Central Administrative Tribunal - Allahabad
Suresh Babu Sharma vs M/O Communications on 9 December, 2025
O.A./360/2016
(Reserved on 26.11.2025)
Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad
Original Application No.360 of 2016
th
Pronounced on this the 9 Day of December, 2025
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash VII, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Mohan Pyare, Member (A)
Suresh Babu Sharma S/o Late Raghuveer Prasad Sharma, aged about 56
years, R/o Village Manakpur, P.O.-Chhapra, District Sambhal.
...Applicant
By Advocate: Shri A.D. Singh
Versus
1. Union of India through its Secretary, Ministry of Communication,
Post and Telegraph Department, Dak Bhawan, Sansad Marg, New
Delhi.
2. Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Moradabad Division,
Moradabad.
3. Director Postal Services (D.P.S.) Office, Bareilly.
4. Sub Divisional Inspector, Post Offices Chandausi (Moradabad).
...Respondents
By Advocate: Shri Shivaji Singh
ORDER
By Hon'ble Mr. Mohan Pyare, Member (A) Present Original Application has been filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following relief:
"i) To issue a suitable order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned orders dated 3.8.2010 and 31.7.2015 passed by the respondent no.2 and 3 (Annexure no.A-1 and A-2) to the original application in compilation no.II.
ii) To issue a suitable order or direction directing the respondents to reinstate the applicant in service and to make the payment of pay and allowances with interest as per bank rate from the date of removal to the date of reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits as the applicant was never been dismissed from service.
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iii) Grant such other relief, as the applicant might be found entitled to, in the facts and circumstances of the case.
iv) Allow the original application with cost of litigation in favour of the applicant."
2. Brief facts of this case are that the applicant was initially appointed on the post of E.D.D.A. Bahjoi, Moradabad Division on 01.09.1983. He was promoted on 01.04.1998 to the post of Postman on qualifying the departmental examination. During his service period, he was suspended and subsequently the suspension was revoked and he was permitted to work as postman. The applicant has claimed that an incompetent authority (respondent no.4) issued a false fabricated and concocted illegal charge sheet under Rule 14 of G.D.S. (Employment) Rule 1965 on 17.2.2005 to the applicant without providing any documents along with the charge sheet in which it was directed to the applicant to submit his reply within 10 days. The applicant submitted his reply on 25.2.2005 against the charge sheet before the respondent no.4 and denied all the charges. Shri B.P. Singh, inspector of post Offices, Amroha, J.P. Nagar inquired the allegation against the applicant and submitted his report in favor of the applicant on 22.9.2007 before the Inquiry Officer Shri Hari Singh, A.S.P.O. Moradabad but the inquiry Officer proved the charges against the applicant on 5.11.2007 and submitted his enquiry report before the disciplinary authority (respondent no.2) for further action. The post Master (H.S.G.-I), Post Office Amroha gave the inquiry report to the applicant vide letter dated 29.5.2008 and directed him to submit his reply against the inquiry report. The applicant had submitted his brief note on 5.6.2008 against the inquiry report through proper channels and categorically denied the charges alleged to have been proved by the inquiry Officer after which the disciplinary authority (respondent no.2) passed the punishment order of dismissal from service on 17.7.2008. Then the applicant made an appeal under G.D.S. (Employment) Rule before the respondent the no.3 on 18.8.2008 against dismissal order explaining all the facts and circumstances of the proceeding for cancellation of the punishment order of dismissal from service Digitally MADHU signed by KUMARI MADHU KUMARI Page 2 of 16 O.A./360/2016 passed by the respondent no.2. Respondent no.3 rejected the appeal of the applicant on 14.7.2009. Then the applicant filed O.A. No. 1286 of 2009 before the Tribunal against the orders dated 17.7.2008 and 14.7.2009 which have been quashed and set aside by the Tribunal vide judgment dated 5.11.2009 with direction to the Disciplinary Authority to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. The applicant submitted an application on 16.11.2009 along with the certified copy of the judgment dated 5.11.2009 passed by the Tribunal before the respondent no.2 for compliance and re- instatement in service. Respondent no.2 sent a letter to the applicant on 20.1.2010 in which it directed him to submit his representation within 15 days for passing the fresh order pursuant to the order of the Tribunal after which the applicant submitted his representation before the respondent no.2 on 8.2.2010. Thereafter, respondent no.2 by means of the impugned order dated 3.8.2010 upheld the major penalty of dismissal from service to the applicant. The applicant again approached this Tribunal through O.A. 1446 of 2010 which was dismissed by this Tribunal vide the judgment and order dated 11.3.2014 with liberty to file appeal against the order dated 3.8.2010 within 30 days. The applicant filed writ petition no. 27124 of 2014 before the Hon'ble High court which has been finally dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 15.5.2014 with liberty to file an appeal against the order dated 3.8.2010 within a month and appellate authority was directed to decide the same on merits as expeditiously as possible. Pursuant to the High court order, the applicant made an appeal dated 6.6.2014 against the order dated 3.8.2010 before the respondent no.3 explaining all the facts and circumstances of the proceeding for cancellation of the punishment order of dismissal from service which has been passed by the respondent no.2. Respondent no.3, however, rejected the appeal of the applicant vide impugned order dated 31.7.2015.
3. Submission of learned counsel for the applicant is that the respondents have not reinstated the applicant before passing the impugned order dated 3.8.2010 hence the further order cannot be Digitally MADHU signed by KUMARI MADHU KUMARI Page 3 of 16 O.A./360/2016 passed unless the applicant is reinstated in service as such the impugned order dated 3.8.2010 is illegal and against the law. The allegations against the applicant are not made out on the basis of the report dated 22.9.2007 submitted by B.P. Singh Inspector, Post office Amroha, Nagar but arbitrarily the inquiry officer has proved the charges on 5.11.2007 against applicant without considering the material facts regarding the dispute in question. It is contended that the respondents illegally called for a fresh representation from the applicant after the Tribunal set aside the orders dated 17.7.2008 and 14.7.2009 vide judgment dated 5.11.2009 with direction to the Disciplinary Authority to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. It is next argued that the disciplinary authority and appellate authority have passed the impugned orders without applying judicial mind and without considering the points raised by the applicant and they have illegally dismissed the services of the applicant by upholding the previous orders which have already been set aside by the Tribunal without even permitting the applicant to join his duty after the dismissal and appellate orders were quashed.
4. Submission of learned counsel for the respondents is that the applicant was posted as Postman Chandausi Head Post Office and for following irregularities in performing his duty assigned to him, he was charged sheeted under Rule 14 of CCS (CC&A) Rules 1965 on 17.02.2005. The charges are as follows:- (a) The applicant while performing the duty of Postman received 42 registered letters on 15.09.2004 for distributing the same to its destination but he neither returned these registered letters nor submitted the distribution list of the same; (b) On 16.09.2004, the applicant took signature of the recipient (receiver) on the money order form and did not pay him the amount of money order amounting to Rs.3,100/-; (c) On 20.09.2004, the applicant was absent without any information or prior permission of the authorities concerned. Thereafter, Shri Hari Singh, the then Assistant Superintendent of Post Offices, North Moradabad was appointed as Enquiry Officer to enquire into the matter. The Digitally MADHU signed by KUMARI MADHU KUMARI Page 4 of 16 O.A./360/2016 Inquiry Officer after giving full opportunity of hearing to the applicant as well as after adducing and producing the evidence and witnesses, concluded the inquiry and submitted the inquiry report on 05.11.2007 in which all the charges leveled against the applicant were found proved. It is mentioned that during the preliminary enquiry, the applicant in his statement dated 01.10.2004 has accepted that on 16.09.2004 he consumed liquor and lost the articles (letters/registered letters), which fully proves the negligent act of the applicant in performing his duties. After considering each and every material fact available on record, the competent authority has passed the order of removal from service dated 17.08.2008 after conducting the departmental inquiry in accordance with Rules. He argues that even in compliance with the order of this Tribunal dated 05.11.2009, fresh representation was sought from the applicant and it was decided as per the rules by the competent authority and fresh speaking and reasoned order dated 03.08.2010 for removal of the applicant from service was passed. The appellate authority has also considered the appeal of the applicant in light of the order of this Tribunal as well as the Hon'ble High Court and the appeal has been rejected vide order dated 31.07.2015. He argued that the applicant has mentioned the GDS Rules which are not applicable for him as he was a permanent departmental employee.
5. We have considered the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire documents on record.
6. Previously in the order dated 05.11.2009 passed by this Tribunal in O.A./1286/2009, the Tribunal had passed the following order:-
"4. While perusing impugned orders, we find no mention of the explanation offered by the applicant in respect of each charge separately nor the impugned order refers to a specific/particular document or the statement of witnesses relied upon in support of a charge separately and specifically. The impugned order does not show as to which document/ oral evidence is being relied upon while rejecting specific defence/contention of the applicant. The vague discussion which is hotch-potch discussion does not satisfy requirement of law.
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5. In view of the above, the impugned orders dated 14.07.2008 and 17.07.2008 (Annexure 1 and 2) are hereby set aside with direction to the Disciplinary Authority to pass fresh orders after hearing the applicant keeping in view above observations in mind in accordance with law."
The above order shows that as the applicant had failed to offer specific explanation regarding each charge and as the previous punishment and appellate orders were non-speaking, the same were quashed by the Tribunal. Thus, the respondents had rightly demanded a fresh representation from the applicant with all the points. After the applicant had moved the fresh representation, the impugned order dated 03.08.2010 was passed. It must be noted that there was no specific direction to the respondents to allow the applicant to join his duties before passing any fresh order and in the fresh orders which have been passed, the applicant has been kept dismissed from service. After that the appellate order dated 31.07.2015 has been passed as per the direction of this Tribunal in O.A. 1446 of 2010 (which was dismissed by this Tribunal vide the judgment and order dated 11.3.2014 with liberty to file appeal against the order dated 3.8.2010 within 30 days) and the writ petition no. 27124 of 2014 filed before the Hon'ble High court (which has been finally dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 15.5.2014 with liberty to file an appeal against the order dated 3.8.2010 within a month and appellate authority was directed to decide the same on merits as expeditiously as possible).
7. As far as the procedures are concerned, the records reveal that the applicant has been given all the opportunities of hearing during the inquiry and all the procedures as per the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. After denial of charges by the applicant in his representation dated 25.02.205, the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed to enquire into the charges leveled against the applicant in charge sheet Under Rule 14 of CCS (CC&A) Rules 1965. As per provisions of aforesaid Rules one Shri Hari Singh, the then Assistant Superintendent of Post Offices, North, Moradabad was appointed as Inquiry Officer and Shri B. P. Singh, Inspector Post Offices, Amroha was appointed as Presenting Officer. After Digitally MADHU signed by KUMARI MADHU KUMARI Page 6 of 16 O.A./360/2016 completion of enquiry Shri B. P. Singh, Inspector Post Offices, Amroha submitted his PO brief dated 22.09.2007 to the Inquiry Officer. The applicant was given full opportunity of hearing and he participated in the inquiry without any objection. The Inquiry Officer has concluded the inquiry after considering witnesses as well as documents adduced and produced by the party and proved the charges on the basis of facts and evidence. The appellate authority has also considered all the material available on record including the statement of applicant while rejecting the appeal of the applicant. The representation of the applicant has also been sought and considered afresh.
8. In his appeal dated 18.08.2008, the applicant has questioned the moral turpitude of the witnesses and has alleged that the witnesses are false and not genuine. In his appeal dated 06.06.2014, the applicant pleaded his case and put forth his side of the explanation regarding all the charges leveled against him. Moreover, in his appeal dated 06.06.2014, the applicant has almost accepted the charges and has not taken any reasonable ground to get relief in his favour. Nowhere, in his appeals has the applicant once raised the issue of procedural irregularities like being deprived of the opportunity of hearing or cross-examining the witnesses. In this connection, it would be relevant to quote the case of K. Prabhakar Hedge vs. Bank of Baroda [2025 INSC 997] wherein in paragraph 57, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that : "Having said that, we cannot be oblivious of the fact that the appellant did not raise any effective objection as to the failure of the Inquiry Officer to strictly adhere to Regulation 6(17) at any stage prior to invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. There being a failure of the Inquiry Officer to question the charged officer, the appellant ought to have raised the same before the disciplinary authority at the first instance; and, even if he did not so raise, he ought to have raised such objection before the appellate authority while he presented his appeal. If such an objection is not raised at any of the two tiers and the omission to do so is not explained in the writ petition, the court may infer that the charged officer was not seriously affected by non-adherence to Regulation 6(17) and it would be open to it to pass an appropriate Digitally MADHU signed by KUMARI MADHU KUMARI Page 7 of 16 O.A./360/2016 order based on the inference drawn." Thus, in the present matter, we do not have any question of procedural irregularities or lack of opportunity to the charged official. The quantum of punishment has also not been contested and the applicant has challenged the validity of the dismissal order on the ground that the points raised by him in his representation have not been considered and that the misconduct of the applicant cannot be held to be proved for want of genuine evidence.
9. Coming to the impugned punishment order dated 03.08.2010, it deals with all the points raised by the applicant in his defence against the charges in his representation and same is a resonated and speaking order. Even in the impugned appellate order dated 31.07.2015, the charges have been said to be proved on the basis of the documentary evidence, witnesses adduced during the oral inquiry as well as the applicant's own submissions and all the points raised by the applicant in his appeal dated 06.06.2014 have been dealt with in detail. The misconduct of the applicant as alleged in the charge sheet has been sufficiently proved in the inquiry report and the punishment order has been passed accordingly which has been upheld by the appellate authority with a reasoned and speaking order.
10. So far as the interference of the Tribunal in the matters of disciplinary proceedings with respect of re-evaluation of evidence and findings of the inquiry officer is concerned, the laws laid down by the Apex Court in a catena of judgments make it very clear that Tribunals should not interfere with disciplinary proceedings unless there is a significant procedural error, a violation of principles of natural justice, or the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the proven misconduct. The scope of judicial review is limited, and tribunals cannot act as an appellate authority, re-evaluate evidence, or substitute their judgment for that of the disciplinary authority on matters of punishment, as long as the process was fair and the findings were based on some evidence.
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11. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka and another Vs. N. Gangaraj decided on 14.2.2020 specifically held in para 15 that:-
"The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal before the State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the findings of facts recorded by re-appreciating evidence as if the Courts are the Appellate Authority. We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed larger bench judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao and B.C. Chaturvedi as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly, appeal is allowed and orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court are set aside and the order of punishment imposed is restored."
12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Anil Kumar Upadhyay Vs. The Director General, SSB and others decided on 20.4.2022 has held in paragraph 8 as under:-
8. On the judicial review and interference of the courts in the matter of disciplinary proceedings and on the test of proportionality, few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to:
i) In the case of Om Kumar (supra), this Court, after considering the Wednesbury principles and the doctrine of proportionality, has observed and held that the question of quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the applicability of one or other of the well-known principles known as 'Wednesbury principles'.
In the Wednesbury case, (1948) 1 KB 223, it was observed that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. Lord Greene further said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely, the order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors were considered, or the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken.
ii) In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), in paragraph 18, this Court observed and held as under:
"18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being factfinding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment Digitally MADHU signed by KUMARI MADHU KUMARI Page 9 of 16 O.A./360/2016 keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof."
iii) In the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (supra), in paragraph 19, it is observed and held as under:
"19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarized as follows:
19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities.
19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority.
19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court.
19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable."
13. In a catena of judgments by the Apex Court, it has been held that the judicial review in the disciplinary matters should not be in the form of re-appreciation of evidence. The Courts should only look Digitally MADHU signed by KUMARI MADHU KUMARI Page 10 of 16 O.A./360/2016 at the correctness of process and not get into re-evaluation of evidence before the Inquiry Officer. The findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority which are affirmed or diluted by the Appellate Authority/Revisional Authority should not be interfered with unless the applicant shows that the order is without jurisdiction; or that there is procedural irregularity in conducting the enquiry. The Apex Court in the case of S.R.Tewari vs. Union of India 2013(7) Scale 417 has held as under:-
"The role of the court in the matter of departmental proceedings is very limited and the Court cannot substitute its own views or findings by replacing the findings arrived at by the authority on detailed appreciation of the evidence on record. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference by the Court is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. The court has to record reasons as to why the punishment is disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice".
14. In a large number of cases including the case of Bank of India v.
Apurba Kumar Saha; (1994) 2 SCC 615, State Bank of India and Others v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde (2006) 7 SCC 212, State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao; AIR 1963 SC 1723, Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Ram Sarup; AIR 1957 SC 82, State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Prabhu Dayal Graver, 1995(6) SCC (L&S) 279-1996(1) SLJ 145 (SC), Deokinandan Sharma v. UOI and Ors., 2000 SCC (L&S) 1079, State Bank of India vs. Ram Lal Bhaskar & Another (2011 STPL (web) 904) and Union of India & Ors. Vs. Raghubir Singh and another, CWP No. 1154/2014 decided on 06.05.2014 by Punjab and Haryana High Court, the underline theme is that the High Court/tribunal does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings of the disciplinary authority and so long as the findings of the disciplinary authority are supported by some evidence the High Court does not re-appreciate the evidence and come to a different and independent finding on the evidence. They have to see whether there is violation of natural justice and fair Digitally MADHU signed by KUMARI MADHU KUMARI Page 11 of 16 O.A./360/2016 play or any procedural irregularity committed by the inquiry officer, Disciplinary authority and due procedure was adopted strictly in accordance with the service rule.
15. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India versus P.Gunasekaran 2015 (2) S.C.C. 610 in paras 12, 13 & 20 has held as follows:-
"12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re- appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge no. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re- appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
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(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.
XX XX XX
19. The disciplinary authority, on scanning the inquiry report and having accepted it, after discussing the available and admissible evidence on the charge, and the Central Administrative Tribunal having endorsed the view of the disciplinary authority, it was not at all open to the High Court to re- appreciate the evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
20. Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in service jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for such assessment. Integrity according to Oxford dictionary is "moral uprightness; honesty". It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence, trustfulness, openness, blamelessness, sincerity, immaculacy, rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness, righteousness, goodness, cleanness, decency, honour, reputation, nobility, irreproachability, purity, respectability, genuineness, moral excellence etc. In short, it depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a code of moral values."
16. The Apex Court in the case of B.C.Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors. Reported in 1995 (6) SCC 749 again has been pleased to observe that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings the Court/Tribunal are not competent and cannot appreciate the evidence. In this regard, the Apex Court has been pleased to observe as under:-
"The Enquiry Officer submitted his report holding the charges against the appellant to have been proved. After consultation with the UPSC, the appellant was dismissed from service by an order dated 29.10.1986. The Tribunal after appreciating the evidence, upheld all the charges as having been proved but converted the order of dismissal Digitally MADHU signed by KUMARI MADHU KUMARI Page 13 of 16 O.A./360/2016 into one of compulsory retirement. The delinquent filed an appeal challenging the finding on merits, and the Union filed an appeal canvassing the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the punishment imposed by it. Allowing the appeal of the Union of India and dismissing that of the delinquent.
Per Ramaswamy and Jeevan Reddy, JJ "Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case."
17. In another case the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v.
Upendra Singh reported in 1994(3)SCC 357 has been pleased to observe that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary enquiry is very limited. The Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe as under:-
"In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry the Tribunal or Court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law. At this stage, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the Digitally MADHU signed by KUMARI MADHU KUMARI Page 14 of 16 O.A./360/2016 charges. The tribunal cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to court or tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as the case may be."
18. The Apex Court has also observed in regard to scope of judicial review as well as in regard to the quantum of punishment in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Md. Ayub Naaz reported in 2006 (1) SCC 589 as under:-
"10. This Court in Om Kumar and Others vs. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 while considering the quantum of punishment / proportionality has observed that in determining the quantum, role of administrative authority is primary and that of court is secondary, confined to see if discretion exercised by the administrative authority caused excessive infringement of rights.
In the instant case, the authorities have not omitted any relevant materials nor any irrelevant fact taken into account nor any illegality committed by the authority nor the punishment awarded was shockingly disproportionate. The punishment was awarded in the instant case, after considering all the relevant materials and, therefore, in our view, the interference by the High Court on reduction of punishment of removal is not called for."
19. In the case of Union of India Vs. S.S. Ahluwalia reported in 2007 Law Suit (SC) 950, the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe as under:-
"The scope of judicial review in the matter of imposition of penalty as a result of disciplinary proceedings is very limited. The court can interfere with the punishment only if it finds the same to be shockingly disproportionate to the charges found to be proved. In such a case the court is to remit the matter to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration of the punishment. In an appropriate case in order to avoid delay the court can itself impose lesser penalty."
20. In the case of State of Meghalaya Vs. Mecken Singh N Marak reported in 2009 Law Suit (SC) 1935, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also held as under:-
"A court or a tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment is not commensurate with the proved charges. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional Digitally MADHU signed by KUMARI MADHU KUMARI Page 15 of 16 O.A./360/2016 cases. The jurisdiction of High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefore. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review."
21. Further in the case of Director General, RPF Vs. Sai Babu reported in 2003 Law Suit (SC) 117, the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold as under:-
"4. Shri Mukul Rohtagi, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the appellants urged that the learned Single Judge was not right and justified in modifying the order of punishment, having observed that the respondent was a habitual offender and due to dereliction of duties, the punishment of stoppage of increments for three years was already ordered in 1984 and that there was no improvement in the conduct of the respondent. He alternatively submitted even if the learned Single Judge was of the view that the punishment imposed was grossly or shockingly disproportionate, punishment could not have been modified but the matter could be remitted to the disciplinary authority to re-examine the issue in regard to the imposition of penalty on the respondent. He further submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court did not go into the merits of the contentions and simply endorsed the view taken by the learned Single Judge."
22. In light of the aforesaid facts, case laws, discussions and deliberations, we do not find any irregularity in the present matter which would warrant any interference on behalf of this Tribunal. Accordingly, the O.A. is liable to be dismissed for want of merit and the same is dismissed.
23. All associated M.A.s also stand disposed of. No costs.
(Mohan Pyare) ( Justice Om Prakash VII)
Member (A) Member (J)
Madhu
Digitally
MADHU signed by
KUMARI MADHU
KUMARI
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