Allahabad High Court
Vijay Kumar 3 Others vs State Of U.P. And 5 Others on 31 October, 2019
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Court No. - 18 A.F.R. Case :- WRIT - B No. - 1831 of 2019 Petitioner :- Vijay Kumar 3 Others Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 5 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Narendra Kumar Chaturvedi Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Ashok Kumar Yadav Hon'ble J.J. Munir,J.
1. Heard Sri Narendra Kumar Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Satish Mohan Tiwari, learned Standing Counsel, appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 at length. Sri Ashok Kumar Yadav, Advocate, has put in appearance on behalf of respondent No.3, but he is not present when the case is called on. So far as respondent Nos. 4 to 14 are concerned, service upon them has been held sufficient vide order dated 13.08.2019. No one appears on behalf of respondent Nos.4 to 14. Today, this matter has come up for final hearing as directed vide order dated 13.08.2019.
2. This writ petition has been filed challenging the impugned orders dated 13.09.2018 and 30.06.2019, passed by the Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad in Revision No.1322 of 2018 (Computerized Case No.AL20180531001322) Keshav Prasad Vs. Dhruv Chand and to quash proceedings in the said Revision. The short facts giving rise to the present petition are that the father of the petitioners filed Case No.T-20130531035785 (Barsu Ram Vs. Roop Chandra & Ors.) under Section 41 Land Revenue Act, 1901 (in short 'the Act') for demarcation of boundaries of Arazi Nos. 36Kha and 74/41. This application was made on 15.07.2006 to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Gorakhpur. The original applicant Barsu Ram died, and in his place, the petitioners were substituted as his heirs and legal representatives, who pursued the said application. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Gorakhpur, after considering all reports submitted by the inspection and technical authorities, as also the objections by parties adversely affected or likely to be so affected, passed an order dated 19.02.2016, approving the report dated 22.02.2007, submitted by the Revenue Inspector, together with changes proposed to the field book. The application was allowed in terms of the aforesaid order dated 19.02.2016, granting demarcation to be made in accordance with the report dated 22.02.2007 (supra). It is averred that the order under Section 41 though made, the process of demarcation did not move and the order was not carried into execution. As such, the petitioners were compelled to file Writ C-No.25500 of 2017, before this Court seeking to carry out the order dated 19.02.2016 into execution. Necessary directions to the Sub-Divisional Officer, were issued by this Court vide order dated 13.05.2017, requiring him to enforce his order dated 19.02.2016, within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of that order.
3. It is the petitioners' case that before the demarcation could be carried out, Keshav Prasad and three others, who were strangers to the proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Officer, filed Appeal No.C-2016050000674 under Section 210 of the Act, to the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division Gorakhpur, challenging the order dated 19.02.2016, passed under Section 41 of the Act in Case No.T-20130531035785 in favour of the petitioners. Lateron, alleging inaction on the part of the Additional Commissioner (Administration), Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur where the appeal was pending, Keshav Prasad and others filed Writ C-No.37039 of 2017 before this Court seeking appropriate directions to decide the pending appeal and further for an interim relief that till disposal of the appeal by the Additional Commissioner, the order of demarcation may not be executed. This Court vide order dated 19.08.2017, passed in Writ C-No.37039 of 2017, disposed of the writ petition directing the Additional Commissioner to pass appropriate orders on the said application of the petitioners, after hearing the parties within 15 days, and, further to decide the appeal expeditiously, within three months thereafter. It was ordered that for a period of one month, both parties would be obliged to maintain status quo on the spot. The Additional Commissioner (Administration), Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur vide his order dated 24.11.2018, proceeded to dismiss the Appeal preferred by Keshav Prasad and others, and affirmed the order dated 19.02.2016 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer in Case No.T-20130531035785, made in favour of the petitioners, under Section 41 of the Act.
4. Aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, affirmed in Appeal by the Commissioner under Section 210 of the Act, Keshav Prasad filed Revision No.1322 of 2018/Gorakhpur, before the Board of Revenue U.P. at Allahabad. The petitioner raised an objection about the maintainability of the Revision on ground that under Section 219(1) of the Act, a Revision is maintainable where no appeal lies, or where it lies, has not been preferred. It is not maintainable where an appeal lies and has been preferred. The Board of Revenue dealt with and rejected the said objection by means of the impugned order dated 13.06.2019, holding that the Board of Revenue under Section 219 of the Act has supervisory powers to examine the legality and propriety of any order passed by a subordinate Court, and that powers are vested in the Board under Section 219 of the Act, to revise any order of a subordinate Court, unless a Court of coordinate jurisdiction has decided the matter already. The objection as to maintainability was, therefore, rejected by means of the order dated 13.06.2019, last mentioned. The further challenge to the order dated 13.09.20018 that has been raised, relates to the interim order that was passed, pending admission. This Court does not think that the legality of the interim order is required to be examined, in view of the wider question that this Court proposes to go into, regarding maintainability of the Revision that has been decided one way by the Board of Revenue, by means of the impugned order dated 13.06.2019.
5. The question that arises for consideration in this Revision is, ''whether in a case where the order of a subordinate Court that is open to appeal, is appealed by a party, can be further challenged in Revision under Section 219 of the Act?' The short answer to the question is to be found in the provisions of Section 219 of the Act, that read to the following effect:
"219. Revision.-(1) The Board or the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner or the Collector or the Record Officer, or the Settlement Officer, may call for the record of any case decided or proceeding held by any revenue Court subordinate to him in which no appeal lies or where an appeal lies but has not been preferred, for the purpose of satisfying himself as too the legality or propriety of the order passed or proceeding held and if such subordinate revenue Court appears to have-
(a) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
(b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the Board or the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner or the Collector or the Record Officer, or the Settlement Officer, as the case may be, pass such order in the case as he thinks fit. (2) If an application under this section has been moved by any person either to the Board, or to the Commissioner, or to the Additional Commissioner, or the Collector or to the Record Officer or to the Settlement Officer, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by any other of them."
(emphasis by Court)
6. A bare reading of the provision of Section 219 of the Act shows that the Board or the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner, or the other superior Courts mentioned there, are empowered to hear and decide any Revision from the order or proceeding, made or held by any Revenue Court subordinate to the named superior Courts mentioned in the statute, in which no appeal lies or where an appeal lies but has not been preferred, to employ the phraseology of the statute. The parameters on which the jurisdiction would be exercised speak about the superior Court satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of the order passed, or the proceedings held by a subordinate Revenue Court is another matter. Here, the question is about the maintainability of a Revision from an order of a subordinate Court that has already been challenged in appeal by a party, and the appeal has been decided one way. The phraseology of the statute clearly reveals that a Revision from the order of a Court of subordinate jurisdiction does not lie to the Board, where an appeal lies and has been preferred by a party; that party cannot apply further in Revision to the Board, as that is not open under Section 219 (1) of the Act.
7. Sri Satish Mohan Tiwari, learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in opposition to the aforesaid view, has brought to the notice of the Court a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Anand Kumar Singh & Another Vs. State of U.P. Thru. Secretary, Revenue U.P. Civil Sectt. & Ors., Misc. Single No.8354 of 2017, decided on 20.04.2017.
8. This Court has keenly perused the said decision. The said decision deals with another aspect of the law, altogether. It bears only resemblance to the facts of the present case about the feature that the said cause also arose out of a demarcation of boundary dispute. The point that His Lordship appears to have decided there, was whether proceedings for demarcation commenced under the Land Revenue Act before the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 came into operation, would be governed by the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, or would be governed by the provisions of the Code of 2006. After an elaborate discussion of the interplay between the provisions of U.P. Land Revenue Act (since repealed) and the Code, along with the saving clauses in Sections 230 and 231 thereof, it has been held by Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, J. in Anand Kumar Singh & Anr. (supra):
"Keeping in view the provisions contained in Sections 230 and 231 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 as also taking into account the provisions contained in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, I find it appropriate to held that remedy of revision as provided under Section 219 of U.P. Land Revenue Act will be available to a person aggrieved against the order passed by the subordinate courts under U.P. Land Revenue Act in the proceedings instituted before enforcement of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, even if they are concluded after enforcement of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006.
In the instant case, proceedings of appeal by the petitioners were instituted prior to enforcement of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 and have culminated in the order passed on 08.03.2017 by the Additional Commissioner (Judicial), Lucknow Division, Lucknow after U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 came into force.
Thus, for the reasons given above, remedy of revision under Section 219 of U.P. Land Revenue Act, will be available to the petitioners in the instant case as well. The petitioners, thus, will have a right to invoke the provisions of Section 219 of U.P. Land Revenue Act for assailing the order dated 08.03.2017 passed by the Additional Commissioner (Judicial), Lucknow Division, Lucknow, which is under challenge in this petition."
9. A reading of the concluding part of the decision in Anand Kumar Singh and another (supra) does show that the Court has said there that the remedy of Revision under Section 219 of the Land Revenue Act, will be available to the petitioners, who sought to assail an appellate order of the Additional Commissioner (Judicial), arising out of proceedings for demarcation; but, that is not even remotely the point decided there. The question whether a party to demarcation proceedings, who had availed his remedy of Appeal before a subordinate Authority, would still have the right to bring a Revision to the Board under Section 219, was certainly not the point involved in Anand Kumar Singh and another (supra).
10. The mere fact that the Court said on facts there, that it would be open to the petitioners to challenge the order in Revision, that was rendered in Appeal under Section 210 of the Land Revenue Act, does not even remotely constitute the ratio decidendi there. The point that fell for consideration in the decision under reference, was whether proceedings that commenced before the enforcement of the U.P. Land Revenue Code, 2006, would continue to be governed by the U.P. Land Revenue Act, and be open to remedies provided under the Act or these would be subject to the new law, that is, the U.P. Land Revenue Code, 2006, which has made orders of demarcation, under Section 24, sub-Sections (5) and (6) final and subject only to an Appeal to the Commissioner, excluding the jurisdiction of the Board, under Section 210 of the Code. It was held in Anand Kumar Singh and another (supra) that proceedings instituted before the enforcement of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, even if concluded after such enforcement, would be governed by the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, and remedies under Section 219 of the Act, last mentioned, by way of Revision, would be open. In the said decision, there was no case that a party who had availed the remedy of Appeal from a demarcation order to a Superior Revenue Court/ Authority, would have no further remedy of Appeal under Section 219 of the Land Revenue Act, after the amendment brought about by U.P. Amendment Act no.20 of 1997 w.e.f. 18.08.1997. It was neither a point mooted or decided in Anand Kumar Singh and another (supra) as to how the provisions of the amended Section 219(1) of the Land Revenue Act, would affect the maintainability of a Revision, once a party had availed his remedy of Appeal. The decision, therefore, where it says that the petitioners will have a right to invoke the provisions of Section 219 of the Land Revenue Act, in assail of the order dated 08.03.2017 passed by the Additional Commissioner (Judicial) (in Appeal), is no more than obiter dicta, said at its best. Else, the said decision is not at all attracted to the proposition involved in the present case.
11. Sri Satish Mohan Tiwari, learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Krishna Devi vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad and others, 1972 R.D. 228: (1972) 42 AWR 409. There, the issue appears to have arisen regarding the correctness of a decision of the Single Judge of this Court, rendered in Kishan Lal Jat vs. State of U.P., 1967 R.D. 134: 1966 AWR 734, where it was held that a decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer, under Rule 115-N of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Rules relating to cancellation of auction of an abadi site held by the Land Management Committee and resultant allotment of it to a person, was not a decision of a Court subordinate to the Board of Revenue, so as to be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Board, under Section 333 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. In the said decision, two points appear to have been decided. It was held that proceedings under Rule 115-N were judicial in nature and the Assistant Collector was a Court subordinate to the Board of Revenue, against whose orders in exercise of powers under Rule 115-N, a Revision lay. It was further decided that the finality to the order of Assistant Collector, envisaged under Rule 115-N(3) would not affect the revisional jurisdiction of the Higher Courts. This part of the proposition is expressed in the following words, in Smt. Krishna Devi (supra):
"11. It is true that Rule 115-N (3) provides that the decision of the Assistant Collector shall be final. It is well-settled that such finality does not restrict the revisional jurisdiction conferred upon higher courts. In the case of Shah Chaturbhuj v. Mauji Ram, 1938 A.W.R. 437 a Full Bench of this Court interpreted the phrase "the decision of revenue court shall be final" occurring in Section 5 of the U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act, 1934, as not depriving the higher courts of revisional powers Under Section 115 of the C.P.C. The Full Bench held that the finality mentioned in the provision only meant that there was no right of appeal vesting in the litigants against such an order. In our opinion, this Full Bench decision equally applies to Section 333. The finality mentioned by sub-Rule (3) of Rule 115-N cannot whittle down the amplitude of the revisional power conferred upon the Board of Revenue by section 333 of the Z.A. and L.R. Act."
12. What is held in Smt. Krishna Devi (supra) is that the finality attached to the decision of the Assistant Commissioner under Rule 115-N, only meant, relying on a Full Bench Decision in Shah Chaturbhuj v. Mauji Ram, 1938 A.W.R. 437, that there was no right of Appeal vesting in the litigant against an order of this kind. It was further held that the finality spoken of in sub-Rule (3) of Rule 115-N, cannot whittle down the scope of the revisional power under Section 333 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. The proposition in Smt. Krishna Devi (supra) is, therefore, about the scope of the revisional powers provided by the principal Act, where it seems to conflict with a finality clause attached to a judicial order, governed by a Rule framed under the Act which is a piece of delegated legislation. The principle, therefore, can have little application to the facts of the present case or the legal proposition involved, where what has to be considered is whether the Revision in question lay at all on the terms of statute itself, investing the Board with the power to revise.
13. It would be gainful to do a juxtaposition of the provisions of Section 219 of the Land Revenue Act as these stood before the amendment, brought about by U.P. Act no.20 of 1997 and afterwards. The provisions as they existed in the pre-amended Statute, read thus:
"Section 219. Revision before the Board.-The Board may call for the record of any case decided by any subordinate court, and if the subordinate Court appears-
(a) to have exercised a Jurisdiction not vested in it in law; or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of jurisdiction Illegality or with material Irregularity.
the Board may pass such order as it thinks fit."
Post-amendment, the provisions of Section 219 of the Land Revenue Act have been completely overhauled and now read as reproduced earlier in this judgment. The amended provisions are not being quoted here in order to eschew repetition.
14. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners has brought to the notice of this Court a decision of this Court in Madhav Pandey and others vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. and others, 2002 All LJ 1178, and a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sewa Lal vs. Sri Kant and others, (2012) 11 SCC 796.
15. This Court is afraid that so far as the question involved in the present petition is concerned, the aforesaid decisions would have no application. Both the decisions, though dealing with the provisions of post-amendment Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, deal with the issue whether a second Revision would lie from an order, once revised before the Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 219(2) as amended by U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997, would appear to bar a second Revision prospectively. It was held that a Revision preferred from the Commissioner's order to the Board prior to the Amendment, would be maintainable notwithstanding the Amendment to the provisions of Section 219 by the Amendment Act, 1997. Likewise, in Madhav Pandey and others (supra), this Court held that in that case, the order of the Commissioner was passed on 07.02.1990, rejecting the Revisions. The Commissioner had exercised his jurisdiction under Section 218 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, filed by the revisionist before him. That was a Revision under Section 218, and not under Section 219, those powers not being available to the Commissioner at the relevant time. It was, therefore, held that Revisions which were filed before the Commissioner under Section 218, could not attract the provisions of Section 219(2) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, amended vide Act no.20 of 1997. Thus, the second Revision to the Board in those facts was held not barred. Thus seen, the two authorities, referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners, do not at all answer the question that is involved here.
16. This Court has been referred to the pre and post amendment provisions of Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, which have been extracted above in extenso. A reading of the pre-amended provision clearly shows that there was no restriction at all on the revisional powers of the Commissioner from orders of a subordinate Court. The provision in the pre-amended statute was in conformity with the scheme of it, where the Commissioner was invested with powers to entertain a Revision, but had no powers to finally determine it. He could at best direct a reference, or reject the Revision. In case he made a reference, there was no question of a Revision being filed. In case he rejected the Revision declining to make the reference, a Revision would, of course, be open under Section 219. The provisions of pre-amendment Section 219 are absolutely untrammeled in the exercise of the revisional powers of the Board, and do not subject them to any restriction about entertaining a Revision, in the second instance by the same party, or against an appellate order.
17. By contrast, a reading of the post-amendment provisions of Section 219, makes it clear that the remedy of a Revision from an order of a subordinate Court is open before the Board, or any other subordinate Authority, mentioned in sub-Section (1) of Section 219, where an appeal does not lie from the orders sought to be revised, or if it lies, has not been preferred.
18. The language of the statute is plain, simple and clear. It lays down that where an Appeal is open but has not been preferred, a Revision to the Board, would certainly be competent. At the same time, the language is equally clear that where an Appeal is open to a party, and that right has been availed, no Revision would lie. That is the unmistakable language of the statute, which can admit of no other interpretation in the clear opinion of this Court. It is well known that where the words of the statute are clear and categorical, the literal rule of interpretation is to be adopted, giving those words their ordinary and natural meaning. In this connection, reference may be made to the exposition of the Rule of literal construction in the celebrated treaties "Principles of Statutory Interpretation (12th Edition) by Justice G.P. Singh, where the learned Author, based on high authority, has made a general exposition of the Rule thus:
"2. THE RULE OF LITERAL CONSTRUCTION
(a) Natural and grammatical meaning The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. [Crawford v Spooner, (1846) 4 MIA 179, p. 181: 6 MOO PC 1 (PC); Grey v. Pearson, (1857) 6 HLC 61, p. 106: 10 ER 1216, p. 1234 (HL): River Wear Commrs. v. v. Adamson, (1877) 2 AC 743: (1874-80) All ER Rep. 1, p. 12 (HL); (further references omitted for the sake of brevity)]. "The true way", according to LORD BROUGHAM is, "to take the words as the Legislature have given them, and to take the meaning which the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of those words is, either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question, controlled or altered"; [Crawford v. Spooner, (1846) 4 MIA 179, p. 181: 6 Moo PC 1 (PC)], and in the words of VISCOUNT HALDANE, L.C., if the language used "has a natural meaning we cannot depart from that meaning unless, reading the statute as a whole, the context directs us to do so" [Attorney General v. Milne, (1914-15) All ER Rep 1061, p. 1063: 1914 AC 765 (HL).] In an oft-quoted passage, LORD WENSLEYDALE stated the rule thus: "In constructing wills and indeed statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the word is adhered to, unless would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity, and inconsistency, but no further."[Grey v. Pearson, (1857) 6 HLC 61, p. 106: 10 ER 1216, p. 1234 (HL);(further references omitted for the sake of brevity)] And stated LORD ATKINSON: "In the construction of statutes, their words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless there be something in the context, or in the object of the statute in which they occur or in the circumstances in which they are used, to show that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense".[Corporation of the City of Victoria v. Bishop of Vancouver Island. AIR 1921 PC 240, p. 242] VISCOUNT SIMON, L.C., said: "The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning". [Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd., (1940) AC 1014 (1940) 3 All ER 549, p. 553 (HL): Chandvarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447, p. 476: AIR 1987 SC 117.] Natural and ordinary meaning of words should not be departed from "unless it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning". Such a meaning cannot be departed from by the judges "in the light of their own views as to policy" although they can "adopt a purposive interpretation if they can find in the statute read as a whole or in material to which they are permitted by law to refer as aids to interpretation an expression of Parliament's purpose or policy." [Shah v. Barnet London Borough Council, (1983) 1 All ER 226, pp. 235, 238 (HL).] For a modern statement of the rule one may refer to the speech of LORD SIMON OF GLAISDALE in a recent case where he said: "Parliament is prima facie to be credited with meaning what is said in an Act of Parliament. The drafting of statutes, so important to a people who hope to live under the rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless courts seek whenever possible to apply ''the golden rule' of construction, that is to read the statutory language, grammatically and terminologically, in the ordinary and primary sense which it bears in its context, without omission addition. Of course, Parliament is to be credited with good sense; so that when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though no further" [Suthendran v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, (1976) 3 All ER 611, p. 616: (1976) 3 WLR 725 (HL). (further references omitted for the sake of brevity)] The rules stated above have been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court.[Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India, AIR 2002 SC 1351, p. 1354: (2002) 3 SCC 722 (8th Edition of this book p. 74 is referred); Guru Jambheshwar University v. Dharam Pal, (2007) 2 SCC 265, (para 16): AIR 2007 SC 1040 (9th Edition (pp. 78, 79) of this book is referred]."
[For omitted references refer to Principles of Statutory Interpretation (12th Edition) by Justice G.P. Singh, Chapter 2, synopsis 2, pp 85-87]
19. Applying these principle to facts that emerge here, it is evident that respondent no.3, Keshav Prasad and another of the respondents, had filed Appeal no. C-2016050000674 of 2016, to the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur. The said Appeal came up for decision before the Additional Commissioner (Administration), Gorakhpur, and was decided by his judgment and order dated 24.01.2018. This Appeal was carried, invoking the provisions of Section 210 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, from the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Gorakhpur, in Case no. T-20130531035785, under Section 41 of the Land Revenue Act. Keshav Prasad, having failed in Appeal, has preferred the present Revision, the proceedings of which are sought to be quashed as not maintainable and without jurisdiction. This Revision, he has filed to the Board of Revenue bearing Revision no.1322 of 2018. The specific objection raised by the petitioners to the maintainability of this Revision, based on the plain terms of Section 219(1) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, has been rejected, and the Board by their order impugned dated 13.09.2019 have assumed jurisdiction to decide the Revision.
20. In the clear opinion of this Court, on a reading of the provisions of Section 219(1) of the Land Revenue Act, the Board would have no jurisdiction to entertain this Revision at the instance of Keshav Prasad, who has already availed his remedy of Appeal before the Commissioner from the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, under Section 41 of the Act. The proceedings in Revision before the Board of Revenue are, therefore, held to be absolutely without jurisdiction.
21. In the result, this Petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 13.09.2019 and proceedings in Revision no.1322 of 2018 (Computerized Case no. AL20180531001322), Keshav Prasad vs. Dhruv Chand and others, pending before the Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad, are hereby quashed.
22. Let a copy of this order be forwarded to the Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad and Lucknow forthwith by the Registrar concerned.
Order Date :- 31.10.2019 NSC/ Anoop