Madras High Court
Revenue Divisional Officer vs Jayalakshmi on 28 November, 2014
Author: V. Dhanapalan
Bench: V.Dhanapalan, G.Chockalingam
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 28.11.2014 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.DHANAPALAN AND THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G.CHOCKALINGAM C.R.P.Nos.617 to 623 of 2007 Revenue Divisional Officer, (Land Acquisition Officer), Tindivanam. ... Petitioner in all C.R.Ps. vs. 1. Jayalakshmi 2. R.K.Gopalakrishnan 3. Manavalan 4. Venkatesan ... Respondents in C.R.P.No.617 of 2007 1. Thayarammal 2. Ramadoss ... Respondents in C.R.P.No.618 of 2007 Manavalan ... Respondent in C.R.P.No.619 of 2007 1. Ramalingam 2. Janakiammal ... Respondent in C.R.P.No.620 of 2007 Suseela Ammal ... Respondent in C.R.P.No.621 of 2007 Balakrishnan ... Respondent in C.R.P.No.622 of 2007 1. Balakrishnan 2. Radhakrishnan ... Respondents in C.R.P.No.623 of 2007 Civil Revision Petitions filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the fair and final orders dated 27.06.2006 made in E.A.No.19 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.13 of 1982, E.A.No.20 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.14 of 1982, E.A.No.21 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.23 of 1982, E.A.No.22 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.20 of 1982, E.A.No.23 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.12 of 1982, E.A.No.34 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.10 of 1982 and E.A.No.335 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.21 of 1982, on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Tindivanam. For Petitioner in all C.R.Ps. : Mr.S.Gomathinayagam, Additional Advocate General assisted by Mr.M.Venugopal, Special Government Pleader (CS) For R2 in C.R.P.Nos.617 & 618/2007 and sole respondent in C.R.P.Nos.619, 621 & 622/2007 and R1 in C.R.P.Nos.620 & 623/2007 : Mr.R.Subramanian * * * * * * * Judgment Reserved on : 24.09.2014 Judgment Delivered on : 28.11.2014 C O M M O N O R D E R
Per V. DHANAPALAN,J.
Heard Mr.S.Gomathinayagam, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the petitioner in all the Civil Revision Petitions assisted by Mr.M.Venugopal, learned Special Government Pleader (CS) and Mr.R.Subramanian, learned counsel appearing for the sole respondent in C.R.P.Nos.619, 621 & 622 of 2007, 1st respondent in C.R.P.Nos.620 & 623 of 2007 and the 2nd respondent in C.R.P.Nos.617 & 618 of 2007.
2. The above Civil Revision Petitions are filed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tindivanam, challenging the execution proceedings taken out by the land owners, who are the respondents herein, seeking payment of compensation along with interest on solatium and additional amount awarded under Section 23-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act').
3. As the issue involved in all the Civil Revision Petitions are one and the same, they are taken up for disposal by a common order.
4. It is seen that the lands covered in all the above petitions were acquired by the Government for construction of a building for the Revenue Divisional Office, Tindivanam. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act has been published in the Government Gazette dated 12.06.1981. The Land Acquisition Officer, in his award proceedings has fixed compensation at the rate of Rs.17,643/- per hectare (Rs.71 per cent) for irrigated dry land and Rs.12,350/- per hectare (Rs.50/- per cent). Not being satisfied with the amount fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer, the land owners took the matter to the Sub Court, Tindivanam under Section 18 of the Act, which resulted in L.A.O.P.Nos.20/1982, 10/1982, 12/1982, 13/1982, 21/1982, 23/1982 and 14/1982, seeking fixation of compensation at the rate of Rs.1000/- per cent. In respect of their claim for higher compensation, claimants in L.A.O.P.Nos.11, 21, 23 and 14 of 1982 have been examined as P.Ws.1 to 4, respectively and one Varadhan Civil Engineer has been examined as P.W.5. They also produced various sale deeds, which were marked as Exs.A1 to A19. On the side of the Referring Officer, an Assistant working in the office of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tindivanam has been examined as R.W.1 and documents vide Exs.B1 to B9 were marked. On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence placed before him, the learned Sub Judge, Tindivanam, held that the amount arrived at by the Land Acquisition Officer is just and reasonable, thereby rejected the reference insofar as the lands concerned in L.A.O.P.No.14/1982. In respect of Well and Pumpset room, the learned Judge granted a sum of Rs.5000/- as compensation. Aggrieved over the same, the land owners as also the Revenue Divisional Officer preferred appeals before this Court in Appeal Nos.1096, 1310 to 1314 of 2009 and 35 and 829 of 1990.
5. In the said appeals, this Court, by a common judgment dated 03.04.2001, was pleased to hold as under:
7. ... I have verified the actual location of the lands covered in all these appeals and I am satisfied by relying on Exs.A15 and A16 and after allowing the reasonable deduction as pointed out by the Honourable Supreme Court, I am of the view that the proper and just compensation for the acquired land would be Rs.600/- per cent. However, in all these appeals, the claimants have prayed for compensation at the rate of Rs.350/- per cent. Accordingly, while setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, in so far as the acquired lands are concerned, compensation is fixed at the rate of Rs.350/- per cent as claimed in all the appeals filed by the claimants.
8. In so far as A.S.No.35/95 filed by the Revenue Divisional Officer questioning the grant of Rs.5000/- for well and pumpset room in the light of oral evidence of the claimant namely P.W.4 as well as Civil Engineer P.W.5. I am of the view that the said amount is quite reasonable and acceptable and the above appeal is liable to be dismissed.
9. With regard to statutory amounts, payable, it is clear that the claimants are entitled 30% solatium only for the market value of the lands acquired. It is also made clear that the claimants are entitled to interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of possession for a period of one year and thereafter at the rate of 15% per annum till the date of deposit. It is further made clear that the claimants are not entitled to interest on solatium. Further, the issue regard grant of interest on solatium is pending before the Larger Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court, depending on the outcome of the case before the Supreme Court, the claimant is entitled to file an appropriate petition before the Sub Court.
10. In the light of what is stated above, all the appeals filed by the claimants are allowed as prayed for and the appeals filed by the Revenue Divisional Officer is dismissed. ...
6. Pursuant thereto, the learned Principal Sub Judge, Tindivanam, by an order dated 27.06.2006, allowed all the applications in E.A.No.19 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.13 of 1982, E.A.No.20 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.14 of 1982, E.A.No.21 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.23 of 1982, E.A.No.22 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.20 of 1982, E.A.No.23 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.12 of 1982, E.A.No.34 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.10 of 1982 and E.A.No.335 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.21 of 1982, thereby awarding interest on solatium at 9% from 08.07.1981 to 08.07.1982 and 15% from 09.07.1982 to 09.06.2006. Challenging the same, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tindivanam, is before this Court by way of the present Civil Revision Petitions.
7. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the petitioner would contend that the court below erred in awarding interest on solatium at 9% from 08.07.1981 to 08.07.1982 and 15% from 09.07.1982 to 09.06.2006 and that the same is liable to be set aside. It is his strenuous contention that the claimants are entitled for interest on solatium only prospectively, i.e. from 19.09.2001, that is the date on which the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered a judgment holding that the land owners are entitled for interest on solatium.
8. To strengthen his contentions, learned Additional Advocate General has relied on the following decisions:
(i) (1989) 2 SCC 754 (Union of India and another vs. Raghubir Singh (dead) by Lrs. Etc.) 30. We now come to the merits of the reference. The refer- ence is limited to the interpretation of s. 30(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1984. Before the enactment of the Amendment Act, solatium was provided under s. 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act (shortly, "the parent Act") at 15% on the market value of the Land computed in accordance with s. 23(1) of the Act, the solatium being provided in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. The Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, 1982 was introduced in the House of the People on 30 April, 1982 and upon enactment the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 commenced operation with effect from 24 September, 1984. S. 15 of the Amendment Act amended s. 23(2) of the parent Act and substituted the words '30 per centum' in place of the words '15 per centum'. Parliament intended that the benefit of the enhanced solatium should be made available albeit to a limited degree, even in respect of acquisition proceedings taken before that date. It sought to effectuate that intention by enacting s. 30(2) in the Amendment Act, S. 30(2) of the Amendment Act provides:
"(2) the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 23 ......of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of s. 15 ........of this Act ....... shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 [the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People] and before the commencement of this Act."
31. In construing s. 30(2), it is just as well to be clear that the award made by the Collector referred to here is the award made by the Collector under s. 11 of the parent Act, and the award made by the Court is the award made by the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction under s. 23 of the parent Act on a reference made to it by the Collector under s. 19 of the parent Act. There can be no doubt that the benefit of the enhanced solatium is intended by s. 30(2) in respect of an award made by the Collector between 30 April 1982 and 24 September, 1984. Likewise the benefit of the enhanced solatium is extended by s. 30(2) to the case of an award made by the Court between 30 April 1982 and .24 September 1984, even though it be upon reference from an award made before 30 April, 1982.
32. The question is: what is the meaning of the words "or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court on appeal against any such award?" Are they limited, as con- tended by the appellants, to appeals against an award of the Collector or the Court made between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984, or do they include also, as contended by the respondents, appeals disposed of between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September 1984 even though arising out of awards of the Collector or the Court made before 30 April, 1982. We are of opinion that the interpretation placed by the appellants should be preferred over that suggested by the respondents. Parliament has identified the appeal before the High Court and the appeal before the Supreme Court by describing it as an appeal against 'any such award'. The submission on behalf of the respondents is that the words 'any such award' mean the award made by the Collector or Court, and carry no greater limiting sense; and that in this context, upon the language of s. 30(2), the order in appeal is an appellate order made between 30 April 1982 and 24-September 1984--in which case the related award of the Collector or of the Court may have been made before 30 April 1982. To our mind, the words 'any such award' cannot bear the broad meaning suggested by learned counsel for the respondents. No such words of description by way of identifying the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court were neces- sary. Plainly, having regard to the existing hierarchical structure of for a contemplated in the parent Act those appellate orders could only be orders arising in appeal against the award of the Collector or of the Court. The words 'any such award' are intended to have deeper signifi- cance, and in the context in which those words appear in s. 30(2) it is clear that they are intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or Court between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. In other words s. 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the benefit of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by the Court is made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 or to appeals against such awards decided by the High Court and the Su- preme Court whether the decisions of the High Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before 24 September, 1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the award by the Collector or by the Court should have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. We find ourselves in agreement with the conclusion reached by this Court in K. Kamalajammanniavaru (dead) by Lrs. v. Special Land Acquisi- tion Officer, (supra), and find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken in Bhag Singh and Others v. Union Terri- tory of Chandigarh, (supra). The expanded meaning given to s. 30(2) in the latter case does not, in our opinion, flow reasonably from the language of that sub-section. It seems to us that the learned judges in that case missed the sig- nificance of the word 'such' in the collocation 'any such award' in s. 30(2). Due significance must be attached to that word, and to our mind it must necessarily intend that the appeal to the High Court or the Supreme Court, in which the benefit of the enhanced solatium is to be given, must be confined to an appeal against an award of the Collector or of the Court rendered between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984.
33. We find substance in the contention of the learned Attorney General that if Parliament had intended that the benefit of enhanced solatium should be extended to all pending proceedings it would have said so in clear language. On the contrary, as he says, the terms in which s. 30(2) is couched indicate a limited extension of the benefit. The Amendment Act has not been made generally retrospective with effect from any particular date, and such retrospectivity as appears is restricted to certain areas covered by the parent Act and must be discovered from the specific terms of the provision concerned. Since it is necessary to spell out the degree of retrospectivity from the language of the relevant provision itself, close attention must be paid to the provisions of s. 30(2) for determining the scope of retrospective relief intended by Parliament in the matter of enhanced solatium. The learned Attorney General is also right when he points out that it was never intended to define the scope of the enhanced solatium on the mere accident of the disposal of a case in appeal on a certain date. Delays in the superi- or Courts extend now to limits which were never anticipated when the right to approach them for relief was granted by statute. If it was intended that s. 30(2) should refer to appeals pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984, they could well refer to proceedings in which an award had been made by the Collector from anything between 10 to 20 years before. It could never have been intended that rates of compensation and solatium applicable to acquisition proceedings initiated so long ago should now enjoy the benefit of statutory en- hancement. It must be remembered that the value of the land is taken under s. 11(1) and s. 23(1) with reference to the date of publication of the notification under-s.4(1), and it is that date which is usually material for the purpose of determining the quantum of compensation and solatium. Both s. 11(1) and s. 23(1) speak of compensation being determined on the basis, inter alia, of the market value of the land on that date, and solatium by s. 23(2), is computed as a per- centage on such market value.
34. Our attention was drawn to the order made in State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, (supra), but in the absence of a statement of the reasons which persuaded the learned Judges to take the view they did we find it difficult to endorse that decision. It received the approval of the learned Judges who decided Bhag Singh (supra), but the judgment in Bhag Singh, (supra) as we have said earlier, has omitted to give due significance to all the material provisions of s. 30(2), and consequently we find ourselves at variance with it. The learned Judges proceeded to apply the principle that an appeal is a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference under-s. 18 but, in our opinion, the application of a general principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself. Learned counsel for the respondents has strenuously relied on the general principle that the appeal is a re-hearing of the original matter, but we are not satisfied that he is on good ground in invoking that principle. Learned counsel for the respondents points out that the word 'or' has been used in s. 30(2), as a disjunctive between the reference to the award made by the Collector or the Court and an order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal and, he says, properly understood it must mean that the period 30 April, 1982 to 24 September, 1984 is as much applicable to the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court as it is to the award made by the Collector or the Court. We think that what Parliament intends to say is that the benefit of s. 30(2) will be available to an award by the Collector or the Court made between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award of the Collector or the Court made between the said two dates. The word 'or' is used with reference to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under-s. 30(2) is sought to be extended. If the proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector or of the Court made between the aforesaid two dates, the benefit of s. 30(2) will be applied to such award made between the aforesaid two dates. If the proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal before the High Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the benefit of s. 30(2) will be applied. But in every case, the award of the Collector or of the Court must have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984.
(ii) 2001 (4) CTC 434 (Sunder vs. Union of India) 27. We think it useful to quote the reasoning advanced by Chief Justice S.S. Sandhawalia of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in State of Haryana vs. Smt. Kailashwati and ors. (supra).
"Once it is held as it inevitably must be that the solatium provided for under Section 23(2) of the Act forms an integral and statutory part of the compensation awarded to a landowner, then from the plain terms of section 28 of the act, it would be evident that the interest is payable on the compensation awarded and not merely on the market value of the land. Indeed the language of S.28 does not even remotely refer to market value alone and in terms talks of compensation or the sum equivalent thereto. The interest awardable under Section 28 therefore would include within its ambit both the market value and the statutory solatium. It would be thus evident that the provisions of Section 28 in terms warrant and authorise the grant of interest on solatium as well."
28. In our view the aforesaid statement of law is in accord with the sound principle of interpretation. Hence the person entitled to the compensation awarded is also entitled to get interest on the aggregate amount including solatium. The reference is answered accordingly.
(iii) (2010) 10 SCC 464 (Iyasamy and another vs. Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition) 18. The learned counsel for Appellants in Civil Appeal Nos. 1760-1761/04 are also claiming interest on solatium and additional compensation as the impugned order of the High Court was pronounced prior to judgment in Sunder v.Union of India reported at (2001) 7 SCC 211. Since the present appeal was pending before this court, therefore, the ratio of Sunder v. Union of India would entitle the appellants to receive interest on solatium under section 23 (2) and additional compensation under Section 23 (1A) in terms of the said decision. It was decided in Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India reported at (2006) 8 SCC 457 that such interest can be claimed only from the date of the judgment in Sunder (supra) i.e. 19.9.2001. Therefore, the appellants in the Civil Appeal Nos. 1760-1761/04 shall be entitled to such interest for the period after 19.9.2001, not the period prior to the same.
9. Per contra, Mr.R.Subramanian, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that the judgment of the Constitution Bench was explained in the case of Land Acquisition Officer and Assistant Commissioner and another vs. Shivappa Mallappa Jigalur and another, [(2010) 12 SCC 387] and a Division Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court clarified the position and concluded that the observations of the Five Judge Bench in Gurpreet Singh's case would apply only in cases where the award is silent and not in cases where the appeals against the determination of compensation were pending on the file of the Reference Court / High Court / Supreme Court. Therefore, learned counsel would contend that the respondents/claimants are entitled to claim interest on the solatium from the date of decree itself.
10. In support of his stand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has relied on the following decisions:
(i) AIR 1962 Mad 450 (R.Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar vs. Rengammal) 4. Before we deal with the question, involved in the appeal, it is necessary to examine the propriety of the procedure adopted by the learned District Judge. The normal rule as to the precedents is, that subordinate Courts are bound in the absence of any decision of the Supreme Court, to follow the decisions of the High Court to which they are subordinate. Where, however, there is a conflict between two decisions of the High Court, the rule to be adopted is as follows :--Where the conflict is between the judgment of a single Judge and a Bench or between a Bench and a larger Bench, the decision of the Bench or the larger Bench as the case may be, will have to be followed. But where the conflict is between two decisions both pronounced by a Bench consisting of the same number of Judges, and the subordinate Court after a careful examination of the decision came to the conclusion that both' of them directly apply to the case before it, it will then be at liberty to follow that decision which seems to it more correct, whether such decision be the later or the earlier one. To enable the subordinate Court to do so, the two apparently conflicting decisions must directly relate to and expressly decide the question that arises before the Court; otherwise a subordinate Court should follow that ruling which specifically deals with the point. It will not be open to it for example to follow the other decision which only impliedly or indirectly or by way of a mere observation gave expression to a contrary view. It follows that the learned District Judge in the present case was not justified in refusing to follow the decision referred in Francis v. Varghese , for his preference a decision which impliedly decided the point as against the one that directly did so is neither consistent with established rules relating to precedents nor conducive to orderly administration of justice.''
(ii) AIR 1987 Patna 191 (Amar Singh Yadav and another vs. Shanti Devi and others) 16. Now the contention strongly urged on behalf of the respondents that the earlier judgment of a co-ordinate Bench is to be mechanically followed and must have pre-eminence, irrespective of any other consideration, because the latter one has missed notice thereof, does not commend itself to me. When judgments of the superior Courts are of co-equal Benches, and, therefore, a matching authority, then their weight inevitably must be considered by the rational and the logic thereof and not by the mere fortuitous circumstance of the timeand date on which they were rendered. Equally, the fact that the subsequent judgment failed to take notice of the earlier one or any presumption that a deviation therefrom could not be intended, cannot possibly be conclusive. Vital issues, pertaining to the vital questions of the certainty and uniformity of the law, cannot be scuttled by such legal sophistry. It is manifest that when two directly conflicting judgments of the superior Court and of equal authority exist, then both of them cannot be binding on the Courts below. A choice, however difficult it may be, has to be made in such a situation and the date cannot be the guide. However, on principle, it appears to me, that the High Court must in this context follow the judgment, which would appear to lay down the law more elaborately and accurately. The mere incidence of time, whether the judgments of co-equal Benches of the superior Court are earlier or later, and whether the later one missed consideration of the earlier, are matters which appear to me as hardly relevant, and, in any case, not conclusive. ''
(iii) 2002 (2) L.W. 39 (Sunder vs. Union of India) 22. In deciding the question as to what amount would bear interest under Section 34 of the Act a peep into Section 31(1) of the Act would be advantageous. That sub-section says: "On making an award under section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub- section." The remaining sub-sections in that provision only deal with the contingencies in which the Collector has to deposit the amount instead of paying it to the party concerned. It is the legal obligation of the Collector to pay "the compensation awarded by him" to the party entitled thereto. We make it clear that the compensation awarded would include not only the total sum arrived at as per sub- section (1) of Section 23 but the remaining sub-sections thereof as well. It is thus clear from Section 34 that the expression "awarded amount" would mean the amount of compensation worked out in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 23, including all the sub-sections thereof.
23. The proviso to Section 34 of the Act makes the position further clear. The proviso says that "if such compensation" is not paid within one year from the date of taking possession of the land, interest shall stand escalated to 15% per annum from the date of expiry of the said period of one year "on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry". It is inconceivable that the solatium amount would attract only the escalated rate of interest from the expiry of one year and that there would be no interest on solatium during the preceding period. What the legislature intended was to make the aggregate amount under Section 23 of the Act to reach the hands of the person as and when the award is passed, at any rate as soon as he is deprived of the possession of his land. Any delay in making payment of the said sum should enable the party to have interest on the said sum until he receives the payment. Splitting up the compensation into different components for the purpose of payment of interest under Section 34 was not in the contemplation of the legislature when that section was framed or enacted.''
(iv) AIR 2003 MP 81 (Jabalpur Bus Operators Association and others vs. State of M.P. And another) 4. Having discussed the views expressed by some of the High Courts, we advert to the decisions of Apex Court on this question. In Atmaram v. State of Punjab (AIR 1959 SC 519), Apex Court said in Paragraph 12 that-
"Where a Full Bench of three Judges is inclined to take a view contrary to that of another Full Bench of equal strength, the better course would be to constitute a Larger Bench. Such a course becomes necessary in view of the fact that otherwise the subordinate Courts are placed under the embarrassment of preferring one view to another, both equally binding upon them."
5. Again, the Supreme Court considered the theory of precedent in Union of India and Anr. v. Hansoli Devi and Ors. (2002 AIR SCW 3755) and said that--
"Judicial discipline and propriety demands that a Bench of two learned Judges should follow a decision of a Bench of three learned Judges. But if a Bench of two learned Judges concludes that an earlier judgment of three learned Judges is so very incorrect that in no circumstances can it be followed, the proper course for it to adopt is, to refer the matter be forfeit to a Bench of three Judges setting out the reasons why it could not agree with the earlier judgment and then if the Bench of three learned Judges also comes to the conclusion that the earlier judgment of a Bench of three learned Judges is incorrect, then a reference could be made to a Bench of five learned Judges."
Having considered the matter with broader dimensions, we find that various High Courts have given different opinion on the question involved. Some hold that in case of conflict between two judgments on a point of law, later decision should be followed; while others say that the Court should follow the decision which is correct and accurate whether it is earlier or later. There are High Courts which hold that decision of earlier Bench is binding because of the theory of binding precedent and Article 141 of the Constitution of India. There are also decisions which hold that Single Judge differing from another Single Judge decision should refer the case to Larger Bench, otherwise he is bound by it. Decisions which are rendered without considering the decisions expressing contrary view have no value as a precedent. But in our considered opinion, the position may be stated thus-
With regard to the High Court, a Single Bench is bound by the decision of another Single Bench. In case, he does not agree with the view of the other Single Bench, he should refer the matter to the Larger Bench. Similarly, Division Bench is bound by the judgment of earlier Division Bench. In case, it does not agree with the view of the earlier Division Bench, it should refer the matter to Larger Bench. In case of conflict between judgments of two Division Benches of equal strength, the decision of earlier Division Bench shall be followed except when it is explained by the latter Division Bench in which case the decision of later Division Bench shall be binding. The decision of Larger Bench is binding on Smaller Benches.
In case of conflict between two decisions of the Apex Court, Benches comprising of equal number of Judges, decision of earlier Bench is binding unless explained by the latter Bench of equal strength, in which case the later decision is binding. Decision of a Larger Bench is binding on smaller Benches. Therefore, the decision of earlier Division Bench, unless distinguished by latter Division Bench, is binding on the High Courts and the Subordinate Courts. Similarly, in presence of Division Bench decisions and Larger Bench decisions, the decisions of Larger Bench are binding on the High Courts and the Subordinate Courts. No decision of Apex Court has been brought to our notice which holds that in case of conflict between the two decisions by equal number of Judges, the later decision in binding in all circumstances, or the High Courts and Subordinate Courts can follow any decision which is found correct and accurate to the case under consideration. High Courts and Subordinate Courts should lack competence to interpret decisions of Apex Court since that would not only defeat what is envisaged under Article 141 of the Constitution of India but also militate hierarchical supremacy of Courts. The common thread which runs through various decisions of Apex Court seems to be that great value has to be attached to precedent which has taken the shape of rule being followed by it for the purpose of consistency and exactness in decisions of Court, unless the Court can clearly distinguish the decision put up as a precedent or is per incuriam, having been rendered without noticing some earlier precedents with which the Court agrees. Full Bench decision in Balbir Singh's case (supra) which holds that if there is conflict of views between the two co-equal Benches of the Apex Court, the High Court has to follow the judgment which appears to it to state the law more elaborately and more accurately and in conformity with the scheme of the Act, in our considered opinion, for reasons recorded in the preceding paragraph of this judgment, does not lay down the correct law as to application of precedent and is, therefore, over-ruled on this point.
After having answered the reference, writ petitions be placed before the Single Judge for decision on merits.
(v) (2006) 8 SCC 457 (Gurpreet Singh vs. Union of India) One other question also was sought to be raised and answered by this Bench though not referred to it. Considering that the question arises in various cases pending in Courts all over the country, we permitted counsel to address us on that question. That question is whether in the light of the decision in Sunder (supra), the awardee/decree holder would be entitled to claim interest on solatium in execution though it is not specifically granted by the decree. It is well settled that an execution court cannot go behind the decree. If, therefore, the claim for interest on solatium had been made and the same has been negatived either expressly or by necessary implication by the judgment or decree of the reference court or of the appellate court, the execution court will have necessarily to reject the claim for interest on solatium based on Sunder (supra) on the ground that the execution court cannot go behind the decree. But if the award of the reference court or that of the appellate court does not specifically refer to the question of interest on solatium or in cases where claim had not been made and rejected either expressly or impliedly by the reference court or the appellate court, and merely interest on compensation is awarded, then it would be open to the execution court to apply the ratio of Sunder (supra) and say that the compensation awarded includes solatium and in such an event interest on the amount could be directed to be deposited in execution. Otherwise, not. We also clarify that such interest on solatium can be claimed only in pending executions and not in closed executions and the execution court will be entitled to permit its recovery from the date of the judgment in Sunder (September 19, 2001) and not for any prior period. We also clarify that this will not entail any re-appropriation or fresh appropriation by the decree-holder. This we have indicated by way of clarification also in exercise of our power under Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution of India with a view to avoid multiplicity of litigation on this question.
(vi) (2010) 12 SCC 387 (Land Acquisition Officer and Assistant Commissioner and another vs. Shivappa Mallappa Jigalur and others) 11. We are unable to accept the submission and in our view the decision in Gurpreet Singh has no application to the facts of the present cases. In paragraph 54 of the decision in Gurpreet Singh's case, the Court was considering the scope of execution proceedings and the limitations of the execution court. The three lines relied upon by Mr. Hegde must be read and understood in the context of what is said earlier. The Court clearly said that the execution court could not go beyond the decree. In the event, the claim of interest was rejected expressly or by necessary implication in the decree, it would not be permissible for the execution court to grant interest relying upon the decision in Sunder. But, even then the Court went on to clarify that if the award of the reference court or the appellate court was silent on the issue of solatium and interest then it would be open to the execution court to apply the ratio of Sunder and say that the compensation awarded would include solatium and in such an event interest on the amount could be directed to be deposited in execution. The decision in Gurpreet Singh, thus, actually enlarged the scope of execution proceeding, in a certain way, on the basis of the decision in Sunder.
13. Coming now to the stipulation that any interest on solatium can only be granted for the period subsequent to September 19, 2001, the date of the decision in Sunder, it is evident that this again, is a limitation on the power of the execution court. The direction is actually referable to those cases in which the award of the reference court or the appellate court being silent, it is left open to the execution court to give direction for the deposit of interest on solatium. In such cases, the reference court can ask for interest only for the period subsequent to September 19, 2001. The direction in no way circumscribes the power of the court dealing with the main proceeding relating to enhancement of the compensation.
14. The matter can be looked at from another angle. The appeal being the continuation of the original proceeding, in the facts of the cases in this sub-group, there can be no question of accrual of interest only after the date of the decision in Sunder. At this stage, it may be recalled that the civil court had awarded solatium @ 30% and interest @ 9% for the first year and @ 15% from second year onwards till the date of realisation. The State's appeal against the judgment of the civil court was dismissed. Thus, the direction for payment of solatium with interest at the rates indicated had become final. The High Court enhanced the rate of compensation. This would inevitably lead to an increase in the amount of solatium and consequently in the amount of interest on the unpaid amount of solatium. Thus, looked at from any point of view, the question of payment of interest subsequent to September 19, 2001 does not arise.
(vii) (2013) 3 SCC 63 (State of Assam vs. Ripa Sarma) 6. Faced with this situation, Mr. Avijit Roy, learned counsel appearing for the State of Assam seeks to rely on a subsequent judgment of this Court in Eastern Coalfields Limited versus Dugal Kumar reported in (2008) 14 SCC 295. He has made a specific reference to paragraphs 22 and 23 of the judgment. In paragraph 23 of the judgment, it is observed as follows:-
It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that when the review petition was dismissed, the order passed by the Division Bench in intra-court appeal got merged in the order of review petition. But even otherwise, when the order passed in the review petition is challenged, it would not be proper to dismiss this appeal particularly when leave was granted in SLP after hearing the parties. We, therefore, reject the objection raised by the writ petitioner.
A perusal of the aforesaid paragraph would clearly show that the judgments noticed by us in the earlier part of the order were not brought to the notice of the Court in Eastern Coalfields Limited case. This apart, the submission with regard to the merger of the main order with the order in review has been merely noticed, and not accepted. The preliminary objection seems to have been rejected on the ground that since leave has been granted in the special leave petition, it would not be proper to dismiss the same without hearing the parties.
7. In the present case, the preliminary objection has been raised at the threshold. In addition, it is an inescapable fact that the judgment rendered in Eastern Coalfields Limited has been rendered in ignorance of the earlier judgments of the Benches of coequal strength, rendering the same per incuriam. Therefore, it cannot be elevated to the status of precedent. In view of the above, we accept the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Jayant Bhushan, learned senior counsel. The special leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
11. Heard the learned counsel on either side and perused all the material documents available on record.
12. From the pleadings, it is seen that the lands covered in all these petitions are acquired by the Government for construction of a building for the Revenue Divisional Office, Tindivanam. Not being satisfied with the compensation fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer, the land owners took the matter to Sub Court, Tindivanam under Section 18 of the Act seeking fixation of higher compensation. Finding that the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer is just and reasonable, the Sub Judge, Tindivanam rejected the plea of the claimants. Aggrieved by the same, the land owners preferred appeals before this Court seeking enhancement of compensation. The learned Single Judge of this Court, while setting aside the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge, Tindivanam, fixed compensation insofar as the acquired lands, as Rs.350/- per cent as claimed by the land owners. Pursuant thereto, the Principal Sub Judge, Tindivanam, by an order dated 27.06.2006, allowed all the Execution Applications, thereby awarding interest on solatium at 9% from 08.07.1981 to 08.07.1982 and 15% from 09.07.1982 to 09.06.2006. Challenging the same, the Revenue Divisional Officer (Land Acquisition), Tindivanam has filed the present Civil Revision Petitions.
13. Now, the question to be decided in the present case is as to whether interest on solatium will be accounted as per the order dated 27.06.2006 passed by the Reference Court in the Execution Applications or from 19.09.2001, the date on which the Hon'ble Apex Court laid down a ratio in Sunder's case.
14. The question of law which arose for consideration before the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sunder's case was as to the State's liability to pay interest on the amount as envisaged under Section 23(2) of the Act. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated that once it is held as it inevitably must be that the solatium provided for under Section 23(2) of the Act forms an integral and statutory part of the compensation awarded to a landowner, then from the plain terms of section 28 of the Act, it would be evident that the interest is payable on the compensation awarded and not merely on the market value of the land. It was further stated therein that the interest awardable under Section 28 would include within its ambit both the market value and the statutory solatium. Thus, it was held that the person entitled to the compensation awarded is also entitled to get interest on the aggregate amount including solatium.
15. For better appreciation, Sections 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act are extracted hereunder:
23 (2). In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall, in every case, award a sum of [thirty per centum] on such market, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition.
28. Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into Court:
Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that where such excess or any part thereof is paid into Court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into Court before the date of such expiry.
16. In Gurpreet Singh's case, the question as to whether in the light of the decision in Sunder's case, the decree holder would be entitled to claim interest on solatium in execution, though it is not specifically granted by the decree, was answered by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, stating that an Execution Court cannot go behind the decree. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while applying the ratio laid down in Sunder's case, held that the compensation awarded includes solatium and in such an event, interest on the amount could be directed to be deposited in execution. It was further clarified that such interest on solatium can be claimed only in pending executions and not in closed executions and the Execution Court will be entitled to permit its recovery from the date of judgment in Sunder's case, i.e. 19.09.2001 and not for any prior period. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also added that this will not entail any re-appropriation or fresh appropriation by the decree holder.
17. Bearing in mind the above two decisions of the Constitution Benches of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, namely, Sunder's case and Gurpreet Singh's case, it can safely be analyzed and concluded as per the clarification rendered in Gurpreet Singh's case, which is more explicit to the effect that interest on solatium could be claimed only in pending execution and not in closed execution and the execution Court will be entitled to recover only from the date of judgment in Sunder's case and not for the prior period.
18. In the course of arguments, learned counsel for the respondents relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of of Land Acquisition Officer and Assistant Commissioner and another vs. Shivappa Mallappa Jigalur and another, reported in (2010) 12 SCC 387, wherein it has been stated that if the direction is actually referable to those cases in which the award of the Reference Court or the appellate court being silent, then it is left open to the execution court to give direction for the deposit of interest in solatium and the Reference court can also ask for interest only for the period subsequent to 19.09.2001 and the direction in no way circumscribes the power of the Court dealing with the main proceeding relating to enhancement of compensation.
19. It is no doubt true that in the said judgment, it has been stated that in case the question of interest on solatium is silent, liberty was granted to the Execution Court to direct deposit of interest on solatium. However, the main issue involved in the present cases revolves around determination of period for fixation of interest on solatium only and therefore, the question of interest on solatium being silent does not arise at all herein in these cases. It is also to be seen that in Paragraph No.11 of the very same judgment, the position has been made clear that the decision rendered in Gurpreet Singh's case has no application to the facts of the present case and therefore, it is not relevant for this Court to take note of the said judgment as precedent to the present cases. Moreover, in case of conflict between two decisions of the Apex Court, namely, Benches comprising of equal number of Judges, decision of the earlier Division Bench unless distinguished by a later Division Bench, is binding on the High Courts and Subordinate Courts. If the said principle is borne in mind, it can easily be said that Shivappa Mallappa's case need not be looked into, as the Constitution Bench comprising of five Judges Bench had already clarified the position with regard to payment of interest on solatium. Above all, Shivappa Mallappa's case was not placed either before the Larger Bench or before the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court for judicial scrutiny.
20. The claim of the respondents that the amount could be paid even prior to the date of Sunder's case (19.09.2001) owing to pendency of Execution Petitions would certainly give a cause of action to claim interest from the date of decree. For the sake of argument, if the aforesaid submissions are taken into account, then the consequences on the interest on solatium will be a far-reaching one, having serious effect on the State exchequer. Therefore, the respondents' claim of pendency of Execution Proceedings could not be a factor to be reckoned in the instant case. Thus, in our considered opinion, taking note of the facts and circumstances of the case and by applying the true interpretation made by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, finding that the claim of the respondents is not well founded, we are of the view that interest on solatium has to be applied only from the date of Sunder's case, viz. 19.09.2001 and not otherwise.
21. Accordingly, the final orders passed by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Tindivanam dated 27.06.2006 made in E.A.No.19 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.13 of 1982, E.A.No.20 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.14 of 1982, E.A.No.21 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.23 of 1982, E.A.No.22 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.20 of 1982, E.A.No.23 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.12 of 1982, E.A.No.34 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.10 of 1982 and E.A.No.335 of 2004 in L.A.O.P.No.21 of 1982 are set aside. However, it is made clear that the respondents shall be entitled to 15% interest on solatium and additional amount awarded under Section 23-A of the Act for the period after 19.09.2001 and not for the prior period.
In fine, these Civil Revision Petitions are allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
Index : Yes [V.D.P.,J.] [G.C.,J.]
Internet : Yes 28.11.2014
abe/ar
To : The Principal Subordinate Judge, Tindivanam.
V.DHANAPALAN,J.
AND
G.CHOCKALINGAM,J.
abe/ar
Pre-delivery common order
in
C.R.P.Nos.617 to 623 of 2007
Dated: 28.11.2014