Madhya Pradesh High Court
Nishant Kumar Jha vs State Of M.P. on 26 November, 2014
Author: S.K. Gangele
Bench: S.K. Gangele
1 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
BENCH AT GWALIOR
DIVISION BENCH:
HON. SHRI JUSTICE S.K. GANGELE
&
HON. SHRI JUSTICE ROHIT ARYA
Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.1869/2012
.........Applicant:
Nishant Kumar Jha
Versus
.......Respondents
State of M.P. and another
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Shri Yogesh Chaturvedi, Advocate for applicant.
Shri Prabal Solanki, Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1/State.
Shri N.S. Kirar, Advocate for respondent No.2/complainant.
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Date of hearing : 05/11/2014
Date of order : 26/11/2014
Whether approved for reporting : Yes
ORDER
(26/11/2014) Per Justice Rohit Arya, Madhya Pradesh Nikshepakon Ke Hiton Ka Sanrakshan Adhiniyam, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 2000') has been enacted to protect the deposits made by the public in the Financial Establishments and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The word 'deposit' in the definition clause, vide 2(b) of the Act of 2000, is defined as under:-
2 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012
"2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) xxxxxxxx
(b) "Deposit" includes and shall be deemed
always to have included any receipt of money or acceptance of any valuable commodity by any financial establishment to be returned after a specified period or otherwise, either in cash or any kind or in the form of a specified service with or without any benefit in the form of interest, bonus, profit, or in any other form, but ......................"
The word 'financial establishment' is defined under Section 2 (c) of the Act of 2000 as under:-
"(c) "Financial establishment" means an individual, an association of individuals or a firm or a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) receiving deposits under any scheme or arrangement or in any other manner but does not include, a Corporation or a Co-operative Society owned or controlled by the State Government or the Central Government, or a Banking Company as defined under clause (c) of Section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (No.20 of 1949)"
2. Section 3 of the Act of 2000 provides that every financial establishment shall intimate about its business in the area of 3 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012 jurisdiction of competent authority and shall file a copy of each of such periodical statement to the competent authority as may be required to be filed under any law, with any other supervisory authority including Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and Reserve Bank of India (RBI).
The competent authority has a discretion to direct such financial establishment to furnish in such form, at such intervals and within such time, such statements, information or particulars relating to or connected with deposits received by the establishment, as may be specified in a general or a special order.
Whosoever contravenes the provisions of Section 3 of the Act of 2000, as referred above, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both.
3. Section 4 of the Act of 2000 provides for attachment of properties on default of return of deposits in the event such deposits in cash or in kind or as promised, not returned after maturity or where the competent authority has reason to believe that any financial establishment is acting in a calculated manner with an intention to defraud the depositors.
4. Section 5 of the Act of 2000 provides for appointment of competent authority not below the rank of Collector by State Government's notification.
5. Section 6 of the Act of 2000 provides for punishment for defaults specified therein by a financial establishment in the 4 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012 matter of non-payment of deposit on maturity alongwith any benefit in the form of interest, bonus profit or in any other form as promised or fails to render service as assured against the deposit, every person including the promoter, partner, director, manager or any other person or an employee responsible for the management of or conducting of the business or affairs of such financial establishment shall on conviction be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six years and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees and such offence financial establishment shall also be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh rupees.
It is further provided that except for special and adequate reasons to be recorded, the imprisonment shall not be less than for one year and the fine shall not be less than fifty thousand rupees.
Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act of 2000 provides that no police official shall investigate an offence under this Act without express permission of an officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police having jurisdiction.
6. Section 7 of the Act of 2000 provides for establishment of Special Court and Section 8 of the Act of 2000 provides for power of Special Court regarding attachment.
7. Section 11 of the Act of 2000 provides for appeal against the order passed by the Special Judge before the High Court within thirty days from the date of the order with the condition of pre- 5 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012 deposit, as provided for under sub-section (2) thereof.
8. Section 14 of the Act of 2000 provides that no Court shall have competence to grant anticipatory bail to any person under this Act notwithstanding provisions of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
9. To carry out the mandate contained in the aforesaid provisions, rules have also been framed in exercise of powers under sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act of 2000.
10. The scope of jurisdiction and interference under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. of this Court by now is well settled in catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the context of factual matrix in hand following judgments, in the opinion of this Court, are relevant for addressing the contentions raised by the learned counsel with due regard to the provisions of the Act of 2000:-
1. R. Kalyani Vs. Janak C. Mehta and others, (2009) 1 SCC 516.
2. Dalip Kaur and Others Vs. Jagnar Singh and another, (2009) 14 SCC 696.
3. Vijayander Kumar and others Vs. State of Rajasthan and another, (2014) 3 SCC 389.
11. In R. Kalyani (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court after having discussed series of judgments on issue viz. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, (1999) 3 SCC 259, Hamida v. Rashid, (2008) 1 SCC 474, Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain, (2008) 2 6 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012 SCC 705, State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo, (2005) 13 SCC 540, Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation, (2005) 2 SCC 571 and Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P., (2008) 8 SCC 781 has laid down the following propositions of law:- para 15 and 16.
"15. Propositions of law which emerge from the said decisions are:
(1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a first information report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence.
(3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the Court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus.
(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue. (Emphasis supplied) 7 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012
16. It is furthermore well known that no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down. Each case has to be considered on its own merits. The Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction, although would not interfere with a genuine complaint keeping in view the purport and object for which the provisions of Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been introduced by Parliament but would not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction in appropriate cases. One of the paramount duties of the superior courts is to see that a person who is apparently innocent is not subjected to persecution and humiliation on the basis of a false and wholly untenable complaint."
12. In Dalip Kaur (supra) the aforesaid judgment, R. Kalyani (supra), has been followed and it has been held that the High Court would exercise its inherent jurisdiction only when one or other propositions of law, as laid down in R. Kalyani (supra), is attracted.
13. In Vijayander Kumar (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court relying upon the aforesaid judgment, R. Kalyani (supra), has held as under:- para 12 and 13 "12. The learned counsel for the respondents is correct in contending that a given sent of facts may make out a civil wrong as also a criminal offence and only because a civil remedy may also be available to the informant/complainant that itself 8 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012 cannot be a ground to quash a criminal proceeding. The real test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. This proposition is supported by several judgments of this Court as noted in para 16 of the judgment in Ravindra Kumar Madhanlal Goenka v. Rugmini Ram Raghav Spinners (P) Ltd., (2009) 11 SCC 529 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1011.
13. On considering the facts of the present case it is found that the facts were properly noticed by the High Court on earlier occasion while examining the petition preferred by the appellants for quashing of FIR of this case. The same view has been reiterated by the High Court in the order under appeal for not interfering with the order of cognizance by the learned Magistrate. Hence, we do not find any good ground to interfere with the criminal proceedings against the appellants at this stage. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No costs."
14. Learned counsel for the applicant laid great emphasis on the fact that the earlier complaint made by the complainant was filed by the SHO, Thatipur. It was found that the dispute between the parties was only as regards money transaction and civil in nature, therefore, no further investigation was required. 9 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012
On perusal of aforesaid report dated 13/3/2011 (Annexure- E), it appears that there was no investigation at all, instead the concerning SHO had just taken a bird's eye view for his prima facie understanding that the dispute did not involve any such act which require investigation and ended up with the observation that the dispute is of a civil nature related to money transaction. Neither the Act of 2000 nor the provisions contained therein nor various clauses of the agreement have been looked into to understand the real nature of the transaction or allegation in the complaint. Therefore, this Court is not convinced with the submission of learned counsel for the applicant that no further complaint could be ordered to be investigated.
On reading of the FIR, it cannot be said that no investigation is warranted in the alleged transaction between the parties qua various clauses of the agreement bearing in mind the Act of 2000 and the provisions contained therein, detailed analysis whereof has already been made in preceding paragraphs.
15. Before deciding this petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. on merits, it is considered apposite to observe that during the course of hearing this Court expressed the view that it shall be in the interest of justice if the applicant approaches the investigating authority with a detail representation seeking indulgence in the matter of investigation on the FIR registered at Crime No.14/2012 dated 10/1/2012, however, learned counsel for the applicant insisted for hearing on merits of the petition and prayed for 10 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012 decision thereupon. Accordingly, we propose to decide this petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code on its own merits.
16. Before we advert to the grounds of challenge made to the FIR dated 10/1/2012 registered at Crime No.14/2012, it is apposite to examine object and reasons for which the Act of 2000 has been enacted, which in fact is to protect the deposits made by the public in the financial establishments and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
17. As there has been rise in complaints brought to the notice of State Government that certain financial establishments take deposits of money from public, but after sometime they run away without returning the deposits of public and there was no enactment to identify and take legal action against such financial establishments, who commit defaults in returning the deposits after maturity, therefore, in order to safeguard the interest of depositors, to identify the financial establishments and to compel them to return the money by taking legal proceeding the aforesaid Act of 2000 has been enacted, which provides for procedure not only for taking legal proceedings against the financial establishments, but also makes every person responsible for the management of affairs of such establishments. Special Courts have been incorporated to punish the persons responsible for the aforesaid defaults for a term which may extend to six years and also imposition of fine which shall not be less than Rs.50,000/-. 11 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012
18. Now in the background of the aforesaid enunciation of law as regards scope of jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and the provisions of the Act of 2000 this Court proposes to examine the factual matrix of the case in hand to consider and decide 'as to whether the FIR dated 10/1/2012 registered against the applicant at Crime No.14/2012 in Police Station Thatipur, Morar, Gwalior for the offence punishable under Section 6 of the Act of 2000 does not disclose any offence and can be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure'.
19. Close scrutiny of nature of transaction is inevitable before we address on the nature of allegations made by the complainant in the FIR lodged on 10/1/2012.
20. The applicant's company is registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 and certificate of incorporation is on record as Annexure-B. The franchisee agreement is alleged to have been executed between the applicant's company and the respondent/complainant; an individual, purportedly under the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 / Companies Act, 1956 as stated in the agreement. Relevant terms and conditions of the agreement are to the following effect:
A- Applicant's company-NPCL appointed the respondent/complainant as the NPCL franchisee from 9th day of October, 2009 to run its services at Gwalior District. (Clause 1). However, term 12 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012 'services' has not been defined. B- Franchisee appointment initially shall be for a period of five years i.e. from October, 9, 2009 to October, 9, 2014 and can be renewed after five years, if found functioning satisfactory, at the discretion of NPCL. (Clause 2) C- Non-refundable franchisee royalty for an amount of Rs.2,22,222/- plus service tax is paid by the franchisee by cross cheque. (Clause 5) D- NPCL shall be free to fix targets for the franchisee center. Present minimum annual target fixed for Gwalior is Rs.25,00,000/- and NPCL shall review center performance periodically based on their achievement of target. (Clause 6). However, nature of target is neither defined nor explained. E- Franchisee has to run its services as per contents and procedures lay down and as per requirements of NPCL time to time. Charges for each product will as decided by NPCL. (Clause 8). What is the nature of product or in what context the term is used is missing in agreement.
F- Franchisee has to deposit the charges/payment collected within 24 working hours in company's bank account opened, operated by company and have to intimate by authorized e-mail ID. 13 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012
(Clause 9) (Emphasis supplied) G- Present rate of franchisee commission is 60% plus applicable service tax of the fee/service charges collected during the month subject minimum of Rs................. (Rupees................only) plus service tax per year payable to NPCL with in time limits to be mentioned beyond that 18% interest to be payable. (Clause 10) H- In case NPCL offers any product, NPCL will deduct 60% plus service tax of the product charges and balance will be paid to franchisee on receipt of payment from customer. (Clause 11) I- Product charge mean the entire amount received by the franchisee from customer. (Clause 12) (Emphasis supplied) J- If franchisee does not generate and/or do not remit to NPCL franchisee commission as indicated above for consecutive three months, NPCL has right to recover from security deposit. (Clause 14) K- Registration of customers shall be done in the NPCL application form for all customers on payment as prescribed from time to time. (Clause
16) L- Franchisee must forward copies of all the bills cash receipts issued to the customers monthly as per 14 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012 format issued, collected by the franchisee on the date fixed therein every month to NPCL, failing which 18% interest will be charged. The franchisee shall be required to maintain enquiry register, ledger register. (Clause 17) M- Franchisee shall have to deposit a total refundable amount of Rs.1,00,000/- as security deposit after completion of six months. (Clause 32)
21. On perusal of the aforesaid agreement and various clauses relevant portions whereof are mentioned hereinabove, it is found that they do not indicate nature of activity intended to be performed by the company through franchisee, for which non- refundable franchisee royalty with service tax has been charged, franchisee commission is offered and targets are fixed. There is no description as regards the nature of activity to justify alleged royalty styled as franchisee royalty. It is also provided for offering of any product by the NPCL, but what is the nature of product, that is not disclosed though it explains that the product charges means the entire amount received by the franchisee from customer. It is not disclosed as to what would be the nature of payment made by the customers to franchisee called as product charges in absence of any description of product, in case NPCL offers the product NPCL will deduct 60% with service tax to the product charges and balance will be paid to the franchisee on receipt of payment from the customers with the further provision that if franchisee does not 15 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012 generate and / or do not remit to NPCL franchisee commission for three months, the same shall be recovered from the security deposit. Therefore, the agreement allegedly executed between the applicant and respondent/complainant appears to be a camouflage exercise intended to solicit deposits in the name of franchisee royalty and security deposits with the promise to pay with interest. There is no explanation as to why customers are required to be registered and for what purpose. It is not deducible from the agreement, as to what is the nature of franchisee been given to the respondent/complainant for which royalty is charged.
22. In Black's Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, the word 'royalty' is defined as a payment in addition to or in place of an up-front payment made to an author or inventor for each copy of a work or article sold under a copyright or patent. Royalties are often paid per item made, used, or sold, or per time elapsed. Likewise, various nature of royalties have been defined viz. Established royalty, Reasonable royalty- Oil and Gas, Haulage royalty, Landowner's royalty, Mineral royalty, Nonparticipating royalty, Overriding royalty, Shut-in-royalty and Royalty interest- Oil & gas. Definitions of all these terminologies lead to the understanding that royalty is an amount payable for use of any property by the user of the property. According to Joweitts' Dictionary of English Law, royalty means 'a payment reserved by the grantor of a patent, lease of a mine or similar right, and payable proportionately to the use made of the right by the 16 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012 grantee'. In the case of State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd., 1985 Supp SCC 280 similar is the meaning attributed to the word 'royalty'. In the case of Continental Construction Ltd. v. CIT, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 567 the Supreme Court held that 'royalty' is generally a consideration paid to the owner of a right or asset such as copyright, patent right, mining right etc. for the privilege of using it for one's own purpose.
23. In the teeth of the fact that the nature of activities claimed to be carried on by the NPCL is not clear from the terms of the agreement and the corresponding obligation of the franchisee as to what nature of activities are required to be carried on by the franchisee, no rules and regulations claimed to have been set up by NPCL from time to time as contemplated under clause 30 of the agreement is placed before this Court to understand the nature of the activities and regulations thereof, under such facts and circumstances, it is difficult to understand as to why there is a requirement to deposit security of Rs. One Lakh as provided for under clause 32. Class 11 of the agreement though shows that NPCL shall offer a product and NPCL will deduct 60% plus service tax of the product charges and balance will be paid to franchisee on receipt of payment from customer, but this prima facie appears to be a clause where-under the amount deposited by the investors is shown to be paid 40% of the total earning out of the said deposit and 60% shall be appropriated by the company. Therefore, upon perusal of different clauses of the 17 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012 agreement, it appears that the entire agreement is misleading in nature prepared only to cover the deposits received from the customers in the form of so-called franchisee royalty and security deposits with the promise of payment with interest.
24. The respondent/complainant filed a complaint in Police Station Thatipur that the applicant-Nishant Kumar Jha, present Zonal Head of Net Profit Consultancy Services Private Ltd., 111, Mayur Nagar, Thatipur, Morar, Gwalior (NPCL) fraudulently taken from the petitioner Rs.2.50 Lakh on 9/10/2009 under the garb of franchisee royalty and other charges. Thereafter, in the name of salary to the employees, expenditure towards furniture glass, advertising, ISO registration etc. Two Lakh Rupees were further taken and thereafter in the form of fix deposit Rupees One Lakh was taken. As such, total Rs. 5.50 lakh was taken from him in the form of cheques and cash and the aforesaid agreement was executed between the two. As per the franchisee conditions, out of the total earning of the deposit, 40% was assured to be given by the Branch Head, however, till date no amount has been paid. Even the interest of 1%, which was promised to be paid on fixed deposit, has also not been paid. Further, despite having promised to refund the fix deposit, the same has not been refunded. One cheque No.205870 of the amount of Rs.1,07,000/- dated 14/2/2011, Axis Bank, was issued by the applicant in favour of complainant, however, on presenting the aforesaid cheque, account No.158010100139359, the same was returned back on 18 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012 15/2/2011 with the note that there is no sufficient fund in the account. It is, therefore, alleged that the complainant has been cheated by fraudulent means by the applicant and, therefore, the case be registered against the applicant for having not refunded deposit with interest. It appears that the aforesaid complaint was presented before the Superintendent of Police, Gwalior and on his orders the FIR was registered by the In-charge Station House Officer, Thatipur, which is under investigation.
25. While investigation is in progress and the applicant remained absconding, he has filed the instant petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashment of the FIR on the ground that on the face of the FIR no offence is made out against any Act much less the Act of 2000. The applicant in his petition has tried to explain the nature of business of the company stating that the business of the company is only to carry on the advisory services on equity analysis, financial consultant and to act as brokers for mutual funds, shares and securities, bonds etc. and then the memorandum of association of the company is also referred to, which upon perusal reflects, what has been stated in this petition as regards the nature of activities and business of the company is quite different and independent of what is deducible from the terms of the agreement between the company and franchisee i.e. the complainant. It is contended that company is a financial consultant and acts as brokers for mutual funds, shares, 19 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012 securities, bonds etc., whereas clause 27 of the agreement reads that franchisee shall not at any time indicate that the center is an office of Stock Broking firm and in all his representation, correspondences has to specifically incite that is a Franchisee center or NPCL Authorized center. As such, averments made in the petition if juxtapositioned to the terms and conditions of the agreement, both appear to be in different streams and it is somewhat like putting round peg in square hole. If the applicant was only a consultant concern in financial matters, there was no occasion for entering the agreement with the individuals like the complainant styling them as franchisees on terms and conditions contained therein as observed in preceding paragraphs, which not only contemplates deposit of royalty, security deposit, sale of product introduced by applicant's company, deduction of 60% plus service tax on sale of product, product charges and balance paid to the franchisee on receipt of payment from the customers, fixing annual targets for the franchisee to the extent of Rupees Twenty Five Lakh, registration of customers and over & above caution to the franchisee that he shall not at any time indicate that the center is an office of Stock Broking firm and in all his representation, correspondences has to specifically incite that is a Franchisee center or NPCL Authorized center.
That apart, during the course of hearing learned counsel for the complainant also placed before this Court certain incriminating documents to fortify his submission that the company is in the 20 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012 business of receiving deposits from the public, however, the same is sought to be denied by the applicant. Be that as it may. Documents relied and filed by either parties shall be critically evaluated to reach a logical conclusion by the investigating agency. This Court is not seizen with the matter to explore, investigate and take decision on the question of saddling of civil and criminal liabilities on parties on appreciation of evidence on record.
26. The Court has noticed various clauses of the agreement executed by the parties only to ascertain the nature of activities of the applicant's company with due advertence to what has been averred in the petition. Various clauses of the agreement do not suggest that the company is a mere financial consultant, as claimed in the petition. Allegations have been made by the complainant in the FIR that under the garb of aforesaid franchisee agreement the applicant has fraudulently taken deposit of Rs.2.5 Lakh as franchisee royalty and Rs. Two Lakh towards expenses and Rs. One Lakh as security deposit through cheques and cash with the assurance of 40% dividend. Since applicant/company has failed to repay and the cheque issued in favour of respondent/complainant by the applicant's company was dishonoured with the comment of insufficient fund, he has filed the complaint against the applicant, which with the orders of the Superintendent of Police has been registered as FIR and investigation is going on. Considering the definition of deposit as 21 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012 contained under Section 2 (b), financial establishment under Section 2 (c) and the penal provisions under Section 6 of the Act, this Court is of the view that in the backdrop of facts and circumstances narrated above as regards the complaint made and registered as FIR, it cannot be said that the dispute between the parties is of the nature of civil liability only arising out of financial transaction simplicitor. In fact under the cover of the said agreement prima facie there appears to be a systematic activity of the applicant/company to solicit deposits from investors with the promise of payment of dividend/interest camouflaged by execution of agreement. Thus, there is sufficient scope of investigation in the matter.
In the light of the factual matrix of the case in hand, the following judgments cited by learned counsel for the applicant are of no help to the applicant as are on different factual matrix having no semblance with the facts of the case in hand :-
1. Mahindra & Mahindra Financial Services Limited and Another Vs. Rajiv Dubey, (2009) 1 SCC 706.
2. Rishipal Singh Vs. State of UP and another, 2014 CRLR (SC) 698.
3. R.P. Singh and others Vs. State of M.P. and another, 2014 CRLR (MP) 45.
4. Rajiv Thapar and others Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330.22 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012
27. Bearing in mind the settled law as regards scope of jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of R. Kalyani (supra), Dalip Kaur (supra) and Vijayander Kumar (supra), in the opinion of this Court, this petition for quashment of FIR registered at Crime No.14/2012, Police Station Thatipur, Morar, Gwalior is bereft of merits and, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, dismissed.
(S.K. Gangele) (Rohit Arya)
Judge Judge
Arun*
23 M.Cr.C. No.1869/2012
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
BENCH AT GWALIOR
DIVISION BENCH:
HON. SHRI JUSTICE S.K. GANGELE
&
HON. SHRI JUSTICE ROHIT ARYA
Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.1869/2012 .........Applicant:
Nishant Kumar Jha Versus .......Respondents State of M.P. and another ORDER FOR CONSIDERATION (Rohit Arya) Judge 24/11/2014 HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE S.K. GANGELE (S.K. Gangele) Judge 24/11/2014 POST IT FOR:26/11/2014 (S.K. Gangele) Judge 24/11/2014