National Green Tribunal
Hotel Claridges Nabha Residence ... vs Uttarakhand Environment Protection ... on 8 August, 2025
Item No. 01 Court No. 1
BEFORE THE NATIONAL GREEN TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
Appeal No. 29/2025
(I.A. No. 287/2025 & I.A. No, 286/2025)
Hotel Claridges Nabha Residence, Mussoorie Appellant
Versus
Uttarakhand Pollution Control Board Respondent
Date of hearing: 08.08.2025
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRAKASH SHRIVASTAVA, CHAIRPERSON
HON'BLE DR. A. SENTHIL VEL, EXPERT MEMBER
Appellant: Mr. Dhaval Mehrotra, Mr. Rahul Garg & Ms. Aditi Desai, Advocates
Respondent: Mr. Mukesh Verma & Ms. Vatsala Tripathi, Advs. for UKPCB (Through
VC)
ORDER
1. By this appeal filed under Section 18(1) read with Section 16 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (NGT, Act), Appellant has challenged the order dated 08.11.2024 by which the Uttarakhand Pollution Control Board has levelled the environmental compensation of Rs.28,80,000/- and directed the appellant to deposit it within one month.
2. On the previous date, on 17.04.2025, the Tribunal had granted time to the counsel for the appellant to examine the issue of limitation.
3. The appeal is barred by time, therefore, appellant has filed I.A. No. 286/2025 seeking condonation of delay. In the application, the plea of the applicant is that there is a delay of only 5 days in filing the appeal, therefore, condonation of delay of 5 days has been sought.
14. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that though the impugned order was passed on 08.11.2024, but it was received by the appellant on 14.12.2024. He submits that it is an erroneous order passed in a mechanical manner, therefore the delay is required to be condoned. He submits that the facts which are recorded in the order are wrong and, on that basis, the impugned order could not have been passed. He submits that because it is an order of reassessment of the environmental compensation, therefore, the appeal should be treated within time. He submits that the knowledge of this order was acquired on 16.01.2025, therefore, there is only a delay of 5 days in filing the appeal.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record.
6. Section 16 of the NGT, Act provides for 30 days limitation for filing the appeal before the Tribunal. The proviso to section 16 of the act stipulates that the delay not exceeding 60 days can be condoned by the Tribunal, if the Tribunal is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within 30 days. Thus, in terms of Section 16 of the NGT Act, the outer limit for condoning the delay and entertaining an appeal is 90 days.
7. The Tribunal in the order dated 24.07.2014 passed in M.A. No. 573/2013 in Appeal No. 67 of 2013 in the matter of Sunil Kumar Samanta Vs. West Bengal Pollution Control Board & Ors. has held: -
"9. A bare reading of the above provision shows that appeal as contemplated under Section 16 against an order or decision or direction or determination, has to be filed within 30 days from the date on which the order is communicated to the aggrieved persons. Proviso to Section 16 of the NGT Act provides for a special limitation i.e. the appeal could be filed beyond the period of 30 days within a further period not exceeding 60 days, upon showing 'sufficient cause'. This means the tribunal cannot allow an appeal to be filed under Section 16 beyond a total period of 90 days. The NGT Act is a 2 self-contained code as it provides for the forum, procedure, limitation, functions and powers of the tribunal. Furthermore, the scheme of the NGT Act, particularly, with reference to the language of Section 16 of the NGT Act, provides special limitation period. Thus, it necessarily excludes the operation of the general law of limitation. The provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be harmoniously construed with the provisions prescribing special limitation under the NGT Act as in that event it would defeat the very purpose of the NGT Act. A limitation provided under special law must prevail over the general law of limitation; particularly in face of the overriding effect given to the NGT Act by the framers of the law in terms of Section 33 of the NGT Act. In terms of Section 33, the provisions of the NGT Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force. The cumulative effect of all these factors would be that the special limitation prescribed under the NGT Act does not admit any exception to attract the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act. Section 16 of the NGT Act controls the very institution of an appeal in the Registry of the Tribunal. In terms of Section 16, the appeal can be filed 'within a further period not exceeding 60 days' but thereafter the Tribunal is not vested with the power to allow the appeal to be filed beyond the total period of 90 days. Thus, the tribunal loses its jurisdiction to entertain an appeal after the expiry of the special period of limitation provided under proviso to Section 16 of the NGT Act.
10. A bench of five members of the National Green Tribunal, in the case of Nikunj Developers v. State of Maharashtra, 2013 All India NGT Reporter (Delhi) (1) 40, after discussing various judgments of the Supreme Court had taken the view that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond a period of 90 days, even if a sufficient cause is shown and the provisions of the Limitation Act including Section 5 are excluded. The tribunal held as under:
"19. From language of the above provision it is clear that the Tribunal loses jurisdiction to condone the delay if the delay is of more than 90 days. Every appeal has to be filed within 30 days from the date of communication of the order. That is, what an applicant is required to ensure before the appeal is heard on merits. However, the Tribunal has been vested with the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal which is filed after 30 days from the date of communication of an order. This power to condone the delay has a clear inbuilt limitation as it ceases to exist if the appeal is filed in excess of 60 days, beyond the prescribed period of limitation of 30 days from the date of communication of such order. To put it simply, once the period of 90 days lapses from the date of communication of the order, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the delay. The language of the provision is clear and explicit. It admits of no ambiguity and the legislative intent that Tribunal should not and cannot condone the delay in excess of 90 days in all, is clear from the plain language of the provision.
20. As stated in the cases Hiralal Ratan Lal and India Houses (supra) the period of limitation statutorily prescribed, has to be strictly adhered to and cannot be relaxed and or departed from, on equitable consideration. Further, in construing a statutory provision, the first and the foremost rule of construction is that 3 of literary construction. We do not see any reason to expand the scope of the provision and interpret the proviso to Section 16 in the manner that Tribunal can be vested with the power of condoning the delay beyond 90 days. Such interpretation would be contrary to the specific language of the Section and would defeat the very legislative intent and object behind this provision.
21. This controversy need not detain us any further as it is no more res integra and stands answered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and others (2010) 5 SCC 23 where the court held as under:
"29. Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which is substantially similar to Section 125 of the Electricity Act came to be interpreted in Union of India v. Popular Construction Company : (2001) 8 SCC 470. The precise question considered in that case was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable to an application challenging an award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The two Judge Bench referred to earlier decisions in Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi: (1976) 1 SCC 392, Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel AIR 1964 SC 1099, Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. L.N. Mishra (supra), Patel Naranbhai Marghabhai v. Dhulabhai Galbabhai : (1992) 4 SCC 264 and held:
12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are "but not thereafter"
used in the proviso to Sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase "but not thereafter"
wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.
16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award "in accordance with" Sub-section (2) and Sub- section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, Sub section (3) would not be an application "in accordance with" that Sub-section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that 4 "where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired ... the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court".
This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award expired, the court was required to "proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow" (Section 17). Now the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
(emphasis supplied)
30. In Singh Enterprises v. C.C.E., Jamshedpur and Ors. (supra), the Court interpreted Section 35 of Central Excise Act, 1944, which is pari materia to Section 125 of the Electricity Act and observed:
8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the Tribunal being creatures of statute are vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short "the Limitation Act") can be availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication to him of the decision or order. However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days' time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was 5 no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days' period.
(emphasis supplied)"
22. The same view was reiterated in Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise v. Punjab Fibres Ltd. : (2008) 3 SCC 73.
"31. In Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited and Anr. (2009) 5 SCC 791, a three-Judge Bench considered the scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and held that High Court has no power to condone delay beyond the period specified in Section 35H thereof. The argument that Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked for condonation of delay was rejected by the Court and observed:
"30. In the earlier part of our order, we have adverted to Chapter VI-A of the Act which provides for appeals and revisions to various authorities. Though Parliament has specifically provided an additional period of 30 days in the case of appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent about the number of days if there is sufficient cause in the case of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Also an additional period of 90 days in the case of revision by the Central Government has been provided. However, in the case of an appeal to the High Court under Section 35G and reference application to the High Court under Section 35H, Parliament has provided only 180 days and no further period for filing an appeal and making reference to the High Court is mentioned in the Act.
32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35B, 35EE, 35G and 35H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days.
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35. It was contended before us that the words "expressly excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here in this case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein is such that 6 the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court.
(emphasis supplied)
32. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory."
23. Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 uses the expression 'not thereafter' while the provision under our consideration uses the terms 'not exceeding'. Both these expressions use negative language. The intention is to divest the Courts/Tribunals from power to condone the delay beyond the prescribed period of limitation. Once such negative language is used, the application of provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act or such analogous provisions would not be applicable.
24. The use of negative words has an inbuilt element of 'mandatory'. The intent of legislation would be to necessarily implement those provisions as stated.
25. Introduction or alteration of words which would convert the mandatory into directory may not be permissible. Affirmative words stand at a weaker footing than negative words for reading the provisions as 'mandatory'. It is possible that in some provision, the use of affirmative words may also be so limiting as to imply a negative. Once negative expression is evident upon specific or necessary implication, such provisions must be construed as mandatory. The legislative command must take precedence over equitable principle. The language of Section 16 of the NGT Act does not admit of any ambiguity, rather it is explicitly clear that the framers of law did not desire 7 to vest the Tribunal with powers, specific or discretionary, of condoning the delay in excess of total period of 90 days. At this stage, we may also refer to Principle of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 13th Edition, where it is stated as under:
"(c) Use of negative words Another mode of showing a clear intention that the provision enacted is mandatory, is by clothing the command in a negative form. As stated by CRAWFORD:
"Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory. And this is so even though the statute provides no penalty for disobedience." As observed by SUBBARAO, J.: "Negative words are clearly prohibitory and are ordinarily used as a legislative device to make a statute imperative". Section 80 and Section 87-B of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; section 77 of the Railways Act, 1890; Section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947; section 213 of the Succession Act, 1925; section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947; section 7 of the Stamp Act, 1899; section 108 of the Companies Act, 1965; section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954; section 55 of the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972 (as amended in 1956); section 10A of Medical Council Act, 1965 (as amended in 1993) and similar other provisions have therefore, been construed as mandatory. A provision requiring 'not less than three months' notice' is also for the same reason mandatory.
But the principle is not without exception. Section 256 of the Government of India, 1953, was construed by the Federal Court as directory though worded in the negative form. Directions related to solemnization of marriages though using negative words have been construed as directory in cases where the enactments in question did not provide for the consequence that the marriage in breach of those directions shall be invalid. Considerations of general inconvenience, which would have resulted in holding these enactments mandatory, appear to have outweighed the effect of the negative words in reaching the conclusion that they were in their true meaning merely director. An interesting example, where negative words have been held to be directory, is furnished in the construction of section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, where compliance of clause (c) has been held to be directory; although compliance of clauses (a) and (b) which are connected by the same negative words is understood as mandatory. These cases illustrate that the rule, that negative words are usually mandatory, is like any other rule subordinate to the context, and the object intended to be achieved by the particular requirement."
26. The provision of Section 16 of the NGT Act are somewhat similar to Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Thus, adopting an analogous reasoning, as was adopted in Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (supra), we would have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that we have no 8 jurisdiction to condone the delay when the same is in excess of 90 days from the date of communication of the order to any person aggrieved.
27. Thus, the application must fail on this ground alone. We are of the considered view that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the delay of 19 days in filing the present appeal, the same being in excess of 90 days computed from the admitted date of communication of order, that is 2nd June, 2012."
11. The above view of the tribunal was followed by different Benches of this tribunal in the case of M/s. Krishna Stone Crushers v. Haryana State Pollution Control Board, 2014 (1) All India NGT Reporter (1) (Delhi) 42. In the case of Aradhana Bhargav v. Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2013 All India NGT Reporter (2) (Bhopal) 1, besides following the law stated in Nikunj Developers (supra), the bench also clearly held that a special enactment, which specifically provides period of limitation would exclude the general law of limitation. Similar view was also expressed by another Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Ms. Medha Patkar v. MoEF & Ors., 2013 All India NGT reporter (Delhi) 285.
12. In all the above cases, the consistent view of the tribunal has been that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the period of 90 days and it is in fact the very filing of the appeal that is impermissible in terms of proviso to Section 16 of the NGT Act. Admittedly, in the present case, the delay in filing the appeal is beyond 90 days i.e. the total delay being 125 days. Thus, this tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal after the expiry of the special limitation period provided under the relevant provisions. We are unable to find any substance in the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, that the judgments of the tribunal do not state the correct law and/or are not applicable to the facts of the present case. We have no hesitation in rejecting the said contention raised on behalf of the appellant.
13. xxx ...................................xxx.......................................xxx
14. The policies underlying the law of limitation are ultimately based on justice and convenience and an individual should not live under the threat of a possible action for an indeterminate period since it would be unjust. Prescription of limitation takes in its ambit fairness and expeditious trial. Indefinite uncertainty in relation to bringing an action would be opposed to public policy. This concept is applicable with great emphasis to the environmental jurisprudence where the project proponent may invest large amount for making its project operational. Challenge to such project on the ground that it does not have any Environmental Clearance or otherwise, has to be within a specified time, as otherwise it would not only be unfair but also be seriously prejudicial to the interest of a party. Vigilance in the pursuit of rightful claims should be encouraged so that these are ethical or rational justifications for the law of limitation.
15. We have already noticed that NGT Act is a self-contained code in itself. It provides the forum/procedure that has to be adopted, the limitation period within which the jurisdiction of the tribunal gets 9 invoked, and the power and functions of the tribunal in explicit terms. As a self-contained code, it does not admit of any ambiguity with regard to application of other laws in the adjudicatory process of the tribunal. The legislature in its wisdom has worded provisions of Section 16 of the NGT Act so as to prohibit even filing of an appeal beyond a total period of 90 days. The language of these provisions clearly demonstrates the legislative intendment on excluding application of general law of limitation to this special statute. Such a view would also find clear support from the language of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act which postulates that when a special law prescribes for any period of limitation different from the period prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act and the language of the provisions of such special law is indicative of express or implied exclusion, then Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act shall apply only and to the extent they are not excluded by the Special Law. The cumulative reading of Section 16, particularly, the proviso and Section 29 of the Limitation Act leaves no doubt in mind that legislature had clearly intended to exclude the application of the general law of limitation provided under the Limitation Act from the NGT Act. Proviso to Section 16 of the NGT Act uses the expression 'allow it to be filed under this Section within a further period not exceeding 60 days'. The use of the negative language 'not' in the proviso makes it mandatory that appeals cannot be filed after the expiry of total period of 90 days and thus, there is lack of jurisdiction of the tribunal to condone the delay beyond a total period of 90 days. The framers of law, where, in their wisdom wanted to give a benefit and/or restrict or place embargo on exercise of a right, have done so by using specific language in Section 16 of the NGT Act. A special concession is made available to an appellant to file an appeal beyond 30 days, the initial period of limitation prescribed under that provision. The framers there put a specific embargo on the power of the Tribunal not to entertain an appeal after the expiry of a further period of 60 days. Thus the legislature, by necessary implication excluded the application of general law of limitation from the provisions of the NGT Act. At this stage we may refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC 133, where the Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of the Representation of the Peoples' Act, 1951 and the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act. The Court in relation to the interpretation of the language of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act held as:
"17. What we have to determine is whether the provisions of this section are expressly excluded in the case of an election petition. It is contended before us that the words "expressly excluded"
would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. As usual the meaning given in the Dictionary has been relied upon, but what we have to see is whether the scheme of the special law, that is in this case the Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in 10 a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation."
16. From the above dictum of the Supreme Court of India, it is clear that the exclusion can be by explicit language or even by necessary implication. It will depend upon the scheme of the Act, it being a self- contained code and what is the intent of legislature? Furthermore, in the case of Union of India v. Popular Construction & Co., AIR 2001 SC 4010, the Supreme Court held that the word 'excluded' appearing in Section 29(2) of the Act would also include 'exclusion by necessary implication'. In the case of Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar, (2004) 4 SCC 252, the Supreme Court read exclusion by implication, where some of the provisions in West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, provided for giving benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act but Section 8 of the said Act did not make such a provision. The court took the view that legislature consciously excluded the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
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19. The bare reading of the above provision shows that power to condone the delay is vested with the Tribunal under that Act but the said appeal cannot be permitted to be filed before the appellate tribunal beyond the period of 60 days. The expression used in the proviso to the section is 'allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding 60 days.' This provision came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2010) 5 SCC 23, where the Supreme Court held that the appellate tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal beyond the prescribed period of 120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act and Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable. It was held that the proviso to Section 125 of the Electricity Act and the interpretation attracting the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof, will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory.
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29. We may also refer to the case of Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise v. Hongo India (P) Ltd., 2009 (5) SCC 791, where the Court while considering the provisions of Section 35(H) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the applications filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, repelled the contention that Section 5 would be attracted and held as under:
"31. In this regard, it is useful to refer to a recent decision of this Court in Punjab Fibres Ltd. The Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise, Noida was the appellant in this case. While considering the very same question, namely, whether the High 11 Court has power to condone the delay in presentation of the reference under Section 35H(1) of the Act, the two-Judge Bench taking note of the said provision and the other related provisions following Singh Enterprises v. CCE6 concluded that: (Punjab Fibres Ltd. case1, SCC p. 75, para 8) "the High Court was justified in holding that there was no power for condonation of delay in filing reference application."
32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35B, 35EE, 35G and 35H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an 18 appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days.
35. It was contended before us that the words "expressly excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law here in this case is Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the legislature intended it to be a complete Code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court."
Having noticed various judgments of the Supreme Court and the High Courts for and against the proposition, the undisputed principle that emerges and which has been consistently followed by the Supreme Court, is that a mere provision of the period of limitation in the statute is not sufficient to displace the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act. But where the act is a complete code in itself and where the scheme 12 of the Act and the language of the relevant provisions expressly or impliedly exclude the applicability of the general law of limitation, then such exclusion is accepted by the Court. Not only the scheme of the NGT Act, which is a self contained code, clearly demonstrates legislative intent for exclusion of the general law of limitation, but specifically gives precedence to the provisions of the NGT Act in terms of Section 33 of the NGT Act, which clearly means that the provisions of limitation contained in the NGT Act would prevail and by necessary implication would exclude the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act. Thus, it squarely satisfies the ingredients of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act."
8. Having examined the record of the present case, we find that the order was passed on 08.11.2024 and the appeal has been preferred on 04.04.2025. The appeal has been preferred after 166 days of the order, whereas the outer limit of 90 days had expired much before the filing of the appeal, if the limitation is calculated from the date of order i.e. 08.11.2024.
9. The plea of the appellant is that the impugned order was received by the appellant on 14.12.2024, therefore, now it is required to be examined if 14.12.2024 is treated to be the starting point of the limitation, the appeal is within the condonable period. Even if we calculate the limitation from 14.12.2024, the appellant has filed an appeal after 130 days, which is much beyond the 90 days. Therefore, even if we treat 14.12.2024 as the starting point of limitation the delay being beyond 90 days cannot be condoned.
10. So far as the other submission of counsel for the appellant that the order is erroneous, it has been passed in a mechanical manner, we cannot go into those issues at this stage because the appeal itself cannot be maintained being beyond the condonable period. The plea of the appellant that the knowledge was acquired in January, 2025 has no basis because as per the admitted position the impugned order was received by the appellant on 14.12.2024. A vague plea has been taken that the impugned order was kept in obeyance without disclosing the details of any such order or communication.
1311. Thus, we find that no case is made out for condoning the delay which is much beyond the condonable period. Hence, I.A. No. 286/2025 is rejected. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed as time barred.
Prakash Shrivastava, CP Dr. A. Senthil Vel, EM August 08, 2025 Appeal No. 29/2025 (I.A. No. 287/2025 & I.A. No, 286/2025) AS 14