Bombay High Court
Godfrey Philips India Limited vs Union Of India on 31 August, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1996(85)ELT242(BOM)
Bench: M.B. Shah, S.H. Kapadia
JUDGMENT Shah, C.J.
1. To the Petitioner No. 1, Godfrey Philips India Limited, notices to show cause-cum-demand were issued under Section 11A of the Central Excises and Salt Act, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), that they are taking deposits from their wholesale buyers and on such deposits they are not paying interest and in turn they are earning huge profits both by earning interest and/or by utilising such amount in purchasing fixed assets and/or procuring raw materials for manufacture of finished products viz. cigarettes and this has helped them in lowering down assessable value on cigarettes. It was stated that this benefit influenced fixation of selling rates of cigarettes on lower side and price paid by such wholesale dealers cannot be treated as sole consideration for the sale. Hence a show cause notice was issued under Section 11A of the Act for allegedly short levy of excise duty by pointing out that on the basis of such under-valuation large amount of approximately Rs. 44 crores of Central Excise was to be recovered, details of which are not required to be given here.
2. On the basis of the said show cause notices, the matters were being heard in the office of the 3rd Respondent at Bombay. Thereafter, in a part-heard adjudication, on the basis of order dated 21st March, 1989 passed by the Central Board of Excise and Customs (Respondent No. 4), the matters were transferred to the Director General of Inspection, New Delhi (Respondent No. 2).
3. The Petitioners have challenged the said transfer orders by filing this petition. They have prayed that Respondents be directed forthwith to withdraw and cancel the Notification No. 159/84-C.E., dated 10th July, 1984 (Exhibit 'M') and the transfer order dated 21st March, 1989 (Exhibit 'U') and also to restrain the Respondents from taking any steps or proceedings pursuant to the show cause notices dated 28th July, 1983 (Exhibit 'E') and 30th July, 1983 (Exhibit 'I').
4. The other prayers are with regard to validity of Rule 5 of the Central Excise Valuation Rules, 1975 and also the issuance of the show cause notices dated 28th July, 1983 and 30th July, 1983. These prayers are not pressed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners and he has not made any submissions.
5. By Notification dated 10th July, 1984 (Exhibit 'M') the Central Board of Excise and Customs invested the Director-General of Inspection in the Directorate of Inspection and Audit (Customs and Central Excise), New Delhi, with the power of a Collector of Central Excise to be exercised by him throughout the territory of India for the purpose of investigation and adjudication of such cases as may be assigned to him by the Central Board of Excise and Customs. In exercise of the powers under the said Notification, the Central Board of Excise and Customs (hereinafter referred to as "the Board") assigned to the Director-General of Inspection the following cases annexed to the order (Exhibit 'U') for the purposes of investigation and adjudication :-
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S. Name of the Number & date of Name of the No. Collectorate Show Cause Notice Respondents
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1 Bombay-I CEX/SCN/GPI/KI M/s. Godfrey Philips
/83, dated 20-7-1983 (I) Ltd., Bombay
2 -do- CEX/SCN/GPI/83 -do-
3 -do- V/PI/30-117/86, -do-
dated 22-5-1987
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6. In this Petition challenge is to the transfer of the matters pertaining to show cause notices dated 20th July, 1983 and 30th July, 1983, that is, the first two matters mentioned above. With regard to the third matter pertaining to show cause notice dated 22nd May, 1987, it is admitted that the Petitioners had preferred Writ Petition No. 706 of 1990 before this Court. In that Petition, after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, a Division Bench of this Court, by its order dated 7th March, 1991, directed the adjudicating authority to continue the proceedings in question. It was specifically directed as under :-
"For the foregoing reasons, the Writ Petition is rejected at this stage, without entering into merits, save and except as regards the challenge to the validity of the order of transfer and assignment of the impugned proceedings to the Collector of Central Excise, Delhi, and similar pervious order(s) of assignment."
It is also admitted that thereafter the adjudicating authority had concluded recently the said proceedings.
7. Pending the aforesaid Writ Petition the Board, by its Order No. 1 of 1990, dated 5th January, 1990 rescinded the Order No. 1089-CX. 6, dated 21st March, 1989 (Exhibit 'U') and simultaneously passed an order assigning the aforesaid three cases and other cases pending with the Collectorate of Central Excise, Hyderabad and Meerut to the Collector of Central Excise, Delhi, by Order No. 5/90/Central Excise, dated 5th January, 1990.
8. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners vehemently submitted that the order dated 10th July, 1984 (Exhibit 'M') transferring the cases from the Bombay Collectorate was illegal and bad. However, that challenge may not survive because of the recession of that order by order dated 5th January, 1990. The vehemently submitted that order dated 5th January, 1990 is illegal and void as it is passed (i) in violation of the principles of natural justice as it is passed without giving any hearing to the Petitioners and (ii) in breach of the interim order passed by this Court on 18th December, 1989. We also note that even though Order No. 2 of 1990, dated 5th January, 1990 is not challenged by filing a separate writ petition or amending the present petition, we have permitted the learned Counsel to raise the contention challenging the said order and on that point, we have heard both the Counsel at length.
9. In substance, the controversy in this Petition is limited and it is with regard to the order dated 5th January, 1990 passed by the Board transferring the two cases of the Petitioner Company to the Collector of Central Excise, Delhi.
10. We would first deal with the question whether the said order is in violation or in breach of the interim order passed by this Court. It is to be stated that there is no direction issued by this Court that the Board shall not pass any order transferring the cases which were already transferred to the Director General of Inspection and Audit (Customs and Central Excise), New Delhi, to any one. There is also no direction that it should be conducted only by the Collectorate at Bombay. This would be clear from the order passed by this Court on 18th December, 1989. At the time of passing of the order dated 18th December, 1989 the Court has specifically observed, in paragraph 3, that the question before the Court was not with regard to the validity of the notification in question but with regard to the exercise of power under that notification on the facts and circumstances of the case. On that basis the Court granted interim relief in terms of prayer clause (e) of the Petition with a further clarification that it would be open to the Respondents to allow the 3rd Respondent to hear the proceedings pursuant to the show cause notices mentioned above. Prayer clause (e) reads as under :
"(e) That pending the hearing and final disposal of this petition, the Respondents, their servants, subordinates, officers and agents be restrained by an order and injunction of this Hon'ble Court from taking any steps or proceedings to the said show cause notices dated 20th July, 1983 (Exhibit 'E') and 30th July, 1983 (Exhibit 'I')."
From the aforesaid injunction order it is apparent that the Court had only restrained the Respondents from taking any steps or further proceedings qua the show cause notices dated 20th July, 1983 and 30th July, 1983. This would not mean that the Respondents cannot rescind their earlier order which was under challenge. The Court had specifically observed that it would be open to the Respondents to allow the 3rd Respondent to hear the proceedings pursuant to the show cause notices in question.
11. The learned counsel for the Petitioners, however, submitted that even though it was open to the Respondents to rescind the order dated 21st March, 1989, it was not open to them to pass Order No. 5, dated 5th January, 1990 altering the status quo by transferring the cases to the Collectorate at New Delhi because by such action it has rendered it impossible for the Respondents to comply with the interim directions of allowing the 3rd Respondent to hear the proceedings pursuant to the aforesaid show cause notices.
12. In our view, this contention is also without any substance. By the interim order this Court has not directed Respondent No. 3 to proceed with the matter, but Court has merely observed that it would be open to the Respondents to allow Respondent No. 3 to proceed with the said proceedings. That means, a discretion or option was given to the Respondents and this cannot be termed as a direction that Respondent No. 3 should proceed with the matter. It is also to be noted that this Court has not granted any interim relief in terms of prayer clause (f) of the Petition directing the Respondents to maintain status quo with regard to the proceedings initiated on the basis of the show cause notices. Hence, by passing the order dated 5th January, 1990 rescinding the order dated 21st March, 1989 and allocating the work of adjudication of the matter to the Collector of Central Excise, Delhi, cannot be termed to be in any manner in violation of the order passed by this Court.
13. The next submission which requires consideration is whether the said order is in violation of the principles of natural justice or whether before passing the transfer order the Respondents were required to give an opportunity of hearing to the Petitioners. On this question, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners vehemently submitted that :
(1) Normally the show cause notices issued under Section 11A of the Act are being adjudicated by the Jurisdictional Collector which is a statutory forum prescribed under Rule 2(ii)(p) of the Central Excise Rules and before depriving the Jurisdictional officer from adjudicating the matter principles of natural justice ought to have been followed.
(2) In the present case it was much more necessary for the Respondents to follow the principles of natural justice because it is alleged by the Respondents that all matters pertaining to tax evasion by Cigarette Companies are assigned to one particular officer. For this purpose, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners heavily relied upon the statement made in the affidavit of Shri C. P. Arya, Additional Collector, dated 19th December, 1991, in reply to the petition to the effect that in order to have a uniform adjudication and centralising of such issues together, the Board had taken a policy decision to transfer all identical matters of tax evasion by tobacco/cigarette companies to a senior-most officer of the Department. If the petitioners were given an opportunity of hearing, they would have pointed out that the matters involved in the two show cause notices in question were not identical and that they do not fall in the class of cases of evasion of tax by cigarette companies.
(3) It is also pointed out that in the present case if an opportunity of hearing was afforded to the Petitioners it would have made a difference because on the record it is an admitted fact that before introducing the scheme of acceptance of deposit, a full and complete disclosure was made by letter dated 15th September, 1980 by the Petitioner Company to the concerned officer. According to the Petitioners, their cases therefore ought not to have been clubbed for hearing with other tax evaders. If an opportunity of hearing was given to them they would have been able to explain that they are not tax evaders. To say that the Petitioners are tax evaders, which by itself is stigma, without giving an opportunity of hearing to them would itself be violative of the principles of natural justice.
(4) In the present case it would be unfair not to have afforded an opportunity of hearing to the Petitioners when there was material which could have been brought to the attention of the Board that the show cause notices should not be assigned to the Collector at Delhi. For this purpose, reliance is placed by the Petitioners upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. W.N. Chadha, .
14. As against this, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents vehemently submitted as under :-
(i) In order to have a uniform adjudication and centralising all such cases involving similar issues together, the Board had taken a policy decision to transfer all matters of tax evasion by cigarette companies to a senior-most officer of the Department. This would avoid inconsistent decisions and the matters could be expedited by the concerned officers. He pointed out that various similar show cause notices were issued to other cigarette companies by different authorities all over the country. These companies include the Indian Tobacco Company (ITC), the GTC, the Asia Tobacco Company and several other companies, totally numbering 25 to 30, and the alleged tax evasion was roughly Rs. 3,000 crores to Rs. 4,000 crores. To have a uniform decision in the matter, the cases are assigned to one high-ranking officer. With regard to the show cause notices dated 20th and 30th July, 1983 issued to the Petitioners. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., it is pointed out that the alleged tax evasion or the Excise duty comes to the tune of approximately Rs. 46.50 crores. The Board considered it to be in public interest to have all these cases decided by one officer for the reasons explained in detail in the affidavit in reply.
(ii) In view of the provisions of Section 28 of the Act read with Rule 4 of the Rules, an 'appointed authority' is also invested with an all India territorial jurisdiction.
(iii) Three other companies, namely, (1) The Asia Tobacco Co., (2) The Duncan Agro Co., and (3) The Indian Tobacco Company, had challenged such orders of transfer from the territorial Collector to the said single authority on various grounds including the vires of the original Notification before the Madras, Delhi and Calcutta High Courts respectively. All these petitions were dismissed by those High Courts and Special Leave Petitions filed by these Companies are also dismissed by the Supreme Court. It is, therefore, submitted that the issues raised in the present Petition stand concluded in view of the rejection of the Special Leave Petitions by the Supreme Court. On Writ Petition No. 706 of 1990 filed by the Petitioners, by order dated 7th March, 1991, this Court has also permitted the authority to continue the proceedings in question, which would clearly mean that the aforesaid contentions raised in this Petition would not survive.
(iv) By transfer of the matter in the present case, no civil consequences would follow and the Petitioners are not deprived of any right or property. Hence, there is no question of violating the principles of natural justice. The cases are transferred as a matter of administrative exigency to see that identical cases are dealt with by one single authority.
(v) The Petitioners are only interested in delaying the further proceedings because of large amount involved in the matter. Because of delay the petitioners gain interest and the Respondents are losing interest on a large amount.
(vi) Considering the facts of the case, even if there is an alleged breach of the principles of natural justice, yet, this Court may not exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
15. At this stage, we would note that the learned Counsel for the parties have submitted their written submissions. Office is directed to keep the written submissions on record.
16. For appreciating the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, we would first refer to the relevant provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
17. Section 2(b) defines "Central Excise Officer" to mean "any officer of the Central Excise Department, or any person (including an officer of the State Government) invested by the Central Board of Excise and Customs constituted under the Central Boards of Revenue Act, 1963 (54 of 1963) with any of the powers of a Central Excise Officer under this Act". Rule 2(ii)(A) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 gives meaning to the word "Collector" in relation to excisable goods other than salt for various areas mentioned therein. For areas of Bombay, clause (p) of Rule 2(ii)(A) provides "Collector of Central Excise, Bombay I". However, it also includes any officer specially authorised under Rules 4 or 5 to exercise throughout any State, or in any specified area therein, all or any of the powers of a Collector under the said Rules. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 are as under :-
"4. Appointment of Officers. - The Central Board of Excise and Customs may appoint such persons as it thinks fit to be Central Excise Officers, or to exercise all or any of the powers conferred by these rules, on such officers.
5. Delegation of powers by the Collector. - Unless the Central Government in any case otherwise directs, the Collector may authorise any officer subordinate to him of exercise throughout his jurisdiction, or in any specified area therein, all or any of the powers of a Collector under these rules.
6. Collector or Deputy Collector to exercise the power of any officer. -
(1) The Collector may perform all or any of the duties, or exercise all or any of the powers, assigned to an officer under these rules.
(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (1), the Deputy Collector of Central Excise appointed by the Central Board of Excise and Customs, may, within his territorial jurisdiction, perform all or any of the duties, or exercise all or any of the powers, assigned under these rules to an officer subordinate to him."
18. The learned Counsel for the Respondents rightly submitted that Section 2(b) of the Act empowers the Board to invest on any person with the powers of a Collector of Central Excise to be exercised by him throughout the territory of India for the purpose of investigation and adjudication of such cases as may be assigned to him by the said Board. This is to be read along with Rule 4 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, which provides that the Central Board of Excise and Customs may appoint such persons as if thinks fit to be Central Excise Officers, or to exercise all or any of the powers conferred by the said Rules, on such officers. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 specifically provides that the Collector may perform all or any of the duties, or exercise all or any of the powers, assigned to an officer under these Rules. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 6 provides that subject to the provisions of sub-rule (1), the Deputy Collector of Central Excise appointed by the Central Board of Excise and Customs, may, within his territorial jurisdiction, perform all or any of the duties, or exercise all or any of the powers, assigned under these rules to an officer subordinate to him.
19. Considering the aforesaid provisions, we are of the view that the Board has been conferred with the jurisdiction to invest a person with any of the powers of a Central Excise Officer under the Act. The Legislature has authorised the Board to confer on such person all or any one or more powers, which would include the power of a Collector or Assistant Collector under Section 11A. There is nothing in the Act to suggest that jurisdiction to be exercised by the Collector or any other officer of Central Excise, specifically authorised under Rule 4 of Central Excise Rules, must be confined to a certain District or State or a particular area. It follows that under Section 2(b) of the Act read with Rule 4 of the Rules, an Appointed Authority could be invested with an all India territorial jurisdiction.
20. In view of Section 2(b) of the Act, the powers of a Collector/Assistant Collector can be invested by the Central Board in any other Officer under the Act, including the Collector of Central Excise at Delhi.
21. In the present case the dispute is not with regard to the investment of power by the Central Board to the Collector of Central Excise at Delhi, but the dispute is that the said power is exercised without giving an opportunity of being heard to the Petitioners. Therefore, we would deal with this question as to whether an opportunity of hearing is required to be given to the Petitioners before transferring the cases from one Collectorate to another.
September 1, 1995
22. Firstly, it is necessary to state that similar contentions were raised by Asia Tobacco Co. Ltd. by filing a Writ Petition before the Madras High Court. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Asia Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr., 1988 (33) E.L.T. 279, rejected the petition and upheld the order passed by the Central Board of Excise and Customs investing the powers of deciding cases to the Director of Anti-evasion (Central Excise), New Delhi. The Court held that there was no infirmity in the notification having regard to inclusive definition of the term "Collector" and there was nothing illegal in the powers of the Collector being invested in the Director of Anti-evasion (Central Excise) and was in conformity with Rule 2(ii). The Court further observed that the powers have been expressly conferred by the Rules and the Act. There is no question of conflict of powers under the Rules vested in the Collector as defined and the power vested by exercise of specific powers under the Act and the Rules. The Court also held as under :-
"In certain cases, evasion may involve persons from different parts of the country when the activities of a manufacturer are spread all over the country. In the instant case, the allegations made in the show cause notice disclose, at least prima facie, that there is an evasion on a large scale by activates in different places in India and that would itself be enough to show that, at least prima facie, the power cannot be said to be either abused or exercised mala fide. The power to invest a Central Excise Officer with the powers of the Collector of Central Excise, or other officers, is vested in the highest authority under the Act and the possibility of abuse of the power cannot thus be assumed."
Similarly, in the case of Duncan Agro Industries Ltd. v. Union of India,1989 (39) E.L.T. 211 (Del.), the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court rejected similar contentions and upheld similar notification. After considering the provisions of Section 2(b) of the Act and the Rules, the Court also rejected the contention that whenever powers are conferred on the designated officer as Collector of Central Excise in Section 11A, it cannot be invested on any other officer of the Central Excise Department. The Court observed that there was no warrant to give a limited or a narrow meaning to the language employed by the legislature in the second part of Section 2(b) so as to restrict to the investing of powers under Sections 19, 21, 25 or 26 as is suggested and not Sec. 11A. The Court further held that there is no territorial limitation laid in the statute and more than one officer is envisaged in the statute who has territorial jurisdiction over the land or premises of the producer of any excisable goods. The Court further held that there is no vested right in a manufacturer or producer to be assessed by a particular functionary. The Court pertinently observed that the Rules do not either expressly or by necessary implication apply the rules of audi alteram partem in assignment of cases to one out of two competent authorities and that the impugned order assigning (matters) to the Director (Audit) certain cases annexed to that order for the purpose of investigation and adjudication is merely a ministerial act of assigning between two competent jurisdictions. It is purely an administrative function by the Department.
23. Similar contentions were raised before the Calcutta High Court in the case of I.T.C. Ltd. v. Union of India, 1991 (53) E.L.T. 234. The Court, after considering the provisions of Section 37A of the Central Excises and Salt Act, held that the provisions of Section 37A clearly go to show that Central Government may invest in the Collector all the powers exercisable by a Board Itself. There is no geographical limitation to the powers exercisable by the Board. If that be so, it is difficult to see why a Collector who can be authorised to exercise all the powers of the Board itself throughout the territory of India cannot be empowered to act as a Collector throughout the country. The Court also held that there is nothing in the Act to suggest that the jurisdiction to be exercised by the Collector or any other Officer of the Central Excise must be confined to a certain District or a certain State or a particular area of the country; for the sake of administrative convenience, the Central Government may divide the country into various administrative zones and place each zone under the Collector; the Central Government may also place certain types of cases or a particular assessee having a network of manufacturing facility all over India under one Collector.
24. It is an admitted fact that against all these judgments and orders, Special Leave Petitions were filed by the concerned companies and those Special Leave Petitions were rejected by the Supreme Court. Considering the aforesaid judgments rendered by the three High Courts upholding the transfer orders and also the fact that Special Leave Petitions were rejected by the Supreme Court, transferring similar matters to the Director of Anti-evasion, Central Excise, in our view, the contentions raised by the petitioners-company require to be rejected. The question as to the validity of the impugned notification transferring the cases is upheld by the various Courts and the Supreme Court has not interfered with those orders.
25. It is, however, submitted that the petitioners' case is required to be dealt with independently by the Court since the petition was filed as early as 1989. We would, therefore, deal with the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners and decide whether any show cause notice was required to be issued before transferring the case from the Collector of Central Excise, Bombay to the Director of Anti-evasion, Central Excise, New Delhi or subsequently rescinding that notification and issuing fresh notification transferring the case to the Collector of Central Excise, Delhi. In our view, the act of the Central Board of Excise and Customs is merely an administrative act and the transfer of cases is solely based on administrative exigencies. It has no civil consequences which affects the rights of the petitioners. It does not decide any question involved in the matter. The Central Board decided that all cases involving similar questions should be dealt with and decided by one authority so that there may not be conflicting view and that the matters can be expeditiously dealt with and decided. In our view, such decision cannot be said to be in any manner arbitrary or it would not require any hearing before transferring the cases.
26. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that in the present case, if the show cause notice was issued to the petitioners before assigning the cases to the Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi, dealing with cases of cigarette companies, it would have pointed out to the Central Board that the petitioners' case should not be clubbed with those cases for various reasons. He pointed out that in the present case, a full and complete disclosure was made by the company to the Assistant Collector by a letter dated 15th September, 1980. Therefore, there was no question of tax evasion by the petitioners. He further submitted that the petitioners are wrongly quoted as tax evaders and to say that the petitioner-company is a tax evader itself is a stigma and before attaching such stigma, the petitioners ought to have been heard.
27. In our view, this submission is without any basis mainly because, admittedly, a show cause notice under Section 11A of the Act was issued to the petitioners. This show cause notice itself would indicate that the allegations against the petitioners were that the Petitioners have evaded payment of tax. At present, there are allegations against the Petitioners that they have evaded large amount by way of tax as stated in the show cause notices. The question whether the petitioners have evaded the tax or not is still required to be adjudicated and all such cases transferred to one authority by the Central Board of Excise and Customs pertain to cigarette companies to whom the notices under Section 11A of the Act are issued. Therefore, in the present case, there is no question of any stigma being cast by transferring the cases.
28. However, the learned Counsel for the petitioners have strongly relied upon the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Anr. v. W.N. Chadha, wherein the Supreme Court has observed that where nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present and meet a case, the rule of audi alteram partem cannot be applied to defeat the ends of justice or to make the law 'lifeless, absurd, stultifying and self-defeating or plainly contrary to the common sense of the situation' and this rule may be jettisoned in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that if the petitioners were given an opportunity to present and point out their case before the authority that there was no tax evasion on their part as there was complete disclosure on their part in the year 1980 that the petitioner-company had started accepting deposit, the authority would not have transferred the cases. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, therefore, submitted that the Petitioners would have pointed out that Section 11A was not applicable. In our view, whether interest on large deposits received by the Petitioners from its wholesale buyers required to be added for determining the market value of the goods is to be adjudicated by the competent authority. That issue cannot be adjudicated at the time of transferring the case from one Collector to another Collector. On the contrary, that would be the main point which would be required to be decided by the adjudicating authority. The adjudicating authority is the Collector and not the Central Board of Excise and Customs which has transferred the cases.
29. In our view, the ratio of the Supreme Court in the case of Win Chadha (supra) in no way assists the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. In the very judgment, the Supreme Court, after referring to various decisions rendered by it, observed, in paragraph 81, as under :-
"81. Thus, there is exclusion of the application of audi alteram partem rule to cases where nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present and meet a case. This rule cannot be applied to defeat the ends of justice or to make the law 'lifeless, absurd, stultifying and self-defeating or plainly contrary to the common sense of the situation and this rule may be jettisoned in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands."
However, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that in the present case it was 'unfair on the part of the Respondents not to afford an opportunity of hearing' when there was material which could be brought to the attention of the Board why the show cause notices should not be assigned to the Collector, Delhi, dealing with tax evasion cases of cigarette companies. As discussed above, the matter which the Petitioners wanted to show to the Board was with regard to the validity of show cause notice. Applying the ratio laid down in the aforesaid paragraph, it is clear that there is nothing on record to indicate that the Board has acted unfairly or that the action of the Board was in any way unfair to the Petitioners in transferring the cases of similar nature to one another. According to the Act and the Rules, the Board was having such power. Rule 4 of the Rules specifically empowers the Board to appoint such persons as it thinks fit to be the Central Excise Officers, or to exercise all or any of the powers conferred by these rules, on such officers.
30. The learned Counsel for the respondents rightly submitted that in view of the stay order granted by this Court, the respondents have suffered irreparably because, the matter still could not be adjudicated by the Competent Authority from 1983 onwards. In our view, whether the Collectorate, Delhi decides of whether the Collectorate, Bombay adjudicates the matter will have no adverse effect on the petitioners' case. The learned Counsel for the Respondents submitted that even if the petitioners want the Collectorate, Delhi should adjudicate the matter at Bombay, the respondents are prepared to do so. However, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are not interested in seeing that the Collector, Central Excise and Customs come to Bombay and decide the matter at Bombay as the petitioners are interested in seeing that the respondents follow the principles of natural justice. In our view, on principle, it would not make any difference whether the matter is decided by the Central Excise Collector, Delhi, or the Central Excise Collector, Bombay. The Petitioners are not having any substantive right that the matters should be decided only by the Collector, Central Excise, Bombay.
31. With regard to the principles of natural justice, in the case of W. N. Chadha (supra), the Supreme Court has specifically held that the principle of law that could be deduced from the various decisions is "whether the decision was purely an administrative one and a full-fledged enquiry followed is relevant and significant factor in deciding whether at that stage, there ought to be a hearing which the statute did not expressly grant". Applying the aforesaid principle, in the present case, a full-fledged enquiry is to follow and the decision of transferring the cases from Collector of Central Excise and Customs from various States at one place at Delhi was purely administrative decision and was warranted by the circumstances. Therefore, there is no breach of the rule of audi alteram partem as contended by the petitioners.
32. From the aforesaid discussion, in short it may be stated that before transferring the matter pending with the Collector of Customs and Excise at Bombay to the Collector of Central Excise at Delhi for adjudication, there was no question of issuing any notice to the Petitioners. The order was passed purely on administrative ground. In the adjudication proceeding, a full-fledged inquiry is yet to be held and the contention whether the Petitioners had evaded Excise duty or not would be decided after giving them full opportunity of hearing. We agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondents that in such a case the rule of audi alteram partem should not be applied to defeat the ends of justice or to make the law lifeless and absurd. By transfer of cases the Petitioners are not likely to be adversely affected in any manner. It has no civil consequences. The persons holding the posts of Collector at Bombay and Delhi are transferable. The Petitioners have no right to say that their case should be adjudicated only by the Central Excise Collector, Bombay. In any case, we have heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioners at length and we are of the view that in this case the transfer of cases to the centralised authority viz. the Collector of Delhi, was for administrative purpose and reasons.
33. In the result, the petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged with costs. Interim reliefs stands vacated.
34. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the interim relief granted by the Court be continued for eight weeks. In our view, this prayer requires to be rejected mainly because in three cases decided by three different High Courts, no stay was granted since the year 1988-90. Further, with regard to the third matter of the petitioners, the Division Bench of this Court has permitted the Collector of Central Excise & Customs, Delhi to decide that matter and that matter is already decided. Hence the prayer is rejected.
35. Issuance of certified copy of this judgment is expedited.