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[Cites 36, Cited by 1]

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Keshv Yadav Kariya vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 17 June, 2022

Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia

Bench: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia

                                           1

            IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                         AT GWALIOR

                                      BEFORE

     HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GURPAL SINGH AHLUWALIA

                         ON THE 17th OF JUNE, 2022


      MISCELLANEOUS CRIMINAL CASE NO. 27293 of 2022

       Between:-

       KESHAV YADAV (KAMARIYA) S/O
       NABAL SINGH YADAV, AGE : 18
       YEARS, OCCUPATION ADHYAYAN,
       R/O    JAHANGEER     KATRA,
       DISTRICT GWALIOR (MADHYA
       PRADESH)
                                                                ........APPLICANT

       (BY SHRI L.P. SHRIVASTAVA - ADVOCATE)

       AND

       THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
       THROUGH      POLICE STATION
       BAHODAPUR, DISTRICT GWALIOR
       (MADHYA PRADESH)

                                                             ........RESPONDENT

        (BY SHRI RAJEEV UPADHYAY - ADVOCATE)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       This application coming on for hearing this day, the Court passed
the following:
                                     2

                                  ORDER

Case diary is available.

This first application under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. has been filed for grant of bail.

The applicant has been arrested on 04.05.2022 in connection with Crime No.100/2022 registered at Police Station Bahodapur District Gwalior for offence under Sections 307, 294, 34, later added 325 of IPC and Sections 25, 27 of IPC.

2. This case has been listed before this Court because of the fact that the bail application for grant of anticipatory bail filed co-accused Anuj Rajput was rejected by this Court by order dated 10.03.2022. However, during summer vacation, co-accused Anuj Rajput filed an application under Section 439 of CrPC and since the rule of listing the cases before the same Court was under suspended animation during summer vacation, therefore, the bail application of Anuj was considered by the coordinate Bench of this Court and by order dated 30.05.2022, co-accused Anuj has been granted bail.

3. According to the prosecution case, the applicant was driving the motorcycle with pillion rider Rahul Dudhiya and the co-accused Anuj Kirar was driving the scooty with pillion rider Lala Agrawal. First of all Rahul Dudhiya fired a gunshot causing injury on the abdomen of Golu Tomar and another gunshot was fired by Lala Agrawal causing injury to Krishna Sharma. It is submitted that the case of the applicant is identical to that of co-accused Anuj Kirar, who has been granted bail by the coordinate Bench of this Court.

4. Per contra, the application is vehemently opposed by the counsel 3 for the State. It is submitted that Rahul Dudhiya, who was the pillion rider along with the applicant opened gunshots causing injury to Yogesh (Golu Tomar), whereas Lala Agrawal who was the pillion rider with the co-accused Anuj had caused injury to Krishna. From the medical documents of Yogesh (Golu Tomar), it is clear that the injured Yogesh Tomar was admitted in the hospital on 23.02.2022 and could be discharged only on 17.03.2022. There was a laceration of liver, lungs were contused, tenth rib was fractured and at the time of admission, his general condition was poor. Blood Pressure was 80/50 mmhg. It is submitted that Krishna Sharma was also operated upon and a bullet was removed from suprapubic region.

5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

6. It is well established principle of law that while considering the bail application, the Court has to consider the gravity of offence. The fact that the pillion rider was having firearm and they had caused injuries on vital parts of the body of both injured was not taken into consideration by the coordinate Bench of this Court. It is a clear case where the applicant was sharing common intention with the persons who had actually fired gunshots. The applicant has been recently arrested.

7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

8. The Supreme Court in the case of Virupakshappa Gouda and another Vs. State of Karnataka and another reported in (2017) 5 SCC 406, has held as under:-

"15. The court has to keep in mind what has been stated in Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. The requisite factors are: (i) the nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence; (ii) reasonable apprehension of 4 tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant; and (iii) prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, it has been opined that while exercising the power for grant of bail, the court has to keep in mind certain circumstances and factors. We may usefully reproduce the said passage: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

"9. ... among other circumstances, the factors which are to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail."

16. In CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy, the Court had reiterated the principle by observing thus: (SCC p. 465, para 34) "34. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusation, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for 5 the purpose of granting bail, the legislature has used the words "reasonable grounds for believing" instead of "the evidence" which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy itself as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt."

(emphasis in original)

17. From the aforesaid principles, it is quite clear that an order of bail cannot be granted in an arbitrary or fanciful manner. In this context, we may, with profit, reproduce a passage from Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., wherein the Court setting aside an order granting bail observed: (SCC pp. 514-15, para 16) "16. The issue that is presented before us is whether this Court can annul the order passed by the High Court and curtail the liberty of the second respondent? We are not oblivious of the fact that the liberty is a priceless treasure for a human being. It is founded on the bedrock of the constitutional right and accentuated further on human rights principle. It is basically a natural right. In fact, some regard it as the grammar of life. No one would like to lose his liberty or barter it for all the wealth of the world. People from centuries have fought for liberty, for absence of liberty causes sense of emptiness. The sanctity of liberty is the fulcrum of any civilised society. It is a cardinal value on which the civilisation rests. It cannot be allowed to be paralysed and immobilised. Deprivation of liberty of a person has enormous impact on his mind as well as body. A democratic body polity which is wedded to rule of law, anxiously guards liberty. But, a pregnant and significant one, the liberty of an individual is not absolute. [The] society by its collective wisdom through process of law can withdraw the liberty that it has sanctioned to an 6 individual when an individual becomes a danger to the collective and to the societal order. Accent on individual liberty cannot be pyramided to that extent which would bring chaos and anarchy to a society. A society expects responsibility and accountability from its members, and it desires that the citizens should obey the law, respecting it as a cherished social norm. No individual can make an attempt to create a concavity in the stem of social stream. It is impermissible. Therefore, when an individual behaves in a disharmonious manner ushering in disorderly things which the society disapproves, the legal consequences are bound to follow. At that stage, the court has a duty. It cannot abandon its sacrosanct obligation and pass an order at its own whim or caprice. It has to be guided by the established parameters of law."

8.1. The Supreme Court in the case of Preet Pal Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another reported in (2020) 8 SCC 645 has held as under:-

"30. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977] , this Court held : (SCC p. 535, para 11) "11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well settled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non-application of mind."
7

***

35. There is a difference between grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC and grant of bail, post conviction. In the earlier case, there may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception, as held by this Court in Dataram Singh v. State of U.P. [Dataram Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC 22 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 675] However, in case of post-conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial. Rather, the court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors. There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) CrPC."

8.2. The Supreme Court in the case of Sudha Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another reported in (2021) 4 SCC 781 has held as under:-

"9. In Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh [Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh, (2012) 9 SCC 446 :

(2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1172] , this Court observed that when citizens were scared to lead a peaceful life and heinous offences were obstructions in the establishment of a well-ordered society, the courts play an even more important role, and the burden is heavy. It emphasised on the need to have a proper analysis of the criminal antecedents of the accused.

10. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis 8 Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765] , it was held that this Court ordinarily would not interfere with a High Court's order granting or rejecting bail to an accused. Nonetheless, it was equally imperative for the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the ratio set by a catena of decisions of this Court. The factors laid down in the judgment were:

(i) Whether there was a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of accusations;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of a conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if granted bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of repetition of the offence;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

(viii) danger of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.

11. There is no doubt that liberty is important, even that of a person charged with crime but it is important for the courts to recognise the potential threat to the life and liberty of victims/witnesses, if such accused is released on bail."

8.3 The Supreme Court in the case of Manoj Kumar Khokhar v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2022) 3 SCC 501 has held as under:-

"19. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer to the judgments of this Court in the matter of granting bail to an accused as under.
20. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor [Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115] , Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of 9 Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that have to be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under : (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) "7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is as to whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being [ Patrick Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 -- Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] .
9. Thus the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record -- particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance."

21. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674] this Court highlighted the aspects which are to be considered by a court while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows : (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) 10 "8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words "reasonable grounds for believing" instead of "the evidence" which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge."

22. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v.

Sudarshan Singh [Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688] , speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail, has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail cannot be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows : (SCC p. 602, para 3) "3. Grant of bail though being a discretionary order -- but, however, calls for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts, however, do always vary from 11 case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though may be considered but that by itself cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail and the same should and ought always to be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail -- more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter."

23. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977] , this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

24. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765] this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under : (SCC p. 499, para 9) "9. ... It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while 12 considering an application for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail."

25. Another factor which should guide the court's decision in deciding a bail application is the period of custody. However, as noted in Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh [Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh, (2012) 9 SCC 446 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1172] , the period of custody has to be weighed simultaneously with the totality of the circumstances and the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any. Further, the circumstances which may justify the grant of bail are to be considered in the larger context of the societal concern involved in releasing an accused, in juxtaposition to individual liberty of the accused seeking bail.

26. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2016) 15 SCC 422 : (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 647] , after referring to a catena of judgments of this Court on the considerations to be placed at balance while deciding to grant bail, observed through Dipak Misra, J. (as his Lordship then was) in paras 15 and 18 as under : (SCC pp. 429-30) "15. This being the position of law, it is clear as cloudless sky that the High Court 13 [Budhpal v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 14815] has totally ignored the criminal antecedents of the accused. What has weighed with the High Court is the doctrine of parity. A history-sheeter involved in the nature of crimes which we have reproduced hereinabove, are not minor offences so that he is not to be retained in custody, but the crimes are of heinous nature and such crimes, by no stretch of imagination, can be regarded as jejune. Such cases do create a thunder and lightning having the effect potentiality of torrential rain in an analytical mind. The law expects the judiciary to be alert while admitting these kind of accused persons to be at large and, therefore, the emphasis is on exercise of discretion judiciously and not in a whimsical manner.

***

18. Before parting with the case, we may repeat with profit that it is not an appeal for cancellation of bail as the cancellation is not sought because of supervening circumstances. The annulment of the order passed by the High Court is sought as many relevant factors have not been taken into consideration which includes the criminal antecedents of the accused and that makes the order a deviant one. Therefore, the inevitable result is the lancination of the impugned order [Budhpal v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 14815] ."

27. In Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425] , this Court, while considering an appeal from an order of cancellation of bail, has spelt out some of the significant considerations of which a court must be mindful, in deciding whether to grant bail. In doing so, this Court has stated that while it is not possible to prescribe an exhaustive list of considerations which are to guide a court in deciding a bail application, the primary requisite of an order granting bail, is that it should result from 14 judicious exercise of the court's discretion. The findings of this Court have been extracted as under : (SCC p. 138, para 17) "17. While granting bail, the relevant considerations are : (i) nature of seriousness of the offence; (ii) character of the evidence and circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; and (iii) likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice; (iv) the impact that his release may make on the prosecution witnesses, its impact on the society; and (v) likelihood of his tampering. No doubt, this list is not exhaustive. There are no hard-and-fast rules regarding grant or refusal of bail, each case has to be considered on its own merits. The matter always calls for judicious exercise of discretion by the Court."

28. In Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana [Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6 SCC 230 :

(2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 722] this Court after referring to a catena of judgments emphasised on the need and importance of assigning reasons for the grant of bail.

This Court categorically observed that a court granting bail could not obviate its duty to apply its judicial mind and indicate reasons as to why bail has been granted or refused. The observations of this Court have been extracted as under : (SCC pp. 251-52, paras 38-39) "38. ... We disapprove of the observations [Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2987] of the High Court in a succession of orders in the present case recording that the counsel for the parties "do not press for a further reasoned order". The grant of bail is a matter which implicates the liberty of the accused, the interest of the State and the victims of crime in the proper administration of criminal justice. It is a well-settled principle that in determining as to whether bail should be granted, the High Court, or for that matter, the Sessions Court deciding an 15 application under Section 439 CrPC would not launch upon a detailed evaluation of the facts on merits since a criminal trial is still to take place. These observations while adjudicating upon bail would also not be binding on the outcome of the trial. But the Court granting bail cannot obviate its duty to apply a judicial mind and to record reasons, brief as they may be, for the purpose of deciding whether or not to grant bail. The consent of parties cannot obviate the duty of the High Court to indicate its reasons why it has either granted or refused bail. This is for the reason that the outcome of the application has a significant bearing on the liberty of the accused on one hand as well as the public interest in the due enforcement of criminal justice on the other. The rights of the victims and their families are at stake as well. These are not matters involving the private rights of two individual parties, as in a civil proceeding. The proper enforcement of criminal law is a matter of public interest. We must, therefore, disapprove of the manner in which a succession of orders in the present batch of cases has recorded that counsel for the "respective parties do not press for further reasoned order". If this is a euphemism for not recording adequate reasons, this kind of a formula cannot shield the order from judicial scrutiny.

39. Grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC is a matter involving the exercise of judicial discretion. Judicial discretion in granting or refusing bail--as in the case of any other discretion which is vested in a court as a judicial institution--is not unstructured. The duty to record reasons is a significant safeguard which ensures that the discretion which is entrusted to the court is exercised in a judicious manner. The recording of reasons in a judicial order ensures that the thought process underlying the order is subject to scrutiny and that it meets objective standards of reason and justice."

16

***

30. The learned counsel for the respondent- accused has relied upon the decision of this Court in Myakala Dharmarajam v. State of Telangana [Myakala Dharmarajam v. State of Telangana, (2020) 2 SCC 743 :

(2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 799] to contend that elaborate reasons need not be assigned for the grant of bail. What is of essence is that the record of the case ought to have been perused by the court granting bail. The facts of the said case are that a complaint was lodged against fifteen persons for offences under Sections 148, 120-B, 302 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860. The accused therein moved an application seeking bail before the Principal Sessions Judge, who, after perusal of the case diary, statements of witnesses and other connected records, released the accused on bail through an order which did not elaborately discuss the material on record.

The High Court cancelled [Bojja Samatha Vijaya v. State of Telangana, 2019 SCC OnLine TS 2259] the bail bond on the ground that the Principal Sessions Judge had not discussed the material on record in the order granting bail.

***

32. However, we are of the view that the said decision in Myakala Dharmarajam case [Myakala Dharmarajam v. State of Telangana, (2020) 2 SCC 743 :

(2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 799] is not applicable to the facts of the instant case for the following reasons:
32.1.Firstly, this Court in the aforecited decision restored the order granting bail to the accused on the ground that although no discussion was made by the Sessions Court as to the material on record, in the order granting bail, it was apparent in the order of the Sessions Court whereby bail was granted, that the decision to grant bail was arrived at after perusal of the entire material on record. While the material may not have been specifically referred to, the order granting bail was indicative of the fact that it had been arrived at after thorough consideration thereof. However, in the instant 17 case, no such indication can be observed in the impugned orders [Ram Narayan Jat v. State of Rajasthan, 2020 SCC OnLine Raj 2850] of the High Court which would be suggestive of the fact that the material on record was perused before deciding to grant bail.
32.2.Secondly, the case referred to by the accused concerned an offence which was allegedly committed by fifteen persons. The complainant therein had not specifically assigned roles to each of such fifteen persons. It was thus found that the allegations being vague, no prima facie case could be made out, justifying the grant of bail to the accused therein. However, in the instant case, only one accused has been named by the appellant-informant and the role attributed to him is specific. Therefore, the facts of the case relied upon, being significantly different from the one before us, we find that the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent-accused would be of no assistance to his case.
33. The most recent judgment of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar [Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1280] , wherein a three-

Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order [Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857] of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows : (Brijmani Devi case [Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1280] , SCC para 35) "35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the 18 accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for grant of bail a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused."

***

35. The Latin maxim cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex meaning "reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself", is also apposite.

36. We have extracted the relevant portions of the impugned order above. At the outset, we observe that the extracted portions are the only portions forming part of the "reasoning" of the High Court while granting bail. As noted from the aforecited judgments, it is not necessary for a court to give elaborate reasons while granting bail particularly when the case is at the initial stage and the allegations of the offences by the accused would not have been crystalised as such. There cannot be elaborate details recorded to give an impression that the case is one that would result in a conviction or, by contrast, in an acquittal while passing an order on an application for grant of bail. However, the court deciding a bail application cannot completely divorce its decision from material aspects of the case such as the allegations made against the accused; severity of the punishment if the allegations are proved beyond reasonable doubt and would result in a conviction; reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced by the accused; tampering of the evidence; the frivolity in the case of the prosecution; criminal antecedents of the accused; and a 19 prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge against the accused.

37. Ultimately, the court considering an application for bail has to exercise discretion in a judicious manner and in accordance with the settled principles of law having regard to the crime alleged to be committed by the accused on the one hand and ensuring purity of the trial of the case on the other.

38. Thus, while elaborate reasons may not be assigned for grant of bail or an extensive discussion of the merits of the case may not be undertaken by the court considering a bail application, an order dehors reasoning or bereft of the relevant reasons cannot result in grant of bail. In such a case the prosecution or the informant has a right to assail the order before a higher forum. As noted in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) [Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41 : 1978 Cri LJ 129] , when bail has been granted to an accused, the State may, if new circumstances have arisen following the grant of such bail, approach the High Court seeking cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) CrPC. However, if no new circumstances have cropped up since the grant of bail, the State may prefer an appeal against the order granting bail, on the ground that the same is perverse or illegal or has been arrived at by ignoring material aspects which establish a prima facie case against the accused."

9. If the facts and circumstances of the case are considered, then prima facie it is clear that the applicant was sharing common intention with the co-accused persons. He was driving the motorcycle, whereas the pillion rider fired a gunshot causing injuries to two witnesses. Furthermore, the applicant is in jail only from 04.05.2022, i.e., approximately one and half months. Period of detention is also one of the considerations for grant of bail.

10. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion 20 that it is not a fit case for grant of bail.

11. The application fails and is hereby dismissed.



                                                          (G.S. AHLUWALIA)
                                                                 JUDGE
Abhi            ABHISHEK
                CHATURVEDI
                2022.06.21
                15:42:50 +05'30'