Allahabad High Court
Ram Das And Others vs Addl. Commissioner And Others on 28 August, 2019
Author: Yashwant Varma
Bench: Yashwant Varma
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Reserved on: 22 August 2019 Delivered on: 28 August 2019 Court No. 6 AFR Case :- WRIT - C No. - 17180 of 1996 Petitioner :- Ram Das And Others Respondent :- Addl. Commissioner And Others Counsel for Petitioner :- S.D.N.Singh,S.O.H. Singh,Sushil Jaiswal,V.D.Ojha Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 13050 of 1996 Petitioner :- Ram Das Respondent :- State Of U.P. And Another Counsel for Petitioner :- B.N.Asthana,N.K. Singh,P.K.Asthana,Ramesh Upadhya,S.D.N.Singh,Sushil Jaiswal,V.D.Ojha Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. Hon'ble Yashwant Varma, J.
Heard Sri V.D. Ojha learned Senior Counsel in support of the writ petitions and Sri Sanjay Goswami learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel on behalf of the State respondents.
Both these writ petitions assail the order dated 29 March 1996 pursuant to which a settlement of surplus land made in favour of the petitioners under Section 27 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 ["the 1960 Act"] has come to be cancelled. They are with the consent of parties taken up for disposal together.
The Court for the purposes of disposal deems it sufficient to notice the essential facts pertaining to Writ-C No. 17180 of 1996. The petitioners claim to be landless labourers. In proceedings initiated under the 1960 Act, the agricultural land of one Smt. Girja Kumari was declared surplus and came to vest in the State of U.P. The aforesaid land is stated to have been settled in favour of the petitioners on 19 November 1990 by the Sub Divisional Officer in accordance with the provisions made in Section 27 of the 1960 Act. The details of the leases as granted are set-forth in paragraph-8 of the writ petition. It transpires from the record that on 25 August 1993 the Naib Tehsildar concerned forwarded a note to the Commissioner Jhansi division raising issues with respect to the validity of the settlement made in favour of the petitioners. Upon receipt of that note, the Commissioner by an order dated 25 August 1993 drew proceedings and transferred them for adjudication to the Additional Commissioner. Pursuant to notices issued, the petitioners entered appearance and filed their written statements. The objection taken by the State respondents to the validity of the settlement made was that the petitioners were unlawfully allotted land even though they were not residents of the concerned village. It was asserted that the petitioner No. 1 was not a landless laborer but a priest of a temple. Insofar as the petitioner No. 2 is concerned, it was stated that he was a jeweller also not residing in the village in question. A similar objection was taken in respect of the petitioner No. 3. In the counter affidavit filed in these proceedings it was averred that none of the petitioners were residents of village Tinduhi. In paragraph-3 details have been given of the land held by the petitioners in different villages. It was essentially asserted that the petitioners were neither landless labourers nor members of the Gram Sabha of Tinduhi and consequently they were ineligible to have been allotted the land under Section 27 of the 1960 Act. It was also alleged that the petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 were the cousins of the then Gram Pradhan and that the settlement made in their favour was clearly illegal and in abuse of the process of law. The respondents asserted that despite numerous landless labourers belonging to the Scheduled Castes being available and eligible for allotment, their claims were overlooked and the land settled in favour of the petitioners illegally and as an outcome of the nexus between them and the erstwhile Gram Pradhan. The impugned order further records that the petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 in their statements recorded before the respondents on 20 April 1991 had admitted to being residents of village Pachpahra. Taking into consideration the aforesaid glaring facts, the Additional Commissioner by the impugned order proceeded to annul the leases granted in favour of the petitioners. When the Court entertained the writ petition on 22 July 1996, interim protection was accorded to the petitioners with a learned Judge providing that if the petitioners are in possession, they shall remain as such over the land in dispute. Pursuant to that interim order, the petitioners are stated to have continued to occupy the land in question.
Sri V.D. Ojha, learned Senior Counsel, apart from assailing the order on merits has principally raised a jurisdictional question with respect to the Additional Commissioner exercising powers under Section 27 of the 1960 Act. According to Sri Ojha the power to cancel a settlement as comprised in Section 27(4) of the 1960 Act stands vested in the "Commissioner" and that consequently the Additional Commissioner has acted clearly without jurisdiction in passing the order impugned. Sri Ojha would contend that the expression "Commissioner" does not include an Additional Commissioner nor does the 1960 Act empower the Commissioner to delegate the functions entrusted to him under Section 27(4). In view of the above, it was his submission that the impugned order deserved to be set-aside on this short ground alone. Assailing the order on merits Sri Ojha has referred to the entries appearing in the Voters List, Ration Card as well as the statement of the Lekhpal to submit that the allegations levelled against the petitioners were clearly not established. Sri Ojha contends that the entries appearing in the Voters List as well as the Ration Cards held by the petitioners clearly established that they were residents of village Tinduhi. It is his submission that the objections which were taken by the respondents were wholly untenable and that the order impugned is consequently liable to be set aside.
Refuting those submissions Sri Goswami, the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, contends that the details set forth in paragraph-3 of the counter affidavit clearly established that the settlement made in favour of the petitioners was an outcome of nepotism and the illegal acts of commission of the erstwhile Pradhan who had a personal interest in the allotments made in favour of the petitioner nos. 3 and 4. Sri Goswami highlighted the fact that the Additional Commissioner had found that the petitioners had fraudulently managed to have their names inserted in the Voters List and obtained Ration Cards by furnishing false information. He also referred to the admission of the petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 themselves as noticed in the impugned order to the effect that they were not residents of village Tinduhi. Sri Goswami contended that Section 27 is to be viewed as a measure of social amelioration aimed at uplifting the status of landless labourers and members of the Scheduled Castes designed to empower them to eke out a living and find means of sustenance. According to Sri Goswami those objectives have been belied by virtue of the wholly illegal settlements made in favour of the petitioners.
Addressing the Court on the question of jurisdiction Sri Goswami contends that while the provisions of the 1960 Act do not define the word "Commissioner", an Additional Commissioner is entitled to exercise the powers enshrined in Section 27(4) by virtue of subsections (3) and (4) of Section 13 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 ["the 1901 Act"] and in any case in light of the order passed by the Commissioner assigning the matters for disposal to the Additional Commissioner. Sri Goswami has also placed reliance upon the decision rendered by a Full Bench of the Court in Brahm Singh v. Board of Revenue And Others1 in support of his submission that an Additional Commissioner is sufficiently empowered in law to exercise the powers enshrined in Section 27(4) of the 1960 Act. It is these rival submissions that fall for determination.
This Court in its order of 25 July 2019 noted the issue of jurisdiction which was principally raised in the following terms: -
"The principal submission which has been addressed by Sri V.D. Ojha, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, is that exercise of powers by the Additional Commissioner purportedly invoking Section 27(4) of the Act is without jurisdiction.
The Court notes that the 1960 Act does not define the expression 'Commissioner' as employed in Section 27(4). However Section 3(21) of that Act provides that words and expressions not defined in the 1960 Act would draw meaning as prescribed to those words and expressions under the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. When the Court travels to the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act 1950, it notes that Section 3(27) of the 1950 Act refers to meanings of words and expressions as used in the United Provinces Land Revenue Act 1901. Under Section 13(3) of the 1901 Act although the Additional Commissioner is empowered to exercise powers vested in a Commissioner, that exercise is subject to an express authorisation made either by the State Government or by the Commissioner. The issue which would therefore, arise would be whether in the present case the Additional Commissioner had been sufficiently empowered to exercise powers comprised in Section 27(4) of the 1960 Act by virtue of an order made under Section 13(3) of the 1901 Act.
Learned Standing Counsel may in this connection place the relevant record for the perusal of the Court on the next date of listing.
List again for final disposal on 13 August 2019."
As noted in that order, the 1960 Act does not define the word "Commissioner". Section 3(21) of that Act however states that the words and expressions not defined therein but used in the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition And Land Reforms Act, 1950 ["the 1950 Act"] shall have the meaning assigned to them in that Act. The Court had noted that even the 1950 Act does not place any definition of the expression "Commissioner". Section 3(27) of the 1950 Act, however, makes the following provision:-
"words and expressions, under-proprietor, sub-proprietor, revenue, mahal, Assistant Collector, Assistant Collector in-charge of sub- division, Commissioner, Board, Tahsildar and minor, not defined in this Act and used in the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901, shall have the meaning assigned to them in that Act;"
When the Court proceeds to review the provisions of the 1901 Act, it is faced with an identical absence of a specific provision defining the expression "Commissioner". However the State respondents place reliance upon Section 13 of the 1901 Act to contend that by virtue of the provisions made therein, an Additional Commissioner is entitled to exercise all powers and discharge duties of a Commissioner pursuant to orders made in that behalf either by the State Government or the Commissioner himself. Section 13 of the 1901 Act reads thus: -
"13. Appointment, powers and duties of Additional Commissioner. - (1) The [State Government] may appoint Additional Commissioner in a division, or in two or more divisions combined.
(2) An Additional Commissioner shall hold his office during the pleasure of the [State Government].
(3) An Additional Commissioner shall exercise such powers and discharge such duties of a Commissioner in such cases or classes of cases as the [State Government] or in the absence of orders from the [State Government], the Commissioner concerned, may direct.
(4) The Act and every other law for the time being applicable to a Commissioner shall apply to the Additional Commissioner, when exercising any powers or discharging any duties under sub-section (3), as if he were the Commissioner of the division."
Upon a review of the statutory position as existing, it is apparent that none of them define the expression "Commissioner". Even Section 13, as is plainly evident, is not a defining provision. As is discernable from a reading of subsection (3) of Section 13, an Additional Commissioner may be empowered either by an order of the State Government or the Commissioner himself to exercise the powers and discharge duties of a Commissioner in such cases or classes of cases as may be directed. While the impact and scope of this provision would clearly have relevancy to the issue at hand, it may only be noted that it does not state or expound the meaning of the word "Commissioner".
Section 27(4) on its plain terms empowers the Commissioner either of his own motion or on the application of an aggrieved person to enquire into the question whether a settlement made is irregular. Subsection (4) reads thus: -
"27(4). The Commissioner may of his own motion and shall, on the application of any aggrieved person, enquire into such settlement and if he is satisfied that the settlement is irregular he may after notice to the person in whose favour such settlement is made to show cause-
(i) cancel the settlement and the lease, if any and thereupon, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or in any instrument, the rights, title and interest of the person in whose favour such settlement was made or lease executed or any person claiming through him in such land shall cease, and such land shall revert to the State Government; and
(ii) direct that every person holing or retaining possession thereof may be evicted, and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary."
The seminal question which, therefore, arises for consideration is whether the expression "Commissioner" as used in subsection (4) would include an Additional Commissioner. While the Court dwells on the provisions as contained in the 1960 Act, it would also be pertinent to note the following aspect. Significantly, although the 1960 Act makes a specific provision for the Collector delegating his powers to an Assistant Collector in terms of Section 43 of that Act, no similar provision is made with respect to a Commissioner of the Division.
As noticed hereinabove in the proceedings that were drawn against the petitioners, the Commissioner by his order of 25 August 1993 transferred the matter for adjudication to the concerned Additional Commissioner. Although the Commissioner chose to employ the word "transfer" in his orders, it essentially appears to have been an assignment of the matters for disposal by the Additional Commissioner. Subsection (3) of Section 13 of the 1901 Act, as noticed hereinabove, is clearly not a definition clause. It only confers a power on the State Government or the Commissioner to authorise an Additional Commissioner to exercise the powers and duties of a Commissioner. It clearly appears to be a provision for conferment of power as distinct from a defining provision as was contended on behalf of the respondents.
Although this provision also uses the expression "...in such cases or classes of cases" that may not impact the order of assignment made by the Commissioner when one bears in mind the provisions of Section 13 of the General Clauses Act, 1872 which clearly provide that words in the singular would also include the plural and vice versa.
In the considered view of this Court, it is the provisions made in subsection (4) of Section 13 that are of greater import and significance. Subsection (4) provides that the 1901 Act and "...every other law for the time being applicable...." to a Commissioner would also apply to an Additional Commissioner exercising powers and discharging duties in accordance with subsection (3) as if he were the Commissioner of the Division. It is thus manifest that on an Additional Commissioner being empowered to discharge duties and exercising powers by virtue of an order made either by the State Government or the Commissioner under subsection (3) it is liable to be viewed as being a discharge of duties or exercise of powers by the Commissioner of the Division himself.
The ancillary issue which immediately springs up is by virtue of subsection (4) employing the phrase ".... every other law for the time being applicable...". The U.P. Land Revenue Act was indubitably promulgated in 1901. The Ceiling Act came to be enacted in 1960. The question, which consequently arises, is whether the 1960 Act would fall within the ambit of the expression "every other law for the time being applicable". This since if that phrase is interpreted literally, it would be likely to be perceived as being confined to a law which was in existence in 1901 when the Land Revenue Act came to be promulgated.
In Devkumarsinghji v. State of Madhya Pradesh2, a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court was called upon to interpret the expression "any other enactment for the time being in force". The question was answered by the Division Bench as under: -
"9. The power of the State Legislature to impose a tax for general revenue is not taken away by the empowerment by it to the municipal corporations to impose a tax on lands and buildings. Nor is the State Legislature precluded by sub-section (4) of Section 132 of the 1956-Act from imposing a tax on lands and buildings after the corporation has exercised its power under Section 132(1)(a) of imposing a tax on lands and buildings. In our opinion, the construction put on sub-section (4) of the Section 132 by Shri Chitale is a forced and unnatural construction. That sub-section no doubt provides that the "imposition of any tax under this section shall be subject to the provisions of any other enactment for the time being in force". The expression "any other enactment for the time being in force" does not mean an enactment which was already in force at the time the corporation imposed a tax under Section 132(1)(a); but means any legislation enacted whether before or after the imposition of the tax by the corporation. The general sense of the phrase "for the time being" is that of time indefinite, and refers to indefinite state of facts which will arise in future and which may vary from time to time. See Ellison v. Thomas, (1862) 31 LJ Ch 867. If with this construction sub-section (4) of Section 132 is read along with Section 4(3) of the impugned Act, then it is plain that the lax imposed by the Corporation on lands and buildings and the tax imposed by the impugned Act can validity co-exist. " (emphasis supplied) The Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) v. Prem Chand Gupta And Another3 had an occasion to rule on the meaning of the expression "for the time being in force". The question that arose before it was whether the service conditions of the employee would be governed by the 1949 Rules which stood incorporated by reference in the service regulations or the 1959 Rules which had repealed and replaced the earlier Rules. Referring to the expression "for the time being in force" as employed therein, it was argued that the service conditions would be governed only by those rules which were in force when the 1959 Regulations were promulgated and not any latter rules. Answering that issue the Supreme Court held as under: -
"13. In this connection, one submission of learned counsel for the respondent workman may be noted. He submitted that as laid down by Regulation 4(1), the rules for the time being in force as mentioned therein would refer to only those rules which were in force when the Service Regulations of 1959 were promulgated and not any latter rules. It is difficult to countenance this submission. Rules for the time being in force will have a nexus with the regulation of condition of service of the municipal officers at the relevant time as expressly mentioned in Regulation 4(1). Therefore, whenever the question of regulation of conditions of service of the municipal officers comes up for consideration, the relevant rules in force at that time have to be looked into. This is the clear thrust of Regulation 4(1). Its scope and ambit cannot be circumscribed and frozen only to the point of time in the year 1959, when the Service Regulations were promulgated. If such was the intention of the framers of the Regulation, Regulation 4(1) would have employed a different phraseology, namely, "rules at present in force" instead of the phraseology "rules for the time being in force". The phraseology "rules for the time being in force" would necessarily mean rules in force from time to time and not rules in force only at a fixed point of time in 1959 as tried to be suggested by learned counsel for the respondent workman.
14. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, it must be held that the termination of the respondent workman from service on 29.4.1966 was not violative of the amended Rule 5 of the latter Rules of 1965 which only applied in his case. Therefore, there was no obligation, on the part of the appellant Corporation to simultaneously offer requisite compensation to the respondent workman as a condition precedent to such termination and such compensation could be offered to him within reasonable time later on. The termination had to be treated to have come into force forthwith when the order of termination was passed and served on the respondent workman. Non-payment of requisite compensation as per the said rule even later on did not attract any invalidating consequences. The first point of determination, therefore, is held in the negative in favour of the appellant and against the respondent workman. " (emphasis supplied) In Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra4 three learned Judges of the Supreme Court were called upon to resolve a contended conflict between the provisions made in TADA and the Juvenile Justice Act. Dealing with that question the Supreme Court held thus: -
"1554. Section 1(4) of the JJ Act was added by amendment with effect from 22-8-2006. In fact, this provision gives the overriding effect to this Act over other statutes. However, it reads that the Act would override "anything contained in any other law for the time being in force". The question does arise as to whether the statutory provisions of the JJ Act would have an overriding effect over the provisions of TADA which left long back and was admittedly not in force on 22-8-2006. Thus, the question does arise as what is the meaning of the law for the time being in force. This Court has interpreted this phrase to include the law in existence on the date of commencement of the Act having overriding effect and the law which may be enacted in future during the life of the Act having overriding effect. (Vide Thyssen Stahlunion GmbH v. SAIL [(1999) 9 SCC 334: AIR 1999 SC 3923] and MCD v. Prem Chand Gupta [(2000) 10 SCC 115: 2000 SCC (L&S) 404]."(emphasis supplied) Viewed in the light of the principles enunciated in the decisions noted above, it is manifest that the expression "every other law for the time being applicable" cannot be interpreted as freezing in time only such enactments which were in existence in 1901. The words "for the time being" would necessarily include any subsequent legislations that may be in force at a time when an order is made by either by the State Government or the Commissioner under Section 13(3). Regard must also be had to the fact that subsection (4) of Section 13 is not placed in the statute as a transitory or temporary provision. This is also clearly indicative of the intent of the legislature to expand the applicability of subsections (3) and (4) of Section 13 to statutes that may come into force even after 1901.
The 1960 Act undisputedly is a law that is applicable to a Commissioner. It is therefore, evident that the provisions of subsection (4) of Section 13 would stand attracted and consequently an Additional Commissioner empowered by an order made under Section 13(3) would be entitled to exercise all powers and discharge any duties of a Commissioner as enjoined "as if he were the Commissioner of the division". By virtue of the fiction introduced by subsection (4) such exercise of powers or duties would be entitled to be understood and viewed as actions initiated and decisions taken by the Commissioner himself. On an order being made under Section 13(3), the Additional Commissioner steps into the shoes and dons the robes of the Commissioner himself. Once an order under Section 13 (3) comes to be made empowering the Additional Commissioner to discharge all duties of a Commissioner, the hierarchal dichotomy, if any existing, vanishes and is swept aside in light of the provisions made in Section 13 (4).
In light of the interpretation accorded to Section 13 above, it is evident that the absence of a provision for delegation of powers akin to Section 43 of the 1960 Act in respect of a Commissioner would neither stand in the way nor be of any significance.
A similar question fell for determination before the Full Bench of this Court in Brahm Singh. The question which arose was whether the word "Collector" as employed in Section 198 (4) of the 1950 Act would include an Additional Collector. Coincidentally, Section 198 (4) of the 1950 Act empowers a Collector to cancel a settlement of land made by way of a lease. The Full Bench, as in this case, fell back to the provisions made in the 1901 Act. Section 14A of the 1901 Act, it becomes apposite to note is pari materia to Section 13 which this Court has considered. Noticing the provisions made in Section 14A, the Full Bench held: -
16. The aforesaid sub-section (4) was inserted in 1950 Act by Section 3 of the U.P. Act No. 34 of 1974, from a perusal whereof it is evident that the ''Collector' for the purposes of 1950 Act is an officer appointed as ''Collector' under 1901 Act and also includes the ''Assistant Collector' of the first class empowered by the State Government by notification in the Gazette to discharge all or any of the functions of a ''Collector' under 1950 Act. Thus, the Act by itself does not confine the term ''Collector' only to those officers, who are appointed under sub-Section 14 of 1901 Act, rather it expands the definition of ''Collector' as an officer appointed as ''Collector', under 1901 Act. It does not confine the word ''Collector' for the purposes of 1950 Act to an officer appointed under Section 14 of 1901 Act but it would also include a person appointed under Section 14-A as well by virtue of declaration made under sub-Section (4) thereof, if we read sub-section (4) of Section 3 of 1950 Act together with sub-section (4) of Section 14-A the expression ''Collector' used in 1950 Act shall have and shall be deemed always to be the ''collector' appointed under Section 14 of the Act and will include ''Additional Collector' appointed under Section 14-A when it exercises power and discharges duty of a ''Collector' under sub-section (3) of Section 14-A because of sub-section (4) of Section 14-A, which provides that the Additional Collector while discharging the powers and duties of a ''Collector' under 1901 Act or under any other law, for the time being applicable to the Collector, as if he were the Collector of the district. Therefore, there is no intention of the legislature to confine the term ''Collector' for the purpose of 1950 Act to an officer appointed under Section 14 of 1901 Act, but it would also include a person appointed under Section 14-A as well by virtue of the declaration made under sub-section (4) thereof.
18. From the provisions of the two Acts, referred to above, it is evident that the power under Section 198(4) of 1950 Act can be exercised by a ''Collector' appointed under 1901 Act. From a plain reading one may refer to only Section 14 of 1901 Act but that would amount to ignore the legislature's intention and not to give effect to the legislative declaration under sub-section (4) of Section 14-A of 1950 Act. To ascertain and to give full meaning, as per legislative intent, one has to read sub-section (4) of Section 3 of 1950 Act together with Section 14 and Section 14-A of 1901 Act. It is true that in finding out the meaning of the word ''Collector' used in the Act, the ordinary meaning given in the definition clause is to be construed, but it is not inflexible and there may be sections in the Act where the meaning have to be departed from on account of the subject or context in which the word had been used. That is why, the definition clause starts with the sentence that unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context ''Collector' means an officer appointed as ''Collector' under the provisions of 1901 Act. Therefore, because of this qualification, while giving correct meaning of definition of the word ''Collector' used in the Act, one has not only to look at the word but also to the context, the collocation and the object of such words relating to such matter and thereafter to interpret the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the words under the circumstances.
The principles articulated by the Court in Brahm Singh clearly set the controversy to rest and beyond the pale of dispute. Once it is recognised that an Additional Commissioner stands duly authorised by virtue of an order made by the Commissioner under Section 13 (3) of the 1901 Act, he, for all intents and purposes, must be recognised as having donned the mantle of the Commissioner himself and the powers so exercised and decisions rendered are entitled in law to be viewed as those made by the Commissioner. The, fiction, statutorily introduced, as evident from the use of the phrase "...as if he were the Commissioner of the division" must be given full effect. The moment an authorisation is made under Section 13 (3), the statutory fiction comes into play and the Additional Commissioner would consequently be entitled to be viewed as being sufficiently empowered to exercise the powers enshrined in Section 27 (4) of the 1960 Act.
Turning to the merits of the case, the Court notes that the allegations set-forth in paragraph-3 of the counter affidavit were clearly serious and strike at the root of the validity of the settlements made in favour of the petitioners. All the petitioners were neither the residents of the concerned village nor were they landless labourers eligible under Section 27 of the 1960 Act. The charge of the settlements being an outcome of nepotism as raised by the State respondents is clearly well founded. It is manifest that the settlements were made illegally thus depriving various other needy and eligible persons existing in the village of the fruits of Section 27. The settlements made in favour of the petitioners was clearly a fraud on statute. The defense of the petitioners based on the entries appearing in the Voters List and Ration Cards, even if assumed to be correct, could not have saved the settlements made in light of the copious evidence gathered by the respondents which established that none of them were landless labourers. The counter affidavit has also brought on record the revenue records which established that they were not residents of the village concerned. This evidence clearly overshadows the entries stated to appear in the Voters List and Ration Cards. The Court is constrained to note that the findings recorded by the respondents with respect to the vocation of respective petitioners was not seriously assailed either in the writ petition or by learned Senior Counsel in his oral submissions. On merits, therefore, the Court finds itself unable to sustain the settlements made in favour of the petitioners.
The writ petitions consequently fail and are dismissed.
Order Date: - 28.8.2019 faraz (Yashwant Varma, J.)