Delhi District Court
Delhi Jal Board vs I.M. Singh Ans on 30 April, 2026
IN THE COURT OF MS. ANURADHA SHUKLA: DISTRICT
JUDGE (COMMERCIAL COURT)-02, SOUTH, SAKET,
DELHI
ARBTN 152/2015 ( 20668/16)
1. Delhi Jal Board
Through the Ex.Engineer (Project) W-VII,
Delhi Jal Board, Annexe Jal Sadan,
Shiv Mandir Marg, Lajpat Nagar,
New Delhi-110024.
.... Petitioner
Versus
1. Sh.I.M.Singh
Sole Arbitrator
C-447, Sheikh Sarai, Phase-I,
New Delhi.
2. M/s. Khub Chand Tyagi
Tyagi Bhawan
B-2/18, Ashok Vihar, Phase-II,
New Delhi-110052.
....Respondents
Date of filing of the suit : 02.11.2015
(received in this court on : 28.05.2025)
Date of reserving judgment : 26.11.2025
Date of judgment : 13.12.2025
ORDER
1. This is a petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking setting aside of arbitration award dt.21.07.2015 passed by Ld. Sole Arbitrator CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 1 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
Sh.I.M.Singh in respect of disputes arising out of work order no.WSU/EE(W) C-IV/T-405/2911 dt.29.09.1987.
2. The petitioner has impleaded the arbitrator as respondent no 1 and claimant as respondent no 2. The challenge of award is against respondent no 2. The reference to respondent herein after shall be to respondent no 2 even if it is not specifically written.
3. The present petition was filed by the petitioner challenging the award dt. 21.07.2015 and was first listed on 02.11.2015. The Ld. Court vide order dt.31.10.2017 held that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court was not made out and granted the petitioner 10 days time to file application u/o 7 rule 10 (a) CPC. The petitioner filed an application for review of the order, which was dismissed by the court on 14.09.2017 and the petitioner was again given 10 days time for filing application u/o 7 rule 10 (a) CPC. No such application was filed. On 02.11.2017 the court directed the return of petition in furtherance of observations of 31.08.2017 and 14.09.2017. The petitioner did not take steps for taking the copy of the petition and file it before the court of jurisdiction. Nine months later it filed an application on 07.08.2018 stating that since the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court was enhanced, therefore, the petition be dealt with by the court. The application was dismissed on 17.08.2022 with observations that no petition was pending before the court. The order was challenged by the petitioner before Hon'ble CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 2 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
High Court. The Hon'ble High Court observed that the petitioner has taken the things for granted. It did not take quick and swift steps. The court, however, allowed the petition of the petitioner with a cost of Rs.80,000/-.
4. The facts would show that the petition of petitioner which was directed to be re-considered by the Hon'ble Court was already time barred, having not been filed immediately after return. It ought to have been filed computing the 120 days from the date of award and considering the order of transfer - such period as would have been justifiable in receiving the petition from the Ld transferor court and filing in the transferee court. The record, however, would show that the petitioner not only did not take the file for refiling; it did not take necessary steps for almost or nine months in moving the application before the court.
5. Once the petition had been returned the court did not have any petition with it in which any application could have been filed by the petitioner. The petitioner was expected to have filed the petition before the court of competent jurisdiction keeping in view the time-lines provided, which, however, was not done. Strictly speaking the petition was already time barred u/s.34 of A & C Act, on the date on which application for taking up the petition was filed by the petitioner. The petition could not have been taken up and heard by the court in view of several judgments passed by the Hon'ble High Court and Hon'ble CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 3 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
Supreme Court as the petition was time barred. Be it as it may, the Hon'ble High Court did provide the petitioner a favour by allowing its petition and directing it to be heard by the court subject to payment of cost. Hence, the judgment on merit of the case.
6. Brief facts as per petitioner are that petitioner is statutory body constituted under the provisions of Delhi Jal Board Act 1998 and is the successor in interest of Delhi Water Supply & Sewage Disposal undertaking under Delhi Municipal Act, 1957. It is stated that predecessor DWS & SDU invited tenders for execution of work named and styled as "replacing the existing 600 x 650 x 975 mm dia MS Main between Chandrawal W.W.No.1 and Jhandewalan by 1200 mm dia PSC/HS Main.
7. It is stated that in response to the said invitation of tender respondent no.2 submitted its tender on 27.05.1987. After negotiations vide letter of intent no. WDU/EE (W)/C-IV/T-405/2045 dt.06.08.1987 the acceptance of tender was communicated to respondent followed by work order no.WSU/EE(W)/C-IV/T-405/2911 dt. 29.09.1987. An agreement being contract agreement no.22(87-88) was executed between the parties relating to the subject works on 28.11.1987.
8. It is further stated that work was awarded at contract value of Rs.71,37,219.80 and work was to be completed in a period of 24 months to be reckoned after 5 days of the date CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 4 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
of issue of work order. Thus, stipulated date of start being 04.10.1987 and completion being 03.10.1989.
9. It is stated that respondent no.2/contractor could not complete the work instead raised disputes for work asserted to be done by it up till 1992-93. Respondent invoked arbitration for the first time vide their letter dt. 21.06.2004. It is stated that consequent to the request of respondent no.2 competent authority appointed respondent no.1 as Sole Arbitrator and referred the disputes for arbitration in terms of the provisions of contract agreement and Ld. Arbirator vide order dt. 21.07.2015 passed the impugned award.
10.The award has been challenged on the grounds that award is in respect of time barred claims and not sustainable; that respondent no.1 has misconducted the award in proceedings; that award made is in ignorance and neglect of provisions of section 28(3) & section 43 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996, which cast a duty on arbitrator in all cases to decide in accordance with the terms of the contract; that direction to prepare final bill and supply copy to respondent no.2 is patently against the terms of contract which stipulates that the final bill shall be submitted by the contractor; that respondent no.1 not only acted against the terms of contract but also acted illegally and took guise the rules of fair play and justice for making it a basis for stretching the limitation of claims of respondent no.2; that observations of sole arbitrator while CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 5 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
rejecting the plea of time barred claims are contradictory; Ld. Arbitrator erroneously held that preliminary objection of respondent that claims against Delhi Jal Board are not maintainable as the agreement was with DWS & SDU, is not valid objection; that impugned award suffers from the malice, unfair approach and in application of law and judicious mind; that Ld. Arbitrator while awarding claims no.1 & 2 has erroneously made applicable the provisions of particular condition no.34 to all other recoveries made in final bill; that Ld. Arbitrator while awarding the escalation ignored the letters of petition wherein it was specifically mentioned that extension was approved with the condition that no escalation will be paid for the extended period and there was no protest by respondent no.2 in accepting the said conditional extension; that Ld. Arbitrator had no authority to bifurcate the decision of Ex. Engineer, who decided to grant extension but with the condition of without payment of escalation but the arbitrator without any lawful basis chose to let the contractor avail longer time as well as monetary benefits; that while awarding the escalation, the date of work done is taken as 15.01.1992 which is neither the date of completion as respondent no.2 or the petitioner; that respondent no.1 granted the claims in defiance of terms of contract. The respondent no.2 was required to seek release of security amount after completing the work on a prescribed form. Non submission where of did not entitlement the payment; that Ld. Arbitrator did not appreciate the facts and evidence emerging on the record CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 6 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
in their actual context and natural perspective i.e the respondent no.2 pleaded lack of working space, change of alignment in a work of replacing the existing 975 mm dia M.S. main by 1200 mm dia PSC/HS proved that alignment was already there so has to be the space ground it which the contract must have or is deemed to have seen as per NIT advice contained in particular condition no.6 and 7 which disentitle any claim on account of alleged difficulties/hindrances/alignment/materials etc.; that the award is in conflict with public policy of India; that award of claim no.6 is against terms of contract, law and in respect of time barred claims under adjudication in arbitration. There being no specific and due amount even in the knowledge of respondent no.2, award of interest is totally unjust; that whole of the award on time barred claims is based on surmises and conjectures of Ld. Arbitrator, who has mis-concluded the arbitration proceedings in award and is liable to be set aside and that copy of award has been served on the petitioner on 28.07.2015, the objection petition is being presented with three months limitation as per provisions of section 34 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.
11.Reply to the petition was filed by respondent no.2. It was stated that the court did not have pecuniary and inherent jurisdiction to entertain the present objection petition as on the date of filing of petition and even thereafter. The objection has been taken care of hereinabove.
CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 7 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
12.It is stated in reply on merit that the petitioner has challenged the issue of limitation which was decided by the Arbitrator as preliminary issue. An interim award was passed u/s. 31 (6) of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 rejecting two of the issues of the petitioner on 19.05.2008. The said award dt. 19.05.2008 on two issues having not been challenged within the time allowed under the law, has become final and binding. It is further stated that present petition is beyond the ambit and scope of section 34 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 as none of the objections or grounds for challenging the award alleged in petition fall under any of the provisions of section 34 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. It is stated that petitioner has raised and re-agitated all such issues and made all such contentions on merits which were made before the Arbitrator and have been decided by Arbitrator after appreciating the rival contentions of the parties and records filed and submissions made before him.
13.Rejoinder was filed. It is stated that no interim award was published. The proceedings dt.19.05.2008 were recorded qua the objectors plea of limitation and maintainability of claims against Delhi Jal Board. The said minutes have been made part of present award, hence the petitioner is entitled to raise objection. It is stated that it is settled legal position that if award is perverse to the terms and conditions of CA, evidence on record and findings are based on surmises and conjectures of the Arbitrator, the courts are fully empowered to examine, appreciate and CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 8 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
decide.
14.Arguments were heard. Record perused.
15.The first and foremost issue raised by petitioner is that the claim filed by the respondent no.2 before Ld. Arbitrator was barred by limitation. It was argued that the petitioner had taken an objection before Ld. Arbitrator that the agreement was executed by claimant with DWS x SDU (Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Disposal undertaking). The work was completed in December, 1992 and the petitioner could have raised claim against DWS x CSDU within 6 months. It is stated that Ld. Arbitrator directed the petitioner to prepare final bill during the pendency of the petition, which was against the contract since as per clause 7 of the contract, R-2 was required to submit final bill.
16.Coming to the award, the issue of limitation was decided by Ld. Arbitrator vide award dt.19.05.2008. A copy of the order has been placed on record by the respondent. It is an issue before the court as to whether the order on limitation passed by Ld. Arbitrator was an interim award and what would be the effect of it having not been challenged as an award.
17.The respondent thereafter, argued that if the award was an interim award the same was to be challenged within 120 days from the date of it having been passed. She placed reliance on the judgment in MS.Stalgmite Infracon Pvt. CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 9 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
Ltd. Vs. Ashray Homes Build Well Pvt. Ltd. O.M.P. 367/2019 dated 07.04.2026.
18.Ld. counsel for petitioner argued that the order on the issue was reproduced in the final award and thus became a part of final award.
In the final award Ld.Arbitrator has merely written that the issue stood finally decided on a previous date. There is no finding on the issue of limitation. It is thus a statement of fact which is recorded in the final award and not any finding on merit.
19.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2018) 2 SCC 534, Indian Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative Ltd. Vs. Bhadra Products had held that "the order on issue of limitation was an interim order and could be challenged u/s.34. The judgment, however, was a permissive judgment where the issue before the court was - whether the interim award could be challenged or not and not whether the interim award on limitation, if not challenged merges with the final award and could be raised at the appellate stage along with main award."
20.Having said that it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments that issue of limitation goes to the root of the matter and could be raised by a party at any stage including upto Hon'ble Supreme Court, even if it was not raised before the trial court or appellate courts, if it was a question of law. Applying the same principle the CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 10 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
issue of limitation even if it was decided by Ld. Arbitrator on an earlier date and had thus become challengable, it being an issue of law, this court has to look into this issue even if the petitioner had not raised the same by challenging the same as an interim award.
In so far as judgment in MS. Stalgmite Infracon (supra) is concerned, the same related to claims which were decided on merit by the Ld. Arbitrator on the facts and evidence and are therefore, distinguishable.
21.Coming to the order on limitation, Ld. Arbitrator for the purposes of computation of limitation relied upon clauses 6 & 7 of the agreement. Clause 6 stated that on completion of the work, the contractor shall be furnished with a certificate by the Executive Engineer of such completion and then gives condition as to when and how such completion is to be given. Clause 7 says that the final bill shall be submitted by the contractor within one month from the date fixed for completion otherwise the Engineer Incharge's certificate of the measurement and of the total amount payable for the work accordingly shall be final and binding on all parties.
It is not the case of petitioner that completion certificate was issued at any point of time by the petitioner. The respondent under such a situation could not have filed the final bill under Clause 7 of the agreement. The clause clearly says that in case the contractor did not submit the final bill within one month, it shall be the Executive Engineer's computation etc. which shall be final. Thus, it CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 11 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
was for the Executive Engineer to have given completion and final word on the payment to be made to the respondent no.2. it could not avoid the liability by simply saying that the respondent did not file the final bill.
22.Admittedly, petitioner never prepared any final bill or gave completion certificate or gave any final word on what amount was to be paid by it to respondent no.2. Apparently it did not even reject the claims of respondent no.2 at any point of time. This was despite the fact that R-2 wrote several letters and reminders in this regard.
23.Ld.Counsel for petitioner has relied upon the judgment in BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. & ANR Vs. M/S. NORTEL NETWORKS INDIA PVT. LTD. (2021) (SC), wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Nortel's claims were ex-facie barred as Nortel raised the notice of arbitration on April 29, 2020 over 5 years after Nortel's claims were rejected by BSNL on August 04, 2014.
The facts do not apply to the present case as in the present case the petitioner did not claim that it had rejected the claims of the respondent. It simply ignored the letters of the petitioner seeking payment and did not prepare the final bill or make any payment or raise any objection as to why the payment was not to be made.
24.It would be relevant to note that on the direction of Ld. Arbitrator the petitioner did prepare the final bill, which would indicate that the petitioner did admit that it had to CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 12 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
make at least that much payment to the respondent but for the issue for limitation. Coming to the award Ld. Arbitrator relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Lekhi Vs. DDA AIR 1988 SC 1107, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that cause of action for appointment of arbitration arises when dispute arises between the parties i.e there must not only be entitlement to money but there must also be a dispute or difference with regard to the entitlement. Ld. Arbitrator relied upon the portion of judgment holding "it is true that on completion of the work right to get payment would normally arise but where final bill as in this case has not been prepared, as it appears from record and when assertion of claim was made on 28.02.1983 and there was non-payment, the cause of action arose from the date that is to say from 28.02.1983." He also placed reliance upon the judgment in Pandit Munshi Ram Vs. DDA in 2002 (DLT) Vol 95 Page 482 and L.K.Ahuja Vs. Union of India AIR 1988 SC 1072, wherein it was held that dispute remains till final bill is made. He placed reliance upon several other judgments to hold that the preparation of final bill in fact gives rise to the cause of action.
25.Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Unity Engineers Vs. I.T.P.O, 2001 SCC Online Del 307, held as under:-
"The instant case is rather on stronger footing. Not only the respondent never intimated the petitioner in writing that the final bill was ready but it continued for months together in settling the full and final payment and CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 13 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
till date the bills are not settled. In this situation the obligation by the respondent as to intimation regarding the final bill cannot be deemed to have been discharged, even as per its understanding, as according to it the final bill has still not been settled."
26.The petitioner has challenged the order of Ld. Arbitrator directing the petitioner to prepare the final bill on the ground of it being violative of clause 7 of the agreement between the parties. Clause 6 & 7 are to be read together while clause 7 says that respondent was to submit the final bill, clause 6 says that petitioner was to give a completion certificate to the respondent. As stated hereinabove it is not the case of petitioner that it at any point of time gave the certificate of completion to the respondent. Ld. Arbitrator could have gone ahead with the petition even without directing the petitioner to file the final bill, considering the claims of respondent no.2, however, it was only fair on the part of Ld. Arbitrator to have asked the petitioner to come up with its calculation and to tell as to what amount was payable from the angle of petitioner. The awarded amount in fact has been as per the final bill of petitioner, which was far less Rs.54,201/- than what was claimed by the respondent in his claim petition (Rs 6,00,000). There is thus no irregularity in the order of Ld. Arbitrator in having directed the petitioner to prepare the final bill.
27.The petitioner has taken an objection that plea was time barred and therefore, Delhi Jal Board was not liable to CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 14 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
prepare the final bill or pay anything to the respondent since the claims were to be raised by respondent with DWS and SDU. He argued that only legally enforceable liabilities could have passed to the DJB and since the present claim was barred by limitation it was not legally recoverable liability. It has been held hereinabove that the finding of Ld. Arbitrator that the claim was within limitation was correct, which would nullify this objection of Ld. Counsel also. Since the liabilities were not time barred, therefore, they were legally recoverable liabilities and would be considered to have validly transferred to the petitioner when all the assets and liabilities of its predecessor DWS x SDU were passed to it.
28.While considering the file it had come to the knowledge of the court that the respondent no.2 on 04.06.1992 had requested for referral of dispute to arbitrator and court had asked the parties to file judgment to show if in such situation the claim of R-2 could be termed as time barred. It was, however, later seen and found by the court that petitioner itself is saying that work was completed by R-2 in December, 1992 as such on 04.06.1992 the claim of R-2 had not finally culminated. The cause of action would have accrued only after completion of work and thereafter, would have continued until the final bill was prepared or claims were rejected by the petitioner.
29. The award has been challenged on the ground that the claim was not maintainable in view of provisions of CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 15 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
section 69 of Partnership Act. This issue was decided by Ld. Arbitrator. It was stated that during the hearing of 10.03.2006 the claimant had filed photocopies of form B (acknowledgment of registration of firm) and form A "name of partners" issued by Registrar of Firms, Delhi. The genuineness thereof was not denied/disputed by the respondent. The name of partners include the name of Sh.Devender Tyagi. It was observed that as per record, the claimant was a registered partnership firm and Sh.Devender Tyagi was one of the partners of the firm. Therefore, the claims of the claimant were not fully hit by section 69 of Partnership Act.
30. Irrespective of above Ld.Counsel for respondent argued that there was no requirement for registration of firm as the litigation between the parties was not in a suit.
She placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Prime Class Kashmir Vs. Aakash Educational Services Ltd. Arb.P. 1742/2024, wherein it was held as under:-
"This court does not find any merit in the contention of the respondent that the petitioner is precluded from initiating arbitration proceedings merely on account of the fact, that it is an unregistered partnership firm.
The legal position in this regard has been a subject matter of consideration in numerous judicial pronouncements including in the cases of Umesh Goel v. Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd., (2016) 11 SCC 313, Hari Om Sharma v. Sauman Kumar Chatterjee and Another, CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 16 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
2024 SCC OnLine Del 7494, Md. Wasim and Another v. Bengal Refrigeration and Company and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine Cal 3035 and M/s Jayamurugan Granite Exports v. M/s SQNY Granite and Another, 2015 SCC OnLine Mad 6848.
14. It has been further held in Umesh Goel(Supra) that:-
"32..... Keeping the said principle in mind when we consider the said submission, we have clearly held as to how a reading of Section 69 as a whole does not permit of any interpretation that would cover arbitral proceedings, dehors filing of a suit in a court and that too in respect of a right under a contract governed by the provisions of the Partnership Act, especially after the coming into force of the 1996 Act and the proceedings governed by the special features contained in the said Act."
15. In Hari Om Sharma (supra) while relying upon Umesh Goel (Supra) it has been held by this Court as under:-
"69. The Apex Court in Umesh Goel v. Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd., (2016) 11 SCC 313, held that the bar of Section 69 of Partnership Act does not come within the expression "other proceedings" as used in Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act. Therefore, the ban imposed under Section 69 has no application to the arbitral proceedings.
16.In Md. Wasim (supra) it has been observed as under-
"10. The objection of the respondents is in respect of the bar contained under Section 69 of the Act of 1932. Sub- sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 of the Act of 1932 restrict filing of suit by any person as a partner of unregistered firm. Sub-section (3) of Section 69 of the Act of 1932 makes the provisions of Sub-sections (1) and (2) applicable also to a CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 17 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
claim of suit of or "other proceedings" to enforce a right arising from a contract. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Umesh Goel v. Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited reported in (2016) 11 SCC 313 has settled that the arbitral proceedings will not come under the expression "other proceedings" of Section 69(3) of the Act of 1932 and that the ban imposed under Section 69 can have no application to arbitration proceedings as well as the arbitral award. Madras High Court in the matter of Jayamurugan Granite Exports v. SQNY Granites reported in (2015) 4 LW 385 has considered the similar issue and held that:
"38. If these observations are looked in the context of Section 69 of the Partnership Act, the bar created for institution of the suit or other proceedings is in respect of the same being instituted in any "courts".
But the aforesaid observation shows that the power has to be exercised under Section 11 of the 1996 Act by the Chief Justice or his delegate and not by the Court. In fact, it is observed in paragraph-20 that there are a variety of reasons as to why the Supreme Court cannot possibly be considered to be "court" within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e) even if it retains seisin over the arbitral proceedings. The Judgment is to the effect that the Chief Justice does not represent the High Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, when exercising power under Section 11, albeit a judicial power. This is also the reason for the decision of the Chief Justice or his designate not being the decision of the Supreme Court or High Court, as the case may be, as there is no precedential value being the decision of the judicial authority, which is not a court of record.
39. In addition, as has been discussed aforesaid, the CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 18 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
scheme of the 1996 Act is different and the process of mechanism for alternate dispute resolution system has to be construed not identical to the 1940 Act, considering the difference in their schemes.
40. I am thus of the view that non-registration of the petitioner firm would not be a bar under Section 69 of the Partnership Act for institution of proceedings under Section 11 of the 1996 Act."
In view of the above legal position, the objection of the respondent based upon Section 69 of the Act of 1932 cannot be sustained and is hereby rejected."
31. Although it is recorded in the award that the petitioner had given up the issue during proceedings; nevertheless the law on the issue as settled by the Hon'ble Courts is in favour of respondent. The objection of petitioner cannot be sustained.
32.It was argued that the respondent no.2 did not seek release of security amount; there were no actual difficulties/hindrances etc. All these issues raised were on the facts which were decided by the Ld. Arbitrator after consideration of documents on record. The security amount could not be refused only on the ground that it was not applied for in the prescribed form, when the petitioner had no other objection or ground for having not returned the same.
33.It has been argued that Ld. Arbitrator went wrong in allowing the escalation for the extended period when the respondent itself had accepted the letters of petitioner CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 19 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
stating that the extensions were approved with the condition that no escalation will be paid for extended period. It was argued that the decision of respondent no.1 bifurcating the decision of Ex. Engineer, who granted conditional extension, was without any authority.
The finding of Ld. Arbitrator is on the merit of case, based on the judgments cited and consideration of the clauses and facts and thus cannot be looked into by the court. He has given the details of how the respondent was kept to wait for no fault of his and was thus not responsible for the delay. He has done the detail computation after considering the record to arrive at conclusion that respondent was entitled for Rs.4,38,000/- on account of escalation as against the claim of respondent of Rs.34,20,000/-. There is no perversity in the findings which would require intervention under section 34 of A&C Act.
34.On the issue of interest also Ld. arbitrator fairly granted only pendente lite and future interest. The argument of Ld. counsel that the petition got delayed by sometime because of respondent's failure to deposit the fee is a lame argument, when the petitioner itself has delayed the matter for substantial time.
35.The power of Court u/s. 34 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act (The Act) when hearing an appeal is very limited. The provision conveys that the Court cannot sit in appeal or re- examine the facts and evidence of the case while hearing CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 20 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
objections under section 34 of the Act. The Court has to find a patent illegality in an award to interfere with it in any manner. It has been time and again held that arbitrator being ultimate master of arbitration, can adjudicate the claims in a manner that is on the lines of basic tenets of law and principle of natural justice and jurisprudence. As long as the award does not shakes the conscience of Court, it warrants no interference from the Court.
36. In UHL Power Company Ltd vs State of HP (2022) 4 SCC 116 , Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on Courts u/s.34 of Arbitration Act is fairly narrow, when it comes to the scope of an appeal u/s.37 of the Arbitration Act, the jurisdiction of an appellate Court in examining and order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, is all the more circumscribed." In MMTC Ltd vs Vedanta Limited (2019) 4 SCC 163, it was held that "As far as Section 34 is concerned the position is well settled by that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under section 34 (2) (b) (ii) i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. As per the legal position clarified through decision of this Court prior to the amendment to the 1996 Act in 2015, a violation of Indian public policy, in turn , includes a violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law, a violation of interest of India , conflict with justice or morality , and the existence of patent illegality of arbitral award".
CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 21 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.
37. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Ircon International Ltd vs Afcons Infrastructure Limited 2023 SCC Online Del. 2350 held that "patent illegality warranting setting aside of award should be such illegality or deficiencies at the face of award and/or shock the conscience of the Court in order for it for quality to be set aside by the Court".
38.Testing the facts of the case on the aforesaid guidelines laid by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts time and again, the Court has to consider if there is any violation or breach of any principles including the principle of natural justice to an extent that warrants interference from the Court.
39.In view of above discussion, I am of the opinion that there is no perversity on the face of the award warranting interference by this court. There is no merit in the case. The petition is dismissed. The amount, if any, deposited by the petitioner in the court shall be released to respondent against proper acknowledgment. File be consigned to record room.
(Anuradha Shukla) District Judge(Commercial Court)-02 South, Saket, Delhi.
Announced in open court Digitally
on 30.04.2026 signed by
anuradha
anuradha shukla
shukla Date:
2026.04.30
13:05:40
+0530
CS (COMM) 152/2015 (20668/16) Page 22 of 22 DELHI JAL BOARD
Vs. I.M. SINGH & ANR.