interference at the hands of the High Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution."
18. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that in light of the above judgment, the case of the school is strengthen, as such, there is no merit in the appeal.
19. Mr. Sushant Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 3 to 6 (Managing Committee) has adopted the arguments of learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents- School and submits that in the tribunal, the school and managing committee have jointly filed the written statement and the same ground has been taken.
20. In view of the above submissions of learned counsel appearing for the parties, the court has gone through the materials available on record including the judgment as well as the referred documents. It is an admitted position, which has not been denied in course of the argument by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the petitioner has now attained the age of superannuation on 22.04.2023. After tending the resignation, the appellant herein was working in Shree Gurunanak Public School, Ramgarh Cantt, Ramgarh and in view of that it appears that the she was gainfully employed. From the resignation letter of the appellant, it appears that the said resignation was voluntarily and even she has stated that she will not give three months notice and she will pay the amount later on. By the letter dated 24.09.2016, she has requested to reimburse the leave -18- [2025:JHHC:26149] encashment. No dues certificate was issued by the school on 24.09.2016 itself, contained at Page-98 and 99 of the appeal. Further she was paid gratuity, leave encashment and thereafter she has demanded experience certificate from the school and the school has been pleased to issue the experience certificate to the appellant on 27.09.2016. She has accepted all the retiral dues on 30.09.2016 in writing and she has further requested with regard to intimation about the 7th pay commission and the withdrawal in writing was made 14.12.2016. Further on 23.09.2016 itself the daughter of the appellant has sent a message on WhatsApp that her mother is suffering from jaundice and she has already resigned and formalities will be done in course of time. In this background the appellant has accepted all the retiral dues and even she was gainfully employed. Further in light of the Bye Laws, there is no necessity of acceptance of the resignation letter by the Managing Committee, as the tendered resignation was voluntary one and in the voluntary resignation, there was no need of acceptance of the same by the Managing Committee.
21. In view of the above, only question is remained to be answered in the present appeal, as to whether the resignation accepted was in accordance with law or not.
22. Rule 29 of the Affiliation Bye-Laws of Central Board of Secondary Education stipulates as under:-
"29. Termination of Service due to Abolition of Posts etc.
1. If an employee at any time after confirmation intends to resign he/she shall give three months notice in writing or three months salary including all allowances to the Managing Committee.
2. The Managing Committee shall also be competent to terminate the services of a confirmed employee only in case of abolition of a post due to closing down of school a class -19- [2025:JHHC:26149] or reduction in the number of sections of a class or discontinuance of a teaching subject by giving three months notice in writing or three months salary including all allowances.
3. The Managing Committee shall have the power to relax the period of notice or payment of salary in special circumstances."
23. In the Delhi Public School Society, New Delhi Rules, the term Termination of Service Due to Abolition of Posts Etc. has been described as under:-
"1. If an employee at any time after confirmation intends to resign he/she shall give three months notice in writing or three months salary including all allowances to the Managing Committee.
2. The Managing Committee shall also be competent to terminate the services of a confirmed employee only in case of abolition of a post due to closing down of school a class or reduction in the number of sections of a class or discontinuance of a teaching subject by giving three months notice in writing or three months salary including all allowances.
3. The Managing Committee shall have the power to relax the period of notice or payment of salary in special circumstances."
24. In view of the above two Rules, on which, heavy reliance has been placed by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, in transpires that the notice for three months is required with regard to resignation or three months salary is the substitution. However, the Managing Committee is having the power to relax the period of notice or payment of salary.
25. In the above Rules, it is not mandatory to accept the resignation by the managing committee. The fact remains that the appellant has resigned voluntarily that too with immediate effect that -20- [2025:JHHC:26149] was also strengthen in light of the whatsapp message of the daughter of the appellant and further in the aforesaid two Rules, there is no mandatory provision to accept the same by the managing committee. Admittedly, the appellant herein has received all the retiral benefits before the letter of withdrawal and thereafter she was employed in one of the school as discussed hereinabove. After such a long period only the resignation has been sought to be withdrawn and in view of that the doctrine of sub-silento certainly comes into play and the case of Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank (Supra) is fully fitted in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
26. Further the case relied by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant in Secy. Technical Education, U.P. & Ors. (Supra), in that case, there was an allegation against the respondent of indecent and objectionable behaviour and respondent of the case has stated that letter of resignation was written by him under the pressure and coercion of the principal and the respondent of the case has requested to hold the proper inquiry regarding the allegations against him and after that Hon'ble Apex court held that employee is entitled to withdraw his resignation before his acceptance by the competent authority, but respondent has to whisper regarding this in his earlier representation that he intend to withdraw his letter of resignation. But the case in hand, petitioner has herself accepted all the retiral benefits and she has also not whispered anything anywhere that she intends to withdraw her resignation and the facts of the present case is also otherwise, as such, the case relied by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is not helping the appellant.
27. Further the case relied by the learned counsel in Mala Tandon Thukral (Supra), in that case the petitioner has submitted her resignation on 05.12.2007 and 06.12.2007, she approached the principal and expressed her desire to withdraw her resignation and in that case court held that approval of resignation was not taken by the Director of -21- [2025:JHHC:26149] Education, but the case in hand, appellant is herself in conscious manner decided to sever her relationship with the employer and appellant of the present case herself taken the decision independently and without any coercion, as such, this case is also not helping the appellant.
28. Even the ex-post facto approval is not ruled out in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Anirudh Kumar Pandey (Supra), however that fact is not present in the present appeal, as the conduct of the appellant by way of withdrawing the retiral benefits taking the experience certificate and getting another employment in one of the school, clearly suggests that the appellant was not intended to go to that school and it was only the afterthought to withdrawn the resignation.
29. In view of the above discussions, facts and reasons, the court finds that there no perversity in the order of the learned tribunal. As such, no case of interference is made out, accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. Pending I.A., if any, stands dismissed.
30. Let the Trial Court Records be sent back to the learned Tribunal forthwith.
(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Amitesh/-
[A.F.R.] -22-