Allahabad High Court
Guddi Devi And 2 Others vs State Of U P And 2 Others on 24 January, 2019
Bench: Shashi Kant Gupta, Manju Rani Chauhan
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Court No. - 32 Reserved A.F.R. Case :- WRIT - C No. - 33348 of 2018 Petitioner :- Guddi Devi And 2 Others Respondent :- State Of U P And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashok Shankar Bhatnagar, Pawan Kumar Bhardwaj, Pramod Bhardwaj, Shashi Kant Sharma, Shri Ashok Khare (Senior Advocate), Yogendra Singh Bohra Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C., Pramod Kumar Singh, Rahul Sahai Hon'ble Shashi Kant Gupta,J.
Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan,J (Delivered by Hon'ble Shashi Kant Gupta, J.)
1. This writ petition has been filed , inter alia, to quash the impugned order dated 7.9.2018 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) passed by Respondent No. 2 and for a direction to the Respondent No. 2 to convene a meeting for consideration of No Confidence Motion against the Respondent No. 3.
2. Brief facts of the case, as set out in the writ petition, are stated as follows:
3. The election of Zila Panchayat Bulandshahar, was conducted in the month of January, 2016 in which 53 members were elected. The respondent no.3 Pradeep Chaudhary was elected as Adhyaksha of Zila Panchayat, Bulandshahar in August, 2017 after a no-confidence motion was carried out against one Harendra Yadav.
4. Petitioner no.3, Mahendra Singh along with 33 other elected members delivered a written notice dated 1.9.2018 to the Collector Bulandshahar under section 28 of U.P. Zila Panchayat Act( hereinafter referred to as 'Act') together with the proposal of motion of no confidence duly signed by the 33 elected members along with their respective affidavits.
5. The District Magistrate, Bulandshahar upon receiving the notice of no-confidence motion nominated the Additional District Magistrate (Administration), Bulandshahar vide its order no. 3908/Pa. Ni. Li./2018-19 dated 5.9.2018 to verify the correctness and genuineness of the aforesaid 33 affidavits.
6. The Additional District Magistrate (Administration) Bulandshahar vide its letter/notice no. 3954/ST ADM (E) dated 5.9.2018 issued notices to all the 33 elected members, who were signatories to the aforesaid proposal of no confidence motion requiring them to appear before him on 7.9.2018 between 11.00 am to 1.00 pm along with their original I.d. and a copy of their election results.
7. All the 33 elected members who had filed their affidavits and were the signatories to the proposal of no-confidence motion, approached the District Magistrate through Shri Mahendra Singh (petitioner no. 3) requesting him to provide security, video coverage and proper police arrangement so that the said 33 members can approach and get their affidavits verified without any fear or pressure. But it appears that the authority concerned turned a deaf ear to the same.
8. It has been further averred in the writ petition that in order to prevent the petitioners from appearing before the A.D.M ( Admin) for the purpose of verification , false and frivolous F.I.Rs. were lodged against all the three petitioners on the very same day i.e. 7.9.2018 . The details of the aforesaid F.I.Rs are given herein below:
1. F.I.R. No. 0173 dated 7.9.2009 time 11.38 Hours , Police Station Adhmadgadh under section 420 and 468 I.P.C. lodged by one Satish Kumar against petitioner no. 1 Smt. Guddi Devi alleging that she had taken Rs. 15 lacs and had given a fake and forged appointment letter.
2. F.I.R. NO.0228 dated 7.9.2018 time 03.00 hours , P.S. Khurja Dehat District Bulandshahr under section 420 and 504 I.P.C. and section 3(1)(d) SC/ST Act lodged by one Virendra Jatav against the petitioner no. 2, Chandra Kesh Baghel alleging that he had taken Rs. 2.00 lacs and had given a fake and forged appointment letter.
3. F.I.R. No. 0250 dated 7.9.2018 time 10.57 hours , Police Station Ahaar District Bulandshahr under sections 420,504 I.P.C. and sections 3(1) (d) SC/ST Act lodged by one Vijendra Jatav against petitioner no. 3, Mahendra Singh alleging that he had refused to pay a sum of Rs. 90,000/- being due as salary and also hurled caste abuses and assaulted him.
9. It has further been averred that when the petitioner No. 3, Mahendra Singh was being prevented from approaching the office of the A.D.M.(Admin), Bulandshahar, one of the elected members namely Subodh Nagar, sent a registered notice to the District Magistrate, Bulandshahr and other authorities informing them that elected members are being illegally detained and prevented from approaching the office of the respondent no. 2 for verification of their affidavits, but all in vain.
10. It has been further, inter alia, averred in paragraph 17 of the writ petition that all the F.I.Rs. are of identical nature and have been lodged nearly at the same time at three different police stations situated at a distance of about 70 Kms. against all the three petitioners, who were proceeding to appear before the ADM (Admin) for verification of their affidavits. Police all of a sudden became so vigilant and active that it detained/arrested all the three petitioners. Malice and mala-fides are writ large and the police was acting at the instance of the respondent no.3.
11. It was further averred that the F.I.R. against the petitioner no. 2, Chandra Kesh Baghel was lodged during odd hours of the night i.e. at 3.00 hours for an offence punishable under section 420 and 504 I.P.C. and 3(1)(d) S.C./S.T. Act. The aforesaid facts clearly reveal the nefarious and evil design of the administration and police, who were hand-in-glove with the Respondent No. 3. The petitioners in this regard have made reference to the various reports published in the Media i.e. Daily Newspaper , Dainik Jagran, New Delhi Edition, Hindustan, Meerut Edition , Amar Ujala, New Delhi Edition dated 8.9.2018, wherein it has been reported that police cases were registered against several members on the preceding night .
12. It was further averred that under the circumstances, only 25 members of Zila Panchayat could appear before the A.D.M.(Admin) Bulandshahar for verification of their signatures. Therefore signatures of only 25 members were verified and accordingly the A.D.M. (Admin) submitted its report to the District Magistrate on 7.9.2018. In pursuance of the said report, the Collector rejected the proposal for no confidence motion on the ground that signature of only 25 elected members on the affidavit could be verified, which was below 50% of the total strength (53 elected members) of the Zila Panchayat as originally constituted.
13. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent no. 2, District Magistrate, Bulandshahar wherein the contention made in the writ petition have been rebutted. However, the factum of lodging of the aforementioned F.I.Rs. against the petitioners on 7.9.2018 whereby the petitioners were prevented from appearing before the A.D.M. (Admin) has not been denied. In reply thereto a rejoinder affidavit has been filed wherein the facts mentioned in the writ petition have been reiterated.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that none of the elected members, who had submitted their affidavits in support of proposed no confidence motion, had made any complaint whatsoever to the respondent no.2 or any other authority denying their signatures either on their affidavits or the notice delivered under section 28(2) of the Act.
15. It was further submitted that there was absolutely no circumstance in existence, on which basis it could be said that the requirement of sub section (2) of Section 28 of the Act had not been fulfilled. It has been further submitted that the written notice together with the motion of no confidence was delivered to the Collector under section 28 (2) of the Act by more than half of the elected members (33 members) of the Zila Panchayat and there was absolutely no occasion or necessity for the District Magistrate to verify the affidavits sworn by them in the absence of any of them denying their signatures.
16. It was further submitted that in order to frustrate the motion of no confidence, false and frivolous F.I.Rs. were registered against the petitioners solely to prevent them from appearing before the A.D.M. for the purpose of verification of their affidavits. Since the petitioners as well as some other elected members could not appear before the A.D.M, the notice delivered to the District Magistrate under section 28(2) of the Act for convening the meeting for consideration of no confidence motion, was illegally rejected by the Collector and meeting was not convened as provided under the Act.
17. Learned counsel for the petitioner while relying upon the decision of Full Bench of this court in Smt. Sheela Devi Vs. State of U.P. And others : 2015(2) ADJ 325 (FB), submitted that there was no such circumstance disclosed on which it could be said that provision of Section 28 of the Act was not satisfied.
18. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 while rebutting the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the office of the Collector is not a post office and the Collector had rightly directed the A.D.M. (Admin) to verify the signatures of the members, who had put their signatures on their affidavits filed in support of the notice proposing no confidence motion against the respondent no. 3. He further submitted that the respondent no. 3 was not responsible in getting the aforementioned F.I.Rs lodged against the petitioners.
19. He lastly submitted that since the meeting could not be convened within 30 days from the date of delivery of notice under section 28(2) of the Act , the matter has become infructuous and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this count alone. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Padmasundara Rao and others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 2002 (3) SCC 533 and decision of this Court in the case of Mahavir Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (6) ALJ (NOC) 1375.
20. Learned counsel for the petitioner while rebutting the aforesaid argument has vehemently argued that the matter has not been rendered infructuous and in support of his contentions has placed various case laws and has referred to the 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation' 12th Edition by Hon'ble Justice G.P. Singh.
21. On the merits of the writ petition, we have heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Y. S. Bohra, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Naveen Sinha, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 and Sri Manoj Kumar Mishra and Ankit Goyal, for the State .
22. On submissions made and on the pleadings contained in the writ petition, in our opinion, the following issues arise for determination in the present writ petition:
(i). Whether the Collector was justified in rejecting the notice delivered to the Collector by the 33 elected members of the Zila Panchayat together with the proposed motion of no confidence, on the basis of the enquiry report submitted by the A.D.M (Admin), Bulandshahar.?
(ii). Whether the present writ petition has been rendered infructuous as the meeting could not be convened under section 28 (3) of the Act within 30 days from the date on which the notice under section 15 (2) of the Act was delivered to the Collector.
(iii) To what relief, if any, are the petitioners entitled to.?
23. Issue No. (i) : Whether the Collector was justified in rejecting the notice delivered to the Collector by the 33 elected members of the Zila Panchayat together with the proposed motion of no confidence, on the basis of the enquiry report submitted by the A.D.M (Admin), Bulandshahar.
24. It has also not been denied that 33 elected members including the petitioners had submitted a written notice expressing want of confidence in Adhyaksha Respondent No. 3 together with the proposed no confidence motion under section 28 (2) of the Act to the Collector and he directed the A.D.M. to verify the affidavits of the elected members who had put their signatures on the affidavits.
25. Now, the first question in this regard is whether the Collector was justified in directing the A.D.M. to verify the signatures on the affidavits of the elected members who had filed their affidavits in support of the written notice filed under Section 28(2) of the Act in the absence of any objection raised by any of such signatories and whether the petitioners and other elected members were prevented from appearing before the A.D.M for the purpose of verification of their signatures on their affidavits in a mala fide and collusive manner.
26. Admittedly, none of the elected members who had signed the affidavits filed in support of the notice delivered to the Collector under section 28(2) of the Act had made any complaint either to the Collector or to any other authorities denying their signatures either on the notice or on the affidavits. It was merely on the basis of the complaint of the respondent no. 3, that the A.D.M. was directed to hold an inquiry with regard to genuineness and correctness of their signatures on their affidavits. Section 28 of the Zila Panchayat Act does not provide for filing of affidavits by the elected members with the notice expressing want of confidence. Since, admittedly, none of the elected members had made any complaint with regard to genuineness of the signatures put by them on their respective affidavits, there was absolutely no material on record or occasion for the Collector to hold any inquiry to verify the affidavits, as such the exercise of verification of the affidavits was not at all required.
27. A similar question which fell for consideration was dealt with in detail by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Sheela Devi and others versus State of U.P. and others, 2015 (2) ADJ 325 (FB) wherein in paragraph 15 of the judgment the Court held as follows:-
"In our view, both the decisions of the majority as well as the minority essentially follow the same line and the area of dissent is rather narrow. Both the judgments of the majority as well as the minority postulate that the Collector ought not to make a detailed enquiry where serious allegations of fraud, coercion and duress are required to be resolved particularly having regard to the fact that a meeting had to be convened as soon as possible. The area of divergence is only this that whereas the majority left it open to the Collector to determine whether and if so what enquiry should be held, the view of the dissenting judge was that the Collector should hold an enquiry so long as a detailed enquiry into serious questions of coercion or fraud was not involved. In either view of the matter and since we are bound by the judgment of the Full Bench, the law on the subject is thus clear. The Collector, in the course of exercising the power which is conferred upon him, ought not to enquire into seriously disputed questions of fact involving issues of fraud, coercion and duress. Moreover, the Collector must have the discretion in each case of determining on the basis of a summary proceeding whether the essential requirements of a valid notice of an intention to move a motion of no confidence have been fulfilled. Where in the course of the summary enquiry, it appears to the Collector that the written notice does not comply with the requirements of law, the Collector would be within his power in determining as to whether all the required conditions have been fulfilled, as enunciated in sub-section (2) of Section 15. Whether the Collector in a given case has transgressed his power is a separate issue on which judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution would be available. However, we expressly clarify that we are not laying down a detailed and exhaustive enumeration of the circumstances in which the Collector can determine the validity of a notice furnished under Section (2) or those in which he can make a limited enquiry which, as we have held, he is entitled and competent to make. Ultimately, each case depends upon its own facts and it is for the Collector to determine as to whether the objections raised before him are outside the scope of the limited inquiry which he can make upon notice of an intent to move a motion of no confidence if it is submitted to him together with a notice of no confidence."
28. Further in Para 11 of the aforesaid judgment Sheela Devi (supra), the Full Court, inter alia, held as follows:-
"But, on the other hand , if there are circumstances before him which are indicative of the fact that provisions of sub section (2) have not been fulfilled, it would not be appropriate to denude the Collector of the power to make a limited verification or enquiry for the purpose of ensuring that the motion of no confidence meets the requirement as spelt out in sub section (2)."
29. The perusal of the aforesaid judgment shows that it is not open to the Collector to hold a detailed fact finding enquiry into the validity of the signatures which are appended to the notice. The Collector, in the course of exercising the power, which is conferred upon him, ought not to enquire into seriously disputed questions of fact involving issues of fraud, forgery, coercion and duress where in a given case the Collector has transgressed the limits of its own jurisdiction is a matter which can be addressed in a challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
30. Mere non-appearance of any of the elected members before the ADM for verification of signatures will not make the signatures on the notice of motion of no confidence as fabricated nor can it be held that the motion is not supported by more than half of the members of the Kshetra Panchayat. There cannot be a presumption about the signatures being forged or not being that of the members. Under the Act, 1961 and the Rules prescribed, there is no requirement of any actual physical presence of the members before the District Magistrate in support of the motion. What is required is that the motion should be signed by more than half of the members, and if there are affidavits on record in support of the motion and further if there are affidavits to the contrary submitted by the Pramukh, it is the duty of the District Magistrate to satisfy himself from the records of the Kshetra Panchayat as to whether prima facie the motion bears the signatures of members or not. He is not required to act as the Civil Court or for making detailed enquiry for coming to the conclusion that the signatures on the motion are genuine or not.
31. There must exist such circumstances so as to suggest that the requirement of sub section (2) of the Act has not been fulfilled. But, here in the present case, no circumstance was disclosed, as admittedly, more than 50% of the elected members had signed the notice and verified the affidavits. No complaint whatsoever was made by any one except the Adhyaksha, Respondent no. 3 against whom the proposed motion of no confidence was submitted. Copy of the proposed no confidence motion was also annexed along with the notice and it was delivered personally by some of elected members who had signed the notice. Thus the conditions provided under Section 28 (2) of the Act were fully satisfied.
32. Curiously enough three F.I.Rs were lodged against the petitioners under various sections of Indian Penal Code in order to prevent them from appearing before the A.D.M i.e. (i) FIR No. 0228 dated 7.9.2018 was lodged at 3.00 A.M. during odd hours of the night at police station Khurja Dehat District Bulandshahar under sections 420, 504 I.P.C. and 3(1) (d) SC/ST Act by one Virendra Jatav with the allegation that the petitioner no. 2 had taken Rs. 2.00/- lacs and had given a fake and forged appointment letter, (ii) F.I.R. No. 0250 dated 7.9.2018 was lodged at 10.57 hours at police station Ahaar District Bulandshahar under section 420, 504 I.P.C. and 3(1) (d) SC/ST Act by one Vijendra Jatav alleging that the petitioner no. 3 had refused to pay a sum of Rs. 90,000/- towards arrears and salary and hurled caste related abuses and assaulted him. (iii) F.I.R. No. 0173 dated 7.9.2009 time 11.38 Hours, Police Station Adhmadgadh under section 420 and 468 I.P.C. was lodged by one Satish Kumar against petitioner No. 1 Smt. Guddi Devi alleging that she had taken Rs. 15 lacs and had issued a fake and forged appointment letter.
33. The aforesaid F.I.Rs, prima facie, appear to have been lodged just to prevent the petitioners from appearing before the A.D.M. for verification of their affidavits. Facts stated in the FIR does not appear to be very inspiring, plausible and real. Two of the FIRs have been lodged just few hours before the verification and third one during odd hours at 3 AM in the preceding night.
34. The facts of the case further reveal that the respondent no. 3 was successful in his nefarious and evil design by preventing some of the members including the petitioner from appearing before the A.D.M. for verification of their affidavits as they were arrested/detained by the police when they were proceeding to verify their affidavits. Despite complaints being made, the Collector paid no heed to the said complaint. The conduct of the District Magistrate, respondent no. 2 also does not appear to be fair and above board. The administrative authorities appear to be in league with the respondent no. 3 who had made all efforts to somehow prevent the petitioners from appearing before the A.D.M. so that the affidavits are not verified, which could further lead to invalidation of the notice delivered under section 28(2) of the Act.
35. The above allegations made in this regard in the writ petition in paragraphs no. 12 to 24 have not been specifically denied by the respondent no. 2 and only a vague reply has been given in para 8 of the counter affidavit which runs as under:
"That the contents of paragraphs no. 12, 13, 14, 15 ,16, 17, 18, 19,20,21,22,23 and 24 of the writ petition are not admitted as stated and as such the same are denied. In reply thereto it is respectfully submitted that the suitable reply has already been given in the preceding paragraphs of this affidavit."
36. Thus, no specific denial has been made by the respondent no. 2, in its counter affidavit though news paper cutting in this regard has been filed along with the writ petition .
37. It is also beyond our comprehension as to how the police became so active overnight to arrest/detain the petitioners at the police station on the basis of the aforesaid three F.I.Rs. alleging almost the identical facts. It is also notable that without any further investigation, all the petitioners were released simultaneously soon after the time period for verification of the affidavits was over, without any personal bond or surety from the petitioners. Such unnatural conduct on the part of the police prima facie reflects that the arrest/detention was made in connivance with the respondent no. 3 in order to benefit the respondent no. 3, by preventing the petitioners from appearing before the A.D.M. for verification of their signatures on the affidavits.
38. According to the impugned order dated 7.9.2018, out of 33 elected members, who had signed the notice, 25 members had appeared before the ADM . Here, it is very significant to note that if all the three petitioners, who were detained at the police station on the basis of the aforesaid F.I.Rs. are included then the total number of elected members for the purpose of 28 (2) of the Act comes to 28, which would thus result in fulfilling the the requirement of section 28 (2) of the Act i.e. more than half of the elected members, for the purpose of submitting notice along with the proposal of no confidence motion.
39. Thus, in view of the above, it can not be said that the requirement of section 28 of the Act was not fulfilled by the petitioners . The respondent no. 2, instead of rejecting the written notice filed along with the no confidence motion against the respondent no. 3 should have convened the meeting under Section 28 (3) of the Act. Thus in view of the aforesaid discussion we are of the considered opinion that decision of the collector in rejecting the notice delivered under section 28 (2) of the Act for convening the meeting for consideration of 'No Confidence Motion' was not justified and liable to be quashed. Issue No. 1 is decided in negative in favour of the petitioners.
40. Issue No. 2 : Whether the present writ petition has been rendered infructuous, as the meeting could not be convened under section 28 (3) of the Act within 30 days from the date on which the notice under section 15 (2) of the Act was delivered to the Collector?
41. For deciding the Issue No. 2, we shall first take up for consideration the argument advanced on behalf of the learned counsel of the Respondent.
42. Learned counsel for the respondents has mainly relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court given by a five Judges Bench in the case of Padmasundara Rao and others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others (supra). The above decision was followed by this court in the case of Mahavir Sahkari Avas Samiti Limited Vs State of U. P. and others, (Supra). Learned counsel for the Respondents has submitted that once the period has been fixed by the Statute for convening a meeting, the court does not have the power to extend the period of limitation prescribed by the Statute. He further submitted that since the period of 30 days, as provided under the Statute, has already expired , no such direction can be issued to the Collector for convening a meeting on the basis of the notice expressing want of confidence in Adhyaksha which already stood rejected by the Collector by an impugned order.
43. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the period of limitation prescribed under the Statute cannot be extended in view of the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in Padmasundara Rao (supra), otherwise, it would amount to rewriting of the Statute. The court will only interpret the law and cannot legislate it.
44. Per contra, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in the case of Padmasundara Rao (supra) and by the Division Bench of this Court in Mahavir Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd.(supra) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The aforesaid law was propounded on different facts and in a completely different context as such is clearly distinguishable The controversy in case of Padmasundara Rao (supra) relates to the acquisition of the land under the Land Acquisition Act,1894 (in short "Act 1894") wherein a fresh notification under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 was issued by the State after the quashing of the earlier notification issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
45. Learned counsel for the petitioner further placed reliance upon a decision of this court in the case of Bareilly Development Authority Vs. Methodist Church of India given in Case No. 1264 of 1988 dated 12.2.1988, which was subsequently affirmed by the Apex Court. In this case, it was held that in computation of the period of three years for completion of the proposed building , the period from 24.1.1984 to 4.5.1985 i.e. the period during which the work of construction had been stopped, had to be excluded.
46. Learned counsel for the petitioner further placed reliance upon a decision in Vinod Kumar Anand Vs. Dr. A.D. Sharma and others : [(1989) 1 UPLBEC 238] wherein the restraint period of four months was excluded and it was further held that Chancellor was under an obligation to fix an extended time limit while sending the communication dated 22nd November,1985, so as to enable the Executive Council to exercise its normal statutory functions. It was further held that the Executive Council had a right to compute the period of four months from 30th July,1985, after excluding the period during, which it had been restrained from taking any decision by the Chancellor. Likewise , the Chancellor had a corresponding duty to give to the Executive Council an extended period of limitation so as to enable it to perform its statutory function.
47. Full Bench of this Court held in the case of Gopal Tiwari Vs. District Panchayat Raj Officer, Deoria and others: [1991)2 UPLBEC 904] that limitation period fixed is directory. Gopal case (supra) was later on distinguished by the divisional bench of this Court in Chhatrapal case (2013 Law Suit (All) 3929).
48. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon a decision in the State of Gujarat and others Vs. Essar Oil Limited and another : (2012) 3 S.C.C. 522 wherein the principle of restitution has been explained and it was held that the loss of time suffered by the respondent as a result of the injunction order cannot cause any prejudice to the respondent. The concept of restitution is basically founded on the idea that when a decree is reversed , the law imposes an obligation on the party who received an unjust benefit of the erroneous decree to restitute the other party for what the other party has lost during the period the erroneous decree was in operation. Therefore, the court while granting restitution is required to restore the parties as far as possible to their same position as they were in at the time when the court by its erroneous action displaced them.
49. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the court has to adopt a purposive approach and has relied upon the mischief rule for purpose of construction of the relevant provisions.
50. Before we may proceed in the matter to decide whether any direction can be issued to the Collector to convene a meeting for consideration of no confidence motion, it would be necessary to examine the aim, object and scheme of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as well as the U.P. Kshetra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats Adhiniyam,1961, since the Apex Court was dealing with the Land Acquisition matter particularly the issuance of fresh notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act while deciding the case of Padmasundara Rao (supra). Therefore, it is necessary to take into consideration the statutory scheme, purpose and object for fixing the time limit under Section 6 and Section 28 (3) of the Land Acquisition Act and UP Kshettra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat Adhiniyam, 1961 respectively.
51. Initially, under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, there were no time limit prescribed for making a declaration under section 6 after the publication of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act. This led to unreasonable delays. In cases, where there was unreasonable delay in the making of the declaration under section 6 of the Act, the owner of the property was under a great disadvantage because the compensation was determined on the basis of the market value prevalent at the time of notification published under Section 4(1) published several years earlier. Such unreasonable delays were criticized by the Supreme Court in State of M P vs. Vishnu Prasad AIR 1966 SC 1593.
52. For the purpose of expediting the making of declarations under section 6, the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 was promulgated. The provisions of the Ordinance were later on incorporated into the Amending Act, 1967 under proviso (ii) to Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, a period of one year was fixed for making a declaration under section 6, from the date of publication of a section 4(1) notification.
53. The Apex Court in Padmasundara Rao (supra) in para 11 of its judgement has discussed the purpose for providing the period of limitation and the effect, essentials and substance of notification under section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act .
54. For ready reference, para 11 of the said judgement is quoted below:
"...... The purpose for providing the period of limitation seems to be avoidance of inconvenience to a person whose land is sought to be acquired. Compensation gets pegged from the date of Notification under Section 4(1). Section 11 provides that the valuation of the land has to be done on the date of publication of Notification under Section 4(1). Section 23 deals with matters to be considered in determining the compensation. It provides that the market value of the land is to be fixed with reference to the date of publication of the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. The prescription of time limit in that background is, therefore, peremptory in nature. In Ram Chand and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (1994 (1) SCC 44), it was held by this Court that though no period was prescribed, action within a reasonable time was warranted. The said case related to a dispute which arose before prescription of specific periods. After the quashing of declaration, the same became non-est and was effaced. It is fairly conceded by learned counsel for the respondents that there is no bar on issuing a fresh declaration after following the due procedure. It is, however, contended that in case a fresh notification is to be issued, the market value has to be determined on the basis of the fresh Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and it may be a costly affair for the State. Even if it is so, the interest of the person whose land is sought to be acquired, cannot be lost sight of. He is to be compensated for acquisition of his land. If the acquisition sought to be made is done in an illogical, illegal or irregular manner, he cannot be made to suffer on that count."
(emphasis supplied)
55. The aforesaid observation by the Apex Court clearly reveals that the purpose for providing the period of limitation was for the benefit of a person whose land is sought to be acquired since the compensation gets pegged from the date of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. According to Section 11 of the Act, 1894 the valuation of the land has to be determined from the date of publication of Notification under Section 4(1), as such, prescription of time limit in the said background was essential. Therefore it was necessary under the Land Acquisition Act that time limit be fixed for issuing declaration under section 6 of the Act, 1894. Otherwise, the long delay in declaration under section 6 of the Act after the issuance of notification under section 4 of the Act would cause grave hardship to the owners of the land who were to get compensation from the date of notification under section 4 (1) of the Act. Therefore, the intention of Legislation of fixing the period of one year's limitation was for the benefit of land owners (who have been deprived of their land) so that they may not suffer any hardship. Therefore, in the aforesaid background, the Constitution Bench, taking into consideration the aforesaid fact, held that the time limit fixed for publication of declaration under Section 6 (1) of the Act is mandatory and it can not be extended from the date the declaration under Section 6 (1) of the Act is quashed by the court.
56. On the other hand, the KSHETTRA PANCHAYATS AND ZILA PANCHAYATS were established in the Districts of Uttrar Pradesh in 1961 to undertake certain Governmental functions at Kshettra and District levels respectively in furtherance of the principles of democratic decentralization of governmental functions and for ensuring proper Municipal Government in rural areas, and to correlate the powers and functions of Gram Sabhas under the United Provinces Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 with Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats.
57. The 73rd amendment was brought into force on 20.4.1993 by adding Part IX-A which confers upon the local self- Government complete autonomy on the basic democratic unit unshackled from official control.
58. It was also brought into force to give effect to the directive principles of State policy enshrined in Article 40, Part IX of the Constitution of India which confers powers on local self Government. What was sought to be done by the 73rd Amendment was to bestow constitutional status to the local self Government as such the District Panchayats, Taluka Panchayats and Village Panchayats. A State Legislature, in the light of the constitutional provisions in Part IX, cannot do away with these democratic bodies at the local level nor can their normal tenure be curtailed otherwise than in accordance with law nor can the State Government delay elections of these bodies. Part IX further confers certain powers on local self governments. It promises duration of five years, free and fair election, representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the administration of institution of local self Government.
59. The Act provides for local self government where the people of Gaon Sabha have been given the right to manage their own affairs and perform governmental function through a democratic process under which they have been given the right to elect a Pradhan and remove him by passing motion of no confidence. Election and removal by motion of no-confidence are two important aspects in democratic set-up for which the Act has made ample provisions.
60. Democracy is a system of government in which a country's political leaders are chosen by the people in regular, free, and fair elections. In a democracy, people have a choice between different candidates and parties who want the power to govern. The people are sovereign. They are the highest authority and government is based on the will of the people. Elected representatives at the national and local levels must listen to the people and be responsive to their needs. Thus, the voters have right to elect their representatives and also criticize and replace them if they do not perform well.
61. In view of the above inherent political philosophy and principle, the provision, for no confidence motion for removing the representatives has been introduced in the present Act. The Will of people is supreme. It cannot be lightly interfered with. The Collector, under Act 1961, under no circumstance can frustrate the will of the people. In a democratic set up where right to govern depends on the will of the people and person who has lost the majority cannot be permitted to hold office. If a representative no longer enjoys the confidence of the people, elected representatives have a right to remove him and he can not be permitted to remain in power even for a second and has to be replaced by a newly elected representative.
62. It may be convenient at this stage, before we proceed further to refer Section 28 of the Zila Panchayat Act.
63. Section 28 (2) of the Zila Panchayat Act which is relevant for deciding the issue No. 2 since considerable argument before us turned upon it. Section 28(2) of the act reads as follows:-
"28. Motion of no-confidence in Adhyaksha [x x x]. . - (1) A motion expressing want of confidence in the Adhyaksha [x x x] of a Zila Panchayat may be made and proceeded with in accordance with the procedure laid down in the following sub-sections. (2) [A written notice] of intention to make the motion, in such form as may be prescribed, signed by not less than one-half of the total number of [elected members] of the Zila Panchayat for the time being, together with a copy of the proposed motion, shall be delivered in person, by any one of the members signing the notice, to the collector having jurisdiction over the Zila Panchayat. (3) The Collector shall thereupon -
(i) convene a meeting of the Zila Panchayat for the consideration of the motion at the office of the Zila Panchayat on a date appointed by him, which shall not be later than thirty days from the date on which the notice under sub-section (2) was delivered to him; and
(ii) give to the [elected members] notice of not less than fifteen days of such meeting in such manner as may be prescribed.
Explanation. - In computing the period of thirty days specified in this sub-section, the period during which a stay order, if any, issued by a Competent Court on a petition filed against the motion made under this section is in force plus such further time as may be required in the issue of fresh notice of the meeting to the [elected members] shall be excluded.
64. A bare perusal of Section 28(3)(i) of the Act would clearly reveal that once a valid notice of intent as prescribed in law is delivered to the Collector, it would be mandatory for him to convene a meeting as provided under Section 28(3) of the Act, 1961. He can not be permitted to frustrate the same on account of a wrongful or illegal rejection of such a proposal. The intention behind it is that the motion of no confidence be considered in the meeting of the Zila Panchayat. Once this is the intention, the same can not be permitted to be frustrated merely on account of a wrongful or illegal rejection of the proposal of no confidence. In other words, the discretion given to the Collector is limited for the purpose of determining whether the notice fulfills the requirement of Section 28(2) of the Act as dealt with in earlier part of this judgment. Rule of law is the bed rock of democracy.
65. At this stage, it would also be useful to refer to para 9, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the decision of Padmasundara Rao (supra), which runs as under:
"9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case, said Lord Morris in Herrington Vs. British Railways Board (1972) 2 WLR 537. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases."
"12. The Apex Court in State of Orissa vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra (AIR 1968 SC 647) (vide para 13) in its judgment has held as follows:
''13. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decide what is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl of Halsbury, LC said in Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495:s.
Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood (1898) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.''
13. In Ambica Quarry Works vs. State of Gujarat & others (1987) 1 SCC 213 (vide para 18) the Court observed as follows:-
''The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it.''
14. In Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd (2003) 2 SCC 111 (vide para 59), the Court observed as follows:-
''It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision.''
15. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & another vs. N.R.Vairamani & another (AIR 2004 SC 4778), a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same Judgment the Court also observed as follows:-
''Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid`s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of the context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments.''
66. Thus, the Apex court in the aforesaid cases have held that the Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is being placed. Circumstantial flexibility may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Sections 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and 28 of the Act 1961 have been framed in different contexts, and the object for prescribing the period of limitation in both the Acts is to achieve different purpose. Period of limitation has been prescribed in Land Acquisition Act for the benefit of land owners as compensation gets pegged from the date of notification under section 4 of the Act and the delay in issuing declaration under section 6 of the said Act will cause great hardship and play havoc with their property rights. As such the constitutional Bench found that the time limit as prescribed under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is mandatory and held that the court can not extend the limitation period by directing to the authority to issue fresh notification after the expiry of one year from the date of issuance of notification under section 4 of the Act.
67. However, in the present case, as we have discussed herein above, the aim, purpose, scheme and object of the present Act is totally different. The limitation period prescribed under section 28 of the present Act is for the benefit of the elected members to replace the Adhyaksha by moving a motion of no confidence if he loses the confidence of the elected members. The Collector can not be permitted to frustrate the will of the people by rejecting a valid notice issued under section 28 of the present Act. Therefore, election as well as removal by motion of no confidence are both equally important aspects of democracy. The natural corollary would be that a person , who no longer enjoys the confidence of the people, would not be allowed to continue in office. There is no quarrel with the proposition that the Collector can not on its own extend the period of limitation as prescribed under the Statute while exercising its power under Section 28 of the Act 1961. But the question that arises here is whether this Court, which is the custodian of the Constitution would be bound to be a silent spectator in a case of this nature where the Collector has exercised his powers in a manner which has the effect of destroying or making erosion in to the democratic set up of the motion, which is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution merely because the thirty days has elapsed by the time the wrongful and illegal rejection by the Collector came to be reviewed by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
68. It may be noted that the Constitution Bench in the Case of padmasundara Rao (supra) , inter alia, held that a casus omissus should not be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself particularly if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislation must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them.
69. It may be noted that in the present case the notice under Section 28 (2) of the Act expressing want of confidence was delivered to the Collector on 1.9.2018. The impugned order was passed on 07.09.2018 rejecting the notice for no confidence motion immediately thereafter the present writ petition was filed challenging the order passed by the Collector and seeking a direction to the Collector to convene a meeting for consideration of no confidence motion. This Court by order dated 3.10.2018 issued notice to the opposite parties.
70. Under the circumstances, recourse to the purposive interpretation doctrine is preferred to literal interpretation. It would be justified, if the principle of interpretation of statutes resorted to by the Court leads to a fair reading of the provisions, the same would fulfill the condition of applying the principles of purposive construction in order to correctly arrive at the legislative intent behind the provision in question. At this stage, it would be useful to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of N. Kannadasan Vs. Ajoy Khose (2009 (7) SCC 1) wherein the apex court while dealing with the purposive interpretation of the statute has held in paragraph No. 26, 27, 55, 57, 59 and 60 as follows:
''26. The High Court has taken recourse to the rule of purposive construction whereas learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants want us to invoke the rule of literal meaning.
27. Interpretative tools of constitutional provisions and the statutory provisions may be different. Whatever interpretative tool is applied, the Court must not forget that its job is to find out the intention of the legislature. It can be gathered from the words used. However, if plain meaning assigned to the section results in absurdity or anomaly, literal meaning indisputably would not be applied.
It is also well settled that the Court may have to change the interpretative tool in the event it is necessary to give effective contextual meaning to the Act.' ........
55. A construction of a statute, as is well known, must subserve the tests of justice and reason. It is a well-settled principle of law that in a given case with a view to give complete and effective meaning to a statutory provision, some words can be read into; some words can be subtracted. Provisions of a statute can be read down (although sparingly and rarely).
56. In Carew and Company Ltd. v. Union of India [(1975) 2 SCC 791], Krishna Iyer, J. opined:
"21. The law is not "a brooding omnipotence in the sky" but a pragmatic instrument of social order. It is an operational art controlling economic life, and interpretative effort must be imbued with the statutory purpose. No doubt, grammar is a good guide to meaning but a bad master to dictate. Notwithstanding the traditional view that grammatical construction is the golden rule, Justice Frankfurter used words of practical wisdom when he observed:
"There is no surer way to misread a document than to read it literally.""
57. Yet Again in K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and Another [(1981) 4 SCC 173], the strict literal reading of a statute was avoided as by reason thereof several vital considerations, which must always be borne in mind, would be ignored, stating:
"...The task of interpretation of a statutory enactment is not a mechanical task. It is more than a mere reading of mathematical formulae because few words possess the precision of mathematical symbols. It is an attempt to discover the intent of the legislature from the language used by it and it must always be remembered that language is at best an imperfect instrument for the expression of human thought and as pointed out by Lord Denning, it would be idle to expect every statutory provision to be "drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity". We can do no better than repeat the famous words of Judge Learned Hand when he laid:
"... it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning."
"... the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all collectively create."
In the aforementioned case, therefore, some words were read into and the plain and natural construction was not given.
58. In Bhudan Singh and Another v. Nabi Bux and Another [(1969) 2 SCC 481], this Court held:
"The object of every legislation is to advance public welfare. In other words as observed by Crawford in his book on "Statutory Constructions" that the entire legislative process is influenced by considerations of justice and reason. Justice and reason constitute the great general legislative intent in every peace of legislation. Consequently where the suggested construction operates harshly, ridiculously or in any other manner contrary to prevailing conceptions of justice and reason, in most instance, it would seem that the apparent or suggested meaning of the statute, was not the one intended by the law makers. In the absence of some other indication that the harsh or ridiculous effect was actually intended by the legislature, there is little reason to believe that it represents the legislative intent."
59. This Court Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia, [ (1988) 4 SCC 284]:
"9. Judicial time and energy is more often than not consumed in finding what is the intention of Parliament or in other words, the will of the people. Blackstone tells us that the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law. (emphasis by the court) See Commentaries on the Laws of England (facsimile of 1st Edn. Of 1765, University of Chicago Press, 1979, Vol. 1, p. 59)."
60. In High Court of Gujarat and Another v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and Others [ (2003) 4 SCC 712 ], this Court noticed:
"33. In United Bank of India v. Abhijit Tea Co. (P) Ltd. this Court noticed: (SCC p. 366, paras 25-26) "25. In regard to purposive interpretation, Justice Frankfurter observed as follows:
`Legislation has an aim, it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of Government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evidenced in the language of the statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose [Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Columbia LR 527, at p. 538 (1947)].' xxx xxx xxx
38. In The Interpretation and Application of Statutes by Reed Dickerson, the author at p. 135 has discussed the subject while dealing with the importance of context of the statute in the following terms:
"...The essence of the language is to reflect, express, and perhaps even affect the conceptual matrix of established ideas and values that identifies the culture to which it belongs. For this reason, language has been called `conceptual map of human experience'."
71. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that great hardship would be caused to the petitioner in case they are again asked to deliver notice under Section 28 (2) of the Act 1961 for convening a meeting for consideration of no confidence motion, particularly when the Collector has illegally rejected the notice delivered under Section 28(2) of the Act, 1961. We find substance in the argument of the counsel for the petitioners. Neither the elected representative nor the Collector can frustrate the will of the people. The explanation although appears to be silent with regard to a situation where the order rejecting the notice under Section 28 of the Act is quashed, but, keeping in view the object and intention of the legislation and in the light of the discussion made herein above, in the circumstances, it is necessary to adopt a purposive construction of statute. The purpose and object of the Act must be given its full effect by applying the principle of purposive construction. Apex Court in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. Vs. Church of South India Trust Association, [(1992) Vol. 3 SCC 1], while considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of the order under challenge, has held that a distinction has to be made between quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order. Quashing of an order results in the restoration of the possession as it stood on the date of the passing of the order which has been quashed in the present case. Therefore, the quashing of the impugned order dated 7.9.2018 results in restoration of the position as it stood on the date of passing of the order i.e. 7.9.2018 which is now being quashed by the Court in view of the finding recorded by the Court while dealing with the issue no. 1. Meaning thereby after quashing of the impugned order dated 7.9.2018, the notice delivered on 01.09.2018 under Section 28 (2) of the Act as well the proceedings under Section 28 of the Act 1961 before the Collector stand revived.
72. The explanation appended to sub-Section 3 of Section 28 of the Act 1961 reads as under:
"Explanation. - In computing the period of thirty days specified in this sub-section, the period during which a stay order, if any, issued by a Competent Court on a petition filed against the motion made under this section is in force plus such further time as may be required in the issue of fresh notice of the meeting to the [elected members] shall be excluded."
The aforesaid explanation as it stands, excludes the period with respect to those cases where the stay, if any, issued by the competent authority on a petition filed against the motion made under Section 28 of the Act and also excludes further time as it may be required in the issue of fresh notice of the meeting to the elected member in complying the period of thirty days specified in sub section (3) of the Section 28 of the Act, 1961.
73. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the discussion made herein above, we are of the considered opinion that in order to give effective, real and purposeful meaning particularly to the provisions of Section 28 of the Act as well as the statutory scheme, purpose and object of the Act 1961 as discussed in the judgment, the explanation appended to Section 28 of the Act, 1961 would also include those cases where order passed by the Collector rejecting the notice expressing want of confidence in Adhyaksha is quashed, meaning thereby that in computing the period of 30 days as specified in sub-section 3 of Section 28 of the Act, 1961, the period during which the petition remained pending before the competent Court filed against the quashing of the order rejecting the notice of no confidence delivered under Section 28(2) of the Act shall be excluded and further time as may be required in the issue of fresh notice of the meeting to the elected members shall also be excluded.
74. In other words, the principle of purposive interpretation is to be applied to the explanation appended to Section 28(3) of the Act 1961. The Apex Court in the case of Kannadasan Vs. Ajoy Khose (Supra) has held that the Court may have to change the interpretive tool in the event it is necessary to give effective meaning to the Act. It would be highly unjust, totally unfair and highly inequitable to permit the respondent no. 3 to take undue advantage of the illegal impugned order on the ground that the notice delivered under Section 28(2) of the Act has been rendered infructuous due to expiry of 30 days from the date on which the notice under Section 28(2) of the Act was delivered to him.
75. It is notable that the present writ petition has been filed against the impugned order within a period of 30 days from the date on which the notice under Section 28(2) of the Act was delivered to the Collector and thereafter it remained pending before this Court. The present writ petition can not made infructuous by the act of the Court which will cause prejudice to the petitioners. Such construction will be against the maxim "Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit" which means act of Court shall prejudice no man.
76. It is also noteworthy, that to hold otherwise, would necessarily imply that every time the collector rejects a proposal of No Confidence Motion in an arbitrary and illegal manner against the Adhyaksha, this Court would be confined to exercise its power of judicial review within a very short span of time (if any left) from 30 days period (prescribed under Section 28(3) of the Act, 1961) making it almost impossible to finally decide the matter if notices are required to be issued to the other side. In other words, if section 28 of the Act is interpreted narrowly and literally it would further amount to effectively closing the avenue of judicial review of the illegal actions of the collector even of wholly arbitrary and illegal rejection of such proposals by the collector. In the circumstance remedy of judicial review against the order of collector would be a mere eye wash and an idle and futile exercise and the collector would be encouraged to keep the notice delivered under Section 28(2) of the Act, 1961 pending and pass orders illegally rejecting the proposal of no confidence motion just before the expiry of 30 days prescribed under Section 28 (3) of the Act in order to frustrate the remedy of judicial review. Surely, this could not have been the intention of legislation. An extended meaning, has therefore to be given to the 'Explanation' appended to sub-Section (3) of Section 28 of the Act 1961 with a view to carry out the object of the Act. Therefore, we decide the issue no. 2 in negative and hold that the present writ petition has not been rendered infructuous.
77. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussions, we hereby quash the impugned order dated 07.09.2018 passed by the respondent no. 2 and the respondent no. 2 is directed to convene a meeting forthwith for consideration of no confidence motion after issuing notices to the elected members as provided under Section 28 of the Act, 1961.
78. The writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
Order Date: 24.01.2019 MLK/Arun