Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 15.5.2025 vs Himachal Pradesh Gramin Bank on 2 July, 2025
2025:HHC:20832 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision Nos. 196 of 2022 .
Reserved on: 15.5.2025 Date of Decision: 02.07.2025.
Ranjeet Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
Himachal Pradesh Gramin Bank, Kharsi
through its Branch Manager
...Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr. Sanket Sankhyan, Advocate. For the Respondent : Ms. Devyani Sharma, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Shivam Sharma, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition against the judgment dated 10.3.2022, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 14.2.2020, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 22025:HHC:20832 Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld and the appeal filed by the petitioner (accused before the .
learned Trial Court) was dismissed. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant is a Body Corporate constituted under the Regional Rural Bank Act, 1976. It is engaged in banking activities. The accused approached the complainant on 11.6.2013 for obtaining a loan of ₹21,05,000/- for the purchase of a new truck. The accused was to repay the loan in 72 equal monthly instalments plus a contractual rate of interest @13.25% per annum with monthly rests and 20% penal interest in case of default. The accused defaulted in depositing the monthly instalments. The complainant demanded money from the accused, and he issued the cheque for ₹16,81,425.40 to discharge his legal liability. The complainant presented the cheque to the bank, but it was ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 3 2025:HHC:20832 dishonoured with an endorsement 'insufficient funds'. The complainant sent a notice to the accused demanding the amount .
mentioned in the cheque from the complainant. The notice was duly served upon the accused, but he failed to pay the amount.
Hence, the complaint was filed against the accused for taking action against him as per the law.
3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The complainant examined Harinder Kumar (CW1) in support of its complaint.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he had approached the bank for seeking a loan of ₹21,05,000/-, which was duly sanctioned to him. He stated that he had handed over the security cheque to the complainant. No intimation regarding dishonour was received. Statements of Babu Ram (DW1) and Ravi Kumar (DW2) were recorded in defence.
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6. Learned Trial Court held that the issuance of the cheque was not disputed. The cheque carried with it the .
presumption that it was issued for consideration in discharge of legal liability. The evidence led by the accused was not sufficient to rebut this presumption. The sale was made as per the terms and conditions agreed between the parties. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement 'insufficient funds', and the accused failed to pay the amount despite receipt of a valid notice on demand. Hence, the accused was convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and pay compensation of ₹20.00 lacs.
7. Being aggrieved from the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Bilaspur (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused had failed to rebut the presumption attached to the cheque. His plea that the cheque was issued as a security was not proved.
The money realised under the CGTMSE Scheme was duly adjusted, and an amount of ₹16,81,425/- was due. The amount ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 5 2025:HHC:20832 of ₹7,30,000/- was realised on 3.8.2015 and 8.8.2015 by the sale, and it was also adjusted in the statement of account. The cheque .
was dishonoured with an endorsement 'funds insufficient' and the accused failed to pay the money despite receipt of a valid notice of demand. Learned Trial Court rightly appreciated the evidence. The sentence imposed was also adequate, and no interference was required with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal filed by the accused was dismissed.
8. Being aggrieved from the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the evidence. The bank claimed the amount due from the CGTMSC Scheme and failed to credit the same to the account of the accused. The plea taken by the accused that the blank signed security cheque was issued was highly probable in view of the statements of the defence witnesses. Learned Courts below erred in rejecting this plea. The interest was not calculated correctly, and the accused had no liability to pay ₹16,81,425/- on 17.10.2015. Therefore, it was prayed that the ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 6 2025:HHC:20832 present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside.
.
9. I have heard Mr. Sanket Sankhyan, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Ms. Devyani Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Shivam Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant.
10. Mr. Sanket Sankhyan, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below failed to appreciate the evidence on record. It was duly proved on record that the money under the CGTMSE Scheme was received by the complainant, which was not credited to the account of the accused. The accused had issued a blank signed cheque as security, which was misused by the complainant. The accused did not have the liability to pay the amount mentioned in the cheque at the time of its presentation. The cheque was not issued in the name of the complainant but in the account mentioned by the accused. Therefore, the complaint at the instance of the complainant is not maintainable. The notice was not served upon the accused; therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 7 2025:HHC:20832 by the learned Courts below be set aside. He relied upon the judgment titled Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel Vs. Hitesh .
Mahendrabhai Patel & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 1497 of 2022 in support of his submission.
11. Ms. Devyani Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/complainant, submitted that the learned Courts below had properly appreciated the evidence and this Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact while deciding the revisional jurisdiction. The payment made under the CGTMSE Scheme is not for the benefit of the borrower and is to be reimbursed to the fund. The amount realised by the sale of the vehicle was duly credited, and the submission that the accused had no subsisting liability is not acceptable. She prayed that the present petition be dismissed. She relied upon the judgments of Ajeet Kumar Kurup v. State Bank of Travancore WP(C) No. 25332 of 2016 (N), Kiran Sharma Vs. Brinda Jewellers and another, 2024:HHC:7951, India Saree Museum Vs. P. Kapurchand & others 1989 SCC OnLine Kar 124, Jeet Ram Vs. HP Gramin Bank 2023:HHC:2849, Yashpal Singh Vs. Guman Singh 2024:HHC:9540, Balak Ram Vs. Ajay Kumar Sharma and another 2024:HHC:8601, B.R. Bhatia Vs. Amarjit Singh 2024:HHC:10249, ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 8 2025:HHC:20832 Vee Kay Concast Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Stanely Products and anr. 2025 NCPHHC 20038, Vee Kay Concast Private Limited Vs. M/s Stanley .
Products and another 2023:PHHC:028762 and ICICI Bank Ltd. Vs. Prafull Chandra and others ILR (2007) II Delhi 250 in support of her submission.
12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
13. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:
(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: -
"10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short "CrPC") vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 9 2025:HHC:20832 provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the .
same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.
14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed:
"13. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 Cr. P.C., which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept into such proceedings. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chandra, (2012) 9 SCC 460, where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under:
"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with the law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 10 2025:HHC:20832 there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not .
exhaustive classes but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC."
15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed on page 169:
"12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the ground for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 11 2025:HHC:20832 "5. ... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order.
.
In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ..."
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) "14. ... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 12 2025:HHC:20832 records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional .
jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction."
14. In the above case, also conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its own view. This Court set aside the High Court's order holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis.
16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:
"16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 13 2025:HHC:20832 Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457], it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the .
absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative."
17. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
18. The cheque was issued in the name of Ranjeet Singh, Account No. 88865K00000049. The statement of account (Ex.DW2/A) mentions the account number as 8886JK00000049.
Therefore, it is apparent that the cheque was issued in the loan account of the accused. The amount deposited in the loan account of the accused is for the benefit of the complainant bank, which had advanced the loan. Therefore, the bank will fall within the definition of the holder in due course.
19. A similar cheque was issued in Sada Vijay Kumar Vs. State of Maharashtra 2012 SCC Online Bombay 1866. It was submitted that the complainant could not have filed the complaint, as it was not a payee. This contention was noticed in paras 8 and 9 as under: -
"8. The cheque was crossed and issued to the HDFC Bank Account, M/s. K. Sada Vijay Kumar Beedi Leaves Merchant against Account No. 3752790000051. The drawer of the ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 14 2025:HHC:20832 cheque was M/s. K. Sada Vijay Kumar Beedi Leaves Merchant, by authorised signatories of cheque No. 414892 drawn on the said Bank, dated 30th September, 2009. The cheque returning memo refers to K. Sada Vijay .
Kumar Beedi Leaves Merchant dated 30th September, 2009.
9. Mr. Tiwari submits that the legal position in an identically placed situation was indicated by this Court in the matter of Credential Finance Limited v. State of Maharashtra decided on 1st March, 2000, reported in (2000) 3 Mah LJ 544. The learned Single Judge of this Court giving reference to the provisions of Sections 7, 123, 124, 125 and 131 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 has held that there could not be any liability in terms of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act against the Payee of the cheque and the observations of the learned Additional Sessions Judge was disapproved."
20. The Bombay High Court held that the bank would be a holder in due course and entitled to file a complaint. It was observed: -
10. The same learned Single Judge in the matter of Ramesh Deshpande v. Panjab and Sind Bank, reported in (2000) 0 AIJ-MH 123889, by order dated 3rd April, 2000 explained the effect of drawee, drawer's cheque, bills of exchange, dishonor of cheque for insufficiency of fund in the account and placed reliance on the aforementioned Judgment of Credential Finance Limited Later order was carried to Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Panjab and Sind Bank v. Vinkar Sahakari Bank Ltd., reported in (2001) 7 SCC 721 overruled the Judgment and order dated 3rd April, 2000.
11. The cheques were post-dated cheques, totally valued at Rs. 3.70 crores. There is non-compliance with the decision of the meeting with the officials of the HDFC Bank in discharging of liability. In the banking system, a ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 15 2025:HHC:20832 borrower issues a cheque to the financier Bank from his account, and the same is credited to the loan account. In such an event, the endorsement as above is not unusual or illegal.
It was thus a payment made by the borrower to HDFC Bank in .
the loan account M/s. K. Sada Vijay Kumar and consequently, in terms of Section 9 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, the bank will be the holder in due course of the said cheque.
12. Section 9 of Negotiable Instrument Act conceive "Holder in due course" means any person who for consideration became the possessor of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque if payable to bearer, or the payee or indorsee thereof, if (payable to order), before the amount mentioned in it became payable, and without having sufficient cause to believe that any defect existed in the title of the person from whom he derived his title.
Thus, the three stipulations envisaged therein are necessarily carved out. These facts are explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter referred above.
13. The argument canvassed by Mr. Tiwari in respect of the non-existence of the drawee or the Payee, M/s. K. Sada Vijay Kumar and the drawer being the same, could not be prosecuted, is inconceivable. Section 139 of the Act reveals that the first factor to be satisfied for presumption is that such a person should be the Holder of the cheque. The complainant has to be either a payee or a holder in due course of the cheque. Legislative object behind the provisions has to be borne in mind and need not be defeated. The Bedrock of section 9 is the entitlement of the holder. The presumption available under Section 118(G) of the Negotiable Instrument Act comes into operation only at the time of the trial. In the present case, presumption will prevail against the Applicant. The cheque was issued by the Applicant in discharge of the liability of the loan to the Bank and naturally will have reference to his account where it was to be credited. The court has to presume a negotiable instrument to be for consideration unless the existence of consideration is disproved. Taking a survey of the above facts, the view expressed by the learned ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 16 2025:HHC:20832 Single Judge of this Court, having not been approved by the Supreme Court as recorded hereinabove, I find no force in the contentions of the Applicant." (Emphasis supplied) .
21. In the present case, the cheque was drawn in the account number mentioned on the cheque. The accused did not dispute in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.
that he had taken the loan from the complainant. It is not shown that the account number mentioned in the cheque is incorrect.
Therefore, the cheque was drawn by the accused in the loan account in his name. Since the loan account was maintained by the complainant and the complainant was entitled to the money deposited in the loan account, therefore, the complainant was the holder in the due course and entitled to file the complaint.
Hence, the submission that the cheque was not issued in the name of the complainant and the complaint filed by the complainant is not maintainable cannot be accepted.
22. The accused stated in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that the cheque was issued for a security purpose. Ravi Kumar (DW2) stated that there were no security cheques in the name of Ranjeet Singh in the loan case file of the Bank, and the Bank does not take security cheques at the time of ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 17 2025:HHC:20832 the sanction of the loan. Hence, the plea taken by the accused that he had issued blank security cheques is not proved by his .
witness.
23. Babu Ram (DW1) filed an affidavit (Ex.DW1/A) in which he stated that the accused had signed the documents;
however, the bank had not taken any cheque from the accused.
The statement of this witness also does not establish the defence that the accused had issued a blank security cheque in favour of the petitioner.
24. There is no other evidence to prove that the accused had issued blank security cheques in favour of the Bank, and the plea taken by the accused that he had issued blank signed security cheques in favour of the bank cannot be accepted.
25. The accused did not dispute that the cheque was issued by him. It was stated in para (g) of the grounds of revision that the complainant had taken the cheque from the accused in advance and filled the amount as per its connivance, which is evident from (Ex.C9) at Serial No.6(b). It was stated in para (g) of the grounds of revision that the cheque was never filled by the accused and there was tampering with the cheque. These two ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 18 2025:HHC:20832 pleas clearly show that the issuance of the cheque has not been disputed. It was laid down by this Court in Naresh Verma vs. .
Narinder Chauhan 2020(1) ShimLC 398 that where the accused had not disputed his signatures on the cheque, the Court has to presume that it was issued in discharge of legal liability and the burden would shift upon the accused to rebut the presumption.
It was observed: -
"8. Once signatures on the cheque are not disputed, the plea with regard to the cheque having not been issued towards discharge of lawful liability, rightly came to be rejected by learned Courts below. Reliance is placed upon Hiten P. Dalal v. Bartender Nath Bannerji, 2001 (6) SCC 16, wherein it has been held as under:
"The words 'unless the contrary is proved' which occur in this provision make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by 'proof' and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible. A fact is said to be proved when its existence is directly established or when, upon the material before it, the Court finds its existence to be so probable that a reasonable man would act on the supposition that it exists. Unless, therefore, the explanation is supported by proof, the presumption created by the provision cannot be said to be rebutted......"
9. S.139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.
::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 192025:HHC:20832 "26. Applying the proposition of law as noted above, in the facts of the present case, it is clear that the signature on the cheque, having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that the cheque was issued in .
discharge of debt or liability."
26. This position was reiterated in Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 75 wherein it was held at page 289:
"14. Once the 2nd appellant had admitted his signatures on the cheque and the deed, the trial court ought to have presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The trial court fell in error when it called upon the respondent complainant to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay. Such an approach of the trial court was directly in the teeth of the established legal position as discussed above, and amounts to a patent error of law."
27. Similar is the judgment in APS Forex Services (P) Ltd.
v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers (2020) 12 SCC 724, wherein it was observed: -
"7.2. What is emerging from the material on record is that the issuance of a cheque by the accused and the signature of the accused on the said cheque are not disputed by the accused. The accused has also not disputed that there were transactions between the parties. Even as per the statement of the accused, which was recorded at the time of the framing of the charge, he has admitted that some amount was due and payable. However, it was the case on behalf of the accused that the cheque was given by way of security, and the same has ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 20 2025:HHC:20832 been misused by the complainant. However, nothing is on record that in the reply to the statutory notice, it was the case on behalf of the accused that the cheque was given by way of security. Be that as it may, however, it is required .
to be noted that earlier the accused issued cheques which came to be dishonoured on the ground of "insufficient funds" and thereafter a fresh consolidated cheque of ₹9,55,574 was given which has been returned unpaid on the ground of "STOP PAYMENT". Therefore, the cheque in question was issued for the second time. Therefore, once the accused has admitted the issuance of a cheque which bears his signature, there is a presumption that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability under Section 139 of the NI Act. However, such a presumption is rebuttable in nature, and the accused is required to lead evidence to rebut such presumption. The accused was required to lead evidence that the entire amount due and payable to the complainant was paid.
9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and considering the fact that the accused has admitted the issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque and that the cheque in question was issued for the second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that even according to the accused some amount was due and payable, there is a presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. Of course, such presumption is rebuttable in nature. However, to rebut the presumption, the accused was required to lead evidence that the full amount due and payable to the complainant had been paid. In the present case, no such evidence has been led by the accused. The story put forward by the accused that the cheques were given by way of security is not believable in the absence of further evidence to rebut the presumption, and more particularly, the cheque in question was issued for the second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured. Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in not properly appreciating and ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 21 2025:HHC:20832 considering the presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability as per Section 139 of the NI Act. It appears that both the learned trial court as well as the High Court have .
committed an error in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove the debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act. As observed above, Section 139 of the Act is an example of reverse onus clause and therefore, once the issuance of the cheque has been admitted and even the signature on the cheque has been admitted, there is always a presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or liability and thereafter, it is for the accused to rebut such presumption by leading evidence."
28. The presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Triyambak S. Hegde v.
Sripad, (2022) 1 SCC 742: (2022) 1 SCC (Civ) 512: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 788 as under at page 747:
"12. From the facts arising in this case and the nature of the rival contentions, the record would disclose that the signature on the documents at Exts. P-6 and P-2 are not disputed. Ext. P-2 is the dishonoured cheque based on which the complaint was filed. From the evidence tendered before the JMFC, it is clear that the respondent has not disputed the signature on the cheque. If that be the position, as noted by the courts below, a presumption would arise under Section 139 in favour of the appellant who was the holder of the cheque. Section 139 of the NI Act reads as hereunder:
"139. Presumption in favour of the holder. --It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 22 2025:HHC:20832 nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability."
13. Insofar as the payment of the amount by the appellant .
in the context of the cheque having been signed by the respondent, the presumption for passing of the consideration would arise as provided under Section 118(a) of the NI Act, which reads as hereunder:
"118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments. -- Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:
(a) of consideration: that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration."
14. The above-noted provisions are explicit to the effect that such presumption would remain until the contrary is proved. The learned counsel for the appellant in that regard has relied on the decision of this Court in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan [K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, (1999) 7 SCC 510:
1999 SCC (Cri) 1284] wherein it is held as hereunder: (SCC pp. 516-17, para 9) "9. As the signature in the cheque is admitted to be that of the accused, the presumption envisaged in Section 118 of the Act can legally be inferred that the cheque was made or drawn for consideration on the date which the cheque bears. Section 139 of the Act enjoins the Court to presume that the holder of the cheque received it for the discharge of any debt or liability. The burden was on the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption. The trial court was not persuaded to rely on the interested testimony of DW 1 to rebut the presumption. The said finding was upheld [Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan v. K. Bhaskaran, Criminal Appeal No. 234 of 1995, order ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 23 2025:HHC:20832 dated 23-10-1998 (Ker)] by the High Court. It is not now open to the accused to contend differently on that aspect."
.
15. The learned counsel for the respondent has, however, referred to the decision of this Court in Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa [Basalingappa v. Mudibasa ppa, (2019) 5 SCC 418: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 571] wherein it is held as hereunder: (SCC pp. 432-33, paras 25-26) "25. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in the above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in the following manner:
25.1. Once the execution of the cheque is admitted, Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability.
25.2. The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption, and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.
25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or the accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely.
25.4. That it is not necessary for the accused to come into the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.
25.5. It is not necessary for the accused to come into the witness box to support his defence.::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 24
2025:HHC:20832
26. Applying the preposition of law as noted above, in the facts of the present case, it is clear that the signature on the cheque, having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that .
the cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability. The question to be looked into is as to whether any probable defence was raised by the accused. In the cross-examination of PW 1, when the specific question was put that a cheque was issued in relation to a loan of Rs 25,000 taken by the accused, PW 1 said that he does not remember.
PW 1 in his evidence admitted that he retired in 1997, on which date he received a monetary benefit of Rs 8 lakhs, which was encashed by the complainant. It was also brought in evidence that in the year 2010, the complainant entered into a sale agreement for which he paid an amount of Rs 4,50,000 to Balana Gouda towards sale consideration. Payment of Rs 4,50,000 being admitted in the year 2010 and further payment of loan of Rs 50,000 with regard to which Complaint No. 119 of 2012 was filed by the complainant, a copy of which complaint was also filed as Ext. D-2, there was a burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity. In the years 2010-2011, as per own case of the complainant, he made a payment of Rs 18 lakhs. During his cross-examination, when the financial capacity to pay Rs 6 lakhs to the accused was questioned, there was no satisfactory reply given by the complainant. The evidence on record, thus, is a probable defence on behalf of the accused, which shifted the burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity and other facts."
16. In that light, it is contended that the very materials produced by the appellant and the answers relating to lack of knowledge of property details by PW 1 in his cross- examination would indicate that the transaction is ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 25 2025:HHC:20832 doubtful, and no evidence is tendered to indicate that the amount was paid. In such an event, it was not necessary for the respondent to tender rebuttal evidence, but the case put forth would be sufficient to indicate that the .
respondent has successfully rebutted the presumption.
17. On the position of law, the provisions referred to in Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act, as also the enunciation of law as made by this Court, need no reiteration as there is no ambiguity whatsoever. In Basalingappav. Mudibasappa [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 571] relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent, though on facts the ultimate conclusion therein was against raising presumption, the facts and circumstances are entirely different as the transaction between the parties as claimed in the said case is peculiar to the facts of that case where the consideration claimed to have been paid did not find favour with the Court keeping in view the various transactions and extent of amount involved. However, the legal position relating to the presumption arising under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act on signature being admitted has been reiterated. Hence, whether there is a rebuttal or not would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case."
29. This position was reiterated in Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant, (2022) 6 SCC 735: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 726: (2022) 3 SCC (Civ) 442: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 302, wherein it was held at page 739:
"8. It is true that this is a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 139 of the NI Act provides that the court shall presume that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. This presumption, however, is ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 26 2025:HHC:20832 expressly made subject to the position being proved to the contrary. In other words, it is open to the accused to establish that there is no consideration received. It is in the context of this provision that the theory of "probable .
defence" has grown. In an earlier judgment, in fact, which has also been adverted to in Basalingappa [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 571], this Court notes that Section 139 of the NI Act is an example of reverse onus (see Rangappa v. Sri Mohan [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441: (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 477: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 184]). It is also true that this Court has found that the accused is not expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof. It is accordingly that the principle has developed that all which the accused needs to establish is a probable defence. As to whether a probable defence has been established is a matter to be decided on the facts of each case on the conspectus of evidence and circumstances that exist..."
30. Similar is the judgment in P. Rasiya v. Abdul Nazer, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1131, wherein it was observed:
"As per Section 139 of the N.I. Act, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Therefore, once the initial burden is discharged by the Complainant that the cheque was issued by the accused and the signature and the issuance of the cheque are not disputed by the accused, in that case, the onus will shift upon the accused to prove the contrary that the cheque was not for any debt or other liability. The presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act is a statutory presumption and thereafter, once it is presumed that the cheque is issued in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which is in favour of the ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 27 2025:HHC:20832 Complainant/holder of the cheque, in that case, it is for the accused to prove the contrary."
31. This position was reiterated in Rajesh Jain v. Ajay .
Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1275, wherein it was observed at page 161:
33. The NI Act provides for two presumptions: Section 118 and Section 139. Section 118 of the Act inter alia directs that it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act stipulates that "unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that the holder of the cheque received the cheque for the discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability". It will be seen that the "presumed fact" directly relates to one of the crucial ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 138. [The rules discussed hereinbelow are common to both the presumptions under Section 139 and Section 118 and are hence not repeated--reference to one can be taken as reference to another]
34. Section 139 of the NI Act, which takes the form of a "shall presume" clause, is illustrative of a presumption of law. Because Section 139 requires that the Court "shall presume" the fact stated therein, it is obligatory for the Court to raise this presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of the presumption had been established. But this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary, as is clear from the use of the phrase "unless the contrary is proved".
35. The Court will necessarily presume that the cheque had been issued towards the discharge of a legally enforceable debt/liability in two circumstances. Firstly, when the drawer of the cheque admits issuance/execution of the cheque and secondly, in the event where the complainant proves that the cheque was issued/executed ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 28 2025:HHC:20832 in his favour by the drawer. The circumstances set out above form the fact(s) which bring about the activation of the presumptive clause. [Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg.
Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal [Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg.
.
Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal, (1999) 3 SCC 35]]
36. Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding that presumption takes effect even in a situation where the accused contends that a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily signed and handed over by him to the complainant. [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40] ]. Therefore, the mere admission of the drawer's signature, without admitting the execution of the entire contents in the cheque, is now sufficient to trigger the presumption.
37. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by the accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device under Section 139 of the Act helps shifting the burden on the accused. The effect of the presumption, in that sense, is to transfer the evidential burden on the accused of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability. Until this evidential burden is discharged by the accused, the presumed fact will have to be taken to be true, without expecting the complainant to do anything further.
38. John Henry Wigmore [John Henry Wigmore and the Rules of Evidence: The Hidden Origins of Modern Law] on Evidence states as follows:
"The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent but if the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the Judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption 'disappears as a ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 29 2025:HHC:20832 rule of law and the case is in the Jury's hands free from any rule'."
39. The standard of proof to discharge this evidential .
burden is not as heavy as that usually seen in situations where the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of an accused. The accused is not expected to prove the non- existence of the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused must meet the standard of "preponderance of probabilities", similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding. [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441: (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 477: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 184: AIR 2010 SC 1898]]
32. Thus, the Court has to start with a presumption that the cheque was issued by the accused for consideration, and the burden is upon the accused to rebut this presumption.
33. It was submitted that the amount of ₹ 10,09,314/-
was received under the CGTMSE Scheme, and this amount was not credited to the account. The copy of the scheme has been filed. Responsibility of the lending institution provided in Para 7(v) reads that the payment of the guarantee claim by the trust to the lending institution does not take away the responsibility of the lending institution to recover the entire outstanding amount from the borrower and the lender shall initiate necessary actions for the recovery of the outstanding amount. It was laid down by the Kerala High Court in Ajit Kumar (supra) that the CTMSE Scheme is an insurance scheme to protect the ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 30 2025:HHC:20832 interest of the bank, and the benefits are to be reimbursed after realising the dues from the borrower. It was observed:
.
"3. As noted above, the case of the petitioners is that since the credit facility availed by the second petitioner is covered by the CGTMSE Scheme, they have no liability to liquidate the outstanding in the account. The petitioners, having obtained a judgment from this Court earlier permitting them to liquidate the liability in the loan account in instalments, according to me, are not entitled to file a fresh writ petition on the aforesaid ground. In other words, this is a contention which might, and ought to have been raised in the earlier writ petition. Further, there is also no substance in the contention of the petitioners that they have no liability to liquidate the outstanding in the loan account since the credit facility availed by the second petitioner is covered by the CGTMSE Scheme. CGTMSE Scheme is an insurance scheme to protect the interest of the banks in the event of default by the borrowers, and the premium payable for the coverage of the loan under the scheme is debited from the account of the borrowers based on the terms of the agreements executed by the borrowers. The benefits of the Scheme are to be reimbursed by the banks after realising the dues from the borrowers concerned. If the contention of the petitioners is accepted, the borrowers will have no obligation to repay the loans/credit facilities availed."
34. A similar view was taken by this Court in Jeet Ram (supra), wherein it was observed: -
"11. During proceedings of the case, Ms. Devyani Sharma, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent- complainant/bank invited attention of this court to Credit Guarantee Fund Scheme for Micro and Small Enterprises, under which, some amount is alleged to have been ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 31 2025:HHC:20832 recovered, to state that amount, if any, recovered under this scheme is liable to be repaid to the Central Government."
.
35. A similar view was taken in Indian Overseas Bank vs. Global Marine Products 2003 STPL 580 Kerala, wherein it was observed:
9. The appellant has contended that though the total loss claimed by the appellant was much more, the ECGC of India Ltd. admitted only a lesser amount and paid the same. It is clear from Clause 18 of Ext. A65 agreement entered into between the appellant and the ECGC of India Ltd. that the amount paid by the Corporation to the appellant is on condition that the appellant should institute recovery proceedings against exporter or any other person from whom such recovery can be effected towards the insured debt and after recovery the amount as well as the cost incurred for recovery should be apportioned between the appellant and the ECGC of India Ltd. in accordance with the proportion stipulated in the agreement. Therefore the payments made by the ECGC to the appellant, being insured is only for the purpose of making good the proportionate loss admitted by the ECGC subject to recovery of the same under due process of law from the exporter or from any other person from whom such amount can be recovered and apportioned as per the ratio provided in the insurance agreement. Hence, that amount paid by the ECGC to the appellant in terms of the insurance agreement cannot be credited to the account of the first defendant exporter from whom the amounts are due and to be recovered by the appellant towards the claim.::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 32
2025:HHC:20832
36. Therefore, the submission that the money paid under the Scheme is to be credited to the account of the accused and he .
is not liable to pay the amount cannot be accepted.
37. It was submitted that the bank seized the vehicle and did not credit the sale proceeds to the account of the accused.
This submission is not correct. The statement of account shows that an amount of ₹1,80,000/- was credited on 3.8.2015, being 25% of the auction amount, and ₹5,50,000/- was credited on 8.8.2015, being the remaining amount of the sale. Thus, the bank had credited the sale proceeds to the account, and the amount of ₹16,81,425.40 was payable on 28.9.2015. The cheque was issued for this amount on 17.10.2015; therefore, the accused had a subsisting liability to pay the amount on the date of presentation of the cheque. Hence, the judgment in Dashrath (supra) does not apply to the present case.
38. Harinder Kumar (CW1) stated that the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement 'insufficient funds', which is corroborated by the memo (Ex.C3), which mentions the reason for dishonour as 'insufficient funds'. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v.
::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 332025:HHC:20832 Nimesh B. Thakore, (2010) 3 SCC 83: (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 625: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 155 that the memo issued by the .
Bank is presumed to be correct and the burden is upon the accused to rebut the presumption. It was observed at page 95:
24. Section 146, making a major departure from the principles of the Evidence Act, provides that the bank's slip or memo with the official mark showing that the cheque was dishonoured would, by itself, give rise to the presumption of dishonour of the cheque, unless and until that fact was disproved. Section 147 makes the offences punishable under the Act compoundable.
39. In the present case, no evidence was produced to rebut the presumption, and the learned Courts below had rightly held that the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement 'insufficient funds'.
40. Harinder Kumar (CW1) stated that the complainant had issued a notice (Ex.C4) to the accused through registered post. The receipt (Ex.C5) was also placed on record. This notice was sent to the address mentioned by the accused in the notice of accusation; the statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., and the personal bonds furnished before the learned Trial Court. Therefore, the notice was sent to the correct address and is being deemed to have been served.::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 34
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41. It was laid down in C.C. Allavi Haji vs. Pala Pelly Mohd.
2007(6) SCC 555 that the person who claims that he had not .
received the notice has to pay the amount within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the summons from the Court and in case of failure to do so, he cannot take the advantage of the fact that notice was not received by him. It was observed:
"It is also to be borne in mind that the requirement of giving of notice is a clear departure from the rule of Criminal Law, where there is no stipulation of giving of notice before filing a complaint. Any drawer who claims that he did not receive the notice sent by post, can, within 15 days of receipt of summons from the court in respect of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, make payment of the cheque amount and submit to the Court that he had made payment within 15 days of receipt of summons (by receiving a copy of the complaint with the summons) and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be rejected. A person who does not pay within 15 days of receipt of the summons from the Court along with the copy of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, cannot obviously contend that there was no proper service of notice as required under Section 138, by ignoring statutory presumption to the contrary under Section 27 of the G.C. Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act. In our view, any other interpretation of the proviso would defeat the very object of the legislation. As observed in Bhaskaran's case (supra), if the giving of notice in the context of Clause (b) of the proviso was the same as the receipt of notice a trickster cheque drawer would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by adopting different strategies and escape from legal consequences of Section 138 of the Act."
(Emphasis supplied) ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 35 2025:HHC:20832
42. The accused did not pay the amount to the complainant despite the receipt of a valid notice of demand.
.
Therefore, it was duly proved on record that the accused had issued the cheque in discharge of the legal liability, but this cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement 'insufficient funds' and the accused failed to pay the amount despite the deemed receipt of the notice of demand. Hence, the complainant had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act.
43. The learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bir Singh v.
Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 138 that the penal provisions of Section 138 is deterrent in nature. It was observed at page 203:
"6. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable instruments, including cheques, and to encourage and promote the use of negotiable instruments, including cheques, in financial transactions. The penal provision of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended to be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable instruments such as cheques without serious intention to ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 36 2025:HHC:20832 honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same."
44. Keeping in view the deterrent nature of the sentence .
to be awarded, the sentence of three months cannot be said to be excessive, and no interference is required with it.
45. Learned Trial Court had ordered the accused to pay a compensation of ₹20.00 lacs to the complainant. The cheque of ₹16,81,425/- was issued on 17.10.2015, and the sentence was imposed on 14.2.2020 after the expiry of more than four years.
The complainant lost interest on the amount which it would have obtained by lending the amount to other persons. The complainant also paid the litigation expenses for filing the complaint. He was entitled to be compensated for the same. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kalamani Tex v.
P. Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25:
(2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 75 that the Courts should uniformly levy a fine up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum. It was observed at page 291:-
19. As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf of the respondent, we are conscious of the settled principles that the object of Chapter XVII of NIA is not only punitive but also compensatory and restitutive. The provisions of NIA envision a single window for criminal ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS 37 2025:HHC:20832 liability for the dishonour of a cheque as well as civil liability for the realisation of the cheque amount. It is also well settled that there needs to be a consistent approach towards awarding compensation, and unless there exist .
special circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy fines up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest @ 9% p.a. [R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260, para 20: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 79: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 520]"
46. The amount of ₹3,18,574.60 awarded as compensation on an amount of ₹16,81,425/- cannot be said to be excessive, and no interference is compensation awarded by the learned Trial Court.
r required with the
47. No other point was urged.
48. In view of the above, the present revision fails, and the same is dismissed.
49. Records of the learned Courts below be sent back forthwith, along with a copy of this judgment.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 2nd July, 2025 (Chander) ::: Downloaded on - 02/07/2025 21:23:09 :::CIS